Older and younger adults' revision of health misconceptions.

Although ample younger adult research has detailed effective strategies for revising misconceptions, research with older adults is less extensive. Older adults may be less able to correct errors in knowledge due to age-related changes in cognition, but it is also possible that older adults' revision of misconceptions has been limited by methodologies which do not provide adequate support for correction. In two experiments, we examined how older and younger adults revise health-related misconceptions when provided with cognitive support in the form of explicit detailed feedback and an immediate test. Older and younger adults in Experiment 1 answered true/false health statements, received feedback with a detailed explanation of the correct response, took an additional test on the same statements immediately following the initial test, and completed a final test 1-week later. Older and younger adults corrected a similar proportion of misconceptions immediately and maintained most of those revisions across a 1-week delay. In Experiment 2, older adults corrected the same proportion of misconceptions on the final test regardless of whether or not they received a test immediately following feedback. Overall, older adults revised health misconceptions as effectively as did younger adults but variables influencing correction (e.g., belief in feedback) may differ.

How do older adults maintain corrections in knowledge across a lengthy delay?

Older adults often correct errors in existing knowledge as effectively as younger adults despite the fact that inaccurate knowledge has the potential to cause interference with memory for a correct response. In the current experiments, we sought to explore whether error corrections are maintained across a delay and identify mechanisms that may support this process. In Experiment 1, younger and older adults answered general knowledge questions, rated confidence in their responses, were shown feedback, and rated their prior knowledge of the question and answer. Half of the participants took a final test after a 6-min delay and half returned 1 week later. Across a 1-week delay, older adults maintained a greater proportion of corrected responses than did younger adults. In Experiment 2, we examined whether participants use their memory for errors on the initial test to mediate retrieval of the correct answer on the final test (i.e., the mediator hypothesis). Participants were more likely to answer questions correctly on a final test when they recalled their initial error, but memory for the initial error was a stronger predictor of final test accuracy for younger adults than for older adults. Additionally, older adults, in comparison with younger adults, corrected a higher proportion of errors when the initial error was forgotten. Overall, inaccurate knowledge did not interfere with older adults' ability to maintain revisions in memory. In addition, we found support for the mediator hypothesis; however, other mechanisms also contribute to older adults' error correction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The influence of feedback on predictions of future memory performance.

Kornell and Rhodes (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 19, 1-13, 2013) reported that correct answer feedback impairs the accuracy of prospective memory judgments. The current experiments explored the boundaries of this effect. In Experiment 1, participants studied Lithuanian-English word pairs, took an initial test, and were either given correct answer feedback or no feedback at all. They then made a judgment of learning (JOL) regarding the likelihood of correctly recalling the English translation on a later test. Presenting the correct answer as feedback increased average JOLs but impaired relative accuracy on a final test. Therefore, Experiments 2-4 aimed to specifically ameliorate impairments in relative accuracy following feedback. Participants in Experiment 2 were exposed to right/wrong feedback, no feedback, and correct answer feedback while making JOLs. Using such a within-subjects design did not improve relative accuracy following correct answer feedback. Experiment 3 showed that previous exposure to a test-feedback-test cycle did not improve relative accuracy. In Experiment 4, feedback was scaffolded such that the correct answer was progressively revealed. Participants corrected more errors if they could generate the correct response with fewer letter cues. However, relative accuracy did not improve in comparison to the previous experiments. Accordingly, the current experiments suggest that participants may understand that feedback is beneficial, but receiving feedback diminishes prediction accuracy for specific items and participants do not appreciate the magnitude of the benefits of feedback.

The role of prior knowledge in error correction for younger and older adults.

Previous work has demonstrated that, when given feedback, younger adults are more likely to correct high-confidence errors compared with low-confidence errors, a finding termed the hypercorrection effect. Research examining the hypercorrection effect in both older and younger adults has demonstrated that the relationship between confidence and error correction was stronger for younger adults compared with older adults. Their results demonstrated that the relationship between confidence and error correction was stronger for younger adults compared with older adults. However, recent work suggests that error correction is largely related to prior knowledge, while confidence may primarily serve as a proxy for prior knowledge. Prior knowledge generally remains stable or increases with age; thus, the current experiment explored how both confidence and prior knowledge contributed to error correction in younger and older adults. Participants answered general knowledge questions, rated how confident they were that their response was correct, received correct answer feedback, and rated their prior knowledge of the correct response. Overall, confidence was related to error correction for younger adults, but this relationship was much smaller for older adults. However, prior knowledge was strongly related to error correction for both younger and older adults. Confidence alone played little unique role in error correction after controlling for the role of prior knowledge. These data demonstrate that prior knowledge largely predicts error correction and suggests that both older and younger adults can use their prior knowledge to effectively correct errors in memory.

Prior knowledge is more predictive of error correction than subjective confidence.

Previous research has demonstrated that, when given feedback, participants are more likely to correct confidently-held errors, as compared with errors held with lower levels of confidence, a finding termed the hypercorrection effect. Accounts of hypercorrection suggest that confidence modifies attention to feedback; alternatively, hypercorrection may reflect prior domain knowledge, with confidence ratings simply correlated with this prior knowledge. In the present experiments, we attempted to adjudicate among these explanations of the hypercorrection effect. In Experiments 1a and 1b, participants answered general knowledge questions, rated their confidence, and received feedback either immediately after rating their confidence or after a delay of several minutes. Although memory for confidence judgments should have been poorer at a delay, the hypercorrection effect was equivalent for both feedback timings. Experiment 2 showed that hypercorrection remained unchanged even when the delay to feedback was increased. In addition, measures of recall for prior confidence judgments showed that memory for confidence was indeed poorer after a delay. Experiment 3 directly compared estimates of domain knowledge with confidence ratings, showing that such prior knowledge was related to error correction, whereas the unique role of confidence was small. Overall, our results suggest that prior knowledge likely plays a primary role in error correction, while confidence may play a small role or merely serve as a proxy for prior knowledge.

General knowledge norms: updated and expanded from the Nelson and Narens (1980) norms.

The Nelson and Narens (Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 19:338-368, 1980) general knowledge norms have been valuable to researchers in many fields. However, much has changed over the 32 years since the 1980 norms. For example, in 1980, most people knew the answer to the question "What is the name of the Lone Ranger's Indian sidekick?" (answer: Tonto), whereas in 2012, few people know this answer. Thus, we updated the 1980 norms and expanded them by providing new measures. In particular, we report two new metacognitive measures (confidence judgments and peer judgments) and provide a detailed report of commission errors. Each of these measures will be valuable to researchers, and together they are likely to facilitate future research in a number of fields, such as research investigating memory illusions, metamemory processes, and error correction. The presence of substantial generational shifts from 1980 to 2012 necessitates the use of updated norms.