Evidence-based severity assessment: Impact of repeated versus single open-field testing on welfare in C57BL/6J mice.

According to current guidelines on animal experiments, a prospective assessment of the severity of each procedure is mandatory. However, so far, the classification of procedures into different severity categories mainly relies on theoretic considerations, since it is not entirely clear which of the various procedures compromise the welfare of animals, or, to what extent. Against this background, a systematic empirical investigation of the impact of each procedure, including behavioral testing, seems essential. Therefore, the present study was designed to elucidate the effects of repeated versus single testing on mouse welfare, using one of the most commonly used paradigms for behavioral phenotyping in behavioral neuroscience, the open-field test. In an independent groups design, laboratory mice (Mus musculus f. domestica) experienced either repeated, single, or no open-field testing - procedures that are assigned to different severity categories. Interestingly, testing experiences did not affect fecal corticosterone metabolites, body weights, elevated plus-maze or home cage behavior differentially. Thus, with respect to the assessed endocrinological, physical, and behavioral outcome measures, no signs of compromised welfare could be detected in mice that were tested in the open-field repeatedly, once, or, not at all. These findings challenge current classification guidelines and may, furthermore, stimulate systematic research on the severity of single procedures involving living animals.

IL PROBLEMA DELL'«ANIMA DEI BRUTI¼ NELL'OPERA DI ALESSANDRO PASCOLI: DA CARTESIO AL VITALISMO.

By means of the analysis of three works (Dell'anima de' bruti [Of the soul of beasts], Sofilo Molossio, and Sofilo senza maschera [Sofilo without a mask]) of Alessandro Pascoli (1669-1757), the psysician and philosopher from Perugia, the article reconstructs his fluctuating thought with regard to the problem of sensation in animals, indicated as the problem of the "soul of beasts." Regarding this question, Pascoli oscillates between, on the one hand, the Cartesian theory, which considered animals similar to mechanical automatons, devoid of the capacity to experience sensations (that is say, devoid of "sensitivity"); and, on the other hand, the Church's scholastic-peripatetic doctrine that attributed to animals the capacity to feel, thus affirming the presence in them of a "sensitive soul," considered -as compared with the human one -imperfect, material, and mortal. In expounding the reasons and argumentations of the Cartesians, on the one hand, and of the ecclesiastic teachings, on the other, Pascoli manifests a substantial convergence with the former, but also the need, inasmuch as Catholic professor of medicine at the Sapienza University of Rome, to not deny the possibility of the latter. In this tormented and contorted alternation of opinions, between the thesis of the animal-machine and that of the animal gifted with a sensitive soul, he introduces conceptual elements that, further developed, will end up by conducting to the ideas of "vital property" and of "vital principle" typical of the vitalistic thought of the 18th and 19th centuries.