RESUMO
The EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW) was asked to deliver a scientific opinion on the use of high-expansion foam for stunning and killing pigs and poultry. A dossier was provided by the applicant as the basis for an assessment of the extent to which the method is able to provide a level of animal welfare at least equivalent to that ensured by the currently allowed methods for pigs and poultry. According to legislation, to be approved in the EU, new stunning methods must ensure (1) the absence of pain, distress or suffering until the onset of unconsciousness, and (2) that the animal remains unconscious until death. An ad hoc Working Group set up by EFSA performed the assessment as follows: (1) The data provided were checked against the criteria laid down in the EFSA Guidance (EFSA, 2018), and was found to partially fulfil those criteria; (2) extensive literature search; (3) data extraction for quantitative assessment; (4) qualitative exercise based on non-formal expert elicitation. The assessment led to conclude that it is more likely than not (certainty > 50%-100%) that high-expansion foam for stunning and killing pigs and poultry, named NEFS in container (Nitrogen Expansion Foam Stunning in container), provides a level of welfare at least equivalent to one or more of the currently allowed methods listed in Annex I of Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. The overall assessment of EFSA is valid only under the technical conditions described in this Opinion for laying hens, broiler chickens of all age and pigs weighing 15-41 kg in situations other than slaughter. The overall assessment of EFSA is that NEFS can be suitable for depopulation using containers for pig and poultry farms respecting the technical conditions and the categories and types of animals defined in this Scientific Opinion.
RESUMO
Sheep and goats of different ages may have to be killed on-farm for purposes other than slaughter (where slaughter is defined as killing for human consumption) either individually (i.e. on-farm killing of unproductive, injured or terminally ill animals) or on a large scale (i.e. depopulation for disease control purposes and for other situations, such as environmental contamination and disaster management) outside the slaughterhouses. The purpose of this opinion was to assess the hazards and welfare consequences associated with the on-farm killing of sheep and goats. The whole killing procedure was divided into Phase 1 (pre-killing) - that included the processes (i) handling and moving the animals to the killing place and (ii) restraint of the animals before application of the killing methods and Phase 2 - that included stunning and killing of the animals. The killing methods for sheep and goats were grouped into three categories: (1) mechanical, (2) electrical and (3) lethal injection. Welfare consequences that sheep and goats may experience during each process were identified (e.g. handling stress, restriction of movements and tissue lesions during restraint) and animal-based measures (ABMs) to assess them were proposed. During application of the killing method, sheep and goats will experience pain and fear if they are ineffectively stunned or if they recover consciousness. ABMs related to the state of consciousness can be used to indirectly assess pain and fear. Flowcharts including ABMs for consciousness specific to each killing method were included in the opinion. Possible welfare hazards were identified for each process, together with their origin and related preventive and corrective measures. Outcome tables linking hazards, welfare consequences, ABMs, origins, preventive and corrective measures were developed for each process. Mitigation measures to minimise welfare consequences were proposed.
RESUMO
Selecting appropriate diagnostic methods that take account of the type of vaccine used is important when implementing a vaccination programme against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). If vaccination is effective, a decreased viral load is expected in the samples used for diagnosis, making molecular methods with high sensitivity the best choice. Although serological methods can be reasonably sensitive, they may produce results that are difficult to interpret. In addition to routine molecular monitoring, it is recommended to conduct viral isolation, genetic sequencing and phenotypic characterisation of any HPAI virus detected in vaccinated flocks to detect escape mutants early. Following emergency vaccination, various surveillance options based on virological testing of dead birds ('bucket sampling') at defined intervals were assessed to be effective for early detection of HPAIV and prove disease freedom in vaccinated populations. For ducks, virological or serological testing of live birds was assessed as an effective strategy. This surveillance could be also applied in the peri-vaccination zone on vaccinated establishments, while maintaining passive surveillance in unvaccinated chicken layers and turkeys, and weekly bucket sampling in unvaccinated ducks. To demonstrate disease freedom with > 99% confidence and to detect HPAI virus sufficiently early following preventive vaccination, monthly virological testing of all dead birds up to 15 per flock, coupled with passive surveillance in both vaccinated and unvaccinated flocks, is recommended. Reducing the sampling intervals increases the sensitivity of early detection up to 100%. To enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry during emergency vaccination, laboratory examinations in the 72 h prior to the movement can be considered as a risk mitigation measure, in addition to clinical inspection; sampling results from existing surveillance activities carried out in these 72 h could be used. In this Opinion, several schemes are recommended to enable the safe movement of vaccinated poultry following preventive vaccination.
RESUMO
Infection with Gyrodactylus salaris was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular, the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid down in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to infection with G. salaris. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method for data collection and assessment previously developed by AHAW panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether infection with G. salaris can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (33-70% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that Infection with G. salaris does not meet the criteria in Section 1 and 3 (Category A and C; 1-5% and 10-33% probability of fulfilling the criteria, respectively) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 4 and 5 (Categories B, D and E; 33-80%, 33-66% and 33-80% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for infection with G. salaris according to Article 8 criteria are provided.
RESUMO
Bacterial kidney disease (BKD) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid out in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to BKD. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method on data collection and assessment developed by AHAW Panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to this assessment, BKD can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (66-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that BKD does not meet the criteria in Sections 1, 2 and 3 (Categories A, B and C; 1-5%, 33-66% and 33-66% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively) but meets the criteria in Sections 4 and 5 (Categories D and E; 66-90% and 66-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for BKD according to Article 8 criteria are provided.
RESUMO
Infection with salmonid alphavirus (SAV) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as laid out in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to infection with SAV. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method on data collection and assessment developed by AHAW Panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment, it was uncertain whether infection with salmonid alphavirus can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (50-80% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that infection with salmonid alphavirus does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 5-10% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 50-90%, probability of meeting the criteria). The animal species to be listed for infection with SAV according to Article 8 criteria are provided.
RESUMO
Spring Viraemia of Carp (SVC) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9 and Article 8 for listing animal species related to SVC. The assessment was performed following the ad hoc method for data collection and assessment previously developed by the AHAW panel and already published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment performed here, it is uncertain whether SVC can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (45-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that SVC does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 5-33% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 33-66%, 10-66%, 45-90% and 45-90% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for SVC according to Article 8 criteria are provided.
RESUMO
Brucellosis due to Brucella melitensis affects domestic and wild ruminants, as well as other mammals, including humans. Despite France being officially free of bovine brucellosis since 2005, two human cases of Brucella melitensis infection in the French Alps in 2012 led to the discovery of one infected cattle herd and of one infected population of wild Alpine ibex (Capra ibex). In this review, we present the results of 10 years of research on the epidemiology of brucellosis in this population of Alpine ibex. We also discuss the insights brought by research and expert assessments on the efficacy of disease management strategies used to mitigate brucellosis in the French Alps.
Title: La brucellose du bouquetin des Alpes - Un exemple de dix années de recherche et d'expertise. Abstract: La brucellose à Brucella melitensis touche les ruminants domestiques et sauvages, ainsi que d'autres mammifères, dont les humains. Bien que la France soit officiellement indemne depuis 2005, deux cas humains reportés en Haute-Savoie en 2012 ont conduit à la découverte de l'infection dans un élevage bovin et chez les bouquetins des Alpes (Capra ibex) du massif du Bargy. Nous présentons dans cette synthèse les principales découvertes de ces dix dernières années sur le système brucellose-bouquetins. Nous discuterons également de l'apport de la recherche et de l'expertise sur l'évaluation de l'efficacité des mesures de gestion sanitaire mises en place dans le massif du Bargy pour lutter contre la brucellose.
Assuntos
Brucelose , Humanos , Animais , Bovinos , Brucelose/epidemiologia , Brucelose/veterinária , Cabras , França/epidemiologiaRESUMO
Several vaccines have been developed against highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), mostly inactivated whole-virus vaccines for chickens. In the EU, one vaccine is authorised in chickens but is not fully efficacious to stop transmission, highlighting the need for vaccines tailored to diverse poultry species and production types. Off-label use of vaccines is possible, but effectiveness varies. Vaccines are usually injectable, a time-consuming process. Mass-application vaccines outside hatcheries remain rare. First vaccination varies from in-ovo to 6 weeks of age. Data about immunity onset and duration in the target species are often unavailable, despite being key for effective planning. Minimising antigenic distance between vaccines and field strains is essential, requiring rapid updates of vaccines to match circulating strains. Generating harmonised vaccine efficacy data showing vaccine ability to reduce transmission is crucial and this ability should be also assessed in field trials. Planning vaccination requires selecting the most adequate vaccine type and vaccination scheme. Emergency protective vaccination is limited to vaccines that are not restricted by species, age or pre-existing vector-immunity, while preventive vaccination should prioritise achieving the highest protection, especially for the most susceptible species in high-risk transmission areas. Model simulations in France, Italy and The Netherlands revealed that (i) duck and turkey farms are more infectious than chickens, (ii) depopulating infected farms only showed limitations in controlling disease spread, while 1-km ring-culling performed better than or similar to emergency preventive ring-vaccination scenarios, although with the highest number of depopulated farms, (iii) preventive vaccination of the most susceptible species in high-risk transmission areas was the best option to minimise the outbreaks' number and duration, (iv) during outbreaks in such areas, emergency protective vaccination in a 3-km radius was more effective than 1- and 10-km radius. Vaccine efficacy should be monitored and complement other surveillance and preventive efforts.
RESUMO
France has been officially free of bovine brucellosis since 2005. Nevertheless, in 2012, as the source of two human cases, a bovine outbreak due to B. melitensis biovar 3 was confirmed in the French Alpine Bargy massif, due to a spillover from wild, protected Alpine ibex (Capra ibex). In order to reduce high Brucella prevalence in the local ibex population, successive management strategies have been implemented. Lateral flow immunochromatography assay (LFIA) was thus identified as a promising on-site screening test, allowing for a rapid diagnosis far from the laboratory. This study compared a commercial LFIA for brucellosis diagnosis with the WOAH-recommended tests for small ruminants (i.e., Rose Bengal test (RBT), Complement fixation test, (CFT) and Indirect ELISA, (iELISA)). LFIA showed the same analytical sensitivity as iELISA on successive dilutions of the International Standard anti-Brucella melitensis Serum (ISaBmS) and the EU Goat Brucella Standard Serum (EUGBSS). Selectivity was estimated at 100% when vaccinated ibex sera were analyzed. When used on samples from naturally infected ibex, LFIA showed high concordance, as well as relative sensitivity and specificity (>97.25%) in comparison with RBT and CFT. This work shows high reliability and ensures a better standardization of LFIA testing for wild ruminants.
RESUMO
Vector or reservoir species of five mollusc diseases listed in the Animal Health Law were identified, based on evidence generated through an extensive literature review, to support a possible updating of Regulation (EU) 2018/1882. Mollusc species on or in which Mikrocytos mackini, Perkinsus marinus, Bonamia exitiosa, Bonamia ostreae and Marteilia refringens were detected, in the field or during experiments, were classified as reservoir species with different levels of certainty depending on the diagnostic tests used. Where experimental evidence indicated transmission of the pathogen from a studied species to another known susceptible species, this studied species was classified as a vector species. Although the quantification of the risk of spread of the pathogens by the vectors or reservoir species was not part of the terms of reference, such risks do exist for the vector species, since transmission from infected vector species to susceptible species was proven. Where evidence for transmission from infected molluscs was not found, these were defined as reservoir. Nonetheless, the risk of the spread of the pathogens from infected reservoir species cannot be excluded. Evidence identifying conditions that may prevent transmission by vectors or reservoir mollusc species during transport was collected from scientific literature. It was concluded that it is very likely to almost certain (90-100%) that M. mackini, P. marinus, B. exitiosa B. ostreae and M. refringens will remain infective at any possible transport condition. Therefore, vector or reservoir species that may have been exposed to these pathogens in an affected area in the wild or at aquaculture establishments or through contaminated water supply can possibly transmit these pathogens. For transmission of M. refringens, the presence of an intermediate host, a copepod, is necessary.
RESUMO
Vector or reservoir species of three diseases of crustaceans listed in the Animal Health Law were identified based on evidence generated through an extensive literature review, to support a possible updating of Regulation (EU) 2018/1882. Crustacean species on or in which Taura syndrome virus (TSV), Yellow head virus (YHV) or White spot syndrome virus (WSSV) were identified, in the field or during experiments, were classified as reservoir species with different levels of certainty depending on the diagnostic tests used. Where experimental evidence indicated transmission of the pathogen from a studied species to another known susceptible species, the studied species was classified as vector species. Although the quantification of the risk of spread of the pathogens by the vectors or reservoir species was not part of the terms of reference, such risks do exist for the vector species, since transmission from infected vector species to susceptible species was proven. Where evidence for transmission from infected crustaceans was not found, these were defined as reservoirs. Nonetheless, the risk of the spread of the pathogens from infected reservoir species cannot be excluded. Evidence identifying conditions that may prevent transmission by vectors during transport was collected from scientific literature. It was concluded that it is very likely to almost certain (90-100%) that WSSV, TSV and YHV will remain infective at any possible transport condition. Therefore, vector or reservoir species that may have been exposed to these pathogens in an affected area in the wild or aquaculture establishments or by water supply can possibly transmit WSSV, TSV and YHV.
RESUMO
Vector or reservoir species of five fish diseases listed in the Animal Health Law were identified, based on evidence generated through an extensive literature review (ELR), to support a possible updating of Regulation (EU) 2018/1882. Fish species on or in which highly polymorphic region-deleted infectious salmon anaemia virus (HPR∆ ISAV), Koi herpes virus (KHV), epizootic haematopoietic necrosis virus (EHNV), infectious haematopoietic necrosis virus (IHNV) or viral haemorrhagic septicaemia virus (VHSV) were detected, in the field or during experiments, were classified as reservoir species with different levels of certainty depending on the diagnostic tests used. Where experimental evidence indicated transmission of the pathogen from a studied species to another known susceptible species, the studied species was classified as a vector species. Although the quantification of the risk of spread of the pathogens by the vectors or reservoir species was not part of the terms or reference, such risks do exist for the vector species, since transmission from infected vector species to susceptible species was proven. Where evidence for transmission from infected fish was not found, these were defined as reservoirs. Nonetheless, the risk of the spread of the pathogens from infected reservoir species cannot be excluded. Evidence identifying conditions that may prevent transmission by vectors or reservoir fish species during transport was collected from scientific literature. For VHSV, IHNV or HPR∆ ISAV, it was concluded that under transport conditions at temperatures below 25°C, it is likely (66-90%) they will remain infective. Therefore, vector or reservoir species that may have been exposed to these pathogens in an affected area in the wild, aquaculture establishments or through water supply can possibly transmit VHSV, IHNV or HPR∆ ISAV into a non-affected area when transported at a temperature below 25°C. The conclusion was the same for EHN and KHV; however, they are likely to remain infective under all transport temperatures.
RESUMO
Bacteria of the genus Brucella are facultative intracellular parasites that cause brucellosis, a severe animal and human disease. Recently, a group of taxonomists merged the brucellae with the primarily free-living, phylogenetically related Ochrobactrum spp. in the genus Brucella. This change, founded only on global genomic analysis and the fortuitous isolation of some opportunistic Ochrobactrum spp. from medically compromised patients, has been automatically included in culture collections and databases. We argue that clinical and environmental microbiologists should not accept this nomenclature, and we advise against its use because (i) it was presented without in-depth phylogenetic analyses and did not consider alternative taxonomic solutions; (ii) it was launched without the input of experts in brucellosis or Ochrobactrum; (iii) it applies a non-consensus genus concept that disregards taxonomically relevant differences in structure, physiology, population structure, core-pangenome assemblies, genome structure, genomic traits, clinical features, treatment, prevention, diagnosis, genus description rules, and, above all, pathogenicity; and (iv) placing these two bacterial groups in the same genus creates risks for veterinarians, medical doctors, clinical laboratories, health authorities, and legislators who deal with brucellosis, a disease that is particularly relevant in low- and middle-income countries. Based on all this information, we urge microbiologists, bacterial collections, genomic databases, journals, and public health boards to keep the Brucella and Ochrobactrum genera separate to avoid further bewilderment and harm.
Assuntos
Brucella , Ochrobactrum , Ochrobactrum/classificação , Ochrobactrum/genética , Ochrobactrum/patogenicidade , Ochrobactrum/fisiologia , Brucella/classificação , Brucella/genética , Brucella/patogenicidade , Brucella/fisiologia , Terminologia como Assunto , Filogenia , Brucelose/tratamento farmacológico , Brucelose/microbiologia , Humanos , Infecções Oportunistas/microbiologiaRESUMO
Infectious pancreatic necrosis (IPN) was assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular, the criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on its eligibility to be listed, Annex IV for its categorisation according to disease prevention and control rules as in Article 9, and Article 8 for listing animal species related to IPN. The assessment was performed following a methodology previously published. The outcome reported is the median of the probability ranges provided by the experts, which indicates whether each criterion is fulfilled (lower bound ≥ 66%) or not (upper bound ≤ 33%), or whether there is uncertainty about fulfilment. Reasoning points are reported for criteria with an uncertain outcome. According to the assessment here performed, it is uncertain whether IPN can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention according to Article 5 of the AHL (50-90% probability). According to the criteria in Annex IV, for the purpose of categorisation related to the level of prevention and control as in Article 9 of the AHL, the AHAW Panel concluded that IPN does not meet the criteria in Section 1 (Category A; 0-1% probability of meeting the criteria) and it is uncertain whether it meets the criteria in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (Categories B, C, D and E; 33-66%, 33-66%, 50-90% and 50-99% probability of meeting the criteria, respectively). The animal species to be listed for IPN according to Article 8 criteria are provided.
RESUMO
This Scientific Opinion concerns the welfare of Domestic ducks (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus), Muscovy ducks (Cairina moschata domesticus) and their hybrids (Mule ducks), Domestic geese (Anser anser f. domesticus) and Japanese quail (Coturnix japonica) in relation to the rearing of breeders, birds for meat, Muscovy and Mule ducks and Domestic geese for foie gras and layer Japanese quail for egg production. The most common husbandry systems (HSs) in the European Union are described for each animal species and category. The following welfare consequences are described and assessed for each species: restriction of movement, injuries (bone lesions including fractures and dislocations, soft tissue lesions and integument damage and locomotory disorders including lameness), group stress, inability to perform comfort behaviour, inability to perform exploratory or foraging behaviour and inability to express maternal behaviour (related to prelaying and nesting behaviours). Animal-based measures relevant for the assessment of these welfare consequences were identified and described. The relevant hazards leading to the welfare consequences in the different HSs were identified. Specific factors such as space allowance (including minimum enclosure area and height) per bird, group size, floor quality, characteristics of nesting facilities and enrichment provided (including access to water to fulfil biological needs) were assessed in relation to the welfare consequences and, recommendations on how to prevent the welfare consequences were provided in a quantitative or qualitative way.
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This Scientific Opinion addresses a European Commission's mandate on the welfare of dairy cows as part of the Farm to Fork strategy. It includes three assessments carried out based on literature reviews and complemented by expert opinion. Assessment 1 describes the most prevalent housing systems for dairy cows in Europe: tie-stalls, cubicle housing, open-bedded systems and systems with access to an outdoor area. Per each system, the scientific opinion describes the distribution in the EU and assesses the main strengths, weaknesses and hazards potentially reducing the welfare of dairy cows. Assessment 2 addresses five welfare consequences as requested in the mandate: locomotory disorders (including lameness), mastitis, restriction of movement and resting problems, inability to perform comfort behaviour and metabolic disorders. Per each welfare consequence, a set of animal-based measures is suggested, a detailed analysis of the prevalence in different housing systems is provided, and subsequently, a comparison of the housing systems is given. Common and specific system-related hazards as well as management-related hazards and respective preventive measures are investigated. Assessment 3 includes an analysis of farm characteristics (e.g. milk yield, herd size) that could be used to classify the level of on-farm welfare. From the available scientific literature, it was not possible to derive relevant associations between available farm data and cow welfare. Therefore, an approach based on expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) was developed. The EKE resulted in the identification of five farm characteristics (more than one cow per cubicle at maximum stocking density, limited space for cows, inappropriate cubicle size, high on-farm mortality and farms with less than 2 months access to pasture). If one or more of these farm characteristics are present, it is recommended to conduct an assessment of cow welfare on the farm in question using animal-based measures for specified welfare consequences.
RESUMO
This Scientific Opinion addresses a European Commission request on the welfare of calves as part of the Farm to Fork strategy. EFSA was asked to provide a description of common husbandry systems and related welfare consequences, as well as measures to prevent or mitigate the hazards leading to them. In addition, recommendations on three specific issues were requested: welfare of calves reared for white veal (space, group housing, requirements of iron and fibre); risk of limited cow-calf contact; and animal-based measures (ABMs) to monitor on-farm welfare in slaughterhouses. The methodology developed by EFSA to address similar requests was followed. Fifteen highly relevant welfare consequences were identified, with respiratory disorders, inability to perform exploratory or foraging behaviour, gastroenteric disorders and group stress being the most frequent across husbandry systems. Recommendations to improve the welfare of calves include increasing space allowance, keeping calves in stable groups from an early age, ensuring good colostrum management and increasing the amounts of milk fed to dairy calves. In addition, calves should be provided with deformable lying surfaces, water via an open surface and long-cut roughage in racks. Regarding specific recommendations for veal systems, calves should be kept in small groups (2-7 animals) within the first week of life, provided with ~ 20 m2/calf and fed on average 1 kg neutral detergent fibre (NDF) per day, preferably using long-cut hay. Recommendations on cow-calf contact include keeping the calf with the dam for a minimum of 1 day post-partum. Longer contact should progressively be implemented, but research is needed to guide this implementation in practice. The ABMs body condition, carcass condemnations, abomasal lesions, lung lesions, carcass colour and bursa swelling may be collected in slaughterhouses to monitor on-farm welfare but should be complemented with behavioural ABMs collected on farm.
RESUMO
The epidemiological situation of SARS-CoV-2 in humans and animals is continually evolving. To date, animal species known to transmit SARS-CoV-2 are American mink, raccoon dog, cat, ferret, hamster, house mouse, Egyptian fruit bat, deer mouse and white-tailed deer. Among farmed animals, American mink have the highest likelihood to become infected from humans or animals and further transmit SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, 44 outbreaks were reported in 2021 in mink farms in seven MSs, while only six in 2022 in two MSs, thus representing a decreasing trend. The introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into mink farms is usually via infected humans; this can be controlled by systematically testing people entering farms and adequate biosecurity. The current most appropriate monitoring approach for mink is the outbreak confirmation based on suspicion, testing dead or clinically sick animals in case of increased mortality or positive farm personnel and the genomic surveillance of virus variants. The genomic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 showed mink-specific clusters with a potential to spill back into the human population. Among companion animals, cats, ferrets and hamsters are those at highest risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection, which most likely originates from an infected human, and which has no or very low impact on virus circulation in the human population. Among wild animals (including zoo animals), mostly carnivores, great apes and white-tailed deer have been reported to be naturally infected by SARS-CoV-2. In the EU, no cases of infected wildlife have been reported so far. Proper disposal of human waste is advised to reduce the risks of spill-over of SARS-CoV-2 to wildlife. Furthermore, contact with wildlife, especially if sick or dead, should be minimised. No specific monitoring for wildlife is recommended apart from testing hunter-harvested animals with clinical signs or found-dead. Bats should be monitored as a natural host of many coronaviruses.
RESUMO
This Scientific Opinion considers the welfare of domestic fowl (Gallus gallus) related to the production of meat (broilers) and includes the keeping of day-old chicks, broiler breeders, and broiler chickens. Currently used husbandry systems in the EU are described. Overall, 19 highly relevant welfare consequences (WCs) were identified based on severity, duration and frequency of occurrence: 'bone lesions', 'cold stress', 'gastro-enteric disorders', 'group stress', 'handling stress', 'heat stress', 'isolation stress', 'inability to perform comfort behaviour', 'inability to perform exploratory or foraging behaviour', 'inability to avoid unwanted sexual behaviour', 'locomotory disorders', 'prolonged hunger', 'prolonged thirst', 'predation stress', 'restriction of movement', 'resting problems', 'sensory under- and overstimulation', 'soft tissue and integument damage' and 'umbilical disorders'. These WCs and their animal-based measures (ABMs) that can identify them are described in detail. A variety of hazards related to the different husbandry systems were identified as well as ABMs for assessing the different WCs. Measures to prevent or correct the hazards and/or mitigate each of the WCs are listed. Recommendations are provided on quantitative or qualitative criteria to answer specific questions on the welfare of broilers and related to genetic selection, temperature, feed and water restriction, use of cages, light, air quality and mutilations in breeders such as beak trimming, de-toeing and comb dubbing. In addition, minimal requirements (e.g. stocking density, group size, nests, provision of litter, perches and platforms, drinkers and feeders, of covered veranda and outdoor range) for an enclosure for keeping broiler chickens (fast-growing, slower-growing and broiler breeders) are recommended. Finally, 'total mortality', 'wounds', 'carcass condemnation' and 'footpad dermatitis' are proposed as indicators for monitoring at slaughter the welfare of broilers on-farm.