RESUMEN
This study examines the use of the Track One prioritized patent examination program by pharmaceutical manufacturers from 2011 to 2022.
Asunto(s)
Patentes como Asunto , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Humanos , Industria Farmacéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados Unidos , Preparaciones FarmacéuticasRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB), the agency that regulates the prices of patented medicines in Canada, published proposed amendments to the regulatory framework in December 2017. Because of a series of changes and delays, the revised policy has not yet been finalized. We sought to evaluate the potential early impact of the uncertainty about the PMPRB policy on patented-medicine launches. METHODS: We developed a retrospective cohort of patented medicines (molecules) sold in Canada and the 13 countries that the PMPRB currently uses or has proposed to use as price comparators, from sales data from the IQVIA MIDAS database for 2012-2021. The outcome was whether a molecule was launched (i.e., sold) in a specific country within 2 years of its global first launch (2-yr launch). We compared the change of 2-year launch before (2012-2017) and after the proposed amendments were published ("uncertain period," 2018-2021) in Canada with the change in the United States and the other 12 countries as a group ("other-countries group"), using interrupted time series and logistic regressions, respectively. We further conducted analyses for each individual country and subgroups by molecule characteristics, such as therapeutic benefit, separately. RESULTS: We included 242 and 107 new molecules launched before publication of the proposed amendments and during the uncertain period, respectively. The corresponding 2-year launch proportions were 45.0% and 30.8% in Canada, 81.4% and 82.2% in the US, and 83.9% and 70.1% in the other-countries group. All analyses showed changes in 2-year launch during the uncertain period in the US and in the other-countries group that were similar to the changes in Canada. Greater decreases were observed in Norway and Sweden than in Canada. The 2-year launch proportion for molecules with major therapeutic benefit decreased from 45.8% to 31.3% in Canada during the uncertain period and from 87.5% to 62.5% in the other-countries group, but increased from 91.7% to 100% in the US. INTERPRETATION: No negative impact of the PMPRB-policy uncertainty on molecule launches was observed when comparing Canada with price-comparator countries, except for molecules with major therapeutic benefit. The reduction in launches of medicines with major therapeutic benefit in Canada requires continuing investigation.
Asunto(s)
Costos de los Medicamentos , Patentes como Asunto , Canadá , Estudios Retrospectivos , Humanos , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Costos de los Medicamentos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados Unidos , Comercio/legislación & jurisprudencia , Comercio/economíaRESUMEN
PURPOSE: The generic drug industry currently faces multiple, serious issues that threaten the US drug supply. So-called "skinny labels" are one of the few tools authorized by Congress to expedite entry into the market by generic competitors when the first patent for a brand's drug compound (only) expires. This article reviews the law on this expedited marketing pathway for generic competitors, as well as limitations on its use. METHODS: We examined the literature on patent protection of brand drugs, including the timelines for production of generic competitors. We also examined the law concerning skinny labels, including a recent decision of the US Federal Circuit Court that clearly articulates the guidelines concerning entry into the generic market, including labeling, marketing, and promotion. FINDINGS: Skinny labels that follow the regulations set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act, including the necessary carve-out procedure for "methods of use" still protected by 1 or more active patents, do not infringe a brand drug's label. Furthermore, the skinny label does not induce or contribute to infringement merely because its label contains US Food and Drug Administration-required safety profile data-even when the data cross-reference superiority studies on still-patent protected methods of use elsewhere in the label. IMPLICATIONS: Generic drugs have become essential to the broad, general availability of clinical therapeutic agents. The Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to facilitate entry of generic competitors into the marketplace, and the skinny label is an important tool to accomplish that end. As long as the generic manufacturer follows the essential skinny-label rules, specifically including marketing the compound without promoting or advertising those methods of use still protected by ongoing patents, the law will not find induced or contributory infringement.
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Etiquetado de Medicamentos , Medicamentos Genéricos , Competencia Económica , Humanos , Industria Farmacéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Etiquetado de Medicamentos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados Unidos , United States Food and Drug Administration/legislación & jurisprudenciaRESUMEN
Importance: The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) oversight role in the pharmaceutical market is critical to the health of patients and the health care system. This study characterized the FTC's policy on the pharmaceutical market in recent decades, identifying the types of actions it has favored, barriers it has faced, and authorities that remain untested. Objective: To review FTC legal actions in the pharmaceutical market from 2000-2022. Evidence Review: Legal actions were determined through manual review of search results from the FTC's online Legal Library as well as a 2023 FTC report on pharmaceutical actions. The alleged misconduct, type of legal action taken, timing, and outcome were collected from press releases, complaints, orders, and other legal documents. Findings: From 2000-2022, the FTC challenged 62 mergers, brought 22 enforcement actions against allegedly unlawful business practices, and made 1 rule related to pharmaceuticals. Alleged misconduct in enforcement actions involved anticompetitive settlements in patent litigation (n = 11), unilateral actions by brand manufacturers to delay generic competition (n = 6), noncompete agreements (n = 4), and monopolization (n = 3), with 10 outcomes involving monetary payment, totaling $1.6 billion. Of the 62 mergers the FTC challenged, 61 were allowed to continue, 58 after divesting certain drugs to third-party competitors. The FTC's reliance on drug divestitures decreased from 18 drugs per year from 2000-2017 to 4.3 per year from 2017-2023. Conclusions and Relevance: The FTC brought about 1 enforcement action and 3 merger actions per year against pharmaceutical manufacturers from 2000-2022, pursuing a small fraction of the estimated misconduct and consolidation in the pharmaceutical marketplace. Although the FTC faces substantial legal and practical limitations, important tools remain untested, including a rule defining "unfair methods of competition," that may allow it to more effectively prevent repetitive patterns of anticompetitive behavior.
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Industria Farmacéutica , Legislación de Medicamentos , Medicamentos bajo Prescripción , United States Federal Trade Commission , Humanos , Industria Farmacéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Competencia Económica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medicamentos bajo Prescripción/economía , Estados UnidosAsunto(s)
Comercio , Industria Farmacéutica , Economía Farmacéutica , Política de Salud , Preparaciones Farmacéuticas , Humanos , Comercio/economía , Comercio/legislación & jurisprudencia , Costos de los Medicamentos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Industria Farmacéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Industria Farmacéutica/economía , Economía Farmacéutica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Preparaciones Farmacéuticas/economía , Estados Unidos , United States Food and Drug Administration/economía , United States Food and Drug Administration/legislación & jurisprudencia , Política de Salud/economía , Política de Salud/legislación & jurisprudenciaRESUMEN
In this Policy Forum piece, Robin Feldman discusses how current legislation contributes to informational deficits around drug patents for biologic drugs in the United States.
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Biosimilares Farmacéuticos , Propiedad Intelectual , Estados Unidos , Humanos , Productos Biológicos , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Legislación de Medicamentos , United States Food and Drug Administration/legislación & jurisprudenciaRESUMEN
The availability of biomaterials is a key component of health research and the development of new health-technologies (including, diagnostics, medicines, and vaccines). People are often encouraged by biobanks to donate samples altruistically to such biobanks. While empirical evidence suggests many donors are motivated by the desire to contribute towards developing new health-technologies for society. However, a tension can arise as health-technologies whose development is contributed to by donors' biomaterials will often be protected by intellectual property rights (IPRs), including patents. Patents give rightsholders control over how patented technologies are used and can be used in a way that impedes public access to technologies developed. Yet, there are no binding European legal obligations mandating disclosure to donors of how IPRs can operate over downstream health-technologies and how they could impact access to health-technologies developed, nor are there legally binding obligations to ensure public accessibility of technologies developed. Focusing on the bioethical implications posed, this article argues that the current situation can impact donors' autonomy and dignity interests. A more holistic approach is needed for biobank donation, which embeds a consideration of donors' expectations/interests from the point of donation through to how such samples are used and how health-technologies developed are accessed. We put forward avenues that seek to address such issues.
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Bancos de Muestras Biológicas , Propiedad Intelectual , Humanos , Bancos de Muestras Biológicas/legislación & jurisprudencia , Bancos de Muestras Biológicas/ética , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Tecnología Biomédica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Tecnología Biomédica/ética , Donantes de Tejidos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Discusiones Bioéticas/legislación & jurisprudenciaRESUMEN
Cambodia has experienced exponential economic growth in recent years and is expected to graduate from least developed country (LDC) status within the next decade. Membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will require Cambodia to grant product and process patents for pharmaceuticals upon LDC graduation. This study aims to measure the impact of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) on the price of HIV and hepatitis C medicine in Cambodia once it graduates from LDC status and is obliged to make patents available for pharmaceutical products and processes. Using scenarios based on likely outcomes of accession to the TRIPS Agreement, it measures the impact on the price of the HIV treatment program and compares that impact with the hepatitis C treatment program. Graduation from LDC status would be expected to result in a modest increase in the cost of the antiretroviral (ARV) treatment program and very large increases in the cost of the direct acting antivirals (DAA) treatment program. If annual treatment budgets remain constant, patent protection could see 1,515 fewer people living with HIV able to access ARV treatment and 2,577 fewer people able to access DAA treatment (a drop in treatment coverage of 93%).
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Infecciones por VIH , Accesibilidad a los Servicios de Salud , Hepatitis C , Propiedad Intelectual , Cambodia/epidemiología , Humanos , Hepatitis C/tratamiento farmacológico , Hepatitis C/epidemiología , Infecciones por VIH/tratamiento farmacológico , Infecciones por VIH/epidemiología , Accesibilidad a los Servicios de Salud/legislación & jurisprudencia , Accesibilidad a los Servicios de Salud/estadística & datos numéricos , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Países en Desarrollo/economía , Antivirales/uso terapéutico , Antivirales/provisión & distribución , Antivirales/economía , Cooperación Internacional/legislación & jurisprudencia , Fármacos Anti-VIH/uso terapéutico , Fármacos Anti-VIH/economía , Costos de los MedicamentosRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Patent protection of therapeutic antibodies and T cell receptors is an important tool to enable the path to the market. In view of the substantial spendings for R&D and regulatory approval, sponsors expect exclusivity for their drug for a given period of time. Different categories exist to protect therapeutic antibodies and T cell receptors. One of these categories are epitope-based patent claims, with regard to which in the different jurisdictions, different patentability standards exist, which, furthermore, are constantly changed by courts and lawmakers. OBJECTIVE: This article tries to explain the patentability issues related to epitope-based patent claims. METHODS: For this purpose, an overview is given on the respective legal provisions and court decisions. RESULTS: The study reveals that the respective patentability standards are constantly changed by courts and lawmakers. CONCLUSIONS: Companies developing therapeutic antibodies or T cell receptors need to consider these developments in their strategic planning.
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Epítopos , Patentes como Asunto , Receptores de Antígenos de Linfocitos T , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Humanos , Epítopos/inmunología , Receptores de Antígenos de Linfocitos T/inmunología , Receptores de Antígenos de Linfocitos T/uso terapéutico , Anticuerpos/uso terapéutico , Anticuerpos/inmunologíaRESUMEN
This cross-sectional study identifies the prevalence of patents on risk evaluation and mitigation strategies and their association with delaying generic competition.
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Medicamentos Genéricos , Patentes como Asunto , Medicamentos bajo Prescripción , Evaluación y Mitigación de Riesgos , Costos de los Medicamentos , Industria Farmacéutica , Medicamentos Genéricos/uso terapéutico , Competencia Económica , Evaluación y Mitigación de Riesgos/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados Unidos , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudenciaRESUMEN
This study examines the frequency of drug patent invalidations based on inequitable conduct.
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Patentes como Asunto , Preparaciones Farmacéuticas , Mala Conducta Científica , United States Food and Drug Administration , Patentes como Asunto/ética , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Mala Conducta Científica/ética , Mala Conducta Científica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados UnidosAsunto(s)
Inteligencia Artificial , Invenciones , Patentes como Asunto , Invenciones/economía , Invenciones/legislación & jurisprudencia , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Inteligencia Artificial/economía , Inteligencia Artificial/legislación & jurisprudencia , Descubrimiento de Drogas/economía , Descubrimiento de Drogas/legislación & jurisprudenciaRESUMEN
Importance: Glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists were first approved for the treatment of type 2 diabetes in 2005. Demand for these drugs has increased rapidly in recent years, as indications have expanded, but they remain expensive. Objective: To analyze how manufacturers of brand-name GLP-1 receptor agonists have used the patent and regulatory systems to extend periods of market exclusivity. Evidence Review: The annual US Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations was used to identify GLP-1 receptor agonists approved from 2005 to 2021 and to record patents and nonpatent statutory exclusivities listed for each product. Google Patents was used to extract additional data on patents, including whether each was obtained on the delivery device or another aspect of the product. The primary outcome was the duration of expected protection from generic competition, defined as the time elapsed from FDA approval until expiration of the last-to-expire patent or regulatory exclusivity. Findings: On the 10 GLP-1 receptor agonists included in the cohort, drug manufacturers listed with the FDA a median of 19.5 patents (IQR, 9.0-25.8) per product, including a median of 17 patents (IQR, 8.3-22.8) filed before FDA approval and 1.5 (IQR, 0-2.8) filed after FDA approval. Fifty-four percent of all patents listed on GLP-1 receptor agonists were on the delivery devices rather than active ingredients. Manufacturers augmented patent protection with a median of 2 regulatory exclusivities (IQR, 0-3) obtained at approval and 1 (IQR, 0.3-4.3) added after approval. The median total duration of expected protection after FDA approval, when accounting for both preapproval and postapproval patents and regulatory exclusivities, was 18.3 years (IQR, 16.0-19.4). No generic firm has successfully challenged patents on GLP-1 receptor agonists to gain FDA approval. Conclusions and Relevance: Patent and regulatory reform is needed to ensure timely generic entry of GLP-1 receptor agonists to the market.
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Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2 , Aprobación de Drogas , Medicamentos Genéricos , Receptor del Péptido 1 Similar al Glucagón , Hipoglucemiantes , Patentes como Asunto , Humanos , Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2/tratamiento farmacológico , Diabetes Mellitus Tipo 2/economía , Aprobación de Drogas/legislación & jurisprudencia , Medicamentos Genéricos/economía , Medicamentos Genéricos/uso terapéutico , Receptor del Péptido 1 Similar al Glucagón/agonistas , Preparaciones Farmacéuticas/economía , Hipoglucemiantes/economía , Hipoglucemiantes/uso terapéutico , Patentes como Asunto/legislación & jurisprudencia , Estados Unidos , Equivalencia Terapéutica , Comercio , Competencia Económica/economía , Competencia Económica/legislación & jurisprudencia , Factores de TiempoRESUMEN
This Viewpoint discusses a current Supreme Court lawsuit, Amgen v Sanofi, involving Amgen's broad patents on PCSK9 that could effectively prevent other manufacturers from producing similar or even clinically superior antibodies, with important negative consequences for patients.