RESUMO
Looking at policies instead of promises shows that global climate targets may be missed by a large margin.
Assuntos
Mudança Climática , Clima , Política AmbientalRESUMO
Many years passed since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, which invites countries to determine their own contributions to climate change mitigation efforts. The Agreement does not offer a standard to measure progress but relies on a process of periodic stocktakes to inform ambition-raising cycles. To contribute to this process, we compare 2021 greenhouse gas emission projections up to 2030 against equivalent projections prepared back in 2015. Both sets of projections were prepared using the same bottom-up modelling approach that accounts for adopted policies at the time. We find that 2021 projections for the G20 as a group are almost 15% lower (approximately 6 GtCO2eq) in 2030 than projected in 2015. Annual emissions grow 1% slower in the coming decade than projected in 2015. This slower growth mostly stems from the adoption of new policies and updated expectations on technology uptake and economic growth. However, around one-quarter of these changes are explained by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on short-term emissions and economic forecasts. These factors combined result in substantially lower emission projections for India, the European Union plus the UK (EU27 + UK), the Unites States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. We observe a remarkable change in South African projections that changed from a substantial increase to now a decline, driven in part by the planned phase-out of most of its coal-based power. Emissions in India are projected to grow slower than in 2015 and in Indonesia faster, but emissions per capita in both countries remain below 5 tCO2eq in 2030, while those in the EU27 + UK decline faster than expected in 2015 and probably cross the 5 tCO2eq threshold before 2030. Projected emissions per capita in Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and the United States are now lower than projected in 2015 but remain above 15 tCO2eq in 2030. Although emission projections for the G20 improved since 2015, collectively they still slightly increase until 2030 and remain insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement temperature goals. The G20 must urgently and drastically improve adopted policies and actions to limit the end-of-century warming to 1.5 °C. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11027-022-10018-5.
RESUMO
By January 2022, 156 countries had submitted new or updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. This study analyses the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and macroeconomic impacts of the new NDCs. The total impact of the updated unconditional and conditional NDCs of these countries on global emission levels by 2030 is an additional reduction of about 3.8 and 3.9 GtCO2eq, respectively, compared to the previously submitted NDCs as of October 2020. However, this total reduction must be about three times greater to be consistent with keeping global temperature increase to well below 2 °C, and even seven times greater for 1.5 °C. Nine G20 economies have pledged stronger emission reduction targets for 2030 in their updated NDCs, leading to additional aggregated GHG emission reductions of about 3.3 GtCO2eq, compared to those in the previous NDCs. The socio-economic impacts of the updated NDCs are limited in major economies and largely depend on the emission reduction effort included in the NDCs. However, two G20 economies have submitted new targets that will lead to an increase in emissions of about 0.3 GtCO2eq, compared to their previous NDCs. The updated NDCs of non-G20 economies contain further net reductions. We conclude that countries should strongly increase the ambition levels of their updated NDC submissions to keep the climate goals of the Paris Agreement within reach. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11027-022-10008-7.
RESUMO
Increased ambition and implementation are essential.
Assuntos
Política Ambiental/legislação & jurisprudência , Política Ambiental/tendências , Aquecimento Global/prevenção & controle , Aquecimento Global/estatística & dados numéricos , Objetivos , Cooperação Internacional/legislação & jurisprudência , Combustíveis Fósseis/economia , Combustíveis Fósseis/provisão & distribuição , Aquecimento Global/legislação & jurisprudência , Paris , Energia Renovável/economia , Energia Renovável/estatística & dados numéricos , Temperatura , Fatores de TempoRESUMO
By introducing an intercalator through D-threoninol to the 10-23 DNAzyme at the junction between its catalytic loop and the binding arm, the RNA cleavage activity was greatly improved.
Assuntos
DNA Catalítico/química , DNA de Cadeia Simples/química , Substâncias Intercalantes/química , RNA/química , Antraquinonas/química , Compostos Azo/química , Compostos Azo/efeitos da radiação , Sequência de Bases , Catálise/efeitos da radiação , Isomerismo , Cinética , Luz , Estrutura Molecular , Oligorribonucleotídeos/química , Fotoquímica , Pirenos/química , Treonina/análogos & derivados , Treonina/química , Raios UltravioletaRESUMO
If we abide by the dead donor rule, we have to comply with the rule that an organ donor must be declared to be irreversibly and unequivocally dead and not merely dying before the commencement of organ extraction. In this paper, I will show the following: that living donor transplantations violate the dead donor rule; that we cannot say that not only all the brain dead patients (HBDs) but also all the cardiac arrest patients (NHBDs) have been irreversibly and univocally dead at the time of organ extraction; and that we do not know how to tell living potential donors from dead potential donors.
Assuntos
Morte Encefálica , Parada Cardíaca , Doadores Vivos , Obtenção de Tecidos e Órgãos/ética , Humanos , Japão , Obtenção de Tecidos e Órgãos/legislação & jurisprudênciaRESUMO
Between the enactment of Japan's "Organ Transplantation Law" (OTL) in 1997 and the end of October 2003, there were 27 (30 now) legal declarations of brain death, and organs were donated from 26 (29) of those. During this period, four applications for human rights relief were made against organ donation facilities by Takayoshi Okamoto and others. One of these remains under investigation, but the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) has offered recommendations relating to the other three. The purpose of this report lies in examining these applications and recommendations.