Pay-for-performance and low back pain with interaction of overwork: findings from the cross-sectional Korean working conditions survey.

Background: Pay-for-performance (PFP) is a type of incentive system where employees receive monetary rewards for meeting predefined standards. While previous research has investigated the relationship between PFP and health outcomes, the focus has primarily been on mental health. Few studies have explored the impact of PFP on specific physical symptoms like pain. Methods: Data from the Korean Working Conditions Survey (KWCS) was analyzed, encompassing 20,815 subjects with information on PFP and low back pain (LBP). The associations between types of base pay (BP) and PFP with LBP were examined using multivariate logistic regression models, taking into account a directed acyclic graph (DAG). The interaction of overtime work was further explored using stratified logistic regression models and the relative excess risk for interaction. Results: The odds ratio (OR) for individuals receiving both BP and PFP was statistically significant at 1.19 (95% CI 1.04-1.35) compared to those with BP only. However, when the DAG approach was applied and necessary correction variables were adjusted, the statistical significance indicating a relationship between PFP and LBP vanished. In scenarios without PFP and with overtime work, the OR related to LBP was significant at 1.54 (95% CI 1.35-1.75). With the presence of PFP, the OR increased to 2.02 (95% CI 1.66-2.45). Conclusion: Pay-for-performance may influence not just psychological symptoms but also LBP in workers, particularly in conjunction with overtime work. The impact of management practices related to overtime work on health outcomes warrants further emphasis in research.

Can financial incentives improve access to care? Evidence from a French experiment on specialist physicians.

In France, addressing balance billing is essential for equitable healthcare access and reducing physician income disparities. The National Health Insurance (NHI) introduced financial incentive programs, namely the "Contract for Access to Care" (CAS) in 2014 and the "Option for Controlled Pricing" (OPTAM) in 2017, to encourage physicians to reduce extra fees and adhere to regulated prices. This study analyzed the impact of these programs on self-employed physicians using a comprehensive administrative dataset covering specialist physicians from 2005 to 2017. The dataset comprised 9891 surgical specialists (30,972 observations) and 6926 medical specialists (21,650 observations) between 2005 and 2017. Applying a difference-in-differences design with a two-way fixed effect model and matching through the "Coarsened Exact Matching" method, the study examined CAS and/or OPTAM membership effects on physicians' activity and fees. The results indicate that both the CAS and OPTAM successfully enhance access to care. Physicians treat more patients, particularly those with lower incomes who might have previously avoided care because of the extra fees. However, an increased patient load translates to a higher workload for physicians. Despite a fee increase, it was observed to be smaller than the surge in activity. Furthermore, if all physicians are appropriately rewarded for their efforts, this improvement in access comes at a cost to NHI. This study's findings provide crucial insights into the nuanced effects of these financial incentive programs on physicians' behavior, highlighting the tradeoff between improved access and increased NHI costs. Ultimately, these findings underscore the complexity of balancing financial incentives, physician workload, and healthcare accessibility in pursuit of a more equitable healthcare system.

Social Risk and Dialysis Facility Performance in the First Year of the ESRD Treatment Choices Model.

Importance: The End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model randomly selected 30% of US dialysis facilities to receive financial incentives based on their use of home dialysis, kidney transplant waitlisting, or transplant receipt. Facilities that disproportionately serve populations with high social risk have a lower use of home dialysis and kidney transplant raising concerns that these sites may fare poorly in the payment model. Objective: To examine first-year ETC model performance scores and financial penalties across dialysis facilities, stratified by their incident patients' social risk. Design, Setting, and Participants: A cross-sectional study of 2191 US dialysis facilities that participated in the ETC model from January 1 through December 31, 2021. Exposure: Composition of incident patient population, characterized by the proportion of patients who were non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, living in a highly disadvantaged neighborhood, uninsured, or covered by Medicaid at dialysis initiation. A facility-level composite social risk score assessed whether each facility was in the highest quintile of having 0, 1, or at least 2 of these characteristics. Main Outcomes and Measures: Use of home dialysis, waitlisting, or transplant; model performance score; and financial penalization. Results: Using data from 125 984 incident patients (median age, 65 years [IQR, 54-74]; 41.8% female; 28.6% Black; 11.7% Hispanic), 1071 dialysis facilities (48.9%) had no social risk features, and 491 (22.4%) had 2 or more. In the first year of the ETC model, compared with those with no social risk features, dialysis facilities with 2 or more had lower mean performance scores (3.4 vs 3.6, P = .002) and lower use of home dialysis (14.1% vs 16.0%, P < .001). These facilities had higher receipt of financial penalties (18.5% vs 11.5%, P < .001), more frequently had the highest payment cut of 5% (2.4% vs 0.7%; P = .003), and were less likely to achieve the highest bonus of 4% (0% vs 2.7%; P < .001). Compared with all other facilities, those in the highest quintile of treating uninsured patients or those covered by Medicaid experienced more financial penalties (17.4% vs 12.9%, P = .01) as did those in the highest quintile in the proportion of patients who were Black (18.5% vs 12.6%, P = .001). Conclusions: In the first year of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' ETC model, dialysis facilities serving higher proportions of patients with social risk features had lower performance scores and experienced markedly higher receipt of financial penalties.

The mechanics of risk adjustment and incentives for coding intensity in Medicare.

OBJECTIVE: To study diagnosis coding intensity across Medicare programs, and to examine the impacts of changes in the risk model adopted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for 2024. DATA SOURCES AND STUDY SETTING: Claims and encounter data from the CMS data warehouse for Traditional Medicare (TM) beneficiaries and Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollees. STUDY DESIGN: We created cohorts of MA enrollees, TM beneficiaries attributed to Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), and TM non-ACO beneficiaries. Using the 2019 Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) software from CMS, we computed HCC prevalence and scores from base records, then computed incremental prevalence and scores from health risk assessments (HRA) and chart review (CR) records. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: We used CMS's 2019 random 20% sample of individuals and their 2018 diagnosis history, retaining those with 12 months of Parts A/B/D coverage in 2018. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Measured health risks for MA and TM ACO individuals were comparable in base records for propensity-score matched cohorts, while TM non-ACO beneficiaries had lower risk. Incremental health risk due to diagnoses in HRA records increased across coverage cohorts in line with incentives to maximize risk scores: +0.9% for TM non-ACO, +1.2% for TM ACO, and + 3.6% for MA. Including HRA and CR records, the MA risk scores increased by 9.8% in the matched cohort. We identify the HCC groups with the greatest sensitivity to these sources of coding intensity among MA enrollees, comparing those groups to the new model's areas of targeted change. CONCLUSIONS: Consistent with previous literature, we find increased health risk in MA associated with HRA and CR records. We also demonstrate the meaningful impacts of HRAs on health risk measurement for TM coverage cohorts. CMS's model changes have the potential to reduce coding intensity, but they do not target the full scope of hierarchies sensitive to coding intensity.

The impact of removing financial incentives and/or audit and feedback on chlamydia testing in general practice: A cluster randomised controlled trial (ACCEPt-able).

BACKGROUND: Financial incentives and audit/feedback are widely used in primary care to influence clinician behaviour and increase quality of care. While observational data suggest a decline in quality when these interventions are stopped, their removal has not been evaluated in a randomised controlled trial (RCT), to our knowledge. This trial aimed to determine whether chlamydia testing in general practice is sustained when financial incentives and/or audit/feedback are removed. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We undertook a 2 × 2 factorial cluster RCT in 60 general practices in 4 Australian states targeting 49,525 patients aged 16-29 years for annual chlamydia testing. Clinics were recruited between July 2014 and September 2015 and were followed for up to 2 years or until 31 December 2016. Clinics were eligible if they were in the intervention group of a previous cluster RCT where general practitioners (GPs) received financial incentives (AU$5-AU$8) for each chlamydia test and quarterly audit/feedback reports of their chlamydia testing rates. Clinics were randomised into 1 of 4 groups: incentives removed but audit/feedback retained (group A), audit/feedback removed but incentives retained (group B), both removed (group C), or both retained (group D). The primary outcome was the annual chlamydia testing rate among 16- to 29-year-old patients, where the numerator was the number who had at least 1 chlamydia test within 12 months and the denominator was the number who had at least 1 consultation during the same 12 months. We undertook a factorial analysis in which we investigated the effects of removal versus retention of incentives (groups A + C versus groups B + D) and the effects of removal versus retention of audit/feedback (group B + C versus groups A + D) separately. Of 60 clinics, 59 were randomised and 55 (91.7%) provided data (group A: 15 clinics, 11,196 patients; group B: 14, 11,944; group C: 13, 11,566; group D: 13, 14,819). Annual testing decreased from 20.2% to 11.7% (difference -8.8%; 95% CI -10.5% to -7.0%) in clinics with incentives removed and decreased from 20.6% to 14.3% (difference -7.1%; 95% CI -9.6% to -4.7%) where incentives were retained. The adjusted absolute difference in treatment effect was -0.9% (95% CI -3.5% to 1.7%; p = 0.2267). Annual testing decreased from 21.0% to 11.6% (difference -9.5%; 95% CI -11.7% to -7.4%) in clinics where audit/feedback was removed and decreased from 19.9% to 14.5% (difference -6.4%; 95% CI -8.6% to -4.2%) where audit/feedback was retained. The adjusted absolute difference in treatment effect was -2.6% (95% CI -5.4% to -0.1%; p = 0.0336). Study limitations included an unexpected reduction in testing across all groups impacting statistical power, loss of 4 clinics after randomisation, and inclusion of rural clinics only. CONCLUSIONS: Audit/feedback is more effective than financial incentives of AU$5-AU$8 per chlamydia test at sustaining GP chlamydia testing practices over time in Australian general practice. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry ACTRN12614000595617.

The 2018 Merit-based Incentive Payment System: Participation, Performance, and Payment Across Specialties.

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) incorporates financial incentives and penalties intended to drive clinicians towards value-based purchasing, including alternative payment models (APMs). Newly available Medicare-approved qualified clinical data registries (QCDRs) offer specialty-specific quality measures for clinician reporting, yet their impact on clinician performance and payment adjustments remains unknown. OBJECTIVES: We sought to characterize clinician participation, performance, and payment adjustments in the MIPS program across specialties, with a focus on clinician use of QCDRs. RESEARCH DESIGN: We performed a cross-sectional analysis of the 2018 MIPS program. RESULTS: During the 2018 performance year, 558,296 clinicians participated in the MIPS program across the 35 specialties assessed. Clinicians reporting as individuals had lower overall MIPS performance scores (median [interquartile range (IQR)], 80.0 [39.4-98.4] points) than those reporting as groups (median [IQR], 96.3 [76.9-100.0] points), who in turn had lower adjustments than clinicians reporting within MIPS APMs (median [IQR], 100.0 [100.0-100.0] points) (P<0.001). Clinicians reporting as individuals had lower payment adjustments (median [IQR], +0.7% [0.1%-1.6%]) than those reporting as groups (median [IQR], +1.5% [0.6%-1.7%]), who in turn had lower adjustments than clinicians reporting within MIPS APMs (median [IQR], +1.7% [1.7%-1.7%]) (P<0.001). Within a subpopulation of 202,685 clinicians across 12 specialties commonly using QCDRs, clinicians had overall MIPS performance scores and payment adjustments that were significantly greater if reporting at least 1 QCDR measure compared with those not reporting any QCDR measures. CONCLUSIONS: Collectively, these findings highlight that performance score and payment adjustments varied by reporting affiliation and QCDR use in the 2018 MIPS.

Primary care bonus payments and patient-reported access in urban Ontario: a cross-sectional study.

BACKGROUND: Rurality strongly correlates with higher pay-for-performance access bonuses, despite higher emergency department use and fewer primary care services than in urban settings. We sought to evaluate the relation between patient-reported access to primary care and access bonus payments in urban settings. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional, secondary data analysis using Ontario survey and health administrative data from 2013 to 2017. We used administrative data to calculate annual access bonuses for eligible urban family physicians. We linked this payment data to adult (≥ 16 yr) patient data from the Health Care Experiences Survey to examine the relation between access bonus achievement (in quintiles of the proportion of bonus achieved, from lowest [Q1, reference category] to highest [Q5]) and 4 patient-reported access outcomes. The average survey response rate to the patient survey during the study period was 51%. We stratified urban geography into large, medium and small settings. In a multilevel regression model, we adjusted for patient-, physician- and practice-level covariates. We tested linear trends, adjusted for clustering, for each outcome. RESULTS: We linked 18 893 respondents to 3940 physicians in 414 bonus-eligible practices. Physicians in small urban settings earned the highest proportion of their maximum potential access bonuses. Access bonus achievement was positively associated with telephone access (Q2 odds ratio [OR] 1.18, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.98-1.42; Q3 OR 1.34, 95% CI 1.10-1.63; Q4 OR 1.46, 95% CI 1.19-1.79; Q5 OR 1.87, 95% CI 1.50-2.33), after hours access (Q2 OR 1.26, 95% CI 1.09-1.47; Q3 OR 1.46, 95% CI 1.23-1.74; Q4 OR 1.77, 95% CI 1.46-2.15; Q5 OR 1.88, 95% CI 1.52-2.32), wait time for care (Q2 OR 1.01, 95% CI 0.85-1.20; Q3 OR 1.17, 95% CI 0.97-1.41; Q4 OR 1.27, 95% CI 1.05-1.55; Q5 OR 1.63, 95% CI 1.32-2.00) and timeliness (Q2 OR 1.29, 95% CI 0.98-1.69; Q3 OR 1.29, 95% CI 0.94-1.77; Q4 OR 1.58, 95% CI 1.16-2.13; Q5 OR 1.98, 95% CI 1.38-2.82). When stratified by geography, we observed several of these associations in large urban settings, but not in small urban settings. Trend tests were statistically significant for all 4 outcomes. INTERPRETATION: Although the access bonus correlated with access in larger urban settings, it did not in smaller settings, aligning with previous research questioning its utility in smaller geographies. The access bonus may benefit from a redesign that considers geography and patient experience.

Plastic Surgeon Financial Compensation-Incentivization Models in Surgical Care Delivery: The Past, Present, and Future.

BACKGROUND: Surgeons are critical for the success of any health care enterprise. However, few studies have examined the potential impact of value-based care on surgeon compensation. METHODS: This review presents value-based financial incentive models that will shape the future of surgeon compensation. The following incentivization models will be discussed: pay-for-reporting, pay-for-performance, pay-for-patient-safety, bundled payments, and pay-for-academic-productivity. Moreover, the authors suggest the application of the congruence model-a model developed to help business leaders understand the interplay of forces that shape the performance of their organizations-to determine surgeon compensation methods applicable in value-based care-centric environments. RESULTS: The application of research in organizational behavior can assist health care leaders in developing surgeon compensation models optimized for value-based care. Health care leaders can utilize the congruence model to determine total surgeon compensation, proportion of compensation that is short term versus long term, proportion of compensation that is fixed versus variable, and proportion of compensation based on seniority versus performance. CONCLUSION: This review provides a framework extensively studied by researchers in organizational behavior that can be utilized when designing surgeon financial compensation plans for any health care entity shifting toward value-based care.

Effect of Financial Incentives for Process, Outcomes, or Both on Cholesterol Level Change: A Randomized Clinical Trial.

Importance: Financial incentives may improve health behaviors. It is unknown whether incentives are more effective if they target a key process (eg, medication adherence), an outcome (eg, low-density lipoprotein cholesterol [LDL-C] levels), or both. Objective: To determine whether financial incentives awarded daily for process (adherence to statins), awarded quarterly for outcomes (personalized LDL-C level targets), or awarded for process plus outcomes induce reductions in LDL-C levels compared with control. Design, Setting, and Participants: A randomized clinical trial was conducted from February 12, 2015, to October 3, 2018; data analysis was performed from October 4, 2018, to May 27, 2021, at the University of Pennsylvania Health System, Philadelphia. Participants included 764 adults with an active statin prescription, elevated risk of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, suboptimal LDL-C level, and evidence of imperfect adherence to statin medication. Interventions: Interventions lasted 12 months. All participants received a smart pill bottle to measure adherence and underwent LDL-C measurement every 3 months. In the process group, daily financial incentives were awarded for statin adherence. In the outcomes group, participants received incentives for achieving or sustaining at least a quarterly 10-mg/dL LDL-C level reduction. The process plus outcomes group participants were eligible for incentives split between statin adherence and quarterly LDL-C level targets. Main Outcomes and Measures: Change in LDL-C level from baseline to 12 months, determined using intention-to-treat analysis. Results: Of the 764 participants, 390 were women (51.2%); mean (SD) age was 62.4 (10.0) years, 310 (40.6%) had diabetes, 298 (39.0%) had hypertension, and mean (SD) baseline LDL-C level was 138.8 (37.6) mg/dL. Mean LDL-C level reductions from baseline to 12 months were -36.9 mg/dL (95% CI, -42.0 to -31.9 mg/dL) among control participants, -40.0 mg/dL (95% CI, -44.7 to -35.4 mg/dL) among process participants, -41.6 mg/dL (95% CI, -46.3 to -37.0 mg/dL) among outcomes participants, and -42.8 mg/dL (95% CI, -47.4 to -38.1 mg/dL) among process plus outcomes participants. In exploratory analysis among participants with diabetes and hypertension, no spillover effects of incentives were detected compared with the control group on hemoglobin A1c level and blood pressure over 12 months. Conclusions and Relevance: In this randomized clinical trial, process-, outcomes-, or process plus outcomes-based financial incentives did not improve LDL-C levels vs control. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02246959.

Association Between the Physician Quality Score in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Hospital Performance in Hospital Compare in the First Year of the Program.

Importance: The scientific validity of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) quality score as a measure of hospital-level patient outcomes is unknown. Objective: To examine whether better physician performance on the MIPS quality score is associated with better hospital outcomes. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study of 38 830 physicians used data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Physician Compare (2017) merged with CMS Hospital Compare data. Data analysis was conducted from September to November 2020. Main Outcomes and Measures: Linear regression was used to examine the association between physician MIPS quality scores aggregated at the hospital level and hospitalwide measures of (1) postoperative complications, (2) failure to rescue, (3) individual postoperative complications, and (4) readmissions. Results: The study cohort of 38 830 clinicians (5198 [14.6%] women; 12 103 [31.6%] with 11-20 years in practice) included 6580 (17.2%) general surgeons, 8978 (23.4%) orthopedic surgeons, 1617 (4.2%) vascular surgeons, 582 (1.5%) cardiac surgeons, 904 (2.4%) thoracic surgeons, 18 149 (47.4%) anesthesiologists, and 1520 (4.0%) intensivists at 3055 hospitals. The MIPS quality score was not associated with the hospital composite rate of postoperative complications. MIPS quality scores for vascular surgeons in the 11th to 25th percentile, compared with those in the 51st to 100th percentile, were associated with a 0.55-percentage point higher hospital rate of failure to rescue (95% CI, 0.06-1.04 percentage points; P = .03). MIPS quality scores for cardiac surgeons in the 1st to 10th percentile, compared with those in the 51st to 100th percentile, were associated with a 0.41-percentage point higher hospital coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) mortality rate (95% CI, 0.10-0.71 percentage points; P = .01). MIPS quality scores for cardiac surgeons in the 1st to 10th percentile and 11th to 25th percentile, compared with those in the 51st to 100th percentile, were associated with 0.65-percentage point (95% CI, 0.013-1.16 percentage points; P = .02) and 0.48-percentage point (95% CI, 0.07-0.90 percentage points; P = .02) higher hospital CABG readmission rates, respectively. Conclusions and Relevance: In this study, better performance on the physician MIPS quality score was associated with better hospital surgical outcomes for some physician specialties during the first year of MIPS.

Using Consistently Low Performance to Identify Low-Quality Physician Groups.

Importance: There has been a growth in the use of performance-based payment models in the past decade, but inherently noisy and stochastic quality measures complicate the assessment of the quality of physician groups. Examining consistently low performance across multiple measures or multiple years could potentially identify a subset of low-quality physician groups. Objective: To identify low-performing physician groups based on consistently low performance after adjusting for patient characteristics across multiple measures or multiple years for 10 commonly used quality measures for diabetes and cardiovascular disease (CVD). Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study used medical and pharmacy claims and laboratory data for enrollees ages 18 to 65 years with diabetes or CVD in an Aetna health insurance plan between 2016 and 2019. Each physician group's risk-adjusted performance for a given year was estimated using mixed-effects linear probability regression models. Performance was correlated across measures and time, and the proportion of physician groups that performed in the bottom quartile was examined across multiple measures or multiple years. Data analysis was conducted between September 2020 and May 2021. Exposures: Primary care physician groups. Main Outcomes and Measures: Performance scores of 6 quality measures for diabetes and 4 for CVD, including hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) testing, low-density lipoprotein testing, statin use, HbA1c control, low-density lipoprotein control, and hospital-based utilization. Results: A total of 786 641 unique enrollees treated by 890 physician groups were included; 414 655 (52.7%) of the enrollees were men and the mean (SD) age was 53 (9.5) years. After adjusting for age, sex, and clinical and social risk variables, correlations among individual measures were weak (eg, performance-adjusted correlation between any statin use and LDL testing for patients with diabetes, r = -0.10) to moderate (correlation between LDL testing for diabetes and LDL testing for CVD, r = .43), but year-to-year correlations for all measures were moderate to strong. One percent or fewer of physician groups performed in the bottom quartile for all 6 diabetes measures or all 4 cardiovascular disease measures in any given year, while 14 (4.0%) to 39 groups (11.1%) were in the bottom quartile in all 4 years for any given measure other than hospital-based utilization for CVD (1.1%). Conclusions and Relevance: A subset of physician groups that was consistently low performing could be identified by considering performance measures across multiple years. Considering the consistency of group performance could contribute a novel method to identify physician groups most likely to benefit from limited resources.

Peer Learning in Radiology: Effect of a Pay-for-Performance Initiative on Clinical Impact and Usage.

OBJECTIVE. The purpose of this article is to assess the effects of a pay-for-performance (PFP) initiative on clinical impact and usage of a radiology peer learning tool. MATERIALS AND METHODS. This retrospective study was performed at a large academic hospital. On May 1, 2017, a peer learning tool was implemented to facilitate radiologist peer feedback including clinical follow-up, positive feedback, and consultation. Subsequently, PFP target numbers for peer learning tool alerts by subspecialty divisions (October 1, 2017) and individual radiologists (October 1, 2018) were set. The primary outcome was report addendum rate (percent of clinical follow-up alerts with addenda), which was a proxy for peer learning tool clinical impact. Secondary outcomes were peer learning tool usage rate (number of peer learning tool alerts per 1000 radiology reports) and proportion of clinical follow-up alerts (percent of clinical follow-ups among all peer learning tool alerts). Outcomes were assessed biweekly using ANOVA and statistical process control analyses. RESULTS. Among 1,265,839 radiology reports from May 1, 2017, to September 29, 2019, a total of 20,902 peer learning tool alerts were generated. The clinical follow-up alert addendum rate was not significantly different between the period before the PFP initiative (9.9%) and the periods including division-wide (8.3%) and individual (7.9%) PFP initiatives (p = .55; ANOVA). Peer learning tool usage increased from 2.2 alerts per 1000 reports before the PFP initiative to 12.6 per 1000 during the division-wide PFP period (5.7-fold increase; 12.6/2.2), to 25.2 in the individual PFP period (11.5-fold increase vs before PFP; twofold increase vs division-wide) (p < .001). The clinical follow-up alert proportion decreased from 37.5% before the PFP initiative, to 34.4% in the division-wide period, to 31.3% in the individual PFP period. CONCLUSION. A PFP initiative improved radiologist engagement in peer learning by marked increase in peer learning tool usage rate without a change in report addendum rate as a proxy for clinical impact.

Socioeconomic inequalities in the quality of primary care under Brazil's national pay-for-performance programme: a longitudinal study of family health teams.

BACKGROUND: Many governments have introduced pay-for-performance programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care. Evidence on whether these programmes reduce or exacerbate disparities in health care is scarce. In this study, we aimed to assess socioeconomic inequalities in the performance of family health teams under Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). METHODS: For this longitudinal study, we analysed data on the quality of care delivered by family health teams participating in PMAQ over three rounds of implementation: round 1 (November, 2011, to March, 2013), round 2 (April, 2013, to September, 2015), and round 3 (October, 2015, to December, 2019). The primary outcome was the percentage of the maximum performance score obtainable by family health teams (the PMAQ score), based on several hundred (ranging from 598 to 914) indicators of health-care delivery. Using census data on household income of local areas, we examined the PMAQ score by income ventile. We used ordinary least squares regressions to examine the association between PMAQ scores and the income of each local area across implementation rounds, and we did an analysis of variance to assess geographical variation in PMAQ score. FINDINGS: Of the 40 361 family health teams that were registered as ever participating in PMAQ, we included 13 934 teams that participated in the three rounds of PMAQ in our analysis. These teams were located in 11 472 census areas and served approximately 48 million people. The mean PMAQ score was 61·0% (median 61·8, IQR 55·3-67·9) in round 1, 55·3% (median 56·0, IQR 47·6-63·4) in round 2, and 61·6% (median 62·7, IQR 54·4-69·9) in round 3. In round 1, we observed a positive socioeconomic gradient, with the mean PMAQ score ranging from 56·6% in the poorest group to 64·1% in the richest group. Between rounds 1 and 3, mean PMAQ performance increased by 7·1 percentage points for the poorest group and decreased by 0·8 percentage points for the richest group (p<0·0001), with the gap between richest and poorest narrowing from 7·5 percentage points (95% CI 6·5 to 8·5) to -0·4 percentage points over the same period (-1·6 to 0·8). INTERPRETATION: Existing income inequalities in the delivery of primary health care were eliminated during the three rounds of PMAQ, plausibly due to a design feature of PMAQ that adjusted financial payments for socioeconomic inequalities. However, there remains an important policy agenda in Brazil to address the large inequities in health. FUNDING: UK Medical Research Council, Newton Fund, and CONFAP (Conselho Nacional das Fundações Estaduais de Amparo à Pesquisa).

Payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings.

BACKGROUND: Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as 'out of hospital' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services. OBJECTIVES: To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects. SEARCH METHODS: We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification. SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes. MAIN RESULTS: We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.

Pay for Performance and Treatment Outcome in Agonist Treatment for Opioid Use Disorder.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Pay for performance (P4P) models have become more popular in reimbursement for medical services, including treatment for substance use disorders. However, studies have not examined whether P4P has an impact on treatment outcome in the individual in opioid agonist treatment (OAT). Thus, the present study was conducted at the individual level, rather than the programmatic level, to determine whether meeting the P4P early engagement criteria (four services in the initial 14 days of treatment and/or eight services within the initial 30 days of treatment) resulted in reduced opioid, benzodiazepine, and cocaine use. METHODS: We performed a retrospective study of 63 patients enrolled in OAT for opioid use disorder. χ2 analyses were conducted crossing P4P early engagement criteria status and urine drug screen (UDS) results for opioid, cocaine, and/or benzodiazepine use at 6 and 12 months postadmission. Methadone dosage and treatment retention were also considered. The odds ratio was used to determine the directionality of significant results. RESULTS: Significant relationships were revealed between patients meeting 30-day P4P early engagement criteria and opioid negative UDS, and with retention in treatment at 6 and 12 months. Methadone dosage was significant at a 6-month follow-up. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: Since significant associations between opioid use and P4P as well as opioid use and methadone dose were revealed, findings partially supported hypothesis. SCIENTIFIC SIGNIFICANCE: P4P and methadone dosage may have some benefit to individuals in OAT in attaining short-term abstinence from opioids. P4P may be less useful in helping individuals achieve abstinence from other substances of abuse. (Am J Addict 2020;00:00-00).

Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) Participation in Radiation Oncology Practices - A Simple Survey.

PURPOSE: Our purpose was to survey nationwide radiation oncology practices on their participation in, burden of, and satisfaction with the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) payment programs. METHODS AND MATERIALS: All radiation oncology practices accredited by a national specialty organization were invited to participate in a voluntary online survey from December 2018 to January 2019. Questions focused on participation in the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) in 2017 and 2018, as by the time of this survey, radiation oncology did not yet have a specialty-specific advanced Alternative Payment Model. RESULTS: Of n = 705 solicited practices, n = 199 completed the survey for an overall response rate of 28.2%. Practices varied significantly in their duration of participation in MACRA programs, means of data submission, and reported improvement activities under MIPS. Forty-nine percent of respondents described being either somewhat or extremely dissatisfied with the ease of submitting measures and data in 2018. The estimated cost to the practices of compliance with MACRA was queried in bins; of users able to estimate the cost of compliance for 2018, the median reported bin was $10,001 to $20,000 (range, less than $1000-100,000 or more). CONCLUSIONS: The participation style in MACRA among radiation oncology practices varied substantially in the years 2017 and 2018. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services gave no precise estimates on the cost of compliance for MIPS, but estimated a $3019.47 cost of compliance with the mandated Radiation Oncology Alternative Payment Model in the 2020 Final Rule for selected practices. In this survey, respondents commonly reported the cost of compliance with MACRA significantly exceeded this estimate.

Synergy between the pay-for-performance scheme and better physician-patient relationship might reduce the risk of retinopathy in patients with type 2 diabetes.

AIMS/INTRODUCTION: This study investigated whether participation by patients with type 2 diabetes in Taiwan's pay-for-performance (P4P) program and maintaining good continuity of care (COC) with their healthcare provider reduced the likelihood of future complications, such as retinopathy. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The analysis used longitudinal panel data for newly diagnosed type 2 diabetes from the National Health Insurance claims database in Taiwan. COC was measured annually from 2003 to 2013, and was used to allocate the patients to low, medium and high groups. Cox regression analysis was used with time-dependent (time-varying) covariates in a reduced model (with only P4P or COC), and the full model was adjusted with other covariates. RESULTS: Despite the same significant effects of treatment at primary care, the Diabetes Complications Severity Index scores were significantly associated with the development of retinopathy. After adjusting for these, the hazard ratios for developing retinopathy among P4P participants in the low, medium and high COC groups were 0.594 (95% confidence interval [CI] 0.398-0.898, P = 0.012), 0.676 (95% CI 0.520-0.867, P = 0.0026) and 0.802 (95% CI 0.603-1.030, P = 0.1062), respectively. Thus, patients with low or median COC who participated in the P4P program had a significantly lower risk of retinopathy than those who did not. CONCLUSIONS: Diabetes care requires a long-term relationship between patients and their care providers. Besides encouraging patients to participate in P4P programs, health authorities should provide more incentives for providers or patients to regularly survey patients' lipid profiles and glucose levels, and reward the better interpersonal relationship to prevent retinopathy.

Association Between a National Insurer's Pay-for-Performance Program for Oncology and Changes in Prescribing of Evidence-Based Cancer Drugs and Spending.

PURPOSE: Cancer drug prescribing by medical oncologists accounts for the greatest variation in practice and the largest portion of spending on cancer care. We evaluated the association between a national commercial insurer's ongoing pay-for-performance (P4P) program for oncology and changes in the prescribing of evidence-based cancer drugs and spending. METHODS: We conducted an observational difference-in-differences study using administrative claims data covering 6.7% of US adults. We leveraged the geographically staggered, time-varying rollout of the P4P program to simulate a stepped-wedge study design. We included patients age 18 years or older with breast, colon, or lung cancer who were prescribed cancer drug regimens by 1,867 participating oncologists between 2013 and 2017. The exposure was a time-varying dichotomous variable equal to 1 for patients who were prescribed a cancer drug regimen after the P4P program was offered. The primary outcome was whether a patient's drug regimen was a program-endorsed, evidence-based regimen. We also evaluated spending over a 6-month episode period. RESULTS: The P4P program was associated with an increase in evidence-based regimen prescribing from 57.1% of patients in the preintervention period to 62.2% in the intervention period, for a difference of +5.1 percentage point (95% CI, 3.0 percentage points to 7.2 percentage points; P < .001). The P4P program was also associated with a differential $3,339 (95% CI, $1,121 to $5,557; P = .003) increase in cancer drug spending and a differential $253 (95% CI, $100 to $406; P = .001) increase in patient out-of-pocket spending, but no significant changes in total health care spending ($2,772; 95% CI, -$181 to $5,725; P = .07) over the 6-month episode period. CONCLUSION: P4P programs may be effective in increasing evidence-based cancer drug prescribing, but may not yield cost savings.