RESUMEN
Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern of results, studies routinely conclude that the sensitivity of RT responses is higher than that of explicit responses-an empirical situation we call Indirect Task Advantage (ITA). Many studies further infer from an ITA that RT effects were driven by a form of recognition that exceeds explicit memory: implicit recognition. However, this reasoning is flawed because the sensitivity underlying RT effects is never computed. To properly establish a difference, a sensitivity comparison is required. We apply this sensitivity comparison in a reanalysis of 20 contextual cueing studies showing that not a single study provides consistent evidence for ITAs. Responding to recent correlation-based arguments, we also demonstrate the absence of evidence for ITAs at the level of individual participants. This lack of ITAs has serious consequences for the field: If RT effects can be fully explained by weak but above-chance explicit recognition sensitivity, what is the empirical content of the label "implicit"? Thus, theoretical discussions in this paradigm-and likely in other paradigms using this standard reasoning-require serious reassessment because the current data from contextual cueing studies is insufficient to consider recognition as implicit.
RESUMEN
Studies using the priming paradigm often infer that unconscious processes have more veridical access to the world than conscious processes. These interpretations are based on a standard reasoning that erroneously infers good sensitivity of indirect measures from a clear priming effect. To correct for this fallacy, researchers should explicitly compute the sensitivities from indirect measures and compare them against the sensitivities of direct measures. Recent results suggest that indirect behavioral measures are not more sensitive than direct measures and challenge interpretations about veridical unconscious processing. We add to these behavioral results by focusing on neurophysiological indirect measures. In two EEG experiments, we investigate whether event related potentials (ERPs) are more sensitive to different visual stimuli than direct measures. The results show the opposite effect: higher sensitivities for direct than indirect measures. Therefore-contrasting commonly held belief-we find no evidence for more veridical unconscious than conscious processes in ERP measures.
