SARS-CoV-2 incidence in secondary schools; the role of national and school-initiated COVID-19 measures.

INTRODUCTION: Our aim was to gain insight into the effect of COVID-19 measures on SARS-CoV-2 incidence in secondary schools and the association with classroom CO2 concentration and airborne contamination. METHODS: Between October 2020-June 2021, 18 schools weekly reported SARS-CoV-2 incidence and completed surveys on school-initiated COVID-19 measures (e.g. improving hygiene or minimizing contacts). CO2 was measured in occupied classrooms twice, and SARS-CoV-2 air contamination longitudinally using electrostatic dust collectors (EDC) and analyzed using RT-qPCR. National COVID-19 policy measures varied during pre-lockdown, lockdown and post-lockdown periods. During the entire study, schools were recommended to improve ventilation. SARS-CoV-2 incidence rate ratios (IRR) were estimated by Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) models. RESULTS: During 18 weeks follow-up (range: 10-22) SARS-CoV-2 school-incidence decreased during national lockdown (adjusted IRR: 0.41, 95%CI: 0.21-0.80) and post-lockdown (IRR: 0.60, 0.39-0.93) compared to pre-lockdown. School-initiated COVID-19 measures had no additional effect. Pre-lockdown, IRRs per 10% increase in time CO2 exceeded 400, 550 and 800 ppm above outdoor level respectively, were 1.08 (1.00-1.16), 1.10 (1.02-1.19), and 1.08 (0.95-1.22). Post-lockdown, CO2-concentrations were considerably lower and not associated with SARS-CoV-2 incidence. No SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in any of the EDC samples. CONCLUSION: During a period with low SARS-CoV-2 population immunity and increased attention to ventilation, with CO2 levels most of the time below acceptable thresholds, only the national policy during and post-lockdown of reduced class-occupancy, stringent quarantine, and contact testing reduced SARS-CoV-2 incidence in Dutch secondary schools. Widespread SARS-CoV-2 air contamination could not be demonstrated in schools under the prevailing conditions during the study.

The Molecular Basis for Antigenic Drift of Human A/H2N2 Influenza Viruses.

Influenza A/H2N2 viruses caused a pandemic in 1957 and continued to circulate in humans until 1968. The antigenic evolution of A/H2N2 viruses over time and the amino acid substitutions responsible for this antigenic evolution are not known. Here, the antigenic diversity of a representative set of human A/H2N2 viruses isolated between 1957 and 1968 was characterized. The antigenic change of influenza A/H2N2 viruses during the 12 years that this virus circulated was modest. Two amino acid substitutions, T128D and N139K, located in the head domain of the H2 hemagglutinin (HA) molecule, were identified as important determinants of antigenic change during A/H2N2 virus evolution. The rate of A/H2N2 virus antigenic evolution during the 12-year period after introduction in humans was half that of A/H3N2 viruses, despite similar rates of genetic change.IMPORTANCE While influenza A viruses of subtype H2N2 were at the origin of the Asian influenza pandemic, little is known about the antigenic changes that occurred during the twelve years of circulation in humans, the role of preexisting immunity, and the evolutionary rates of the virus. In this study, the antigenic map derived from hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers of cell-cultured virus isolates and ferret postinfection sera displayed a directional evolution of viruses away from earlier isolates. Furthermore, individual mutations in close proximity to the receptor-binding site of the HA molecule determined the antigenic reactivity, confirming that individual amino acid substitutions in A/H2N2 viruses can confer major antigenic changes. This study adds to our understanding of virus evolution with respect to antigenic variability, rates of virus evolution, and potential escape mutants of A/H2N2.

Avian influenza virus transmission to mammals.

Influenza A viruses cause yearly epidemics and occasional pandemics. In addition, zoonotic influenza A viruses sporadically infect humans and may cause severe respiratory disease and fatalities. Fortunately, most of these viruses do not have the ability to be efficiently spread among humans via aerosols or respiratory droplets (airborne transmission) and to subsequently cause a pandemic. However, adaptation of these zoonotic viruses to humans by mutation or reassortment with human influenza A viruses may result in airborne transmissible viruses with pandemic potential. Although our knowledge of factors that affect mammalian adaptation and transmissibility of influenza viruses is still limited, we are beginning to understand some of the biological traits that drive airborne transmission of influenza viruses among mammals. Increased understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of airborne transmission may aid in assessing the risks posed by avian influenza viruses to human health, and preparedness for such risks. This chapter summarizes recent discoveries on the genetic and phenotypic traits required for avian influenza viruses to become airborne transmissible between mammals.

Determinants of virulence of influenza A virus.

Influenza A viruses cause yearly seasonal epidemics and occasional global pandemics in humans. In the last century, four human influenza A virus pandemics have occurred. Occasionally, influenza A viruses that circulate in other species cross the species barrier and infect humans. Virus reassortment (i.e. mixing of gene segments of multiple viruses) and the accumulation of mutations contribute to the emergence of new influenza A virus variants. Fortunately, most of these variants do not have the ability to spread among humans and subsequently cause a pandemic. In this review, we focus on the threat of animal influenza A viruses which have shown the ability to infect humans. In addition, genetic factors which could alter the virulence of influenza A viruses are discussed. The identification and characterisation of these factors may provide insights into genetic traits which change virulence and help us to understand which genetic determinants are of importance for the pandemic potential of animal influenza A viruses.

Transmission of influenza A/H5N1 viruses in mammals.

Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses occasionally infect humans and cause severe respiratory disease and fatalities. Currently, these viruses are not efficiently transmitted from person to person, although limited human-to-human transmission may have occurred. Nevertheless, further adaptation of avian H5N1 influenza A viruses to humans and/or reassortment with human influenza A viruses may result in aerosol transmissible viruses with pandemic potential. Although the full range of factors that modulate the transmission and replication of influenza A viruses in humans are not yet known, we are beginning to understand some of the molecular changes that may allow H5N1 influenza A viruses to transmit via aerosols or respiratory droplets among mammals. A better understanding of the biological basis and genetic determinants that confer transmissibility to H5N1 influenza A viruses in mammals is important to enhance our pandemic preparedness.

Predicting 'airborne' influenza viruses: (trans-) mission impossible?

Repeated transmission of animal influenza viruses to humans has prompted investigation of the viral, host, and environmental factors responsible for transmission via aerosols or respiratory droplets. How do we determine-out of thousands of influenza virus isolates collected in animal surveillance studies each year-which viruses have the potential to become 'airborne', and hence pose a pandemic threat? Here, using knowledge from pandemic, zoonotic and epidemic viruses, we postulate that the minimal requirements for efficient transmission of an animal influenza virus between humans are: efficient virus attachment to (upper) respiratory tissues, replication to high titers in these tissues, and release and aerosolization of single virus particles. Investigating 'airborne' transmission of influenza viruses is key to understand-and predict-influenza pandemics.

Pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus causes diffuse alveolar damage in cynomolgus macaques.

The pathogenesis of lower respiratory tract disease from the pandemic 2009 H1N1 (H1N1v) influenza A virus is poorly understood. Therefore, either H1N1v virus or a seasonal human H1N1 influenza A virus was inoculated into cynomolgus macaques as a nonhuman primate model of influenza pneumonia, and virological, pathological, and microarray analyses were performed. Macaques in the H1N1v group had virus-associated diffuse alveolar damage involving both type I and type II alveolar epithelial cells and affecting an average of 16% of the lung area. In comparison, macaques in the seasonal H1N1 group had milder pulmonary lesions. H1N1v virus tended to be reisolated from more locations in the respiratory tract and at higher titers than seasonal H1N1 virus. In contrast, differential expression of messenger RNA transcripts between H1N1v and seasonal H1N1 groups did not show significant differences. The most upregulated genes in H1N1v lung samples with lesions belonged to the innate immune response and proinflammatory pathways and correlated with histopathological results. Our results demonstrate that the H1N1v virus infects alveolar epithelial cells and causes diffuse alveolar damage in a nonhuman primate model. Its higher pathogenicity compared with a seasonal H1N1 virus may be explained in part by higher replication in the lower respiratory tract.

Evaluation of a rapid molecular algorithm for detection of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus and screening for a key oseltamivir resistance (H275Y) substitution in neuraminidase.

BACKGROUND: Rapid and specific molecular tests for identification of the recently identified pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 virus as well as rapid molecular tests to identify antiviral resistant strains are urgently needed. OBJECTIVES: We have evaluated the performance of two novel reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reactions (RT-PCRs) targeting specifically hemagglutinin and neuraminidase of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus in combination with a conserved matrix PCR. In addition, we investigated the performance of a novel discrimination RT-PCR for detection of the H275Y resistance mutation in the neuraminidase gene. STUDY DESIGN: Clinical performance of both subtype specific RT-PCR assays was evaluated through analysis of 684 throat swaps collected from individuals meeting the WHO case definition for the novel pandemic influenza virus. Analytical performance was analyzed through testing of 10-fold serial dilutions of RNA derived from the first Dutch sequenced and cultured confirmed case of novel pandemic influenza infection. Specificity and discriminative capacities of the H275Y discrimination assay were performed by testing wild type and recombinant H275Y pandemic influenza. RESULTS: 121 throat swaps collected from April 2009 to July 2009 were positive by at least two out of three RT-PCRs, and negative for the seasonal H3/H1 subtype specific RT-PCR assays. 117 of these were tested positive for all three (Ct-values from 15.1 to 36.8). No oseltamivir resistance was detected. CONCLUSIONS: We present a sensitive and specific approach for detection of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 and a rapid RT-PCR assay detecting a primary oseltamivir resistance mutation which can be incorporated easily into clinical virology algorithms.

Influenza A virus surveillance in wild birds in Northern Europe in 1999 and 2000.

Using reverse transcription/polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), we have screened more than 8500 wild birds in Northern Europe in 1999 and 2000 for the presence of influenza A virus. Although our primary focus was on ducks, geese, and shorebirds, we have also tested thousands of samples from other bird species. Approximately 1% of our samples were positive for influenza A virus by RT-PCR, and from half of these we were able to isolate influenza A virus in embryonated chicken eggs. A wide variety of isolates was obtained representing hemagglutinin (HA) subtypes 1 through 7, 10, 11, 13, an unidentifiable HA, and neuraminidase (NA) subtypes 1 through 8.

Detection of influenza A viruses from different species by PCR amplification of conserved sequences in the matrix gene.

The recently raised awareness of the threat of a new influenza pandemic has stimulated interest in the detection of influenza A viruses in human as well as animal secretions. Virus isolation alone is unsatisfactory for this purpose because of its inherent limited sensitivity and the lack of host cells that are universally permissive to all influenza A viruses. Previously described PCR methods are more sensitive but are targeted predominantly at virus strains currently circulating in humans, since the sequences of the primer sets display considerable numbers of mismatches to the sequences of animal influenza A viruses. Therefore, a new set of primers, based on highly conserved regions of the matrix gene, was designed for single-tube reverse transcription-PCR for the detection of influenza A viruses from multiple species. This PCR proved to be fully reactive with a panel of 25 genetically diverse virus isolates that were obtained from birds, humans, pigs, horses, and seals and that included all known subtypes of influenza A virus. It was not reactive with the 11 other RNA viruses tested. Comparative tests with throat swab samples from humans and fecal and cloacal swab samples from birds confirmed that the new PCR is faster and up to 100-fold more sensitive than classical virus isolation procedures.