Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) recognize that their guesses could be wrong and can pass a two-cup disjunctive syllogism task.

When chimpanzees search for hidden food, do they realize that their guesses may not be correct? We applied a post-decision wagering paradigm to a simple two-cup search task, varying whether we gave participants visual access to the baiting and then asking after they had chosen one of the cups whether they would prefer a smaller but certain reward instead of their original choice (experiment 1). Results showed that chimpanzees were more likely to accept the smaller reward in occluded than visible conditions. Experiment 2 found the same effect when we blocked visual access but manipulated the number of hiding locations for the food piece, showing that the effect is not owing to representation type. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that when given information about the contents of the unchosen cup, chimpanzees were able to flexibly update their choice behaviour accordingly. These results suggest that language is not a pre-requisite to solving the disjunctive syllogism and provides a valuable contribution to the debate on logical reasoning in non-human animals.

Functional fixedness in chimpanzees.

Differences in the tool use of non-human primates and humans are subject of ongoing debate. In humans, representations of object functions underpin efficient tool use. Yet, representations of object functions can lead to functional fixedness, which describes the fixation on a familiar tool function leading to less efficient problem solving when the problem requires using the tool for a new function. In the current study, we examined whether chimpanzees exhibit functional fixedness. After solving a problem with a tool, chimpanzees were less efficient in solving another problem which required using the same tool with a different function compared to a control group. This fixation effect was still apparent after a period of nine months and when chimpanzees had learned about the function of a tool by observation of a conspecific. These results suggest that functional fixedness in our closest living relatives likely exists and cast doubt on the notion that stable function representations are uniquely human.

Variation in neophilia in seven primate species.

Neophilia is a measure of individuals' attraction to novelty and is thought to provide important fitness benefits related to the acquisition of information and the ability to solve novel problems. Although neophilia is thought to vary across individuals and species, few studies have made direct comparisons to assess the factors that predict this variation. Here we operationalized neophilia as the probability of interacting with novel objects and compared the response to familiar and novel objects in 53 captive individuals belonging to seven different primate species: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis), tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella), and Geoffroy's spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi). Our results showed that individuals were overall more likely to interact with novel than familiar objects. Moreover, we found no evidence that neophilia varied across individuals depending on their sex, age, and dominance rank. However, macaques were overall less likely to interact with objects (regardless of their novelty), as compared to bonobos, orangutans, gorillas, and capuchin monkeys. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Chimpanzees use social information to acquire a skill they fail to innovate.

Cumulative cultural evolution has been claimed to be a uniquely human phenomenon pivotal to the biological success of our species. One plausible condition for cumulative cultural evolution to emerge is individuals' ability to use social learning to acquire know-how that they cannot easily innovate by themselves. It has been suggested that chimpanzees may be capable of such know-how social learning, but this assertion remains largely untested. Here we show that chimpanzees use social learning to acquire a skill that they failed to independently innovate. By teaching chimpanzees how to solve a sequential task (one chimpanzee in each of the two tested groups, n = 66) and using network-based diffusion analysis, we found that 14 naive chimpanzees learned to operate a puzzle box that they failed to operate during the preceding three months of exposure to all necessary materials. In conjunction, we present evidence for the hypothesis that social learning in chimpanzees is necessary and sufficient to acquire a new, complex skill after the initial innovation.

Chimpanzees demonstrate a behavioural signature of human joint action.

The strength of human society can largely be attributed to the tendency to work together to achieve outcomes that are not possible alone. Effective social coordination benefits from mentally representing a partner's actions. Specifically, humans optimize social coordination by forming internal action models adapted to joint rather than individual task demands. To what extent do humans share the cognitive mechanisms that support optimal human coordination and collaboration with other species? An ecologically inspired joint handover-to-retrieve task was systematically manipulated across several experiments to assess whether joint action planning in chimpanzees reflects similar patterns to humans. Chimpanzees' chosen handover locations shifted towards the location of the experimenter's free or unobstructed hand, suggesting they represent the constraints of the joint task even though their individual half of the task was unobstructed. These findings indicate that chimpanzees and humans may share common cognitive mechanisms or predispositions that support joint action.

Bonobos and chimpanzees remember familiar conspecifics for decades.

Recognition and memory of familiar conspecifics provides the foundation for complex sociality and is vital to navigating an unpredictable social world [Tibbetts and Dale, Trends Ecol. Evol. 22, 529-537 (2007)]. Human social memory incorporates content about interactions and relationships and can last for decades [Sherry and Schacter, Psychol. Rev. 94, 439-454 (1987)]. Long-term social memory likely played a key role throughout human evolution, as our ancestors increasingly built relationships that operated across distant space and time [Malone et al., Int. J. Primatol. 33, 1251-1277 (2012)]. Although individual recognition is widespread among animals and sometimes lasts for years, little is known about social memory in nonhuman apes and the shared evolutionary foundations of human social memory. In a preferential-looking eye-tracking task, we presented chimpanzees and bonobos (N = 26) with side-by-side images of a previous groupmate and a conspecific stranger of the same sex. Apes' attention was biased toward former groupmates, indicating long-term memory for past social partners. The strength of biases toward former groupmates was not impacted by the duration apart, and our results suggest that recognition may persist for at least 26 y beyond separation. We also found significant but weak evidence that, like humans, apes may remember the quality or content of these past relationships: apes' looking biases were stronger for individuals with whom they had more positive histories of social interaction. Long-lasting social memory likely provided key foundations for the evolution of human culture and sociality as they extended across time, space, and group boundaries.

Chimpanzees prepare for alternative possible outcomes.

When facing uncertainty, humans often build mental models of alternative outcomes. Considering diverging scenarios allows agents to respond adaptively to different actual worlds by developing contingency plans (covering one's bases). In a pre-registered experiment, we tested whether chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) prepare for two mutually exclusive possibilities. Chimpanzees could access two pieces of food, but only if they successfully protected them from a human competitor. In one condition, chimpanzees could be certain about which piece of food the human experimenter would attempt to steal. In a second condition, either one of the food rewards was a potential target of the competitor. We found that chimpanzees were significantly more likely to protect both pieces of food in the second relative to the first condition, raising the possibility that chimpanzees represent and prepare effectively for different possible worlds.

Orcas remember what to copy: a deferred and interference-resistant imitation study.

Response facilitation has often been portrayed as a "low level" category of social learning, because the demonstrator's action, which is already in the observer's repertoire, automatically triggers that same action, rather than induces the learning of a new action. One way to rule out response facilitation consists of introducing a delay between the demonstrator's behavior and the observer's response to let their possible effects wear off. However, this may not rule out "delayed response facilitation" in which the subject could be continuously "mentally rehearsing" the demonstrated actions during the waiting period. We used a do-as-the-other-did paradigm in two orcas to study whether they displayed cognitive control regarding their production of familiar actions by (1) introducing a delay ranging from 60 to 150 s between observing and producing the actions and (2) interspersing distractor (non-target) actions performed by the demonstrator and by the subjects during the delay period. These two manipulations were aimed at preventing the mental rehearsal of the observed actions during the delay period. Both orcas copied the model's target actions on command after various delay periods, and crucially, despite the presence of distractor actions. These findings suggest that orcas are capable of selectively retrieving a representation of an observed action to generate a delayed matching response. Moreover, these results lend further support to the proposal that the subjects' performance relied not only on a mental representation of the specific actions that were requested to copy, but also flexibly on the abstract and domain general rule requested by the specific "copy command". Our findings strengthen the view that orcas and other cetaceans are capable of flexible and controlled social learning.

On the murky dissociation between expression and communication.

The authors present an ambitious attempt to outline the gradual evolution of the cognitive foundations of ostensive communication. We focus on three problematic aspects of the distinction between expression and communication: ambiguity in the distinction's central principle of "complementary mechanisms," inconsistencies in the application of the distinction across taxa, and the dismissal of mentalizing in nonhuman primates.

Do chimpanzees reason logically?

Psychologists disagree about the development of logical concepts such as or and not. While some theorists argue that infants reason logically, others maintain that logical inference is contingent on linguistic abilities and emerges around age 4. In this Registered Report, we conducted five experiments on logical reasoning in chimpanzees. Subjects (N = 16; 10 females; M = 24 years) participated in the same setup that has been administered to children: the two-, three-, and four-cup-task. Chimpanzees performed above chance in the two-cup-, but not in the three-cup-task. Furthermore, chimpanzees selected the logically correct option more often in the test than the control condition of the four-cup-task. We discuss possible interpretations of these findings and conclude that our results are most consistent with non-deductive accounts.

Are you as fooled as I am? Visual illusions in human (Homo) and nonhuman (Sapajus, Gorilla, Pan, Pongo) primate species.

It has been argued that humans' susceptibility to visual illusions does not simply reflect cognitive flaws but rather specific functional adaptations of our perceptual system. The data on cross-cultural differences in the perception of geometric illusions seemingly support this explanation. Little is known, however, about the developmental trajectories of such adaptations in humans, let alone a conclusive picture of the illusionary susceptibility in other primate species. So far, most developmental or comparative studies have tested single illusions with varying procedural implementations. The current study aims at overcoming these limitations by testing human subjects of four different age classes (3- to 5 year-old children and adults) and five nonhuman primate species (capuchin monkeys, bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans) with an identical setup in five well-known geometric illusions (horizontal-vertical, Ebbinghaus, Mueller-Lyer, Ponzo, and Sander). Two food items of identical size were presented on separate trays with surrounding paintings eliciting the illusion of size differences and subjects were required to choose one of the items. Four of the five illusions elicited a strong effect in adult humans, and older children showed a greater susceptibility to illusions than younger ones. In contrast, only two illusions (Ebbingaus and horizontal-vertical) elicited a mild effect on nonhuman primates with high variation within species and little variation between species. Our results suggests that humans learn to see illusions as they develop during childhood. They also suggest that future work should address how nonhuman primates' experience of these illusion changes throughout their development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Inter-individual coordination in walking chimpanzees.

Humans, like many other animals, live in groups and coordinate actions with others in social settings.1 Such interpersonal coordination may emerge unconsciously and when the goal is not the coordination of movements, as when falling into the same rhythm when walking together.2 Although one of our closest living relatives, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), shows the ability to succeed in complex joint action tasks where coordination is the goal,3 little is known about simpler forms of joint action. Here, we examine whether chimpanzees spontaneously synchronize their actions with conspecifics while walking together. We collected data on individual walking behavior of two groups of chimpanzees under semi-natural conditions. In addition, we assessed social relationships to investigate potential effects on the strength of coordination. When walking with a conspecific, individuals walked faster than when alone. The relative phase was symmetrically distributed around 0° with the highest frequencies around 0, indicating a tendency to coordinate actions. Further, coordination was stronger when walking with a partner compared with two individuals walking independently. Although the inter-limb entrainment was more pronounced between individuals of similar age as a proxy for height, it was not affected by the kinship or bonding status of the walkers or the behaviors they engaged in immediately after the walk. We conclude that chimpanzees adapt their individual behavior to temporally coordinate actions with others, which might provide a basis for engaging in other more complex forms of joint action. This spontaneous form of inter-individual coordination, often called entrainment, is thus shared with humans.

The "avoid the empty cup" hypothesis does not explain great apes' (Gorilla gorilla, Pan paniscus, Pan troglodytes, Pongo abelii) responses in two three-cup one-item inference by exclusion tasks.

In the two-cup one-item task, subjects are shown a food item, which is then hidden inside one of two cups. Several species spontaneously select the baited cup above chance levels if shown that the other cup is empty. Although this response may indicate inference by exclusion (if not A, then B), another possibility is that subjects simply avoid choosing the empty cup, not because they expect the food to be in the other cup but because they have seen that cup to be empty. I tested whether this hypothesis explains great apes' responses in a three-cup one-item task. Subjects saw three opaque cups on a platform, with two of them located behind a barrier during baiting. After baiting one of the cups behind the barrier, I revealed the identity of the empty cup that had been located behind the barrier (Experiment 1) or revealed the contents of the center cup (baited in half of the trials), but always removed it before the subjects' choice (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, subjects preferentially selected the baited cup even though one of the other two cups had not been shown to be empty. In Experiment 2, subjects' preference for the cup that had been located behind the barrier during baiting was modulated by the contents of the removed cup. These results suggest that expectations about the food's location, not just the sight of the empty cup, as postulated by the "avoid the empty cup" hypothesis, determine apes' responses in the three-cup one-item task. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) navigate to find hidden fruit in a virtual environment.

Almost all animals navigate their environment to find food, shelter, and mates. Spatial cognition of nonhuman primates in large-scale environments is notoriously difficult to study. Field research is ecologically valid, but controlling confounding variables can be difficult. Captive research enables experimental control, but space restrictions can limit generalizability. Virtual reality technology combines the best of both worlds by creating large-scale, controllable environments. We presented six chimpanzees with a seminaturalistic virtual environment, using a custom touch screen application. The chimpanzees exhibited signature behaviors reminiscent of real-life navigation: They learned to approach a landmark associated with the presence of fruit, improving efficiency over time; they located this landmark from novel starting locations and approached a different landmark when necessary. We conclude that virtual environments can allow for standardized testing with higher ecological validity than traditional tests in captivity and harbor great potential to contribute to longstanding questions in primate navigation, e.g., the use of landmarks, Euclidean maps, or spatial frames of reference.

The structure of executive functions in preschool children and chimpanzees.

Executive functions (EF) are a core aspect of cognition. Research with adult humans has produced evidence for unity and diversity in the structure of EF. Studies with preschoolers favour a 1-factor model, in which variation in EF tasks is best explained by a single underlying trait on which all EF tasks load. How EF are structured in nonhuman primates remains unknown. This study starts to fill this gap through a comparative, multi-trait multi-method test battery with preschoolers (N = 185) and chimpanzees (N = 55). The battery aimed at measuring working memory updating, inhibition, and attention shifting with three non-verbal tasks per function. For both species the correlations between tasks were low to moderate and not confined to tasks within the same putative function. Factor analyses produced some evidence for the unity of executive functions in both groups, in that our analyses revealed shared variance. However, we could not conclusively distinguish between 1-, 2- or 3-factor models. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to the ecological validity of current psychometric research.

Exploring the development of attentional set shifting in young children with a novel Intradimensional/Extradimensional shift task.

Attentional set shifting is a core part of cognition, allowing quick and flexible adaption to new demands. The study of its development during early childhood has been hampered by a shortage of measures not requiring language. This article argues for a revival of the Intradimensional/Extradimensional (ID/ED) shift task by presenting a new nonverbal version of the task (Shifting Tray task). Children (N = 95 3- to 5-year-olds; 49 girls; predominantly European White) were presented with pairs of trays, each filled with a substrate and an upside-down cup on top, and were asked to find stickers. In the pre-switch phase, children learned (through trial and error) which dimension (substrate or cup) was predictive of the rewards. In the post-switch phase, all stimuli were exchanged. For children in the intradimensional shift condition, the dimension predictive of the sticker was the same as the one predictive in the pre-switch phase. For children in the extradimensional shift condition, the previously irrelevant dimension was now relevant. Results showed that most 3-year-olds were able to switch, and older children did not outperform younger children. The easy and flexible nature of the task allows researchers to investigate the impact of labels and instructions and to use it in cross-cultural and comparative research.

Human adults prefer to cooperate even when it is costly.

Joint actions are cooperative activities where humans coordinate their actions to achieve individual and shared goals. While the motivation to engage in joint action is clear when a goal cannot be achieved by individuals alone, we asked whether humans are motivated to act together even when acting together is not necessary and implies incurring additional costs compared to individual goal achievement. Using a utility-based empirical approach, we investigated the extent of humans' preference for joint action over individual action, when the instrumental costs of performing joint actions outweigh the benefits. The results of five experiments showed that human adults have a stable preference for joint action, even if individual action is more effective to achieve a certain goal. We propose that such preferences can be understood as ascribing additional reward value to performing actions together.

Primate cognition in zoos: Reviewing the impact of zoo-based research over 15 years.

Primate cognition research is reliant on access to members of the study sp ecies and logistical infrastructures to conduct observations and experiments. Historically founded in research centers and private collections, and spreading to modern zoos, sanctuaries, and the field, primate cognition has been investigated in diverse settings, each with benefits and challenges. In our systematic review of 12 primatology, animal behavior, and animal cognition journals over the last 15 years, we turn a spotlight on zoos to quantify their current impact on the field and to highlight their potential as robust contributors to future work. To put zoo-based research in context, we compare zoos to three other site types: university-owned or independent research centers, sanctuaries, and field sites. We assess the contributions of zoos across several critical considerations in primate cognition research, including number of investigations, species diversity, sample size, research topic diversity, and methodology. We identified 1119 publications reporting studies of primate cognition, almost 25% of which report research conducted in zoos. Across publications, zoo-based research has greater species diversity than research centers and covers a diverse range of research topics. Although our review is merely a snapshot of primate cognition research, our findings suggest that zoos may present advantages to researchers regarding species diversity, and lack some of the methodological constraints of field sites, allowing greater ease of access to a diverse range of subjects for cognition investigations. We suggest that zoos have great potential as key contributors for future investigations in primate cognition. Finally, we shed light on the symbiotic relationship that can emerge between researchers and zoos, forming partnerships that bring unique advantages to both parties.

Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions.

Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make-revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence.