Deciphering the global research trends and significance of moral intelligence via bibliometric analysis.

Introduction: Moral Intelligence (MI) as a concept has gained importance in recent years due to its wide applicability in individual, organizational, and clinical settings or even policy making. The present study employed Bibliometric analysis to understand the emerging topics associated with MI and its global research trend. This paper's primary aim was (i) to explore the temporal and geographic growth trends of the research publication on MI. (ii) to identify the most prolific countries, institutions, and authors, working on MI, (iii) to identify the most frequent terminologies, (iv) to explore research topics and to provide insight into potential collaborations and future directions, and (v) to explore the significance of the concept of moral intelligence. Method: Bibliometric analysis was used to understand the emerging topics associated with MI and its global research trend using the SCOPUS database. VOS viewer and R were employed to analyze the result. Through the analysis conducted, the development of the construct over time was analyzed. Results: Results have shown that Iran and the United States and these two combined account for 53.16% of the total country-wise publications. Switzerland has the highest number of Multi-county publications. Authors from Iran and Switzerland have the most number of publications. Emerging topics like decision-making, machine ethics, moral agents, artificial ethics, co-evolution of human and artificial moral agents, green purchase intention etc were identified. Discussion: The application of MI in organisational decision-making, education policy, artificial intelligence and measurement of moral intelligence are important areas of application as per the results. Research interest in MI is projected to increase according to the results delineated in this article.

Modular morals: Mapping the organization of the moral brain.

Is morality the product of multiple domain-specific psychological mechanisms, or one domain-general mechanism? Previous research suggests that morality consists of a range of solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. This theory of 'morality as cooperation' suggests that there are (at least) seven specific moral domains: family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property rights. However, it is unclear how these types of morality are implemented at the neuroanatomical level. The possibilities are that morality is (1) the product of multiple distinct domain-specific adaptations for cooperation, (2) the product of a single domain-general adaptation which learns a range of moral rules, or (3) the product of some combination of domain-specific and domain-general adaptations. To distinguish between these possibilities, we first conducted an anatomical likelihood estimation meta-analysis of previous studies investigating the relationship between these seven moral domains and neuroanatomy. This meta-analysis provided evidence for a combination of specific and general adaptations. Next, we investigated the relationship between the seven types of morality - as measured by the Morality as Cooperation Questionnaire (Relevance) - and grey matter volume in a large neuroimaging (n = 607) sample. No associations between moral values and grey matter volume survived whole-brain exploratory testing. We conclude that whatever combination of mechanisms are responsible for morality, either they are not neuroanatomically localised, or else their localisation is not manifested in grey matter volume. Future research should employ phylogenetically informed a priori predictions, as well as alternative measures of morality and of brain function.

Let's not get ahead of ourselves: we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress.

An important question about moral progress is what causes it. One of the most popular proposed mechanisms is moral reasoning: moral progress often happens because lots of people reason their way to improved moral beliefs. Authors who defend moral reasoning as a cause of moral progress have relied on two broad lines of argument: the general and the specific line. The general line presents evidence that moral reasoning is in general a powerful mechanism of moral belief change, while the specific line tries to establish that moral reasoning can explain specific historical examples of moral progress. In this paper, we examine these lines in detail, using Kumar and Campbell's (2022, A Better Ape: The Evolution of the Moral Mind and How It Made Us Human. Oxford University Press) model of rational moral progress to sharpen our focus. For each line, we explain the empirical assumptions it makes; we then argue that the available evidence supports none of these assumptions. We conclude that at this point, we have no idea if moral reasoning causes moral progress.

Expanding the empirical study of virtual reality beyond empathy to compassion, moral reasoning, and moral foundations.

This study utilizes a controlled experimental design to investigate the influence of a virtual reality experience on empathy, compassion, moral reasoning, and moral foundations. With continued debate and mixed results from previous studies attempting to show relationships between virtual reality and empathy, this study takes advantage of the technology for its ability to provide a consistent, repeatable experience, broadening the scope of analysis beyond empathy. A systematic literature review identified the most widely used and validated moral psychology assessments for the constructs, and these assessments were administered before and after the virtual reality experience. The study is comprised of two pre-post experiments with student participants from a university in the United States. The first experiment investigated change in empathy and moral foundations among 44 participants, and the second investigated change in compassion and moral reasoning among 69 participants. The results showed no significant change in empathy nor compassion, but significant change in moral reasoning from personal interest to post-conventional stages, and significant increase in the Care/harm factor of moral foundations. By testing four of the primary constructs of moral psychology with the most widely used and validated assessments in controlled experiments, this study attempts to advance our understanding of virtual reality and its potential to influence human morality. It also raises questions about our self-reported assessment tools and provides possible new insights for the constructs examined.

A concept in flux and starved of the metaphysical: desecularizing emotion.

Despite being of undisputed importance, there is no consensus on what emotions are, with the majority of research that constructs ideas about them being colored by a particular worldview. This conceptual article examines the case for conducting an Islamic analysis of emotion. It might seem a peculiar area to examine; what would be the need to analyze such a universal psychological concept through the lens of a particular religion? Three points are used to argue for this endeavor. To begin with, this article highlights the relative instability of the term; there is yet no universally agreed upon definition of what emotions are, and which human processes they contribute to. As the concept is still being defined, there is merit in engaging with the discussion, particularly given the relative absence of metaphysics from the debate. Secondly, specificities relating to emotions and how they have conceptualized are considered. This section delves into the way in which variable factors, such as culture, language, and worldview, influence how emotions manifest. The overarching point argued for here is that how emotions are experienced, and even which emotions are experienced, are shaped by factors that are not consistent across time and space. Accordingly, different worldviews will formulate different "emotional palates" and "emotional ideologies"; different groups of people will understand and engage with emotions differently. Thirdly, a broader discussion ensues pertaining to the nature of science, psychology, and their relationship with secularity. This discussion includes critique of the idea that forces such as secularism and scientific materialism have been "discovered" and are therefore value-neutral. Accordingly, understandings of emotions to have emerged from the Academy, and contemporary psychology, are value-laden. This section also looks at the origins of science in order to determine whether it is inherently atheistic or areligious, and therefore antagonistic to a religious worldview. The section also challenges the apparent secularity of psychology and key psychologists. A range of other facets pertaining to how the emotions have been conceptualized, such as their relational core, their interaction with moral faculties, and their enmeshment with what is important to individuals and groups, are also considered.

Institutional design and moral conflict in health care priority-setting.

Priority-setting policy-makers often face moral and political pressure to balance the conflicting motivations of efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment. Using the conflict between these motivations as a case study can enrich the understanding of institutional design in developed democracies. This essay presents a cognitive-psychological account of the conflict between efficiency and rescue/non-abandonment in health care priority-setting. It then describes three sets of institutional arrangements-in Australia, England/Wales, and Germany, respectively-that contend with this conflict in interestingly different ways. The analysis yields at least three implications for institutional design in developed democracies: (1) indeterminacy at the level of moral psychology can increase the probability of indeterminacy at the level of institutional design; (2) situational constraints in effect require priority-setting policy-makers to adopt normative-moral pluralism; and (3) the U.S. health care system may be in an anti-priority-setting equilibrium.

The Intergroup Value Protection Model: A Theoretically Integrative and Dynamic Approach to Intergroup Conflict Escalation in Democratic Societies.

SCIENTIFIC ABSTRACT: We review social-psychological evidence for a theoretically integrative and dynamic model of intergroup conflict escalation within democratic societies. Viewing individuals as social regulators who protect their social embeddedness (e.g., in their group or in society), the intergroup value protection model (IVPM) integrates key insights and concepts from moral and group psychology (e.g., group identification, outrage, moralization, protest) into a functional intergroup value protection process. The model assumes that social regulators are continuously looking for information diagnostic of the outgroup's intentions to terminate the relationship with the ingroup, and that their specific cognitive interpretations of an outgroup's action (i.e., as a violation of ingroup or shared values) trigger this process. The visible value-protective responses of one group can trigger the other group's value-protective responses, thus dynamically increasing chances of conflict escalation. We discuss scientific implications of integrating moral and group psychology and practical challenges for managing intergroup conflict within democratic societies. PUBLIC ABSTRACT: The 2021 Capitol Hill attack exemplifies a major "trigger event" for different groups to protect their values within a democratic society. Which specific perceptions generate such a triggering event, which value-protective responses does it trigger, and do such responses escalate intergroup conflict? We offer the intergroup value protection model to analyze the moral and group psychology of intergroup conflict escalation in democratic societies. It predicts that when group members cognitively interpret another group's actions as violating ingroup or shared values, this triggers the intergroup value protection process (e.g., increased ingroup identification, outrage, moralization, social protest). When such value-protective responses are visible to the outgroup, this can in turn constitute a trigger event for them to protect their values, thus increasing chances of intergroup conflict escalation. We discuss scientific implications and practical challenges for managing intergroup value conflict in democratic societies, including fears of societal breakdown and scope for social change.

Rethinking Norm Psychology.

Norms permeate human life. Most of people's activities can be characterized by rules about what is appropriate, allowed, required, or forbidden-rules that are crucial in making people hyper-cooperative animals. In this article, I examine the current cognitive-evolutionary account of "norm psychology" and propose an alternative that is better supported by evidence and better placed to promote interdisciplinary dialogue. The incumbent theory focuses on rules and claims that humans genetically inherit cognitive and motivational mechanisms specialized for processing these rules. The cultural-evolutionary alternative defines normativity in relation to behavior-compliance, enforcement, and commentary-and suggests that it depends on implicit and explicit processes. The implicit processes are genetically inherited and domain-general; rather than being specialized for normativity, they do many jobs in many species. The explicit processes are culturally inherited and domain-specific; they are constructed from mentalizing and reasoning by social interaction in childhood. The cultural-evolutionary, or "cognitive gadget," perspective suggests that people alive today-parents, educators, elders, politicians, lawyers-have more responsibility for sustaining normativity than the nativist view implies. People's actions not only shape and transmit the rules, but they also create in each new generation mental processes that can grasp the rules and put them into action.

When does "no" mean no? Insights from sex robots.

Although sexual assault is widely accepted as morally wrong, not all instances of sexual assault are evaluated in the same way. Here, we ask whether different characteristics of victims affect people's moral evaluations of sexual assault perpetrators, and if so, how. We focus on sex robots (i.e., artificially intelligent humanoid social robots designed for sexual gratification) as victims in the present studies because they serve as a clean canvas onto which we can paint different human-like attributes to probe people's moral intuitions regarding sensitive topics. Across four pre-registered experiments conducted with American adults on Prolific (N = 2104), we asked people to evaluate the wrongness of sexual assault against AI-powered robots. People's moral judgments were influenced by the victim's mental capacities (Studies 1 & 2), the victim's interpersonal function (Study 3), the victim's ontological type (Study 4), and the transactional context of the human-robot relationship (Study 4). Overall, by investigating moral reasoning about transgressions against AI robots, we were able to gain unique insights into how people's moral judgments about sexual transgressions can be influenced by victim attributes.

Moral Uncanny Valley revisited - how human expectations of robot morality based on robot appearance moderate the perceived morality of robot decisions in high conflict moral dilemmas.

In recent years a new sub-field of moral psychology has emerged: moral psychology of AI and robotics. In this field there are several outstanding questions on how robot appearance and other perceived properties of the robots influences the way their decisions are evaluated. Researchers have observed that robot decision are not treated identically to human decisions, even if their antecedents and consequences are identical to human decisions. To study this moral judgment asymmetry effect further, two studies with a series of high conflict moral dilemmas were conducted: Study 1 - which used photorealistic full body imagery -- revealed that utilitarian decisions by human or non-creepy (i.e., nice) looking robotic agents were less condemned than "creepy" (i.e., unease inducing) robots, whereas "creepy" robots received higher moral approval when making deontological decisions. Furthermore, an exploratory analysis demonstrated that the creepiest robot did not cause moral surprise or disappointment when making utilitarian decisions. However, Study 2 showed that mere symbolic representation of the agent's face did not trigger the Moral Uncanny Valley (where decisions of creepy robots are perceived negatively), suggesting that the effect is dependent on the photorealistic appearance of the agent. These results are in tension with some previous findings in robot moral judgment literature. Future research should focus on creating standardized stimuli for studying moral decisions involving robots and elucidating the complex interactions between agent appearance, decision type, and pre-decision expectations. This work deepens our understanding of the relationship between a decision-making agent's appearance and the moral judgment of their decisions. The findings have significant implications for the design and implementation of autonomous agents in morally charged situations.

A quantitative survey measure of moral evaluations of patient substance misuse among health professionals in California, urban France, and urban China.

BACKGROUND: The merits and drawbacks of moral relevance models of addiction have predominantly been discussed theoretically, without empirical evidence of these potential effects. This study develops and evaluates a novel survey measure for assessing moral evaluations of patient substance misuse (ME-PSM). METHODS: This measure was tested on 524 health professionals (i.e., physicians, nurses, and other health professionals) in California (n = 173), urban France (n = 102), and urban China (n = 249). Demographic factors associated with ME-PSM were investigated using analyses of variance (ANOVAs) and t-tests, with results suggesting that ME-PSM is higher among younger health professionals, nurses (when compared with physicians and other health professionals), and Chinese health professionals (when compared with French and American health professionals). RESULTS: Results provide preliminary support for the psychometric quality of the survey measure introduced in this study, including the existence of a single latent structure and partial invariance of collected data across countries. CONCLUSION: The survey measure for ME-PSM which was developed and tested in the current study appears to hold potential utility for use as a measure of moral views of patient substance misuse. With development, this measure may be used to examine moral evaluations, both as factors of stigma and of other clinical factors associated with the treatment of patients with substance use disorders.

Actual and counterfactual effort contribute to responsibility attributions in collaborative tasks.

How do people judge responsibility in collaborative tasks? Past work has proposed a number of metrics that people may use to attribute blame and credit to others, such as effort, competence, and force. Some theories consider only the actual effort or force (individuals are more responsible if they put forth more effort or force), whereas others consider counterfactuals (individuals are more responsible if some alternative behavior on their or their collaborator's part could have altered the outcome). Across four experiments (N=717), we found that participants' judgments are best described by a model that considers both actual and counterfactual effort. This finding generalized to an independent validation data set (N=99). Our results thus support a dual-factor theory of responsibility attribution in collaborative tasks.

Moral reframing increases support for economically progressive candidates.

Economically progressive candidates-candidates who champion redistributive policies designed to reduce inequality-rarely win elections in the United States. Here, we propose that progressive candidates achieve greater support by framing their policy platforms in terms of values that resonate beyond their progressive base. In two experiments (total N = 4,138), including one preregistered experiment conducted on a nationally representative probability sample, we found that a presidential candidate who framed his progressive economic platform using values consistent with the "binding" moral foundations-e.g. patriotism, family, and respect for tradition-as opposed to values consistent with the "individualizing" foundations, e.g. equality and social justice, received significantly stronger support. This effect was driven by increased support among conservatives and, unexpectedly, moderates as well. By comparison, a manipulation of how progressive the candidate's platform was had small and inconsistent effects. Despite the potential gains associated with binding framing, analyses using presidential candidates' debate speeches reveal that appeals to binding values are least common among progressive candidates. These findings show, however, that the alignment between values and candidate support is malleable, suggesting economically progressive candidates can build broader coalitions by reframing the values they associate with their platforms.

Online Moral Conformity: how powerful is a Group of Strangers when influencing an Individual's Moral Judgments during a video meeting?

People make moral decisions every day. When making such decisions, they may be influenced by their companions (a so-called moral conformity effect). Increasingly, people make decisions in online environments, like video meetings. In the current preregistered experiment, we studied the moral conformity effect in an online context. We applied an Asch conformity paradigm by asking participants (N = 120) to reply to sacrificial moral dilemmas through the online video communication tool Zoom either when sitting in a "virtual" room with strangers (confederates instructed on how to answer; experimental condition) or when sitting alone (control condition). We found that people displayed a moral conformity effect on half the dilemmas included in our study as well as in the aggregate. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04765-0.

The delusive benefit of the doubt.

Science promises benefits, some true and some illusory. Consider a scientific agnostic who thinks that to reap the true benefits of a scientific theory he does not have to believe in its theoretical posits. Instead, it is enough if he believes that the theory successfully predicts the behavior of the observables, as ultimately only such predictions matter. Say, however, that given the results of her thorough research, a psychologist proposes a theory describing a psychological mechanism underlying a certain class of normative judgments. Moreover, the mechanism seems unfit for the task-once you see the details of the mechanism, you will realize that this is not the way they should be produced. Therefore, if the psychologist is right, it seems that these normative judgments should not inform one's normative theorizing or one's actions (Greene, 2008; Greene, 2014; Kelly, 2014). And say that the agnostic accepts the psychologist's theory, trusting that it makes correct predictions about, for example, fMRI images and subjects' reaction times, as they are observable. He also thinks that if the psychologist's description of the mechanism is correct, the judgments should not be trusted. Yet, since the mechanism posited by the theory is not observable, the agnostic is agnostic about it. He thus cannot be convinced that these judgments are produced in a flawed way and, consequently, has no reason to distrust them. Scientific agnosticism comes, therefore, at the cost of dismissing normative arguments that invoke unobservable posits of psychological models. The ability to make such arguments is a true (rather than illusory) benefit of science, despite the agnostic's promise that his philosophical theory leaves intact benefits that genuinely matter.

Harm Hypervigilance in Public Reactions to Scientific Evidence.

Two preregistered studies from two different platforms with representative U.S. adult samples (N = 1,865) tested the harm-hypervigilance hypothesis in risk assessments of controversial behavioral science. As expected, across six sets of scientific findings, people consistently overestimated others' harmful reactions (medium to large average effect sizes) and underestimated helpful ones, even when incentivized for accuracy. Additional analyses found that (a) harm overestimations were associated with support for censoring science, (b) people who were more offended by scientific findings reported greater difficulty understanding them, and (c) evidence was moderately consistent for an association between more conservative ideology and harm overestimations. These findings are particularly relevant because journals have begun evaluating potential downstream harms of scientific findings. We discuss implications of our work and invite scholars to develop rigorous tests of (a) the social pressures that lead science astray and (b) the actual costs and benefits of publishing or not publishing potentially controversial conclusions.

Is Online Moral Outrage Outrageous? Rethinking the Indignation Machine.

Moral outrage is often characterized as a corrosive emotion, but it can also inspire collective action. In this article we aim to deepen our understanding of the dual nature of online moral outrage which divides people and contributes to inclusivist moral reform. We argue that the specifics of violating different types of moral norms will influence the effects of moral outrage: moral outrage against violating harm-based norms is less antagonistic than moral outrage against violating loyalty and purity/identity norms. We identify which features of social media platforms shape our moral lives. Connectivity, omniculturalism, online exposure, increased group identification and fostering what we call "expressionist experiences", all change how moral outrage is expressed in the digital realm. Finally, we propose changing the design of social media platforms and raise the issue of moral disillusion when ample moral protest in the online environment does not have the expected effects on the offline world.

Renouncing the attempt versus perpetration distinction.

Legal and moral luck goes against the basic principle of criminal law that responsibility ascriptions are based on the mental state of the perpetrator, rather than merely the outcome of her action. If outcome should not play a decisive role in responsibility ascriptions, the attempt versus perpetration distinction becomes more difficult to justify. One potential justification is that we never know whether the attempter would not have resigned from pursuing her criminal intent even at the last moment. However, this paper argues that resigning from criminal intent and trying to stop the criminal outcome, which is called the renunciation defense, can be just as subject to outcome luck as the attempt versus perpetration distinction. And yet the availability of the renunciation defense in court is outcome dependent. I show with a series of experiments (N = 479) that outcome dependence for the renunciation defense is perceived as unjust and discuss the implications for the renunciation defense as well as attempt versus perpetration distinction. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11229-022-04000-6.

Collaborative Cheating in Hierarchical Teams: Effects of Incentive Structure and Leader Behavior on Subordinate Behavior and Perceptions of Leaders.

What facilitates collaborative cheating in hierarchical teams, and what are its outcomes for those engaged? In two preregistered studies (N = 724), we investigated how subordinates are influenced by leaders signaling a willingness to engage in collaborative cheating, and how subordinates perceive such leaders. Participants performed a task in which they could either report their performance honestly, or cheat for financial gain. Each participant was assigned a leader who could choose to check the report's veracity. In Study 1, leaders who checked less often were perceived as more moral, trustworthy, competent, and psychologically closer than leaders who checked more often. This trustworthiness bonus translated to investments in a subsequent trust game. Study 2 revealed that these relationship benefits specifically arise for collaborative cheating, compared to competitive cheating (at the leader's expense). We conclude that collaborative cheating in subordinate-leader dyads strengthens in-group bonds, bringing people closer together and cultivating trust.