Left hemisphere EEG coherence in infancy predicts infant declarative pointing and preschool epistemic language.

Pointing plays a central role in preverbal communication. While imperative pointing aims at influencing another person's behavior, declarative gestures serve to convey epistemic information and to share interest in an object. Further, the latter are hypothesized to be a precursor ability of epistemic language. So far, little is known about their underlying brain maturation processes. Therefore, the present study investigated the relation between brain maturation processes and the production of imperative and declarative motives as well as epistemic language in N = 32 infants. EEG coherence scores were measured at 14 months, imperative and declarative point production at 15 months and epistemic language at 48 months. Results of correlational analyses suggest distinct behavioral and neural patterns for imperative and declarative pointing, with declarative pointing being associated with the maturation of the left hemisphere. Further, EEG coherence measures of the left hemisphere at 14 months and declarative pointing at 15 months are related to individual differences in epistemic language skills at 48 months, independently of child IQ. In regression analyses, coherence measures of the left hemisphere prove to be the most important predictor of epistemic language skills. Thus, neural processes of the left hemisphere seem particularly relevant to social communication.

Same or different? ERP correlates of pretense and false belief reasoning in children.

Pretend play, emerging at about 18 months, and explicit false belief (FB) understanding, arising around 4 years, constitute two pivotal milestones in the development of a Theory of Mind since both involve the ability to separate real from non-real content. The developmental lag has evoked vivid discussion with respect to whether or not pretense (PT) involves a metarepresentational understanding similar to FB. However, in children PT and FB have not yet been contrasted on a neural level to reveal whether they are subserved by the same neurocognitive mechanism. Therefore, the present event-related potential (ERP) study compared PT to a FB and to a non-mental control condition in 6- to 8-year-old children. Results revealed distinct ERP components for PT and FB. PT elicited a parietal P2, which was assumed to reflect the detection of incongruence, and a negative frontal slow wave (290-600 ms), which was associated with the identification of the intention underlying the pretend behavior. In contrast, FB evoked the characteristic positive fronto-central late slow wave (290-920 ms) that is supposed to indicate metarepresentation. Further, the broad distribution of the anterior slow-wave patterns associated with PT and FB reasoning was assumed to reflect the ongoing structural development and neural specialization of the respective areas, indicating the developmental progress in conceptualizing the mental domain. Given the differences in latency, polarity, and topography, PT and FB seem to rely on distinct neural substrates in children. The early negative frontal slow wave indicates that for PT reasoning children may use simple mentalizing processes such as intention processing, whereas the late positive slow-wave shows that for FB children may engage in metarepresentational processing. Therefore, the present findings seem to substantiate theoretical accounts postulating simple mentalistic reasoning for PT in children.

Deception and sabotage in autistic, retarded and normal children.

We investigated autistic, mentally retarded, and normal children's ability to deceive or obstruct an opponent. When required to tell a lie (saying that a box was locked) autistic children performed significantly worse than their controls, taking into account mental age. However, they readily prevented a competitor from gaining a reward by physical manipulation (locking a box). Their success on sabotage demonstrated that their failure on deception was not due to an inability to understand the task. Performance on deception was predicted by performance on a false belief attribution task. The present findings confirm that autistic children have a specific deficit in understanding and manipulating beliefs.

Children's understanding of cognitive cuing: how to manipulate cues to fool a competitor.

4-6-year-old children's understanding of cognitive cuing was studied in 2 experiments using a strategic interaction paradigm. Children could fool a competitor by hiding targets in locations that were labeled with semantically weakly associated cues and help a cooperative partner by hiding them in semantically highly associated locations. Very few 4-year-olds, half the 5-year-olds, and almost all 6-years-olds appropriately chose semantically highly vs. weakly associated hiding places to make the targets easy vs. difficult to find. The second experiment showed that 4-year-olds did not strategically manipulate cues as sources of information, although they themselves proficiently used them as such in a search task. These findings are discussed with regard to research on children's developing understanding of origins of knowledge and belief and with regard to recent claims that young preschoolers possess a metacognitive understanding of cognitive cuing.

Children's understanding of moral emotions.

4-8-year-old children's attributions of emotion to a story figure who violated a moral rule were studied in a series of experiments. Most 4-year-olds judged a wrongdoer to experience positive emotions, focusing their justifications on the successful outcome of his action, whereas almost all 8-year-olds attributed negative feelings, focusing on the moral value of the wrongdoer's action. A developmental trend from outcome-oriented toward morally oriented emotion attributions was also observed in children's judgments of the feelings of a story character who had resisted temptation. When morally evaluating a wrongdoer, only children above the age of 6 years took emotional reactions into account, judging a "happy" wrongdoer to be worse than a "sorry" one. 4- and 5-year-olds attributed positive emotions to a wrongdoer even if his transgression was severe and if he did not gain any material profit from it. However, they did not expect a person (even an ill-motivated one) to feel good if he or she unintentionally harmed another person or merely observed someone being hurt. These results are discussed in relation to recent research on children's developing conceptions of emotion and on the early development of moral understanding.