RESUMEN
The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in governments playing increasingly prominent roles as active economic agents. However, state capitalism does not necessarily serve broad developmental purposes, and rather can be directed to supporting sectional and private interests. As the literature on variegated capitalism alerts us, governments and other actors regularly devise fixes in response to a systemic crisis, but the focus, scale, and scope of the interventions vary considerably, according to the constellation of interests. Rapid progress with vaccines notwithstanding, the UK government's response to COVID-19 has been associated with much controversy, not only because of an extraordinarily high death rate, but also because of allegations of cronyism around the granting of government contracts and bailouts. We focus on the latter, investigating more closely who got bailed out. We find that badly affected sectors (e.g. hospitality, transportation) and larger employers were more likely to get bailouts. However, the latter also favored the politically influential and those who had run up debt profligately. Although, as with state capitalism, crony capitalism is most often associated with emerging markets, we conclude that the two have coalesced into a peculiarly British variety, but one that has some common features with other major liberal markets. This might suggest that the eco-systemic dominance of the latter is coming to an end, or, at the least, that this model is drifting towards one that assumes many of the features commonly associated with developing nations.
RESUMEN
Despite the unprecedented levels of liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to banks during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, lending by banks slowed dramatically during and after that global episode. In this study, we propose that, given capital constraints, the lobbying expenditures by banks to combat Dodd-Frank might have crowded out lending activity. A variety of univariate and multivariate tests show that while lending by banks fell significantly around the financial crisis, lobbying rose dramatically. Our results also show that bank lobbying and lending are imperfect substitutes during non-crisis periods. Such substitutability likely is explained by the value perceived in the political connections gained through lobbying, such as the ability to influence regulation, preferential treatment on supervisory or enforcement decisions, and protection against adverse shocks in the form of government bailouts.
RESUMEN
The impact of COVID-19 on air transport is unprecedented and some well-known airline brands may disappear as a result. Governments around the world have responded swiftly to cushion the financial impact by offering direct wage subsidies, tax relief, loans, etc. This paper explores the government's appropriate responses to failing airlines' bailout request by examining the case of Virgin Australia. Following the bailout policy principles established in the literature, we suggest that bankruptcy protection should be considered as the first solution to a failing carrier. A bailout decision should be guided by a set of principles and procedures, which should not be taken lightly. Our analysis also shows that the government cannot take a hands-off approach in the absence of private lenders and investors, as the costs to consumers and regional residents would be huge if the carrier could not get through the COVID-19 pandemic. A minimum level of assistance with conditions might be needed to maintain market competition.
RESUMEN
In 2008, as the financial crisis unfolded in the United States, the banking industry elevated its lobbying and campaign spending activities. By the end of 2008, and during 2009, the biggest political spenders, on average, received the largest bailout packages. Is that relationship causal? In this paper, I examine the effect of political connections on the allocation of funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to the US financial services industry during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. I find that TARP recipients that lobbied the government, donated to political campaigns, or whose top executives had direct connections to politics received better bailout deals. I estimate regression discontinuity design and instrumental variable models to uncover how election outcomes for politicians in close races affected the distribution of bailout funds for connected firms. The results do not imply that some banks were deliberately favored over others, just that favored banks benefited because of their proximity to the right people in power. If being politically connected matters in general, in times of crisis it matters even more. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11127-020-00871-w.
RESUMEN
BACKGROUND/AIMS: The financial crisis that enveloped Europe in 2009 created financial pressure for governments and required a number of countries to obtain a financial bailout from the IMF. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the financial crisis on public health expenditure in bailout countries and if bailouts shift the burden of paying for healthcare from the state onto individuals. METHODS: Quantitative health expenditure data were collected from the WHO and OECD for the period 2004-2015 and evaluated using a comparison of means Welch's t test. RESULTS: The majority of bailout countries recorded a decrease in public health expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure, with Ireland recording the largest decrease with government health expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure, falling by 22% (P < .01). In addition, the results also suggest that the burden of paying for healthcare shifted from the state onto individuals in three countries, namely Hungary, Ireland and Portugal, where public health expenditure declined and private expenditure increased significantly. CONCLUSIONS: The ramifications of shifting the burden of paying for healthcare from the state onto individuals at this point remain unclear with further research required to identify the long-term consequences for healthcare.
