Moral beacons: Understanding moral character and moral influence.

OBJECTIVE: We introduce the concept of moral beacons-individuals who are higher in moral character than their peers and prominent within their social environment-and examine the degree to which moral beacons increase the moral awareness of their peers. BACKGROUND: Using data from cohorts of students in graduate business education across two universities, we applied theory and methods from organizational behavior, personality psychology, and social networks analysis to test two research questions about moral beacons. METHOD: We used latent profile analysis of data from personality questionnaires and social network surveys completed by graduate business students at two universities (N = 502) to identify individuals classified as moral beacons. We used peer nominations and an in-class business case discussion exercise to assess moral influence. RESULTS: Latent profile analysis identified a latent class of moral beacons in our sample. These individuals received more nominations from their peers in end-of-class surveys as guides for moral thought and action and positively impacted the moral awareness of their peers in a discussion of a difficult business case about possible lead poisoning of employees, but did not significantly change their counterparts' moral awareness in a different case. CONCLUSIONS: These results provide promising initial evidence that moral beacons can be distinguished from their peers by both moral character and social prominence and can act as guides for others, at times encouraging greater consideration of the moral aspects of situations and decisions. As these results are the first of their kind, we encourage further replication and investigations of moral beacons and moral influence in other settings.

Gender Bias in Collaborative Medical Decision Making: Emergent Evidence.

This initial, exploratory study on gender bias in collaborative medical decision making examined the degree to which physicians' reliance on a team member's patient care advice differs as a function of the gender of the advice giver. In 2018, 283 anesthesiologists read a brief, online clinical vignette and were randomly assigned to receive treatment advice from 1 of 8 possible sources (physician or nurse, man or woman, experienced or inexperienced). They then indicated their treatment decision, as well as the degree to which they relied upon the advice given.The results revealed 2 patterns consistent with gender bias in participants' advice taking. First, when treatment advice was delivered by an inexperienced physician, participants reported replying significantly more on the advice of a man versus a woman, F(1,61) = 4.24, P = .04. Second, participants' reliance on the advice of the woman physician was a function of her experience, F(1,62) = 6.96, P = .01, whereas reliance on the advice of the man physician was not, F(1,60) = 0.21, P = .65.These findings suggest women physicians, relative to men, may encounter additional hurdles to performing their jobs, especially at early stages in their careers. These hurdles are rooted in psychological biases of others, rather than objective features of cases or treatment settings. Cultural stereotypes may shape physicians' information use and decision-making processes (and hinder collaboration), even in contexts that appear to have little to do with social category membership. The authors recommend institutions adopt policies and practices encouraging equal attention to advice, regardless of the source, to help ensure advice taking is a function of information quality rather than the attributes of the advice giver. Such policies and practices may help surface and implement diverse expert perspectives in collaborative medical decision making, promoting better and more effective patient care.

Asymmetric memory for harming versus being harmed.

Most people have been both the victim and the perpetrator of a moral transgression at some point in their lives; this article asks whether one set of moral experiences is easier to remember than the other, and why. In Study 1, we documented this basic asymmetry, finding that individuals recalled more instances in which they were the victim of a moral transgression than instances in which they were the perpetrator. In Study 2, we found that this asymmetry in memory arises because experiences of being the victim are perceived more negatively than experiences of being the perpetrator. In Studies 3 and 4, we demonstrated the critical role of intent in this asymmetry, finding that victim memories emphasize perpetrator intent to a greater degree than do perpetrator memories (Study 3), and that the memory asymmetry disappeared when individuals recalled unintentional moral violations (Study 4). Finally, in Study 5, we ruled out a potential alternative mechanism for these effects-that of self-protective motivation on the part of perpetrators. We found that the threat associated with the moral violation moderated victim (but not perpetrator) memories, a finding that is inconsistent with a motivational account for perpetrator memories. This research demonstrates that perceived agency shapes emotional experience and autobiographical memory and speaks to the importance of studying morality as it occurs in everyday contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Pessimistic expectations and poorer experiences: The role of (low) extraversion in anticipated and experienced enjoyment of social interaction.

Given research suggesting that social interactions are beneficial, it is unclear why individuals lower in extraversion engage less in social interactions. In this study, we test whether individuals lower in extraversion reap fewer hedonic rewards from social interactions and explore social psychological processes that explain their experiences. Before participants socialized, we measured extraversion, state positive affect, cognitive capacity, and expectations about the social interactions. After participants socialized with one another, we measured state positive affect and cognitive capacity again as well as fear of negative evaluation and belief in limited cognitive capacity. Participants also rated the social skillfulness of each interaction partner. We found that less extraverted individuals expect to feel worse after socializing. However, all but those extremely low in extraversion (17% of sample) actually experience an increase in positive affect after socializing. Surprisingly, those low in extraversion did not show reduced cognitive capacity after socializing. Although they are more likely to believe that cognitive capacity is limited and to be fearful of negative evaluation, these characteristics did not explain the social experience of those low in extraversion.

Once a Utilitarian, Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences.

Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects-effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near-perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment.

Agreement on the perception of moral character.

This study tested for inter-judge agreement on moral character. A sample of students and community members rated their own moral character using a measure that tapped six moral character traits. Friends, family members, and/or acquaintances rated these targets on the same traits. Self/other and inter-informant agreement was found at the trait level for both a general character factor and for residual variance explained by individual moral character traits, as well as at the individual level (judges agreed on targets' "moral character profiles"). Observed inter-judge agreement constitutes evidence for the existence of moral character, and raises questions about the nature of moral character traits.

Context, as well as inputs, shape decisions, but are people aware of it?

Even if people are experts at understanding how various input cues landed them at a particular decision (something the authors refer to as cue utilization), they may still fail to appreciate how context influences the weight given to those input variables. We review evidence suggesting that people are unaware of contextual influences on their decisions.

Beyond the Correlation Coefficient in Studies of Self-Assessment Accuracy: Commentary on Zell & Krizan (2014).

Zell and Krizan (2014, this issue) provide a comprehensive yet incomplete portrait of the factors influencing accurate self-assessment. This is no fault of their own. Much work on self-accuracy focuses on the correlation coefficient as the measure of accuracy, but it is not the only way self-accuracy can be measured. As such, its use can provide an incomplete and potentially misleading story. We urge researchers to explore measures of bias as well as correlation, because there are indirect hints that each respond to a different psychological dynamic. We further entreat researchers to develop other creative measures of accuracy and not to forget that self-accuracy may come not only from personal knowledge but also from insight about human nature more generally.

Prospection by Any Other Name? A Response to Seligman et al. (2013).

We stand in agreement with Seligman et al. (2013, this issue) that prospection is an important psychological process, but we disagree that it has been neglected within the psychological literature. We further question some of the broader claims made by the authors regarding conscious decision making and free will. We argue that future-oriented cognition is fully consistent with deterministic accounts of cognition, including automaticity, and that prospection does little to advance the position of free will.

Whatever is willed will be: a temporal asymmetry in attributions to will.

Why do people neglect or underweight their past failures when thinking about their prospects of future success? One reason may be that people think of the past and future as guided by different causal forces. In seven studies, the authors demonstrate that people hold asymmetric beliefs about the impact of an individual's will on past versus future events. People consider the will to be a more potent determinant of future events than events that happened in the past. This asymmetry holds between- and within-subjects, and generalizes beyond undergraduate populations. The authors contend that this asymmetry contributes to the tendency for people to remain confident about their future performance in domains in which they have largely failed in the past. This research thus contributes to a growing body of literature exploring how thoughts about events in the past differ from thoughts about the same events set in the future.

Why and when peer prediction is superior to self-prediction: the weight given to future aspiration versus past achievement.

Peer predictions of future behavior and achievement are often more accurate than those furnished by the self. Although both self- and peer predictions correlate equally with future outcomes, peers tend to avoid the degree of overoptimism so often seen in self-predictions. In 3 studies, the authors tested whether this differential accuracy arises because people give more weight to past behavior when predicting others, but emphasize agentic information, in particular data about their aspiration level, when predicting the self. Studies 1 and 3 showed that the exact same participants rated past behavior more diagnostic of future performance when predicting another person but viewed aspiration-level data as more valuable when someone else was trying to predict them. In Studies 2 and 3 (predicting an upcoming exam score and performance in a lab task, respectively), participants gave greater weight in self-predictions to aspiration-level data than did a yoked peer, who instead gave greater weight to evidence of past achievement. This differential weighting explained why peer predictions tended to be less optimistic and, thus, more accurate. Discussion centers on strategies for predicting future behavior and why people may remain ignorant of their own incompetence despite feedback.

Dirty liberals! Reminders of physical cleanliness influence moral and political attitudes.

Many moral codes place a special emphasis on bodily purity, and manipulations that directly target bodily purity have been shown to influence a variety of moral judgments. Across two studies, we demonstrated that reminders of physical purity influence specific moral judgments regarding behaviors in the sexual domain as well as broad political attitudes. In Study 1, individuals in a public setting who were given a reminder of physical cleansing reported being more politically conservative than did individuals who were not given such a reminder. In Study 2, individuals reminded of physical cleansing in the laboratory demonstrated harsher moral judgments toward violations of sexual purity and were more likely to report being politically conservative than control participants. Together, these experiments provide further evidence of a deep link between physical purity and moral judgment, and they offer preliminary evidence that manipulations of physical purity can influence general (and putatively stable) political attitudes.

Traits, states, and attentional gates: temperament and threat relevance as predictors of attentional bias to social threat.

This study investigated the influence of situational and dispositional factors on attentional biases toward social threat, and the impact of these attentional biases on distress in a sample of adolescents. The results suggest greater biases for personally relevant threat cues, as individuals reporting high social stress were vigilant to subliminal social threat cues, but not physical threat cues, and those reporting low social stress showed no attentional biases. Individual differences in fearful temperament and attentional control interacted to influence attentional biases, with fearful temperament predicting biases to supraliminal social threat only for individuals with poor attentional control. Multivariate analyses exploring relations between attentional biases for social threat and symptoms of anxiety and depression revealed that attentional biases alone were rarely related to symptoms. However, biases did interact with social stress, fearful temperament, and attentional control to predict distress. The results are discussed in terms of automatic and effortful cognitive mechanisms underlying threat cue processing.