"When does human life begin?" teaching human embryology in the context of the American abortion debate.

The Dobbs decision of the United States Supreme Court and the actions of several state legislatures have made it risky, if not outright dangerous, to teach factual material concerning human embryology. At some state universities, for instance, if a professor's lecture is felt to teach or discuss abortion (as it might when teaching about tubal pregnancies, hydatidiform moles, or eneuploidy), that instructor risks imprisonment for up to 14 years (Gyori, 2023). Some states' new censorship rules have thus caused professors to drop modules on abortion from numerous science and humanities courses. In most states, instructors can still teach about human embryonic development and not risk putting their careers or livelihoods in jeopardy. However, even in many of these institutions, students can bring a professor to a disciplinary hearing by claiming that the instructor failed to provide ample trigger warnings on such issues. This essay attempts to provide some strategies wherein human embryology and the ethical issues surrounding it might be taught and students may be given resources to counter unscientific falsehoods about fertilization and human development. This essay provides evidence for teaching the following propositions. Mis-information about human biology and medicine is rampant on the internet, and there are skills that can be taught to students that will help them determine which sites should trusted. This is a skill that needs to be taught as part of science courses.

Best to possibly not be: A prudential argument for antinatalism.

This article starts by examining the present state of death ethics by attending to the euthanasia debate. Given that voluntary active euthanasia has seen strong support in the academic community, insights on the choiceworthiness of continued existence may be derived. Having derived cases of choiceworthy nonexistence (which I refer to as choiceworthy nonexistence [CNE] cases), I extend these intuitions to lives not worth starting, or choiceworthy nonexistence for potential people (which I refer to as foetal-CNE, or fCNE cases). Although I depart from Benatarian antinatalism by rejecting Benatar's claim that all existence is necessarily a harm, I posit a weaker argument that all existence is likely a harm since we cannot know until later in life if an existence is a harm. If I am right, then we have prudential reasons not to bear children, since they are more likely to suffer in lives not worth living than not.

Emerging post-Dobbs liability concerns for providers handling embryos.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: This review outlines novel, emerging legal risks for in-vitro fertilization (IVF) providers and patients. RECENT FINDINGS: This article reviews recent antiabortion legal developments that create novel legal risks to IVF. This article examines new potential liability for the handling or managing of embryos, and threats to safe, efficient, standard-of-care practice of IVF. It reviews established US and international judicial and regulatory frameworks based on scientifically grounded recognition of IVF embryos as deserving of 'special respect', and finds this approach to be an alternative for law and policy makers. SUMMARY: Defining life as 'beginning at fertilization' (or 'conception') or otherwise embracing 'embryonic personhood' creates emerging legal vulnerabilities and concerns for IVF patients and professionals who handle embryos and threatens standard-of-care IVF. Internationally and domestically established, scientifically grounded understandings of IVF embryos, rather than religious beliefs, should be the basis for legal frameworks that accord appropriate - but not unlimited - protections to IVF embryos. This article presents this framework as an alternative to the current path being embraced by some US policymakers and courts, as a means of protecting the rights of patients, providers and the families they create.

The beginning of becoming a human.

According to birth certificates, the life of a child begins once their body comes out of the mother's womb. But when does their organismal life begin? Science holds a palette of answers-depending on how one defines a human life. In 1984, a commission on the regulatory framework for human embryo experimentation opted not to answer this question, instead setting a boundary, 14 days post-fertilization, beyond which any experiments were forbidden. Recently, as the reproductive technologies developed and the demand for experimentation grew stronger, this boundary may be set aside leaving the ultimate decision to local oversight committees. While science has not come closer to setting a zero point for human life, there has been significant progress in our understanding of early mammalian embryogenesis. It has become clear that the 14-day stage does in fact possess features, which make it a foundational time point for a developing human. Importantly, this stage defines the separation of soma from the germline and marks the boundary between rejuvenation and aging. We explore how different levels of life organization emerge during human development and suggest a new meaning for the 14-day stage in organismal life that is grounded in recent mechanistic advances and insights from aging studies.

Eduardo Odio Pérez, un médico cubano que combatió al fascismo en España / Eduardo Odio Pérez, a Cuban doctor who fought fascism in Spain

En la Guerra Civil Española participaron médicos cubanos que integraron la sanidad militar de las fuerzas republicanas; un tema que ha suscitado diversos estudios, pero del que quedan aún aspectos por investigar. El presente trabajo se enfoca en un médico cubano que participó en la gesta internacionalista en España, el doctor Eduardo Odio Pérez. Nació en Santiago de Cuba y se graduó de médico en los EE. UU. El objetivo es contribuir al conocimiento de los médicos cubanos que participaron en la lucha contra el fascismo en España. Los resultados hacen referencia a su participación como integrante de la sanidad militar de la XV Brigada Internacional Abraham Lincoln. Prestó servicios en hospitales militares, donde se atendieron las bajas sanitarias de importantes acciones combativas del conflicto armado, como la batalla del Jarama. Alcanzó el grado de capitán y solicitó el ingreso al Partido Comunista Español. Su contribución a la lucha contra el fascismo en España es una muestra de internacionalismo y un modelo referencial para el trabajo educativo en la formación médica.

Cuban doctors participated in the Spanish Civil War as part of the military health service of the Republican forces; a topic that has been the subject of several studies, but aspects of which still remain to be investigated. The present work focuses on a Cuban physician who participated in the internationalist heroic deed in Spain, Dr. Eduardo Odio Perez. He was born in Santiago de Cuba, and graduated as a doctor in the U.S.A. The objective is to contribute to the knowledge of Cuban doctors who participated in the fight against fascism in Spain. The results refer to his participation as a member of the military health service of the XV International Abraham Lincoln Brigade. He served in military hospitals, where he attended the medical casualties of important combat actions of the armed conflict, such as the battle of Jarama. He reached the rank of captain and applied to join the Spanish Communist Party. His contribution to the fight against fascism in Spain is an example of internationalism and a reference model for educational work in medical training.

A critical view on using "life not worth living" in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.

Potentiality switches and epistemic uncertainty: the Argument from Potential in times of human embryo-like structures.

Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement-and perhaps ultimately replace-the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS-when further improved-also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP). According to the AfP, human embryos deserve special moral status because they have the unique potential to develop into persons. While some take the development of hELS to challenge the very foundations of the AfP, the ongoing debate suggests that its dismissal would be premature. Since the AfP is a spectrum of views with different moral implications, it does not need to imply that research with human embryos or hELS that (may) have 'active' potential should be completely off-limits. However, the problem with determining active potential in hELS is that this depends on development passing through 'potentiality switches' about the precise coordinates of which we are still in the dark. As long as this epistemic uncertainty persists, extending embryo research regulations to research with specific types of hELS would amount to a form of regulative precaution that as such would require further justification.

Responsibility Arguments in Defence of Abortion: When One is Morally Responsible for the Creation of a Fetus.

I argue against responsibility arguments that offer a defence of abortion even on the assumption that the fetus is a person. I focus on argumentation originally offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson and then later defended by David Boonin. I offer thought experiments meant to show that, under certain conditions, one bears moral responsibility for creating a fetus. I then offer a positive argument for when one is morally responsible for the creation of a fetus. This argument relies on the presence of other forms of sex that reasonably approximate the goods of penile-vaginal intercourse. Given the presence of these options, sexual partners who engage in penile-vaginal intercourse bear moral responsibility for the creation of the fetus. While I do not think this argument settles the abortion debate - there still may be other ways to successfully defend abortion - it does explain why responsibility arguments like those offered by Thomson fail.

Pregnancy and superior moral status: a proposal for two thresholds of personhood.

In this paper, I suggest that, if we are committed to accepting a threshold approach to personhood, according to which all beings above the threshold are persons with equal moral status, there are strong reasons to also recognise a second threshold that would be reached through human pregnancy, and that would confer on pregnant women a temporary superior moral status. This proposal is not based on the moral status of the fetus, but on the moral status of the pregnant woman. It is not only the fetus which is an organism sui generis: the pregnant woman, also, is a unique being. Following almost any view on the moral status of the fetus, the pregnant woman should be regarded, herself, as more than a singular individual. She is, herself, 'more than one'. Pregnant women are also necessary for the continued survival of the human species, and there are important justice-based reasons to recognise the higher status. Furthermore, the recognition of a superior moral status for pregnant women does not imply that pregnancy should always be viewed as desirable, or imply any position on the permissibility of abortion. My proposal is not as radical as it might seem, as it does not require that pregnant women should always receive superior treatment, but only that they should to some extent. It could have a range of potential positive practical consequences. Finally, my approach does not threaten, but rather promotes, human equality.

Less is more: Antibiotics at the beginning of life.

Antibiotic exposure at the beginning of life can lead to increased antimicrobial resistance and perturbations of the developing microbiome. Early-life microbiome disruption increases the risks of developing chronic diseases later in life. Fear of missing evolving neonatal sepsis is the key driver for antibiotic overtreatment early in life. Bias (a systemic deviation towards overtreatment) and noise (a random scatter) affect the decision-making process. In this perspective, we advocate for a factual approach quantifying the burden of treatment in relation to the burden of disease balancing antimicrobial stewardship and effective sepsis management.

Miscarriage, Abortion, and Disease.

The frequency of death from miscarriage is very high, greater than the number of deaths from induced abortion or major diseases. Berg (2017 , Philosophical Studies 174:1217-26) argues that, given this, those who contend that personhood begins at conception (PAC) are obliged to reorient their resources accordingly-towards stopping miscarriage, in preference to stopping abortion or diseases. This argument depends on there being a basic moral similarity between these deaths. I argue that, for those that hold to PAC, there are good reasons to think that there is no such similarity. There is a morally relevant difference between preventing killing and letting die, giving PAC supporters reasons to prioritize reducing abortion over reducing miscarriage. And the time-relative interest account provides a morally relevant difference in the badness of death of miscarriages and deaths of born adults, justifying attempts to combat major diseases over attempts to combat miscarriage. I consider recent developments in the literature and contend that these new arguments are unsuccessful in establishing moral similarities between deaths from miscarriage and abortion, and deaths from miscarriage and disease.

Orphans cannot be after-birth aborted: a response to Bobier.

I offer a response to an objection to my account of the moral difference between fetuses and newborns, an account that seeks to address an analogy between abortion and infanticide, which is based on the apparent equality of moral value of fetuses and newborns.

Human equality arguments against abortion.

In this paper, I argue that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism-equality between non-disabled human adults-implies fetal personhood. Since the most plausible bases for human value are in being human, or in a gradated property, and since the latter of which implies an inequality between non-disabled adult humans, I conclude that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human-an attribute which fetuses have.

Facts and doubts on the beginning of human life - scientific, legal, philosophical and religious controversies.

It is very complicated to give correct answer to the question "How to define human life?" Nowadays dilemmas consider the respect of human life from the birth to death involve not just biology but also other sciences like philosophy, theology, sociology, psychology, law and politics. These sciences evaluate the topic from different points of view. Integration of all of these perspectives could result with a proper definition. The principal purpose of this paper is to try to determine when a human individual begins. If this proves to be too difficult, we might have to settle for a specific stage in the reproductive process before which it would be impossible to say with any plausibility that a human individual exists. It is necessary to return the moral dimension of observation to the science of life. The point is to reconcile the universal ethical principles concerning the absolute value of life with the everyday challenges and dilemmas. It is our deepest conviction that life has an absolute value and that there always remains something indestructible and substantial in life, which may neither be evaluated by anything final, nor completely reduced to the material biological equivalent and the genetic substratum.

Egalitarianism, moral status and abortion: a reply to Miller.

Calum Miller recently argued that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism-equality between non-disabled human adults-implies fetal personhood. Miller claims that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human-an attribute which fetuses have-therefore, abortion is likely to be morally wrong. In this paper, I offer a plausible defence for the view that equality between non-disabled human adults does not imply fetal personhood. I also offer a challenge for Miller's view.

Saúde mental e abortamento voluntário na audiência pública da ADPF442/STF / Mental health and voluntary abortion in the public hearing of ADPF442/STF / Salud mental y aborto voluntario en la audiencia pública del ADPF442/STF

O estudo teve como objetivo identificar os argumentos da estratégia de persuasão dos discursos apresentados na audiência pública sobre a Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental-ADPF 442, realizada em 2018, cujo propósito era discutir sobre a interrupção voluntária da gravidez até a 12ª semana. Para tal, foi realizada uma pesquisa de abordagem qualitativa, analítico-descritiva e documental. O objeto de análise foi o registro da audiência, apresentado em vídeo, disponibilizado na plataforma digital YouTube, e em ata lavrada pelo STF, ambos de acesso público. A partir de uma análise do discurso, identificou-se os argumentos utilizados na estratégia de persuasão, que foram sistematizados em quatro categorias de argumentos para cada um dos dois grupos identificados: o grupo pró e o grupo contra a descriminalização do aborto. As três primeiras categorias, Saúde mental, Direito e Saúde pública, mesmo com diferenças na forma de apresentar o argumento, se repetem nos dois grupos. Todavia, a quarta categoria, Pressupostos, se diferenciou. No grupo pró descriminalização do aborto, apresentou-se como Pressupostos filosóficos e científicos, e no grupo contra, como Pressupostos morais. Por fim, a defesa da saúde mental das mulheres foi o principal argumento numa forma de humanizar o sofrimento vivido pelas que desejam abortar e não encontram o suporte do Estado para assegurar sua dignidade, cidadania e efetiva igualdade, garantidas constitucionalmente.(AU)

The study aimed to identify the arguments of the persuasion strategy of the speeches presented at the public hearing on the Action Against the Violation of Constitutional Fundamental Rights -ADPF 442, held in 2018, whose purpose was to discuss the voluntary interruption of pregnancy until the 12th week. To this end, a qualitative, analytical-descriptive, and documentary research was carried out. The object of analysis was the video recording of the hearing available on the YouTube platform, and in minutes drawn up by the STF, both of which are public. Based on a discourse analysis, the arguments used in the persuasion strategy were identified, which were systematized into four categories of arguments for each of the two identified groups: the group for and the group against the decriminalization of abortion. The first three categories, Mental Health, Law and Public Health, even with differences in the way of presenting the argument, are repeated in both groups. However, the fourth category, Assumptions, differed. In the group for the decriminalization of abortion, it was presented as Philosophical and Scientific Assumptions, whereas the group against, as Moral Assumptions. Finally, the defense of women's mental health was the main argument in a way of humanizing the suffering experienced by those who wish to have an abortion and do not find the support of the State to guarantee their dignity, citizenship, and effective equality, constitutionally guaranteed.(AU)

El estudio tuvo como objetivo identificar los argumentos de la estrategia de persuasión de los discursos presentados en la audiencia pública sobre el Argumento por Incumplimiento de un Percepto Fundamental -ADPF 442, realizada en 2018, con el objetivo de discutir la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo hasta la 12.ª semana. Para ello, se llevó a cabo una investigación cualitativa, analítico-descriptiva y documental. El objeto de análisis fue la grabación de la audiencia, que está disponible en la plataforma digital YouTube, y actas levantadas por el Supremo Tribunal Federal -STF, ambas de acceso público. A partir de un análisis del discurso se identificaron los argumentos utilizados en la estrategia de persuasión, los cuales se sistematizaron en cuatro categorías de argumentos para cada uno de los dos grupos identificados: el grupo pro y el grupo en contra de la despenalización del aborto. Las tres primeras categorías ("salud mental", "derecho" y "salud pública") aún con diferencias en la forma de presentar el argumento se repiten en ambos grupos. Pero difiere la cuarta categoría "supuestos". En el grupo a favor de la despenalización del aborto se presentó como "supuestos filosóficos y científicos", y en el grupo en contra, como "supuestos morales". Finalmente, la defensa de la salud mental de las mujeres fue el principal argumento en un intento por humanizar el sufrimiento que viven aquellas que desean abortar y no encuentran el apoyo del Estado para garantizar su dignidad, ciudadanía e igualdad efectiva, preconizadas por la Constitución.(AU)