Name Norms: A Guide to Casting Your Next Experiment.

Psychologists often test hypotheses by constructing vignettes depicting people engaging in behavior and displaying characteristics designed to operationalize specific variables. People described in these vignettes are typically given names, but names have a variety of connotations that could lead to unwanted variance between conditions of an experiment and in other ways have implications for the results of a study. An up-to-date source of information to help guide the selection of names would be useful for researchers. Participants from four different regions of the United States rated a large sample of names in terms of perceived age, warmth, and competence. The full set of names is presented, along with some simple demonstration studies concretely illustrating the implications of name choice.

Registered Replication Report: Strack, Martin, & Stepper (1988).

According to the facial feedback hypothesis, people's affective responses can be influenced by their own facial expression (e.g., smiling, pouting), even when their expression did not result from their emotional experiences. For example, Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) instructed participants to rate the funniness of cartoons using a pen that they held in their mouth. In line with the facial feedback hypothesis, when participants held the pen with their teeth (inducing a "smile"), they rated the cartoons as funnier than when they held the pen with their lips (inducing a "pout"). This seminal study of the facial feedback hypothesis has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the results of 17 independent direct replications of Study 1 from Strack et al. (1988), all of which followed the same vetted protocol. A meta-analysis of these studies examined the difference in funniness ratings between the "smile" and "pout" conditions. The original Strack et al. (1988) study reported a rating difference of 0.82 units on a 10-point Likert scale. Our meta-analysis revealed a rating difference of 0.03 units with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.11 to 0.16.

What underlies appraisals? Experimentally testing a Knowledge-and-Appraisal Model of Personality Architecture among smokers contemplating high-risk situations.

We tested a theoretical model of personality structures underlying patterns of intra-individual variability in contextualized appraisals. The KAPA (Knowledge-and-Appraisal Personality Architecture) model was tested experimentally among smokers appraising their efficacy to resist the urge to smoke in high-risk situations. In a novel design, we assessed self-knowledge and situational beliefs idiographically and employed cognitive priming to manipulate the accessibility of self-knowledge experimentally. The results confirmed the unique KAPA-model prediction that priming would affect appraisals in a contextualized manner. Priming positively valenced self-knowledge enhanced self-efficacy appraisals specifically within that subset of situations that were relevant to the primed knowledge. The results were consistent with the hypothesis that systems of self- and situational knowledge underlie consistency and variability in appraisals.