Reconstructing AI Ethics Principles: Rawlsian Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.

The popularisation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has sparked discussion about their ethical implications. This development has forced governmental organisations, NGOs, and private companies to react and draft ethics guidelines for future development of ethical AI systems. Whereas many ethics guidelines address values familiar to ethicists, they seem to lack in ethical justifications. Furthermore, most tend to neglect the impact of AI on democracy, governance, and public deliberation. Existing research suggest, however, that AI can threaten key elements of western democracies that are ethically relevant. In this paper, Rawls's theory of justice is applied to draft a set of guidelines for organisations and policy-makers to guide AI development towards a more ethical direction. The goal is to contribute to the broadening of the discussion on AI ethics by exploring the possibility of constructing AI ethics guidelines that are philosophically justified and take a broader perspective of societal justice. The paper discusses how Rawls's theory of justice as fairness and its key concepts relate to the ongoing developments in AI ethics and gives a proposition of how principles that offer a foundation for operationalising AI ethics in practice could look like if aligned with Rawls's theory of justice as fairness.

A Rubik's Cube-Inspired Pedagogical Tool for Teaching and Learning Engineering Ethics.

To facilitate engineering students' understanding of engineering ethics and support instructors in developing course content, this study introduces an innovative educational tool drawing inspiration from the Rubik's Cube metaphor. This Engineering Ethics Knowledge Rubik's Cube (EEKRC) integrates six key aspects-ethical theories, codes of ethics, ethical issues, engineering disciplines, stakeholders, and life cycle-identified through an analysis of engineering ethics textbooks and courses across the United States, Singapore, and China. This analysis underpins the selection of the six aspects, reflecting the shared and unique elements of engineering ethics education in these regions. In an engineering ethics course, the EEKRC serves multiple functions: it provides visual support for grasping engineering ethics concepts, acts as a pedagogical guide for both experienced and inexperienced educators in course design, offers a complementary assessment method for evaluating students learning outcomes, and assists as a reference for students engaging in ethical analysis.

A Confucian Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles.

Any moral algorithm for autonomous vehicles must provide a practical solution to moral problems of the trolley type, in which all possible courses of action will result in damage, injury, or death. This article discusses a hitherto neglected variety of this type of problem, based on a recent psychological study whose results are reported here. It argues that the most adequate solution to this problem will be achieved by a moral algorithm that is based on Confucian ethics. In addition to this philosophical and psychological discussion, the article outlines the mathematics, engineering, and legal implementation of a possible Confucian algorithm. The proposed Confucian algorithm is based on the idea of making it possible to set an autonomous vehicle to allow an increased level of protection for selected people. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can be implemented alongside other moral algorithms, using either the framework of personal ethics settings or that of mandatory ethics settings.

Setting Expectations for Ethics Theory from the Standpoint of the User.

Ethics theory is highly valued to the point that some commentators have claimed that it has taken on a life of its own, with too much focus on the justification of moral judgment and not enough on the needs of users of such theory. Building from various personal experiences of interdisciplinary ethics collaborative developments and empirical research projects, the wisdom gleaned by others, as well as insights from pragmatist theory, this article offers five (non-exhaustive) expectations for ethics theory from the standpoint of a user. The article is intended to prompt broad reflection on expectations toward ethics theory and why user perspectives should be considered early in the development of ethics scholarship.

Disruptive Technologies and Open Science: How Open Should Open Science Be? A 'Third Bioethics' Ethical Framework.

This paper investigates the ethical implications of applying open science (OS) practices on disruptive technologies, such as generative AIs. Disruptive technologies, characterized by their scalability and paradigm-shifting nature, have the potential to generate significant global impact, and carry a risk of dual use. The tension arises between the moral duty of OS to promote societal benefit by democratizing knowledge and the risks associated with open dissemination of disruptive technologies. Van Rennselaer Potter's 'third bioethics' serves as the founding horizon for an ethical framework to govern these tensions. Through theoretical analysis and concrete examples, this paper explores how OS can contribute to a better future or pose threats. Finally, we provide an ethical framework for the intersection between OS and disruptive technologies that tries to go beyond the simple 'as open as possible' tenet, considering openness as an instrumental value for the pursuit of other ethical values rather than as a principle with prima facie moral significance.

The sufficiency theory of justice and the allocation of health resources.

According to the sufficiency theory of justice in health, justice requires that people have equal access to adequate health. In this article, I lay out the structure of this view and I assess its distributive implications for setting priority (i) between health needs across persons and (ii) between health care spending and other societal goods. I argue, first, that according to the sufficiency theory, deficiency in health cannot be completely offset by providing other societal goods. And, second, that it can prevent the medicalization of societies by stressing that improvements beyond the level of adequate health have relatively little weight, if any, from the standpoint of justice.

Toward a new clinical pragmatism: method in clinical ethics consultation.

In this paper, I leverage the pragmatist tradition in philosophy, the collective wisdom of scholarship in clinical ethics consultation, and earlier attempts to apply pragmatism in clinical ethics to develop a new vision of clinical ethics practice called New Clinical Pragmatism. It argues that clinical ethics methodology, from the New Clinical Pragmatist's perspective, amounts to the recommendation that consultants should customize a methodological approach, drawing on the various available methods, depending on the demands of the specific case, and should avoid attempts to identify a 'true' methodology but to the incoherence and inevitable failure of those attempts. I argue that pragmatism's emphasis on practical wisdom and experimentation allow the New Clinical Pragmatist to do this while avoiding irrationality in choosing methods. I discuss how the New Clinical Pragmatist gives a unique, constructive perspective on key aspects of clinical ethics consultation such as the choice of common morality vs. internal morality of medicine approaches, process standards, bioethics mediation, and narrative ethics, and suggest how New Clinical Pragmatism's relaxed approach to choice of methodology encourages consultants to balance attention to the particulars of the case with knowledge of what the many insightful scholars of clinical ethics methodology have found useful in the past. I also argue that New Clinical Pragmatism is consistent with efforts to professionalize clinical ethics consultation.

Take five? A coherentist argument why medical AI does not require a new ethical principle.

With the growing application of machine learning models in medicine, principlist bioethics has been put forward as needing revision. This paper reflects on the dominant trope in AI ethics to include a new 'principle of explicability' alongside the traditional four principles of bioethics that make up the theory of principlism. It specifically suggests that these four principles are sufficient and challenges the relevance of explicability as a separate ethical principle by emphasizing the coherentist affinity of principlism. We argue that, through specification, the properties of explicability are already covered by the four bioethical principles. The paper finishes by anticipating an objection that coherent principles could not facilitate technology induced change and are not well-suited to tackle moral differences.

Virtue ethics and the unsettled ethical questions in controlled human infection studies.

Controlled human infection studies (CHIs) involve the intentional infection of human subjects for a scientific aim. Though some past challenge trials have involved serious ethical abuses, in the last few decades, CHIs have had a strong track record of safety. Despite increased attention to the ethics of CHIs during the COVID-19 pandemic, CHIs remain controversial, and there has been no in-depth treatment of CHIs through the lens of virtue ethics. In this article, we argue that virtue theory can be helpful for addressing CHIs that present a constellation of controversial, unresolved, and/or under-regulated ethical issues. We begin with some brief background on virtue ethics. We then substantiate our claim that some CHIs raise a constellation of ethical issues that are unresolved in the ethics literature and/or lack adequate regulatory guidance by demonstrating that CHIs can present indeterminate social value, risks to third parties, limitations on the right to withdraw from research, and questions about the upper limit of allowable risk. We argue that the presence of a virtuous investigator, with virtues such as prudence, compassion, and integrity, is especially important when these unresolved research ethics issues arise, which is the case for certain types of controlled human infection studies. We use the historical example of Walter Reed and the Yellow Fever Commission to illustrate this claim, and we also highlight some contemporary examples. We end by sketching some practical implications of our view, such as ensuring that investigators with experience running CHIs are involved in novel CHI models.

Rethinking Health Recommender Systems for Active Aging: An Autonomy-Based Ethical Analysis.

Health Recommender Systems are promising Articial-Intelligence-based tools endowing healthy lifestyles and therapy adherence in healthcare and medicine. Among the most supported areas, it is worth mentioning active aging. However, current HRS supporting AA raise ethical challenges that still need to be properly formalized and explored. This study proposes to rethink HRS for AA through an autonomy-based ethical analysis. In particular, a brief overview of the HRS' technical aspects allows us to shed light on the ethical risks and challenges they might raise on individuals' well-being as they age. Moreover, the study proposes a categorization, understanding, and possible preventive/mitigation actions for the elicited risks and challenges through rethinking the AI ethics core principle of autonomy. Finally, elaborating on autonomy-related ethical theories, the paper proposes an autonomy-based ethical framework and how it can foster the development of autonomy-enabling HRS for AA.

Using symbiotic empirical ethics to explore the significance of relationships to clinical ethics: findings from the Reset Ethics research project.

BACKGROUND: At the beginning of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, many non-Covid healthcare services were suspended. In April 2020, the Department of Health in England mandated that non-Covid services should resume, alongside the continuing pandemic response. This 'resetting' of healthcare services created a unique context in which it became critical to consider how ethical considerations did (and should) underpin decisions about integrating infection control measures into routine healthcare practices. We draw on data collected as part of the 'NHS Reset Ethics' project, which explored the everyday ethical challenges of resetting England's NHS maternity and paediatrics services during the pandemic. METHODS: Healthcare professionals and members of the public participated in interviews and focus group discussions. The qualitative methods are reported in detail elsewhere. The focus of this article is our use of Frith's symbiotic empirical ethics methodology to work from our empirical findings towards the normative suggestion that clinical ethics should explicitly attend to the importance of relationships in clinical practice. This methodology uses a five-step approach to refine and develop ethical theory based on a naturalist account of ethics that sees practice and theory as symbiotically related. RESULTS: The Reset project data showed that changed working practices caused ethical challenges for healthcare professionals, and that infection prevention and control measures represented harmful barriers to the experience of receiving and offering care. For healthcare professionals, offering care as part of a relational interaction was an ethically important dimension of healthcare delivery. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that foregrounding the importance of relationships across a hospital community will better promote the ethically important multi-directional expression of caring between healthcare professionals, patients, and their families. We offer two suggestions for making progress towards such a relational approach. First, that there is a change of emphasis in clinical ethics practice to explicitly acknowledge the importance of the relationships (including with their healthcare team) within which the patient is held. Second, that organisational decision-making should take into account the moral significance afforded to caring relationships by healthcare professionals, and the role such relationships can play in the negotiation of ethical challenges.

The use and abuse of moral theories in conservation debate about killing animals.

Recent ethical debate about compassionate conservation has invoked moral theories to oppose or support traditional practices of killing animals to protect biodiversity and ecosystems. The debate has featured the mainstream moral theories of consequentialism and utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics. We identify problematic applications and critique of these moral theories in conservation discussions. Problems include a lack of clarity when invoking moral theories, misunderstanding and mischaracterizing theories, and overlooking features and circumstances affecting a theory's application. A key omission in the debate is a detailed discussion of the moral significance of animals and nature. We then examine the role of moral theory as such in ethical discussion, contrasting moral theory with ethical outlooks that center, for example, forms of love and care. Our aim is to advance the ethical debate about harming animals in conservation.

Uso y abuso de las teorías morales en el debate de conservación sobre la muerte de animales Resumen El debate ético reciente sobre la conservación compasiva ha recurrido a las teorías morales para oponerse o respaldar la práctica de matar animales para proteger la biodiversidad y los ecosistemas. El debate ha expuesto las teorías morales predominantes de la deontología del consecuencialismo y el utilitarismo y la ética de las virtudes. Identificamos la aplicación problemática y la crítica de estas teorías morales en las discusiones de conservación. Los problemas incluyen la falta de claridad cuando se recurre a las teorías morales, el malentendido y caracterización errónea de las teorías y pasar por alto las características y circunstancias que afectan la aplicación de la teoría. Una omisión importante en el debate es la discusión detallada del significado moral de los animales y la naturaleza. Después analizamos el papel de la teoría moral como tal en la discusión ética, lo que contrasta la teoría moral con las perspectivas éticas que se centran, por ejemplo, en formas de amor y cariño. Nuestro objetivo es promover el debate ético sobre el daño a los animales en la conservación.

Effects of ChatGPT's AI capabilities and human-like traits on spreading information in work environments.

The rapid proliferation and integration of AI chatbots in office environments, specifically the advanced AI model ChatGPT, prompts an examination of how its features and updates impact knowledge processes, satisfaction, and word-of-mouth (WOM) among office workers. This study investigates the determinants of WOM among office workers who are users of ChatGPT. We adopted a quantitative approach, utilizing a stratified random sampling technique to collect data from a diverse group of office workers experienced in using ChatGPT. The hypotheses were rigorously tested through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) using the SmartPLS 4. The results revealed that system updates, memorability, and non-language barrier attributes of ChatGPT significantly enhanced knowledge acquisition and application. Additionally, the human-like personality traits of ChatGPT significantly increased both utilitarian value and satisfaction. Furthermore, the study showed that knowledge acquisition and application led to a significant increase in utilitarian value and satisfaction, which subsequently increased WOM. Age had a positive influence on WOM, while gender had no significant impact. The findings provide theoretical contributions by expanding our understanding of AI chatbots' role in knowledge processes, satisfaction, and WOM, particularly among office workers.

Does Bioethics Need Ethical Theories?

The relationship between philosophy and bioethics remains a matter of perennial debate, but there does appear to be a consensus on one issue: whatever bioethics might want to borrow from philosophical ethics, it won't be normative theories. This essay argues that theories can have an important role to play in bioethics, though it might not be the one traditionally assumed by philosophers.

Moral obligations towards human persons' wellbeing versus their suffering: An analysis of perspectives of moral philosophy.

What do we owe other persons? Are we as much obliged to promote their wellbeing as we are to reduce their suffering? This question is crucial for a range of social institutions and welfare services, and especially for the health services. To address this question the article investigates prominent positions and arguments in moral philosophy. It finds that while classical utilitarianism claims that there is symmetry in the moral obligation with respect to peoples' wellbeing and their suffering, a wide range of other positions and perspectives argue for an asymmetric relationship with stronger moral obligations towards other persons' suffering than towards their wellbeing. This difference in obligations is supported ontologically by basic differences inherent in wellbeing and suffering and axiologically by a relative (gradual) difference in value. The many well-founded arguments for stronger moral obligations towards other persons' suffering than towards their wellbeing has important implications for health policy; especially for priority setting. Avoiding and reducing suffering should have priority to the promotion and enhancement of wellbeing.

James Rachels and the morality of euthanasia.

My fundamental thesis is that Rachels dismisses the traditional Western account of the morality of killing without offering a viable replacement. In this regard, I will argue that the substitute account he offers is deficient in at least eight regards: (1) he fails to justify the foundational principle of utilitarianism, (2) he exposes preference utilitarianism to the same criticisms he lodges against classical utilitarianism, (3) he neglects to explain how precisely one performs the maximization procedure which preference utilitarianism requires, (4) his account of the sanctity of life is subject to the very criticism he levels against the traditional position, (5) he cannot justify the exceptions he makes to his interpretation of the sanctity of life, (6) his account could easily be used to justify murder, (7) his embrace of autonomy as an ethical principle undermines his preference utilitarianism, and (8) he cannot maintain the moral identification of acts of killing and letting die.

Physics and the quest for transcendence: A Durkheimian approach.

This essay aims to shed some light on the still common sense of a vocation among scientists. Taking its cue from Paul Forman's analysis of twentieth-century disciplinary science and Emile Durkheim's social view of religions, it suggests that modern scientific communities resemble religious communities in their penchant for transcendence. The essay aims to illustrate this perspective by looking at some developments within the physics discipline since its emergence in the late nineteenth century. One indication for this penchant is the tendency to distance oneself from the material conditions which allowed the discipline to flourish. These utilitarian conditions, industrial as well as material, were seen to pose a threat to the disinterested pursuit of truth. Another is the persistent tendency among theoretical physicists to search for otherworldly, immaterial and unifying foundations.

Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status.

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.