Is evidence-based practice justified?-A philosophical critique.

BACKGROUND: Evidence-based practice is the principle governing a range of healthcare practices and beyond. However, it has suffered from a lack of philosophical rigour. This paper sets out to analyse the epistemological basis of evidence-based practice. METHOD: The paper uses a conceptual analysis. First, it describes the implicit epistemology at work in evidence-based practice. Second, it evaluates the implicit epistemological basis. RESULTS: The analysis indicates that evidence-based practice lacks an explicit epistemological basis. It shows, moreover, that the implicit epistemological basis is untenable. CONCLUSION: There is a need to re-think the epistemological basis for evidence-based practice. Evidence-based practice is out of touch with developments within philosophy of science.

Why we should not "help bad choosers:" screening, nudging, and epistemic risk.

One prominent line of support for nudging in screening programs is the claim that nudging can help 'bad choosers' - that is, it can help some patients make choices more in line with their own values and preferences. In this article, I argue that due to the presence of epistemic risk in many screening programs, the argument that nudging can help 'bad choosers' should be revised or rejected. Expanding on the work of Biddle, J. B. 2020. Epistemic risks in cancer screening: Implications for ethics and policy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 79: 101200.), I argue that epistemic risk undermines the argument that nudging can help to promote patient autonomy in the context of screening. Specifically, I argue that epistemic risk results in the inclusion of non-patient values and preferences in the screening process, which challenges the claim that nudging can help patients make choices more in line with their own values and preferences. I present four reasons to think epistemic risk undermines the argument in this way: (1) conflicting values; (2) lack of transparency; (3) limited autonomy in opting out; (4) unjustified manipulation. The presence of epistemic risk in screening programs means that nudging may not always be an effective means of promoting patient autonomy and informed consent. As such, epistemic risk poses significant challenges to at least one ethical justification of nudging in screening programs, and raises further questions about the role of nudging in promoting patient decision-making.

The Pragmatist roots of scientific medicine: Reassessing Abraham Flexner's report on medical education.

Abraham Flexner's 1910 report on medical education is widely regarded as a watershed moment in the history of modern medicine in the US and beyond. Most commentators focus on its administrative and managerial impact, despite Flexner dedicating a sizeable portion of his report to a theoretical account of the kind of medicine that he seeks to implement. Close attention to these sections reveals a surprisingly coherent account of medicine that, based on a Deweyan Pragmatist philosophy of science, unites scientific investigator and medical practitioner in a new experimental paradigm of science. Flexner can develop an account that goes beyond a mere epistemic redefinition of medicine, providing the profession with a social, cultural, and ethical identity that avails itself of the extremely wide purview that Dewey granted to modern science. Due to the subsequent narrowing of philosophy of science to a delimited academic subdiscipline, these broad Pragmatist philosophical commitments at the roots of Flexner's scientific medicine remained a largely unexplored intellectual legacy.

Toward a new clinical pragmatism: method in clinical ethics consultation.

In this paper, I leverage the pragmatist tradition in philosophy, the collective wisdom of scholarship in clinical ethics consultation, and earlier attempts to apply pragmatism in clinical ethics to develop a new vision of clinical ethics practice called New Clinical Pragmatism. It argues that clinical ethics methodology, from the New Clinical Pragmatist's perspective, amounts to the recommendation that consultants should customize a methodological approach, drawing on the various available methods, depending on the demands of the specific case, and should avoid attempts to identify a 'true' methodology but to the incoherence and inevitable failure of those attempts. I argue that pragmatism's emphasis on practical wisdom and experimentation allow the New Clinical Pragmatist to do this while avoiding irrationality in choosing methods. I discuss how the New Clinical Pragmatist gives a unique, constructive perspective on key aspects of clinical ethics consultation such as the choice of common morality vs. internal morality of medicine approaches, process standards, bioethics mediation, and narrative ethics, and suggest how New Clinical Pragmatism's relaxed approach to choice of methodology encourages consultants to balance attention to the particulars of the case with knowledge of what the many insightful scholars of clinical ethics methodology have found useful in the past. I also argue that New Clinical Pragmatism is consistent with efforts to professionalize clinical ethics consultation.

Learning from disability studies to introduce the role of the individual to naturalistic accounts of disease.

Disability studies have been successfully focusing on individuals' lived experiences, the personalization of goals, and the constitution of the individual in defining disease and restructuring public understandings of disability. Although they had a strong influence in the policy making and medical modeling of disease, their framework has not been translated to traditional naturalistic accounts of disease. I will argue that, using new developments in evolutionary biology (Extended Evolutionary Synthesis [EES] about questions of proper function) and behavioral ecology (Niche conformance and construction about the questions of reference classes in biostatistics accounts), the main elements of the framework of disability studies can be used to represent life histories at the conceptual level of the two main "non-normative" accounts of disease. I chose these accounts since they are related to medicine in a more descriptive way. The success of the practical aspects of disability studies this way will be communicated without causing injustice to the individual since they will represent the individuality of the patient in two main naturalistic accounts of disease: the biostatistical account and the evolutionary functional account. Although most accounts criticizing the concept of disease as value-laden do not supply a positive element, disability studies can supply a good point for descriptive extension of the concept through inclusion of epistemic agency.

Cognitive Enhancement, Hyperagency, and Responsibility Explosion.

Hyperagency objections appeal to the risk that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control. I charitably formulate and engage with a prominent version of this objection due to Sandel (2009) -viz., that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by creating an "explosion" of responsibilities. I first outline why this worry might look prima facie persuasive, and then I show that it can ultimately be defended against. At the end of the day, if we are to resist cognitive enhancement, it should not be based on a Sandel-style hyperagency argument.

Phrenitis and the pathology of the mind in western medical thought (fifth century BCE to twentieth century cE).

Phrenitis is ubiquitous in ancient medicine and philosophy. Galen mentions the disease innumerable times, Patristic authors take it as a favourite allegory of human flaws, and no ancient doctor fails to diagnose it and attempt its cure. Yet the nature of this once famous disease has not been properly understood by scholars. My book provides the first full history of phrenitis. In doing so, it surveys ancient ideas about the interactions between body and soul, both in health and in disease. It also addresses ancient ideas about bodily health, mental soundness and moral 'goodness', and their heritage in contemporary psychiatry, offering a chance to reflect critically on contemporary ideas about what it means to be 'insane'.

Wakefield's Harm-Based Critique of the Biostatistical Theory.

Jerome Wakefield criticizes my biostatistical analysis of the pathological-as statistically subnormal biological part-functional ability relative to species, sex, and age-for its lack of a harm clause. He first charges me with ignoring two general distinctions: biological versus medical pathology, and disease of a part versus disease of a whole organism. He then offers 10 counterexamples that, he says, are harmless dysfunctions but not medical disorders. Wakefield ends by arguing that we need a harm clause to explain American psychiatry's 1973 decision to declassify homosexuality. I reply, first, that his two distinctions are philosophic fantasies alien to medical usage, invented only to save his own harmful-dysfunction analysis (HDA) from a host of obvious counterexamples. In any case, they do not coincide with the harmless/harmful distinction. In reality, medicine admits countless chronic diseases that are, contrary to Wakefield, subclinical for most of their course, as well as many kinds of typically harmless skin pathology. As for his 10 counterexamples, no medical source he cites describes them as he does. I argue that none of his examples contradicts the biostatistical analysis: all either are not part-dysfunctions (situs inversus, incompetent sperm, normal-flora infection) or are indeed classified as medical disorders (donated kidney, Typhoid Mary's carrier status, latent tuberculosis or HIV, cherry angiomas). And if Wakefield's HDA fits psychiatry, the fact that it does not fit medicine casts doubt on psychiatry's status as a medical specialty.

Indignity of Nazi data: reflections on the utilization of illicit research.

Human rights may feel self-apparent to us, but less than 80 years ago, one of the most advanced countries at the time acted based on an utterly contrary ideology. The view of social Darwinism that abandoned the idea of the intrinsic value of human lives instead argued that oppression of the inferior is not only inevitable but desirable. One of the many catastrophic outcomes is the medical data obtained from inhuman experiments at concentration camps. Ethical uncertainty over whether the resulting insights should be a part of the medical literature provides a chance to consider the seemingly irreplaceable social construct of human dignity. Would any medical benefit justify the utilization of this illicit data? Would utilization even qualify as an insult to the dignity of the exploited subjects, or is this a question about intersubjective meaning? This work discusses the wisdom in blind adherence to human dignity, the possibility of retrospective insults, moral complicity, contrary viewpoints, and possible resolutions.

Patient autonomy in the era of the sustainability crisis.

In the realm of medical ethics, the foundational principle of respecting patient autonomy holds significant importance, often emerging as a central concern in numerous ethically complex cases, as authorizing medical assistance in dying or healthy limb amputation on patient request. Even though advocates for either alternative regularly utilize prima facie principles to resolve ethical dilemmas, the interplay between these principles is often the core of the theoretical frameworks. As the ramifications of the sustainability crisis become increasingly evident, there is a growing need to integrate awareness for sustainability into medical decision-making, thus reintroducing potential conflict with patient autonomy. The contention of this study is that the ethical standards established in the 20th century may not adequately address the challenges that have arisen in the 21st century. The author suggests an advanced perception of patient autonomy that prioritizes fostering patients' knowledge, self-awareness, and sense of responsibility, going beyond a sole focus on their intrinsic values. Empowering patients could serve as a tool to align patient autonomy, beneficence, and the aim to reduce resource consumption.

An "ethics of strangers"? On knowing the patient in clinical ethics.

The shape and function of ethical imperatives may vary if the context is an interaction between strangers, or those who are well acquainted. This idea, taken up from Stephen Toulmin's distinction between an "ethics of strangers" and an "ethics of intimacy", can be applied to encounters in healthcare. There are situations where healthcare personnel (HCP) know their patients (corresponding to an "ethics of intimacy") and situations where HCP do not know their patients (corresponding to "an ethics of strangers"). Does it make a difference for normative imperatives that follow from central concepts and principles in medical ethics whether HCP know their patients or not? In our view, this question has not yet been answered satisfactorily. Once we have clarified what is meant by "knowing the patient", we will show that the distinction is particularly relevant with regard to some thorny questions of autonomy in healthcare (e.g., regarding advance directives or paternalism in the name of autonomy), whereas the differences with regard to imperatives following from the principles of justice and beneficence seem to be smaller. We provide a detailed argument for why knowing the patient is ethically valuable in encounters in healthcare. Consequently, healthcare systems should provide fertile ground for HCP to get to know their patients, and structures that foster therapeutic continuity. For this to succeed, a number of questions still need to be clarified, which is an important task for medical ethics.

A critical and systematic literature review of epistemic justice applied to healthcare: recommendations for a patient partnership approach.

Invalidation from healthcare practitioners is an experience shared by many patients, especially those marginalized or living with contested conditions (e.g., chronic pain, fibromyalgia, etc.). Invalidation can include not taking someone's testimony seriously, imposing one's thoughts, discrediting someone's emotions, or not perceiving someone's testimony as equal and competent. Epistemic injustices, that is, the disqualification of a person as a knower, are a form of invalidation. Epistemic injustices have been used as a theoretical framework to understand invalidation that occurs in the patient-healthcare provider relationship. However, to date, the different recommendations to achieve epistemic justice have not been listed, analyzed, nor compared yet. This paper aims at better understanding the state of the literature and to critically review possible avenues to achieve epistemic justice in healthcare. A systematic and critical review of the existing literature on epistemic justice was conducted. The search in four databases identified 629 articles, from which 35 were included in the review. Strategies to promote epistemic justice that can be applied to healthcare are mapped in the literature and sorted in six different approaches to epistemic justice, including virtuous, structural, narrative, cognitive, and partnership approaches, as well as resistance strategies. These strategies are critically appraised. A patient partnership approach based on the Montreal Model, implemented at all levels of healthcare systems, seems promising to promote epistemic justice in healthcare.

Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity.

A common justification for abortion rights is that the death of the fetus does not violate any of the fetus's time-relative interests. The time-relative interest account (TRIA) of harm and wrongdoing tells us that a necessary condition for harming someone is that his or her time-relative interests are frustrated. Regarding the justification for abortion, this account falls prey to impairment arguments. Impairment arguments entertain cases of prenatal injury, such as the mother using illicit drugs that disable the child. The intuition is that the child who is born with such disabilities is harmed by the mother's drug use. But it is unclear what time-relative interest is violated in cases of prenatal harm. Typical responses to impairment arguments point out that the abortion case is different because the child does not exist to experience such harms; but in prenatal injury + survival cases, the child does live to experience those harms. Thus, the TRIA justification for abortion is not impugned by impairment counter-examples. This article argues that this response to impairment arguments is viciously circular. The response must say that so long as you kill the child, no harm is done. But this assumes that killing itself is morally inconsequential and is not itself a case of harm. The response to impairment arguments, then, assumes the permissibility of abortion.

Unshared Minds, Decaying Worlds: Towards a Pathology of Chronic Loneliness.

The moment when a person's actual relationships fall short of desired relationships is commonly identified as the etiological moment of chronic loneliness, which can lead to physical and psychological effects like depression, worse recovery from illness and increased mortality. But, this etiology fails to explain the nature and severe impact of loneliness. Here, we use philosophical analysis and neuroscience to show that human beings develop and maintain our world-picture (our sense of what is true, important, and good) through joint attention and action, motivated by friendship, in the Aristotelian sense of "other selves" who share a sense of the true and the good, and desire the good for each other as much as for themselves. The true etiological event of loneliness is the moment one's world-picture becomes unshared. The pathogenesis is a resultant decay of our world-picture, with brain and behavior changes following as sequelae.

Do Not Risk Homicide: Abortion After 10 Weeks Gestation.

When an abortion is performed, someone dies. Are we killing a human person? Widespread disagreement exists. However, it is not necessary to establish personhood in order to establish the wrongness of abortion: a substantial chance of personhood is enough. We defend The Do Not Risk Homicide Argument: abortions are wrong after 10 weeks gestation because they substantially and unjustifiably risk homicide, the unjust killing of a human person. Why 10 weeks? Because the cumulative evidence establishes a substantial chance (a more than one in five chance) that preborn human beings are persons after 10 weeks (if not before then). We submit evidence from our bad track record, widespread disagreement about personhood (after 10 weeks gestation), problems with theories of personhood, the similarity between preborn human beings and premature newborns, miscalculations of gestational age, and the common intuitive responses of women to their pregnancies and miscarriages. Our argument is cogent because it bypasses the stalemate over preborn personhood and rests on common ground rather than contentious metaphysics. It also strongly suggests that society must do more to protect preborn human beings. We briefly discuss its practical implications for fetal pain relief, social policy, and abortion law.

Ethical Problems of Observational Studies and Big Data Compared to Randomized Trials.

The temptation to use prospective observational studies (POS) instead of conducting difficult trials (RCTs) has always existed, but with the advent of powerful computers and large databases, it can become almost irresistible. We examine the potential consequences, were this to occur, by comparing two hypothetical studies of a new treatment: one RCT, and one POS. The POS inevitably submits more patients to inferior research methodology. In RCTs, patients are clearly informed of the research context, and 1:1 randomized allocation between experimental and validated treatment balances risks for each patient. In POS, for each patient, the risks of receiving inferior treatment are impossible to estimate. The research context and the uncertainty are down-played, and patients and clinicians are at risk of becoming passive research subjects in studies performed from an outsider's view, which potentially has extraneous objectives, and is conducted without their explicit, autonomous, and voluntary involvement and consent.

What Happens When the Zygote Divides? On the Metaphysics of Monozygotic Twinning.

It is often argued that certain metaphysical complications surrounding the phenomenon of monozygotic twinning force us to conclude that, prior to the point at which twinning is no longer possible, the zygote or early embryo cannot be considered an individual human organism. In this essay, I argue, on the contrary, that there are in fact several ways of making sense of monozygotic twinning that uphold the humanity of the original zygote, but also that there is no easy answer to what happens when the human zygote twins. All of the options available carry with them one or more surprising, alarming, or otherwise counterintuitive implications. All things considered, I conclude that the "budding option," according to which the original human organism present before twinning carries on as one of the resulting embryos but not the other, is the most plausible explanation of what happens when a human zygote twins.

What We Argue About When We Argue About Death.

The literature on the determination of death has often if not always assumed that the concept of human death should be defined in terms of the end of the human organism. I argue that this broadly biological conceptualization of human death cannot constitute a basis for agreement in a pluralistic society characterized by a variety of reasonable views on the nature of our existence as embodied beings. Rather, following Robert Veatch, I suggest that we must define death in moralized terms, as the loss of an especially significant sort of moral standing. Departing from Veatch, however, I argue that we should not understand death in terms of the loss of all moral status whatsoever. Rather, I argue, what we should argue about, when we argue about death, is when and why people lose their rights-claims to the protection and promotion of their basic bodily functioning.