Serological analysis in humans in Malaysian Borneo suggests prior exposure to H5 avian influenza near migratory shorebird habitats.

Cases of H5 highly pathogenic avian influenzas (HPAI) are on the rise. Although mammalian spillover events are rare, H5N1 viruses have an estimated mortality rate in humans of 60%. No human cases of H5 infection have been reported in Malaysian Borneo, but HPAI has circulated in poultry and migratory avian species transiting through the region. Recent deforestation in coastal habitats in Malaysian Borneo may increase the proximity between humans and migratory birds. We hypothesise that higher rates of human-animal contact, caused by this habitat destruction, will increase the likelihood of potential zoonotic spillover events. In 2015, an environmentally stratified cross-sectional survey was conducted collecting geolocated questionnaire data in 10,100 individuals. A serological survey of these individuals reveals evidence of H5 neutralisation that persisted following depletion of seasonal H1/H3 HA binding antibodies from the plasma. The presence of these antibodies suggests that some individuals living near migratory sites may have been exposed to H5 HA. There is a spatial and environmental overlap between individuals displaying high H5 HA binding and the distribution of migratory birds. We have developed a novel surveillance approach including both spatial and serological data to detect potential spillover events, highlighting the urgent need to study cross-species pathogen transmission in migratory zones.

Detection of airborne wild waterbird-derived DNA demonstrates potential for transmission of avian influenza virus via air inlets into poultry houses, the Netherlands, 2021 to 2022.

BackgroundOutbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) on poultry farms and in wild birds worldwide persists despite intensified control measures. It causes unprecedented mortality in bird populations and is increasingly affecting mammalian species. Better understanding of HPAI introduction pathways into farms are needed for targeted disease prevention and control. The relevance of airborne transmission has been suggested but research involving air sampling is limited and unequivocal evidence on transmission routes is lacking.AimWe aimed to investigate whether HPAI virus from wild birds can enter poultry houses through air inlets by characterising host materials through eukaryote DNA sequencing.MethodsWe collected particulate matter samples in and around three HPAI-affected poultry farms which were cleared and decontaminated before sampling. Indoor measurements (n = 61) were taken directly in the airflow entering through air inlets, while outdoor air samples (n = 60) were collected around the poultry house. Positive controls were obtained from a bird rehabilitation shelter. We performed metabarcoding on environmental DNA by deep sequencing 18S rRNA gene amplicons.ResultsWe detected waterbird DNA in air inside all three, and outside of two, poultry farms. Sequences annotated at species level included swans and tufted ducks. Waterbird DNA was present in all indoor and outdoor air samples from the bird shelter.ConclusionAirborne matter derived from contaminated wild birds can potentially introduce HPAI virus to poultry houses through air inlets. The eDNA metabarcoding could assess breaches in biosecurity for HPAI virus and other pathogens potentially transmitted through air via detection of their hosts.

Detection and spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1 in the Antarctic Region.

Until recent events, the Antarctic was the only major geographical region in which high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) had never previously been detected. Here we report on the detection of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic regions of South Georgia and the Falkland Islands, respectively. We initially detected H5N1 HPAIV in samples collected from brown skuas at Bird Island, South Georgia on 8th October 2023. Since this detection, mortalities were observed in several avian and mammalian species at multiple sites across South Georgia. Subsequent testing confirmed H5N1 HPAIV across several sampling locations in multiple avian species and two seal species. Simultaneously, we also confirmed H5N1 HPAIV in southern fulmar and black-browed albatross in the Falkland Islands. Genetic assessment of the virus indicates spread from South America, likely through movement of migratory birds. Critically, genetic assessment of sequences from mammalian species demonstrates no increased risk to human populations above that observed in other instances of mammalian infections globally. Here we describe the detection, species impact and genetic composition of the virus and propose both introductory routes and potential long-term impact on avian and mammalian species across the Antarctic region. We also speculate on the threat to specific populations following recent reports in the area.

Exponential stability and fixed-time control of a stochastic avian influenza model with spatial diffusion and nonlocal delay.

Spatial heterogeneity, random disturbances in the external environment, and the incubation period of infected individuals collectively have a significant impact on the outbreak of avian influenza. In this paper, a stochastic susceptible-infective-susceptible-infected-recovered (SI-SIR) avian influenza model is established that incorporates spatial diffusion and nonlocal delay. The existence and uniqueness of mild solutions are established by applying the Banach fixed point theorem, the truncation method, and the semigroup approach. Based on the Borel-Cantelli lemma, the mean-square exponential stability and almost sure exponential stability of the mild solution are analyzed. Additionally, in combination with the Lyapunov theory, a fixed-time control strategy is proposed to achieve stability within the desired settling time. Numerical simulations are conducted to validate the impacts of key parameters and enhance the understanding of the results of the theory.

Neu5Gc binding loss of subtype H7 influenza A virus facilitates adaptation to gallinaceous poultry following transmission from waterbirds.

Between 2013 and 2018, the novel A/Anhui/1/2013 (AH/13)-lineage H7N9 virus caused at least five waves of outbreaks in humans, totaling 1,567 confirmed human cases in China. Surveillance data indicated a disproportionate distribution of poultry infected with this AH/13-lineage virus, and laboratory experiments demonstrated that this virus can efficiently spread among chickens but not among Pekin ducks. The underlying mechanism of this selective transmission remains unclear. In this study, we demonstrated the absence of Neu5Gc expression in chickens across all respiratory and gastrointestinal tissues. However, Neu5Gc expression varied among different duck species and even within the tissues of the same species. The AH/13-lineage viruses exclusively bind to acetylneuraminic acid (Neu5Ac), in contrast to wild waterbird H7 viruses that bind both Neu5Ac and N-glycolylneuraminic acid (Neu5Gc). The level of Neu5Gc expression influences H7 virus replication and facilitates adaptive mutations in these viruses. In summary, our findings highlight the critical role of Neu5Gc in affecting the host range and interspecies transmission dynamics of H7 viruses among avian species.IMPORTANCEMigratory waterfowl, gulls, and shorebirds are natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses (IAVs) that can occasionally spill over to domestic poultry, and ultimately humans. This study showed wild-type H7 IAVs from waterbirds initially bind to glycan receptors terminated with N-acetylneuraminic acid (Neu5Ac) or N-glycolylneuraminic acid (Neu5Gc). However, after enzootic transmission in chickens, the viruses exclusively bind to Neu5Ac. The absence of Neu5Gc expression in gallinaceous poultry, particularly chickens, exerts selective pressure, shaping IAV populations, and promoting the acquisition of adaptive amino acid substitutions in the hemagglutinin protein. This results in the loss of Neu5Gc binding and an increase in virus transmissibility in gallinaceous poultry, particularly chickens. Consequently, the transmission capability of these poultry-adapted H7 IAVs in wild water birds decreases. Timely intervention, such as stamping out, may help reduce virus adaptation to domestic chicken populations and lower the risk of enzootic outbreaks, including those caused by IAVs exhibiting high pathogenicity.

Ecology and evolution of avian influenza viruses.

Four types of influenza virus have been identified in nature: influenza A, B, and C viruses are capable of infecting humans, and influenzas A and B cause annual epidemics (seasonal flu) in humans; however, influenza D is currently known to infect only pigs and cattle. The influenza A viruses (IAVs) are of greatest importance to humans, causing widespread significant morbidity and mortality, and have been responsible for at least five pandemics documented since the beginning of the 20th century (Table 1). The H1N1 and H3N2 IAVs continue to circulate in humans as seasonal influenza. In addition to humans, IAVs have a wide range of host animal species in nature, especially wild aquatic birds, the reservoir hosts of IAVs. The IAVs isolated from or adapted to an avian host are named avian influenza viruses (AIVs), and are of great concern owing to their involvement in the genesis of pandemic and outbreak strains. Moreover, the majority of AIVs persist in wild birds and domestic poultry, and novel variants continue to emerge in birds and other hosts, posing non-negligible threats to host ecology and public health.

H5N1 influenza: Urgent questions and directions.

H5N1 is an avian influenza virus that causes respiratory disease in birds and several land and sea mammals. The recent outbreak in the United States, including infection of dairy workers, has increased the concern around potential transmission and spread. We asked virologists, epidemiologists, and public health experts what the most urgent questions and action points are at this stage of the outbreak.

Can 'cow flu' be eliminated-or is it too late?

Feeble government response and lack of industry cooperation hamper U.S. control efforts.

Stop H5N1 influenza in US cattle now.

The relentless march of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) strain, known as H5N1, to become an unprecedented panzootic continues unchecked. The leap of H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b from Eurasia and Africa to North America in 2021 and its further spread to South America and the Antarctic have exposed new avian and mammalian populations to the virus and led to outbreaks on an unrivaled scale. The virus has infected wild birds across vast geographic regions and caused wildlife deaths in some of the world's most biodiverse ecosystems. Hundreds of millions of poultry have died or been culled, affecting global food security in some of the world's poorest regions. Numerous mammalian species, including sea lions and fur animals, have been infected. Outbreaks in dairy cows in the United States have been occurring for months, seemingly unchecked in most affected states. Why is there not a greater sense of urgency to control these infections?

Evaluating the epizootic and zoonotic threat of an H7N9 low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (LPAIV) variant associated with enhanced pathogenicity in turkeys.

Between 2013 and 2017, the A/Anhui/1/13-lineage (H7N9) low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus (LPAIV) was epizootic in chickens in China, causing mild disease, with 616 fatal human cases. Despite poultry vaccination, H7N9 has not been eradicated. Previously, we demonstrated increased pathogenesis in turkeys infected with H7N9, correlating with the emergence of the L217Q (L226Q H3 numbering) polymorphism in the haemagglutinin (HA) protein. A Q217-containing virus also arose and is now dominant in China following vaccination. We compared infection and transmission of this Q217-containing 'turkey-adapted' (ty-ad) isolate alongside the H7N9 (L217) wild-type (wt) virus in different poultry species and investigated the zoonotic potential in the ferret model. Both wt and ty-ad viruses demonstrated similar shedding and transmission in turkeys and chickens. However, the ty-ad virus was significantly more pathogenic than the wt virus in turkeys but not in chickens, causing 100 and 33% mortality in turkeys respectively. Expanded tissue tropism was seen for the ty-ad virus in turkeys but not in chickens, yet the viral cell receptor distribution was broadly similar in the visceral organs of both species. The ty-ad virus required exogenous trypsin for in vitro replication yet had increased replication in primary avian cells. Replication was comparable in mammalian cells, and the ty-ad virus replicated successfully in ferrets. The L217Q polymorphism also affected antigenicity. Therefore, H7N9 infection in turkeys can generate novel variants with increased risk through altered pathogenicity and potential HA antigenic escape. These findings emphasize the requirement for enhanced surveillance and understanding of A/Anhui/1/13-lineage viruses and their risk to different species.

H5 and H9 avian influenza - potential re-emergent zoonotic threats to humans.

PURPOSE OF REVIEW: This review aims to discuss the current state of human infections with Avian Influenza A (H5) and (H9) viruses, to support awareness of the global epidemiology among clinicians and public health professionals interested in emerging respiratory infections. RECENT FINDINGS: Among increasing numbers of detections in avian species of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b globally, reported human cases of severe infection have been rare.Enhanced surveillance of persons exposed to avian species infected with Influenza A (H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b in different countries has identified small numbers of asymptomatic individuals with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) detected by PCR from the upper respiratory tract; some of these instances have been considered to represent contamination rather than infection.There have also been recent sporadic human cases of Avian Influenza A(H9N2) internationally, including in China and Cambodia. SUMMARY: Human infections with Avian Influenza A(H5) and (H9) viruses remain of interest as an emerging infection both to clinicians and public health professionals. While maintaining effective surveillance is essential, one health strategies to control infection in avian species will be key to mitigating these risks.