Exploring the Role of Attentional Reorienting in the Reactive Effects of Judgments of Learning on Memory Performance.

Making judgments of learning (JOLs) while studying related word pairs can enhance performance on tests that rely on cue-target associations (e.g., cued recall) compared to studying alone. One possible explanation for this positive JOL reactivity effect is that the prompt to make JOLs, which typically occurs halfway through the presentation of each pair, may encourage learners to devote more attention to the pair during the second half of the encoding episode, which may contribute to enhanced recall performance. To investigate this idea, an online sample of participants (Experiment 1) and undergraduate students (Experiment 2) studied a set of moderately related word pairs (e.g., dairy-cow) in preparation for a cued recall test. Some participants made JOLs for each pair halfway through the presentation, whereas other participants did not. Also, some participants were presented with a fixation point halfway through the presentation, whereas other participants were not. The goal of this fixation point was to simulate the possible "reorienting" effect of a JOL prompt halfway through each encoding episode. In both an unsupervised online context and a supervised laboratory context, cued recall performance was higher for participants who made JOLs compared to those who did not make JOLs. However, presenting a fixation point halfway through the presentation of each pair did not lead to reactive effects on memory. Thus, JOLs are more effective than a manipulation that reoriented participants to the word pairs in another way (i.e., via a fixation point), which provides some initial evidence that positive reactivity for related pairs is not solely driven by attentional reorienting during encoding.

Does Interactive Imagery Influence the Reactive Effect of Judgments of Learning on Memory?

Making judgments of learning (JOLs) while studying is a useful tool for students to evaluate the status of their learning. Additionally, in associative learning contexts, JOLs can directly benefit learning when the to-be-learned information is related. One explanation for this reactive effect is that making JOLs strengthens the associative relationship, leading to enhanced memory performance when a test relies on that relationship (e.g., cued-recall tests). In the present research, we evaluated whether having students make interactive mental images-another strategy that can increase the strength of a cue-target relationship-impacts the reactive effect of JOLs on learning. Students studied word pairs that were related and unrelated. Half of the students were instructed to form a mental image of the words interacting, whereas the other half were not. Additionally, in each group half of the students made a JOL for each pair, whereas half did not. Following a short delay, students completed a cued-recall test. Consistent with prior research, students who made JOLs remembered more related word pairs than did students who did not. By contrast, students who made JOLs recalled fewer unrelated word pairs than did students who did not. Moreover, although students who formed interactive images demonstrated enhanced memory relative to students who did not, interactive imagery did not impact the reactive effect of JOLs. These outcomes are informative for existing theory of JOL reactivity. Specifically, JOLs may only benefit learning of associative information when it has a pre-existing semantic relationship (e.g., related word pairs) and not when that that relationship is created by the learner (e.g., by forming interactive images).

Judgments of learning enhance recall for category-cued but not letter-cued items.

Making immediate judgments of learning (JOLs) during study can influence later memory performance, with a common outcome being that JOLs improve cued-recall performance for related word pairs (i.e., positive reactivity) and do not impact memory for unrelated pairs (i.e., no reactivity). The cue-strengthening hypothesis proposes that JOL reactivity will be observed when a criterion test is sensitive to the cues used to inform JOLs (Soderstrom et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41 (2), 553-558, 2015). Across four experiments, we evaluated this hypothesis with category pairs (e.g., A type of gem - Jade) and letter pairs (e.g., Ja - Jade). Participants studied a list comprised of both pair types, made (or did not make) JOLs, and completed a cued-recall test (Experiments 1a/b). The cue-strengthening hypothesis predicts greater positive reactivity for category pairs than for letter pairs, because making a JOL strengthens the relationship between the cue and target, which is more beneficial for material with an a priori semantic relationship. Outcomes were consistent with this hypothesis. We also evaluated and ruled out alternative explanations for this pattern of effects: (a) that they arose due to overall differences in recall performance for the two pair types (Experiment 2); (b) that they would also occur even when the criterion test is not sensitive to the cues used to inform JOLs (Experiment 3); and (c) that JOLs only increased memory strength for the targets (Experiment 4). Thus, the current experiments rule out plausible accounts of reactivity effects and provide further, converging evidence for the cue-strengthening hypothesis.

Do Domain Knowledge and Retrieval Practice Predict Students' Study Order Decisions?

Learning complex concepts is necessary for student success, but it is often challenging. Learning such concepts can be influenced by students' study order choices during learning to switch to a new category (interleaved study order) or stay within the same category (blocked study order). Students often prefer stay decisions during learning and make relatively few switch decisions; however, an open question is whether students' switch decisions are related to their level of prior knowledge in the domain and the learning strategy they use (retrieval practice versus study). To examine these relationships, we recruited undergraduate students from an introductory geology course. Prior to the course modules on rock classification, students self-rated their knowledge, took a prior knowledge test, classified rock exemplars by completing study or retrieval practice trials, and made study order choices. Students then completed assignments and attended lectures in their geology course on igneous, sedimentary, and metamorphic rocks. Next, students self-rated their knowledge, took a new prior knowledge test, completed study or retrieval practice trials, made study order decisions, took final classification tests, and self-reported beliefs about study order choices. Even though students' knowledge increased after course modules on rock identification, and most students believed that domain knowledge impacts study decisions, prior knowledge did not predict students' switch decisions. In contrast, students who completed retrieval practice trials made substantially more switch decisions (i.e., interleaved study) than did students who completed study trials.

People hold mood-congruent beliefs about memory but do not use these beliefs when monitoring their learning.

Contemporary theories of metacognitive monitoring propose that beliefs play a critical role in monitoring of learning. Even so, recent evidence suggests that beliefs are not always sufficient to impact people's monitoring. In seven experiments, we explored people's beliefs about the impact of mood and item valence on memory and whether people use their beliefs about these cues when monitoring their learning. Participants expressed mood-congruent beliefs (Experiments 1, 6, and 7). That is, they believed people in a negative mood would remember more negative items than positive and neutral items. To evaluate whether they use this belief when monitoring their learning, participants studied emotional (positive and negative) and neutral pictures (Experiments 2 and 3) or words (Experiments 4, 5, and 7), made a judgment of learning (JOL) for each, and completed a free-recall test. In Experiments 2-5, participants completed the learning task while in a negative or neutral mood. The negative mood was induced with an established mood induction procedure. In contrast to the belief-based hypothesis, participants did not make mood-congruent JOLs; JOLs were not influenced by mood. By contrast, JOLs were consistently higher for emotional relative to neutral items. Thus, although participants demonstrated a mood-congruent belief, they did not use this belief when monitoring their learning. These outcomes demonstrate that simply having a belief about a person-centered cue (e.g., a belief about the impact of a person's mood on memory) is not sufficient for that belief to impact monitoring of learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

The rich-get-richer effect: Prior knowledge predicts new learning of domain-relevant information.

When learning new information, students' prior knowledge related to that information will often vary. Prior research has not systematically explored how prior knowledge relates to learning of new, previously unknown information. Accordingly, the goal of the present research was to explore this relationship. In three experiments, students first completed a prior knowledge test over two domains (football and cooking) and then learned new information from these domains by answering questions and receiving feedback. Students also made a judgment of learning for each. To ensure that the learning was new (i.e., previously unknown) for all students, the to-be-learned information was false. Last, students completed a final test over the same questions from the learning phase. Prior knowledge in each domain was positively related to new learning for items from that domain but not from the other domain. Thus, the relationship between prior knowledge and new learning was domain specific, which we refer to as the rich-get-richer effect. Prior knowledge was also positively related to the magnitude of judgments of learning. In Experiment 3, to explore a potential reason why prior knowledge is related to new learning, students rated their curiosity in learning each item prior to receiving feedback. Critically, students' curiosity judgments mediated the relationship between prior knowledge and new learning. These outcomes suggest that for high-knowledge learners, curiosity may be related to attention-based mechanisms that increase the effectiveness of encoding during feedback. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

How do older adults maintain corrections in knowledge across a lengthy delay?

Older adults often correct errors in existing knowledge as effectively as younger adults despite the fact that inaccurate knowledge has the potential to cause interference with memory for a correct response. In the current experiments, we sought to explore whether error corrections are maintained across a delay and identify mechanisms that may support this process. In Experiment 1, younger and older adults answered general knowledge questions, rated confidence in their responses, were shown feedback, and rated their prior knowledge of the question and answer. Half of the participants took a final test after a 6-min delay and half returned 1 week later. Across a 1-week delay, older adults maintained a greater proportion of corrected responses than did younger adults. In Experiment 2, we examined whether participants use their memory for errors on the initial test to mediate retrieval of the correct answer on the final test (i.e., the mediator hypothesis). Participants were more likely to answer questions correctly on a final test when they recalled their initial error, but memory for the initial error was a stronger predictor of final test accuracy for younger adults than for older adults. Additionally, older adults, in comparison with younger adults, corrected a higher proportion of errors when the initial error was forgotten. Overall, inaccurate knowledge did not interfere with older adults' ability to maintain revisions in memory. In addition, we found support for the mediator hypothesis; however, other mechanisms also contribute to older adults' error correction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Do judgments of learning modify older adults' actual learning?

Judgments of learning (JOLs) can improve younger adults' associative learning of related information. One theoretical explanation for this finding is that JOLs strengthen the relationship between the cue and target words of a related word pair. This cue-strengthening hypothesis is particularly relevant for older adults because learning interventions that enhance associations between items typically benefit their learning. Thus, we investigated the degree to which JOLs have a direct influence on older adults' learning. To do so, older and younger adults studied a list of related word pairs (Experiments 1 and 2) or weakly related word pairs (Experiments 3, 4, and 5). Half of the participants made a JOL for each pair and half did not. After a filled 3-min retention interval, participants took a cued-recall test. In all experiments, older adults' memory performance was not impacted by making JOLs. By contrast, younger adults who made JOLs recalled significantly more than those who did not. JOLs may not have modified older adults' learning because of age-related deficits in processing that limited the degree to which JOLs strengthened cue-target relationships. It is also possible that JOLs encourage attentional reorienting, which older adults do not benefit from because they are already engaged with the materials. An important direction for future work will be to explore these possibilities, as well as others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Beliefs about memory decline in aging do not impact judgments of learning (JOLs): A challenge for belief-based explanations of JOLs.

The cue-utilization framework (Koriat, 1997) and the analytic processing theory (Dunlosky, Mueller, & Tauber, 2015) identify people's beliefs about their memory as central to how judgments of learning (JOLs) are made. This assumption is supported by ample evidence. However, researchers have almost exclusively explored the impact of participants' beliefs about the materials or the learning task, and none have evaluated the impact of beliefs about a person on JOLs. Thus, to inform JOL theory, we evaluated the degree to which JOLs are related to the belief that "memory declines with aging in adulthood." In seven experiments, college-aged participants studied words, made JOLs, and took a memory test. Participants made JOLs predicting memory performance for an average younger adult (i.e., 18-21 years old) or for an average older adult (i.e., 65+ years old). Most important, beliefs about aging in adulthood were not always sufficient to produce cue effects on JOLs, which contrasts with expectations from the aforementioned theories. An important challenge for future research will be to discover factors that moderate belief effects. To guide such explorations, we discuss possible explanations for why beliefs about aging would have demonstrated little to no relationship with people's JOLs.

Aging and forgetting: Forgotten information is perceived as less important than is remembered information.

Recently, researchers have evaluated the mechanisms that contribute to younger adults' metacognitive monitoring. According to analytic-processing theory, people's beliefs about their memory are central to their monitoring judgments. Although this theory has received ample support with younger adults, it has yet to be evaluated with older adults. We aimed to address this gap in the literature. Specifically, we evaluated younger and older adults' beliefs about forgetting, and the role of these beliefs in their judgments about forgotten information. Younger adults tend to recall forgotten information as being less important than remembered information (dubbed the forgetting bias). Moreover, this bias is largely driven by their beliefs about forgotten information. In the present research, we evaluated (a) whether older adults also show a forgetting bias and (b) the contribution of their beliefs to this bias. In Studies 1 and 2, participants completed a value-directed remembering task. Next, participants took a surprise cued-recall test for the values. In Study 2, we evaluated participants' beliefs by having them make a memory-for-past-test judgment prior to recalling the values. In Study 3, we directly probed participants' beliefs about the value of forgotten information with a survey. Older and younger adults demonstrated a forgetting bias. Moreover, and consistent with analytic-processing theory, people's beliefs about forgotten information contributed to this bias. Thus, beliefs are an important mechanism that contribute to both older and younger adults' metacognitive monitoring. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Monitoring of learning for emotional faces: how do fine-grained categories of emotion influence participants' judgments of learning and beliefs about memory?

Researchers have evaluated how broad categories of emotion (i.e. positive and negative) influence judgments of learning (JOLs) relative to neutral items. Specifically, JOLs are typically higher for emotional relative to neutral items. The novel goal of the present research was to evaluate JOLs for fine-grained categories of emotion. Participants studied faces with afraid, angry, sad, or neutral expressions (Experiment 1) and with afraid, angry, or sad expressions (Experiment 2). Participants identified the expressed emotion, made a JOL for each, and completed a recognition test. JOLs were higher for the emotional relative to neutral expressions. However, JOLs were insensitive to the categories of negative emotion. Using a survey design in Experiment 3, participants demonstrated idiosyncratic beliefs about emotion. Some people believed the fine-grained emotions were equally memorable, whereas others believed a specific emotion (e.g. anger) was most memorable. Thus, beliefs about emotion are nuanced, which has important implications for JOL theory.

Explaining the forgetting bias effect on value judgments: The influence of memory for a past test.

People often feel that information that was forgotten is less important than remembered information. Prior work has shown that participants assign higher importance to remembered information while undervaluing forgotten information. The current study examined two possible accounts of this finding. In three experiments, participants studied lists of words in which each word was randomly assigned a point value denoting the value of remembering the word. Following the presentation of each list participants engaged in a free recall test. After the presentation of all lists participants were shown each of the words they had studied and asked to recall the point value that was initially paired with each word. Experiment 1 tested a fluency-based account by presenting items for value judgments in a low-fluency or high-fluency format. Experiment 2 examined whether value judgments reflect attributions based on the familiarity of an item when value judgments are made. Finally, in Experiment 3, we evaluated whether participants believe that forgotten words are less important by having them judge whether an item was initially recalled or forgotten prior to making a value judgment. Manipulating the fluency of an item presented for judgment had no influence on value ratings (Experiment 1) and familiarity exerted a limited influence on value judgments (Experiment 2). More importantly, participants' value judgments appeared to reflect a theory that remembered information is more valuable than forgotten information (Experiment 3). Overall, the present work suggests that individuals may apply a theory about remembering and forgetting to retrospectively assess the value of information.

The concreteness effect on judgments of learning: Evaluating the contributions of fluency and beliefs.

Researchers have often determined how cues influence judgments of learning (JOLs; e.g., concrete words are assigned higher JOLs than are abstract words), and recently there has been an emphasis in understanding why cues influence JOLs (i.e., the mechanisms that underlie cue effects on JOLs). The analytic-processing (AP) theory posits that JOLs are constructed in accordance with participants' beliefs of how a cue will influence memory. Even so, some evidence suggests that fluency is also important to cue effects on JOLs. In the present experiments, we investigated the contributions of participants' beliefs and processing fluency to the concreteness effect on JOLs. To evaluate beliefs, participants estimated memory performance in a hypothetical experiment (Experiment 1), and studied concrete and abstract words and made a pre-study JOL for each (Experiments 2 and 3). Participants' predictions demonstrated the belief that concrete words are more likely to be remembered than are abstract words, consistent with the AP theory. To evaluate fluency, response latencies were measured during lexical decision (Experiment 4), self-paced study (Experiment 5), and mental imagery (Experiment 7). Number of trials to acquisition was also evaluated (Experiment 6). Fluency did not differ between concrete and abstract words in Experiments 5 and 6, and it did not mediate the concreteness effect on JOLs in Experiments 4 and 7. Taken together, these results demonstrate that beliefs are a primary mechanism driving the concreteness effect on JOLs.