Emotion regulation elicits cross-linguistically shared and language-specific forms of linguistic distancing.

Cognitively reappraising a stressful experience-reinterpreting the situation to blunt its emotional impact-is effective for regulating negative emotions. English speakers have been shown to engage in linguistic distancing when reappraising, spontaneously using words that are more abstract or impersonal. Across two preregistered studies (N = 299), we investigated whether such shifts in language use generalize to Spanish, a language proposed to offer unique tools for expressing psychological distance. Bilingual speakers of Spanish and English and a comparison group of English monolinguals transcribed their thoughts in each of their languages while responding naturally to negative images or reappraising them. Reappraisal shifted markers of psychological distance common to both languages (e.g., reduced use of "I"/"yo"), as well as Spanish-specific markers (e.g., greater use of "estar": "to be" for temporary states). Whether these linguistic shifts reflected successful emotion regulation depended on language experience: in exploratory analyses, the common markers were more strongly linked to reduced negative affect for late than early Spanish learners, and one Spanish-specific marker ("estar") also predicted reduced negative affect for early learners. Our findings suggest that people distance their language in both cross-linguistically shared and language-specific ways when regulating their emotions.

Lab Meets World: the Case for Use-Inspired Basic Research in Affective Science.

We join others in envisioning a future for affective science that addresses society's most pressing needs. To move toward this vision, we consider a research paradigm that emerged in other disciplines: use-inspired basic research. This paradigm transcends the traditional basic-applied dichotomy, which pits the basic goal of fundamental scientific understanding against the applied goal of use in solving social problems. In reality, these goals are complementary, and use-inspired basic research advances them simultaneously. Here, we build a case for use-inspired basic research-how it differs from traditional basic science and why affective scientists should engage in it. We first examine how use-inspired basic research challenges problematic assumptions of a strict basic-applied dichotomy. We then discuss how it is consistent with advances in affective science that recognize context specificity as the norm and consider ethical issues of use being a complementary goal. Following this theoretical discussion, we differentiate the implementation of use-inspired basic research from that of traditional basic science. We draw on examples from recent research to illustrate differences: social problems as a starting point, stakeholder and community engagement, and integration of research and service. In conclusion, we invite affective scientists to embrace the "lab meets world" perspective of use-inspired basic research as a promising pathway to real-world impact.

Even simple framing effects are rational.

Bermúdez persuasively argues that framing effects are not as irrational as commonly supposed. In focusing on the reasoning of individual decision-makers in complex situations, however, he neglects the crucial role of the social-communicative context for eliciting certain framing effects. We contend that many framing effects are best explained in terms of basic, rational principles of discourse processing and pragmatic reasoning.

Who's the "Real" Victim? How Victim Framing Shapes Attitudes Toward Sexual Assault.

People accused of sexual assault are often described as the "real" victim by their defenders, but the impact of "victim framing" on public opinion is unknown. We investigated this issue across four experiments (N = 2,614). Online U.S. adult participants read a report about an alleged sexual assault that framed the female accuser as the victim (of assault), framed the male alleged perpetrator as the victim (of false accusations), or was neutral about victimhood (baseline). Relative to those in the baseline condition, participants in the assault- and allegation-victim conditions generally expressed more support for the victim-framed protagonist and less support for the other protagonist. The consistency of these effects varied with how often the victim frame was instantiated and whether the report described a fictionalized or real-world case. Across all contexts, however, participants who identified the victim-related language as influencing their evaluations exhibited strong framing effects. This suggests that social-pragmatic reasoning is a key mechanism by which victim framing shapes moral judgments.

Is Emotional Magnitude Spatialized? A Further Investigation.

Accumulating evidence suggests that different magnitudes (e.g., number, size, and duration) are spatialized in the mind according to a common left-right metric, consistent with a generalized system for representing magnitude. A previous study conducted by two of us (Holmes & Lourenco, ) provided evidence that this metric extends to the processing of emotional magnitude, or the intensity of emotion expressed in faces. Recently, however, Pitt and Casasanto () showed that the earlier effects may have been driven by a left-right mapping of mouth size rather than emotional magnitude, and they found no evidence for an emotional magnitude mapping when using words as stimuli. Here, we report two new experiments that further examine these conclusions. In Experiment 1, using face stimuli with mouths occluded, we replicate the original finding: Less emotional faces were associated with the left and more emotional faces with the right. However, we also find that people can reliably infer the sizes of the occluded mouths, and that these inferred mouth sizes can explain the observed left-right mapping. In Experiment 2, we show that comparative judgments of emotional words yield a left-right mapping of emotional magnitude not attributable to stimulus confounds. Based on these findings, we concur with Pitt and Casasanto that faces pose challenges for isolating the forces driving spatialization, but we suggest that emotional magnitude, when assessed using unconfounded stimuli in a sufficiently sensitive task, may indeed be spatialized as originally proposed. Suggestions for further research on the spatialization of emotional magnitude are discussed.

Compound Words Reflect Cross-Culturally Shared Bodily Metaphors.

Parts of the body are often embedded in the structure of compound words, such as heartbreak and brainchild. We explored the relationships between the semantics of compounds and their constituent body parts, asking whether these relationships are largely arbitrary or instead reflect deeper metaphorical mappings shared across languages and cultures. In three studies, we found that U.S. English speakers associated the English translation equivalents of Chinese compounds with their constituent body parts at rates well above chance, even for compounds with highly abstract meanings and even when accounting for the semantic relatedness of the compounds and body parts. English speakers in India and Chinese speakers in Hong Kong showed similar intuitions about these associations. Our results suggest that the structure of compound words can provide insight into cross-culturally shared ways of connecting meaning to the body.

Revisiting the role of language in spatial cognition: Categorical perception of spatial relations in English and Korean speakers.

The spatial relation of support has been regarded as universally privileged in nonlinguistic cognition and immune to the influence of language. English, but not Korean, obligatorily distinguishes support from nonsupport via basic spatial terms. Despite this linguistic difference, previous research suggests that English and Korean speakers show comparable nonlinguistic sensitivity to the support/nonsupport distinction. Here, using a paradigm previously found to elicit cross-language differences in color discrimination, we provide evidence for a difference in sensitivity to support/nonsupport between native English speakers and native Korean speakers who were late English learners and tested in a context that privileged Korean. Whereas the former group showed categorical perception (CP) when discriminating spatial scenes capturing the support/nonsupport distinction, the latter did not. An additional group of native Korean speakers-relatively early English learners tested in an English-salient context-patterned with the native English speakers in showing CP for support/nonsupport. These findings suggest that obligatory marking of support/nonsupport in one's native language can affect nonlinguistic sensitivity to this distinction, contra earlier findings, but that such sensitivity may also depend on aspects of language background and the immediate linguistic context.

Categorical Perception Beyond the Basic Level: The Case of Warm and Cool Colors.

Categories can affect our perception of the world, rendering between-category differences more salient than within-category ones. Across many studies, such categorical perception (CP) has been observed for the basic-level categories of one's native language. Other research points to categorical distinctions beyond the basic level, but it does not demonstrate CP for such distinctions. Here we provide such a demonstration. Specifically, we show CP in English speakers for the non-basic distinction between "warm" and "cool" colors, claimed to represent the earliest stage of color lexicon evolution. Notably, the advantage for discriminating colors that straddle the warm-cool boundary was restricted to the right visual field-the same behavioral signature previously observed for basic-level categories. This pattern held in a replication experiment with increased power. Our findings show that categorical distinctions beyond the basic-level repertoire of one's native language are psychologically salient and may be spontaneously accessed during normal perceptual processing.

Right idea, wrong magnitude system.

Leibovich et al. claim that number representations are non-existent early in life and that the associations between number and continuous magnitudes reside in stimulus confounds. We challenge both claims - positing, instead, that number is represented independently of continuous magnitudes already in infancy, but is nonetheless more deeply connected to other magnitudes through adulthood than acknowledged by the "sense of magnitude" theory.

Registered Replication Report: Strack, Martin, & Stepper (1988).

According to the facial feedback hypothesis, people's affective responses can be influenced by their own facial expression (e.g., smiling, pouting), even when their expression did not result from their emotional experiences. For example, Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) instructed participants to rate the funniness of cartoons using a pen that they held in their mouth. In line with the facial feedback hypothesis, when participants held the pen with their teeth (inducing a "smile"), they rated the cartoons as funnier than when they held the pen with their lips (inducing a "pout"). This seminal study of the facial feedback hypothesis has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the results of 17 independent direct replications of Study 1 from Strack et al. (1988), all of which followed the same vetted protocol. A meta-analysis of these studies examined the difference in funniness ratings between the "smile" and "pout" conditions. The original Strack et al. (1988) study reported a rating difference of 0.82 units on a 10-point Likert scale. Our meta-analysis revealed a rating difference of 0.03 units with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.11 to 0.16.

Gamble on gaze: Eye movements reflect the numerical value of blackjack hands.

We used a novel task-a blackjack game that naturally involves mental summation of numerical values-to investigate the role of attention in the mental number line (MNL) and to provide insight into the ecological validity of this representational format. By analyzing the spatial position of participants' spontaneous, task-irrelevant eye movements, we avoided some of the limitations of previous research on the MNL, in which the findings could be attributed to task-specific factors such as the use of overt spatial cues. In two experiments, we found that eye movements along the horizontal axis reflected the overall numerical value of participants' hands, with smaller-value hands eliciting fixations toward the left of the screen and larger-value hands eliciting fixations toward the right. This pattern held even when controlling for the number of cards in the hand and the value of the card most recently dealt-suggesting that the effects were driven by mental summation of values, not merely by the processing of serial order or individual numbers. Vertical eye movements, in contrast, reflected hand value less reliably. In showing that spontaneous eye movements along the horizontal axis track the magnitude of internally computed sums in an ecologically relevant task, our findings provide evidence for a dynamic MNL that supports magnitude-driven shifts of attention and that may be recruited during everyday forms of numerical reasoning.

Spatial language as a window on representations of three-dimensional space.

Recent research investigating the language­thought interface in the spatial domain points to representations of the horizontal and vertical dimensions that closely resemble those posited by Jeffery et al. However, the findings suggest that such representations, rather than being tied to navigation, may instead reflect more general properties of the perception of space.

When numbers get heavy: is the mental number line exclusively numerical?

The mental number line, with its left-to-right orientation of increasing numerical values, is often regarded as evidence for a unique connection between space and number. Yet left-to-right orientation has been shown to extend to other dimensions, consistent with a general magnitude system wherein different magnitudes share neural and conceptual resources. Such observations raise a fundamental, yet relatively unexplored, question about spatial-numerical associations: What is the nature of the information represented along the mental number line? Here we show that this information is not exclusive to number, simultaneously accommodating numerical and non-numerical magnitudes. Participants completed the classic SNARC (Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes) task while sometimes wearing wrist weights. Weighting the left wrist-thereby linking less and more weight to right and left, respectively-worked against left-to-right orientation of number, leaving no behavioral trace of the mental number line. Our findings point to the dynamic integration of magnitude dimensions, with spatial organization instantiating representational currency (i.e., more/less relations) shared across magnitudes.

Spatial language and the psychological reality of schematization.

Although the representations underlying spatial language are often assumed to be schematic in nature, empirical evidence for a schematic format of representation is lacking. In this research, we investigate the psychological reality of such a format, using simulated motion during scene processing--previously linked to schematization--as a diagnostic. One group of participants wrote a verbal description of a scene and then completed a change detection task assessing simulated motion, while another group completed only the latter task. We expected that effects of simulated motion would be stronger following language use than not, and specifically following the use of spatial, relative to non-spatial, language. Both predictions were supported. Further, the effect of language was scene independent, suggesting that language may encourage a general mode of schematic construal. The study and its findings illustrate a novel approach to examining the perceptual properties of mental representations.

Orienting numbers in mental space: horizontal organization trumps vertical.

While research on the spatial representation of number has provided substantial evidence for a horizontally oriented mental number line, recent studies suggest vertical organization as well. Directly comparing the relative strength of horizontal and vertical organization, however, we found no evidence of spontaneous vertical orientation (upward or downward), and horizontal trumped vertical when pitted against each other (Experiment 1). Only when numbers were conceptualized as magnitudes (as opposed to nonmagnitude ordinal sequences) did reliable vertical organization emerge, with upward orientation preferred (Experiment 2). Altogether, these findings suggest that horizontal representations predominate, and that vertical representations, when elicited, may be relatively inflexible. Implications for spatial organization beyond number, and its ontogenetic basis, are discussed.

Does categorical perception in the left hemisphere depend on language?

Categorical perception (CP) refers to the influence of category knowledge on perception and is revealed by a superior ability to discriminate items across categories relative to items within a category. In recent years, the finding that CP is lateralized to the left hemisphere in adults has been interpreted as evidence for a kind of CP driven by language. The present research challenges this conclusion. In 2 experiments, we found that CP for novel object categories was stronger in the left hemisphere than in the right, consistent with a role for language. However, both labeled and unlabeled categories gave rise to such effects, and to comparable degrees. These results suggest that left-lateralized CP does not depend on language but rather may reflect the left hemisphere's more general propensity for categorical processing. Our findings raise implications for research on linguistic relativity.

Common spatial organization of number and emotional expression: a mental magnitude line.

Converging behavioral and neural evidence suggests that numerical representations are mentally organized in left-to-right orientation. Here we show that this format of spatial organization extends to emotional expression. In Experiment 1, right-side responses became increasingly faster as number (represented by Arabic numerals) or happiness (depicted in facial stimuli) increased, for judgments completely unrelated to magnitude. Additional experiments suggest that magnitude (i.e., more/less relations), not valence (i.e., positive/negative), underlies left-to-right orientation of emotional expression (Experiment 2), and that this orientation accommodates to the context-relevant emotion (e.g., happier faces are more rightward when judged on happiness, but more leftward when judged on angriness; Experiment 3). These findings show that people automatically extract magnitude from a variety of stimuli, representing such information in common left-to-right format, perhaps reflecting a mental magnitude line. We suggest that number is but one dimension in a hyper-general representational system uniting disparate dimensions of magnitude and likely subserved by common neural mechanisms in posterior parietal cortex.

Linguistic relativity.

The central question in research on linguistic relativity, or the Whorfian hypothesis, is whether people who speak different languages think differently. The recent resurgence of research on this question can be attributed, in part, to new insights about the ways in which language might impact thought. We identify seven categories of hypotheses about the possible effects of language on thought across a wide range of domains, including motion, color, spatial relations, number, and false belief understanding. While we do not find support for the idea that language determines the basic categories of thought or that it overwrites preexisting conceptual distinctions, we do find support for the proposal that language can make some distinctions difficult to avoid, as well as for the proposal that language can augment certain types of thinking. Further, we highlight recent evidence suggesting that language may induce a relatively schematic mode of thinking. Although the literature on linguistic relativity remains contentious, there is growing support for the view that language has a profound effect on thought. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 253-265 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.104 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.