Doing Phenomenological Research and Writing.

When looking through phenomenology articles in human science and philosophy journals, we may be excused to get the impression that they offer an inconsistent array of phenomenology publications. In this article, we describe three simple but helpful distinctions for determining some order: first, the great foundational publications; second, exegetical publications in the wake of the great works; and third, phenomenological studies done directly on phenomena. Our aim in this article is not to lay claim to phenomenology as a label but rather to discuss how "doing phenomenology directly on the phenomena and the things" means taking up a certain attitude and practicing an attentive awareness to the things of the world as we live and experience them. We propose that engaging in philosophical exegesis and argumentation is not very helpful for analyzing and explicating originary meanings of experiential phenomena. And we show how doing phenomenology directly on the things can be facilitated by a phenomenologically inspired interpretive attitude as well as by a sensitive talent for employing phenomenological examples.

Rebuttal: Doing Phenomenology on the Things.

This rebuttal responds to the article "Getting it quite wrong" (published in this journal issue of QHR). My work is described as "amassing experiential descriptions," simply aiming to "reproduce the original experience unaltered," naively claiming "that the fundamental question of phenomenology is to understand what it is like to have this or that experience" and other such injudicious points. I take issue with these claims. Husserl is quoted as supportively stating that "phenomenology was from the beginning never supposed to be anything except the path to a radically genuine 'strictly scientific metaphysics.'" I will show with textual examples that the presented view of phenomenology is too limited and one sided.

Rebuttal Rejoinder: Present IPA For What It Is-Interpretative Psychological Analysis.

I appreciate this opportunity to join Jonathan Smith in his rebuttal to my discussion of the meaning and method of his interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Different forms of inquiry make unique contributions to our understanding of professional practices of psychology, education, pedagogy, nursing, medicine, and other health sciences. So, it should be worthwhile to understand the nature of these potential contributions and their methods. But what if some methods are misnamed, misconstrued, or misdirected? Does it matter? Perhaps or perhaps only academically. I am happy to engage in this rejoinder with Jonathan Smith-certainly there is merit in dialogue and discussions surrounding our understandings of phenomenology as a method for human science research. In addition, I feel collegial amity for Jonathan and his interest in phenomenology and willingness to engage in conversation. In this rejoinder, I will express my views of IPA and Jonathan's rebuttal in some brief detail and with considered care.

Phenomenology in Its Original Sense.

In this article, I try to think through the question, "What distinguishes phenomenology in its original sense?" My intent is to focus on the project and methodology of phenomenology in a manner that is not overly technical and that may help others to further elaborate on or question the singular features that make phenomenology into a unique qualitative form of inquiry. I pay special attention to the notion of "lived" in the phenomenological term "lived experience" to demonstrate its critical role and significance for understanding phenomenological reflection, meaning, analysis, and insights. I also attend to the kind of experiential material that is needed to focus on a genuine phenomenological question that should guide any specific research project. Heidegger, van den Berg, and Marion provide some poignant exemplars of the use of narrative "examples" in phenomenological explorations of the phenomena of "boredom," "conversation," and "the meaningful look in eye-contact." Only what is given or what gives itself in lived experience (or conscious awareness) are proper phenomenological "data" or "givens," but these givens are not to be confused with data material that can be coded, sorted, abstracted, and accordingly analyzed in some "systematic" manner. The latter approach to experiential research may be appropriate and worthwhile for various types of qualitative inquiry but not for phenomenology in its original sense. Finally, I use the mythical figure of Kairos to show that the famous phenomenological couplet of the epoché-reduction aims for phenomenological insights that require experiential analysis and attentive (but serendipitous) methodical inquiry practices.

The pedagogy of Momus technologies: Facebook, privacy, and online intimacy.

Through cable and wireless connections at home and at work, through Wi-Fi networks and wireless spots in hotels, coffee shops, and town squares, we are indeed connected to each other. But what is the phenomenology of this connection? Technologies of expression such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and other social networking technologies increasingly become like Momus windows of Greek mythology, revealing one's innermost thoughts for all to see. They give access to what used to be personal, secret, and hidden in the lives of its users, especially the young. In this article I explore the pedagogy of Momus effects of social networking technologies in the way they may alter young people's experience of privacy, secrecy, solitude, and intimacy. In addition, I examine the forms of contact afforded by instant messaging and texting on wireless mobile technologies such as the cell phone (and its wireless hybrids) for the way young people are and stay in touch with each other, and how intimacies and inner lives are attended to.

Writing qualitatively, or the demands of writing.

Have you ever said this or heard someone say this: "I have done all of my data analysis--I just have to write it down." Or, "I just have to write it up"? I will suggest that within the context of phenomenological inquiry, it is not necessarily helpful to try to assist researchers learning "how to write down" their reflections or "how to write up" their results. What should be more helpful is learning "how to write." Qualitative writing may be seen as an active struggle for understanding and recognition of the lived meanings of the lifeworld, and this writing also possesses passive and receptive rhetoric dimensions. It requires that we be attentive to other voices, to subtle significations in the way that things and others speak to us. In part, this is achieved through contact with the words of others. These words need to touch us, guide us, stir us.

Care-as-Worry, or "don't worry, be happy".

Care, or caring, is one of the central concepts in North American health science and nursing theories. Yet, experiential accounts of caring show dimensions of meaning that have received little attention in the literature. The author compares the meanings of the terms care and caring with their counterparts in other languages. He explores the significance of care-as-worry embedded in lived relations of caring and relates these concepts to ethical considerations surrounding health care. It is because of this felt "care-as-worry" that the life of care may be experienced as a complex moral-emotional relation of responsibility.