The "Reading the Mind in the Eyes" Test Shows Poor Psychometric Properties in a Large, Demographically Representative U.S. Sample.

The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (RMET) is a widely used measure of theory of mind (ToM). Despite its popularity, there are questions regarding the RMET's psychometric properties. In the current study, we examined the RMET in a representative U.S. sample of 1,181 adults. Key analyses included conducting an exploratory factor analysis on the full sample and examining whether there is a different factor structure in individuals with high versus low scores on the 28-item autism spectrum quotient (AQ-28). We identified overlapping, but distinct, three-factor models for the full sample and the two subgroups. In all cases, each of the three models showed inadequate model fit. We also found other limitations of the RMET, including that nearly a quarter of the RMET items did not meet the criteria for inclusion in the RMET that were established in the original validation study. Due to the RMET's weak psychometric properties and the uncertain validity of individual items, as indicated by our study and previous studies, we conclude that significant caution is warranted when using the RMET as a measure of ToM.

Examining the presence and nature of delusions in Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia syndromes.

OBJECTIVES: Abnormal beliefs and delusions have been reported in some people with dementia, however, the prevalence of delusions, and their neurocognitive basis has been underexplored. This study aimed to examine the presence, severity, content and neural correlates of delusions in a large, well-characterised cohort of dementia patients using a transdiagnostic, cross-sectional approach. METHODS: Four-hundred and eighty-seven people with dementia were recruited: 102 Alzheimer's disease, 136 behavioural-variant frontotemporal dementia, 154 primary progressive aphasia, 29 motor neurone disease, 46 corticobasal syndrome, 20 progressive supranuclear palsy. All patients underwent neuropsychological assessment and brain magnetic resonance imaging, and the Neuropsychiatric Inventory was conducted with an informant, by an experienced clinician. RESULTS: In our cohort, 48/487 patients (10.8%) had delusions. A diagnosis of behavioural-variant frontotemporal dementia (18.4%) and Alzheimer's disease (11.8%) were associated with increased risk of delusions. A positive gene mutation was observed in 11/27 people with delusions. Individuals with frequent delusions performed worse on the Addenbrooke's Cognitive Examination (p = 0.035), particularly on the orientation/attention (p = 0.022) and memory (p = 0.013) subtests. Voxel-based morphometry analyses found that increased delusional psychopathology was associated with reduced integrity of the right middle frontal gyrus, right planum temporale and left anterior temporal pole. CONCLUSION: Our results demonstrate that delusions are relatively common in dementia and uncover a unique cognitive and neural profile associated with the manifestation of delusions. Clinically, delusions may lead to delayed or misdiagnosis. Our results shed light on how to identify individuals at risk of neuropsychiatric features of dementia, a crucial first step to enable targeted symptom management.

Cognitive correlates of 'Formal Thought Disorder' in a non-clinical sample with elevated schizotypal traits.

Different dimensions of formal thought disorder (FTD) are distinguished by different patterns of cognitive dysfunction in patients with schizophrenia; however, inconsistent findings may relate to patient-related confounds. To avoid these confounds, we examined relationships between FTD dimensions and cognitive domains in a non-clinical sample with attenuated schizophrenia-like traits, or schizotypal traits, on the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (N = 91). To our knowledge, no study has done this. FTD dimension scores were derived following principal component analysis of the Scale for the Assessment of Thought, Language and Communication (TLC dimensions: Disorganisation, Verbosity, Emptiness) and the Thought and Language Index (TLI dimensions: Negative, Idiosyncratic). The sample completed a comprehensive neuropsychological battery. Findings indicate that higher-order reasoning, executive function (set shift and generative ability) and language/semantic functioning are the primary drivers of FTD in our non-clinical sample with elevated schizotypal traits, in line with schizophrenia research. FTD may have shared aetiology along the schizophrenia spectrum.

Perception of visual-tactile asynchrony, bodily perceptual aberrations, and bodily illusions in schizophrenia.

Body perception can be altered in individuals with schizophrenia resulting in experiences of undefined boundaries, loss of ownership, and size changes. These individuals may also be more susceptible to the rubber hand illusion (RHI: an illusion of body perception that can also be induced in neurotypical populations), but the findings are mixed. Furthermore, the perception of multisensory timing, which is thought to be fundamental for body perception, is altered in schizophrenia. We tested whether altered perception of the temporal relationship between visual and tactile signals in schizophrenia predicts self-reported perceptual aberrations and RHI susceptibility. We found that the sensitivity to detect temporal asynchronies is reduced in schizophrenia and this is a significant predictor for bodily perceptual symptoms. In contrast, we found no evidence for a direct relationship between asynchrony detection sensitivity and RHI susceptibility. Instead, our findings suggest that experiencing more bodily perceptual symptoms increases the likelihood of endorsing unusual bodily experiences, resulting in higher RHI self-ratings but not higher proprioceptive drift scores. Our findings provide new insight into factors that may underlie the report of unusual body perceptions in schizophrenia.

Recognition of Social Rule Violation in "Deficit Syndrome" Schizophrenia: A Study Using Economic Games.

Aberrant social behavior is a frequent clinical feature of schizophrenia and seems related to the duration and chronicity of the disorder. However, there is a paucity of research into the relationship between social behavior and social cognition in patients with severe chronic courses of schizophrenia. Accordingly, the present study sought to examine the appreciation of social rules and norms such as fairness and cooperation in schizophrenia patients who fulfilled the criteria for "deficit syndrome". To this end, we utilized a so-called Ultimatum Game, and a Dictator Game, in which participants had the option to punish others' unfair behavior. In addition, "theory of mind", the ability to appreciate others' mental states, was also examined using the Mental State Attribution Task (MSAT). Symptom severity was determined using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. While patients with deficit schizophrenia responded to varying levels of fairness in similar ways to controls, the patients accepted fewer fair offers and engaged less in third-party punishment. Impaired theory of mind in patients reduced the latter, but not the former, group difference to non-significance. No significant correlations emerged between symptom severity and task performance. Together, these findings suggest that the understanding of others' minds partly contributes to the appreciation of social rules and norms in patients with severe chronic courses of schizophrenia.

Perceiving and attributing intentionality in schizophrenia.

Introduction: People with schizophrenia perform poorly on theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks. They also generate less mental-state language to describe test stimuli depicting intentionality. Some of these individuals also show excessive mentalising when objective cues of intentionality are absent. We tested perceiving and attributing intentionality to resolve this paradox. Methods: 23 schizophrenia patients and 20 healthy controls completed the chasing detection task to assess perceptual sensitivity to cues of intentionality. Other tasks assessed spontaneous attributions of intentionality (irrespective of accuracy) and accurate ToM inferences. Results: Perceptual sensitivity to cues of intentionality did not differ between groups. Patients were less likely to spontaneously attribute intentionality (irrespective of accuracy) or perform ToM tasks accurately. Chasing-detection response bias, but not perceptual sensitivity, correlated with attributions of intentionality. Referential (and to less extent) persecutory ideation associated with excessive mentalising when cues of intentionality were absent. Conclusions: Intentionality can be directly perceived, independent of attributions or inferences, in people with schizophrenia. We conclude that the flow of information from intact perceptual detection to evoke spontaneous attributions of intentionality is disrupted in schizophrenia, with flow-on detrimental effects on accurate ToM reasoning. Referential/persecutory ideation motivates inappropriate mentalising when objective cues of intentionality are absent.

Appearance-based trust processing in schizophrenia.

OBJECTIVES: Schizophrenia is characterized by impaired social interactions and altered trust. In the general population, trust is often based on facial appearance, with limited validity but enormous social consequences. The aim was to examine trust processing in schizophrenia and specifically to examine how people with schizophrenia use facial appearance as well as actual partner fairness to guide trusting decisions. DESIGN: An experimental economic game study. METHODS: Here, we tested how patients with schizophrenia and control participants (each N = 24) use facial trustworthiness appearance and partner fairness behaviour to guide decisions in a multi-round Trust Game. In the Trust Game, participants lent money to 'partners' whose facial appearance was either untrustworthy or trustworthy, and who either played fairly or unfairly. Clinical symptoms were measured as well as explicit trustworthiness impressions. RESULTS: Overall, the patients with schizophrenia showed unimpaired explicit facial trustworthiness impressions and unimpaired facial appearance biases in the Trust Game. Crucially, patients and controls significantly differed so that the patients with schizophrenia did not learn to discriminate in the Trust Game based on actual partner fairness, unlike control participants. CONCLUSION: A failure to discriminate trust has important implications for everyday functioning in schizophrenia, as forming accurate trustworthiness beliefs is an essential social skill. Critically, without relying on more valid trust cues, people with schizophrenia may be especially susceptible to the misleading effect of appearance when making trusting decisions. PRACTITIONER POINTS: Findings People with schizophrenia made very similar facial trustworthiness impressions to healthy controls and also used facial appearance to guide trust decisions similarly to controls. However, the patient group were less able to explicitly distinguish between fair and unfair partners based on their behaviour compared with the control group. Moreover, people with schizophrenia failed to use actual partner fairness to guide their financial decisions in the Trust Game, unlike controls, and this impairment was specific to a social task. People with schizophrenia may be particularly reliant on facial appearance when trusting others, as they may struggle to incorporate more valid trustworthiness information in their decision-making, such as actual partner fairness.

"Formal Thought Disorder" in a General-Community Sample With Elevated Schizotypal Traits.

Different dimensions of formal thought disorder (FTD) are distinguished by different patterns of cognitive dysfunction and cortical variability in patients with schizophrenia; however, inconsistent findings may relate to patient-related confounds. Investigating FTD in nonpatient samples with elevated levels of schizotypal traits avoids these confounds, but its utility to FTD research is unknown. Thus, we performed principal components analysis (PCA) of FTD ratings using the Scale for the Assessment of Thought, Language, and Communication (TLC) and the Thought and Language Index (TLI) in a general-community sample with elevated schizotypal traits. Both scales showed "clinically elevated" FTD, particularly, the TLC. PCA described a three-component TLC solution ("disorganization," "verbosity," "emptiness") and a two-component TLI solution ("negative," "idiosyncratic"), generally consistent with schizophrenia research. TLC "disorganization" and "emptiness" were correlated with psychosis-like experiences. TLI "negative" was associated with lower general cognitive function, consistent with schizophrenia research. FTD may have shared etiology along the schizophrenia spectrum.

Responding to joint attention bids in schizophrenia: An interactive eye-tracking study.

This study investigated social cognition in schizophrenia using a virtual reality paradigm to capture the dynamic processes of evaluating and responding to eye gaze as an intentional communicative cue. A total of 21 patients with schizophrenia and 21 age-, gender-, and IQ-matched healthy controls completed an interactive computer game with an on-screen avatar that participants believed was controlled by an off-screen partner. On social trials, participants were required to achieve joint attention by correctly interpreting and responding to gaze cues. Participants also completed non-social trials in which they responded to an arrow cue within the same task context. While patients and controls took equivalent time to process communicative intent from gaze shifts, patients made significantly more errors than controls when responding to the directional information conveyed by gaze, but not arrow, cues. Despite no differences in response times to gaze cues between groups, patients were significantly slower than controls when responding to arrow cues. This is the opposite pattern of results previously observed in autistic adults using the same task and suggests that, despite general impairments in attention orienting or oculomotor control, patients with schizophrenia demonstrate a facilitation effect when responding to communicative gaze cues. Findings indicate a hyper-responsivity to gaze cues of communicative intent in schizophrenia. The possible effects of self-referential biases when evaluating gaze direction are discussed, as are clinical implications.

Should I trust you? Autistic traits predict reduced appearance-based trust decisions.

Facial impressions of trustworthiness guide social decisions in the general population, as shown by financial lending in economic Trust Games. As an exception, autistic boys fail to use facial impressions to guide trust decisions, despite forming typical facial trustworthiness impressions (Autism, 19, 2015a, 1002). Here, we tested whether this dissociation between forming and using facial impressions of trustworthiness extends to neurotypical men with high levels of autistic traits. Forty-six Caucasian men completed a multi-turn Trust Game, a facial trustworthiness impressions task, the Autism-Spectrum Quotient, and two Theory of Mind tasks. As hypothesized, participants' levels of autistic traits had no observed effect on the impressions formed, but negatively predicted the use of those impressions in trust decisions. Thus, the dissociation between forming and using facial impressions of trustworthiness extends to the broader autism phenotype. More broadly, our results identify autistic traits as an important source of individual variation in the use of facial impressions to guide behaviour. Interestingly, failure to use these impressions could potentially represent rational behaviour, given their limited validity.

Contradiction processing in schizophrenia.

INTRODUCTION: Patients with schizophrenia present clinically with difficulties in manipulating contradictory information in the form of loose associations, surface contradictions and delusional beliefs. It is to date unclear whether patients can detect and process information that contradicts their beliefs and prior knowledge and whether this capacity is related to their symptoms and the nature of contradictory stimuli (e.g., personally significant information, emotional information). METHODS: We probed contradiction processing in patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls using sentence verification tasks that involve self-referential judgements (Experiment 1) and general knowledge (Experiment 2), while manipulating the emotional content of the stimuli. RESULTS: We found no differences between patients and controls either on reaction time (Experiment 1 & 2) or accuracy measures (Experiment 1). CONCLUSIONS: Our results show no general impairment in contradiction processing in schizophrenia. Rather, failures to detect and correct contradictions in symptoms such as formal though disorder or delusions could arise through a complex interplay between executive dysfunctions, stress and the emotional content of the information.

Belief, delusion, hypnosis, and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: A transcranial magnetic stimulation study.

According to the Two-Factor theory of delusional belief (see e.g. Coltheart at al., 2011), there exists a cognitive system dedicated to the generation, evaluation, and acceptance or rejection of beliefs. Studies of the neuropsychology of delusion provide evidence that this system is neurally realized in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC). Furthermore, we have shown that convincing analogues of many specific delusional beliefs can be created in nonclinical subjects by hypnotic suggestion and we think of hypnosis as having the effect of temporarily interfering with the operation of the belief system, which allows acceptance of the delusional suggestions. If the belief system does depend on rDLPFC, then disrupting the activity of that region of the brain by the application of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) will increase hypnotizability. Dienes and Hutton (2013) have reported such an experiment except that it was left DLPFC to which rTMS was applied. An effect on a subjective measure of hypnotizability was observed, but whether there was an effect on an objective measure could not be determined. We report two experiments. The first was an exact replication of the Dienes and Hutton experiment; here we found no effect of rTMS to lDLPFC on any hypnotic measure. Our second experiment used rTMS applied to right rather then left DLPFC. This right-sided stimulation enhanced hypnotizability (when hypnotic response was measured objectively), as predicted by our hypothesis. These results imply a role for rDLPFC in the cognitive process of belief evaluation, as is proposed in our two-factor theory of delusion. They are also consistent with a conception of the acceptance of a hypnotic suggestion as involving suspension of disbelief.

Clinical symptoms predict concurrent social and global functioning in an early psychosis sample.

AIM: Although well established in chronic schizophrenia, the key determinants of functioning remain unknown during the early phase of a psychotic disorder. The aim of this study was to comprehensively examine the social cognitive, basic neurocognitive and clinical predictors of concurrent social functioning and global functioning in an early psychosis sample. METHODS: This study examined the relationship between social cognition, basic neurocognition and clinical symptoms with concurrent functioning in 51 early psychosis individuals. Assessments included a range of self-report, observational and clinician-rated measures of cognitive, symptom severity and functioning domains. RESULTS: Results revealed a significant association between self-reported social function and lower levels of both social interaction anxiety and negative psychotic symptoms. A significant association was also observed between lower levels of negative psychotic symptoms and observed social functioning. Lastly, results demonstrated a significant association between reduced negative psychotic symptoms and clinician-rated global functioning. CONCLUSIONS: Clinical domains such as negative symptoms and social interaction anxiety significantly contribute to an optimal model predicting outcome during the early phase of a psychotic disorder. These clinical features may also provide useful markers of an individual's capacity for social participation. Clinical implications include the need for early targeted intervention to address social anxiety and negative psychotic symptoms to facilitate optimum patient outcome.

Indirect task instructions better reveal theory-of-mind impairment, independent of executive dysfunction, in schizophrenia.

Theory of mind (TOM) impairments associate significantly with executive deficits in schizophrenia, consistent with the proposal that executive abilities can limit TOM task performance, and confounding identification of those patients who would benefit most from targeted mentalising interventions. 50 schizophrenia patients and 30 healthy controls completed an executive battery and four TOM tasks that were alike with regards generating overt measures of causal false-belief reasoning, but differed with regards using indirect (vs. more direct) instructions. Only the TOM tasks that used indirect instructions to elicit spontaneous false-belief inferences revealed impairment, independent of executive dysfunction, in the schizophrenia patients.

Impairments of spontaneous and deliberative mentalizing co-occur, yet dissociate, in schizophrenia.

OBJECTIVES: Evidence of impairment in explicit mentalizing in people with schizophrenia has inspired interventions to improve awareness of others' mental states in these individuals. Less is known of implicit mentalizing in schizophrenia, with current findings mixed. We sought to resolve previous inconsistencies using Heider & Simmel's (H&S) classic animation to elicit spontaneous mentalizing and examined relations between spontaneous and deliberative mentalizing. METHODS: Forty-five schizophrenia outpatients and 27 general-community controls completed two explicit theory-of-mind (TOM) tasks and then described the H&S animation (to elicit spontaneous social attributions about emotionally driven, as well as goal-driven, behaviours), before and after an instruction to think of the shapes as people. Accuracy of basic and social facts and frequencies of personification and different mental-state terms were recorded. RESULTS: Explicit TOM performance was impaired in patients. Patients also generated fewer social (but not basic) facts than controls to describe the H&S animation, and used less mental-state language, before, and even more so, after the 'people' instruction, despite that both groups had used more personification terms after the 'people' instruction. Measures of explicit and spontaneous mentalizing contributed independently to discriminating between groups. CONCLUSIONS: Patients respond less to the bottom-up signals of agency that ought normally to elicit spontaneous social attributions, even when cued to think of the stimuli as people, and the stimuli depict emotionally driven, as well as goal-driven, behaviour. That impairments of spontaneous and deliberative mentalizing dissociate in schizophrenia suggests that training deliberative mentalizing may not be enough; interventions to improve spontaneous mentalizing are also needed. PRACTITIONER POINTS: Findings People with schizophrenia were less likely than controls to spontaneously attribute causal mental states when viewing dynamic signals of emotionally driven and goal-driven behaviours. These impairments were even more pronounced when participants were instructed to think of the stimuli as people, suggesting that perceiving others in social roles does not prompt people with schizophrenia to anthropomorphize about others as agents motivated by their own inner worlds. Impairments of spontaneous mentalizing were found to co-occur independently with explicit mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia, consistent with the claim that humans can access two distinct systems for understanding others' minds. Findings suggest that interventions to improve conscious deliberative mentalizing in schizophrenia may not be enough; we also need to target implicit mentalizing processes. Limitations The patient sample was chronic and only mildly symptomatic. As such, findings cannot be generalized to other stages and phases of the illness. All patients were also medicated, allowing for the possibility that automatic responses to socially salient stimuli may have been pharmacologically attenuated. Future research may examine whether unmedicated young people at ultra-high risk of psychosis show a similar profile of mentalizing impairment. Future work may also examine whether impairments of deliberative and spontaneous mentalizing associate differentially with social functioning and different cognitive domains in schizophrenia.

Judgment of moral and social transgression in schizophrenia.

INTRODUCTION: Despite evidence of pervasive social-cognitive deficits in schizophrenia, little is known of moral cognition in this population. While recent research indicates that impairment of explicit moral reasoning is explained by these individuals' other cognitive deficits, their capacities for basic moral judgment are unknown. METHODS: 45 people with schizophrenia and 27 healthy controls completed the Moral-Conventional Distinction Task: a classic task that assesses judgment of violations of moral or social convention on permissibility, severity, and authority-contingence. Justifications of judgments were also probed. Basic cognition was indexed by measures of IQ, verbal memory, and information processing speed. Self-report inventories were used to assess different facets of 'empathy' (e.g., perspective-taking, or theory of mind, and empathic concern), and aggressive tendencies. RESULTS: Groups did not differ significantly in judgments of permissibility or authority-contingency, or justifications of judgments. Patients did, however, rate violations of social (but not moral) convention more harshly. They also took longer to judge impermissibility of moral (but nor social) transgressions. Slower moral judgment in patients was associated with lower levels of self-reported empathic concern, while harsher condemnation of social transgression was associated with poorer (self-reported) perspective-taking. CONCLUSIONS: Findings provide no evidence that moral judgment is fundamentally compromised in schizophrenia. Evidence of slower moral judgment in schizophrenia does suggest, however, that patients were less influenced by automatic aversive responses to amoral conduct. The association found between poorer (self-reported) perspective-taking and greater condemnation of social transgressions also suggests that an insensitivity to others' extenuating motives may exacerbate social misunderstandings in schizophrenia.

Outcome-focused judgements of moral dilemmas in schizophrenia.

Previous research on moral judgement in healthy adults suggests a complex interplay of automatic, emotional and deliberative processing. We aimed to advance understanding of these processes by examining moral judgement in individuals with schizophrenia, a population characterised by social-cognitive deficits and interpersonal difficulties. Forty-five patients with schizophrenia and 27 healthy controls judged high-conflict moral dilemmas in response to 3rd-person (i.e. "Is it morally okay to [perform X]?") and 1st-person (i.e. "Would you [perform X]?") probes. Controls were less utilitarian for 3rd-person than 1st-person probes, while this discrepancy did not hold for patients. Utilitarianism in patients correlated with higher levels of interpersonal conflict. Findings suggest that people with schizophrenia focus equally on outcomes across moral-judgement conditions that ought normally to elicit an outcome-action discrepancy, suggesting that they are less influenced by an automatic aversive response to harmful acts in dilemma scenarios, consistent with a dual-process model of moral judgement.

Assessing early processing of eye gaze in schizophrenia: measuring the cone of direct gaze and reflexive orienting of attention.

INTRODUCTION: The accurate discrimination of another person's eye-gaze direction is vital as it provides a cue to the gazer's focus of attention, which in turn supports joint attention. Patients with schizophrenia have shown a "direct gaze bias" when judging gaze direction. However, current tasks do not dissociate an early perceptual bias from high-level top-down effects. We investigated early stages of gaze processing in schizophrenia by measuring perceptual sensitivity to fine deviations in gaze direction (i.e., the cone of direct gaze: CoDG) and ability to reflexively orient to locations cued by the same deviations. METHODS: Twenty-four patients and 26 controls completed a CoDG discrimination task that used realistic direct-face images with six fine degrees of deviation (i.e., 3, 6 or 9 pixels to the left and right) and direct gaze, and a gaze cueing task that assessed reflexive orienting to the same fine-grained deviations. RESULTS: Our data showed patients exhibited no impairment in gaze discrimination, nor did we observe a reduced orienting response. CONCLUSIONS: These results suggest that while patients may suffer deficits associated with interpreting another person's gaze, the earliest processes concerned with detecting averted gaze and reflexively orienting to the gazed-at location are intact.

Electrophysiological, cognitive and clinical profiles of at-risk mental state: The longitudinal Minds in Transition (MinT) study.

The onset of schizophrenia is typically preceded by a prodromal period lasting several years during which sub-threshold symptoms may be identified retrospectively. Clinical interviews are currently used to identify individuals who have an ultra-high risk (UHR) of developing a psychotic illness with a view to provision of interventions that prevent, delay or reduce severity of future mental health issues. The utility of bio-markers as an adjunct in the identification of UHR individuals is not yet established. Several event-related potential measures, especially mismatch-negativity (MMN), have been identified as potential biomarkers for schizophrenia. In this 12-month longitudinal study, demographic, clinical and neuropsychological data were acquired from 102 anti-psychotic naive UHR and 61 healthy controls, of whom 80 UHR and 58 controls provided valid EEG data during a passive auditory task at baseline. Despite widespread differences between UHR and controls on demographic, clinical and neuropsychological measures, MMN and P3a did not differ between these groups. Of 67 UHR at the 12-month follow-up, 7 (10%) had transitioned to a psychotic illness. The statistical power to detect differences between those who did or did not transition was limited by the lower than expected transition rate. ERPs did not predict transition, with trends in the opposite direction to that predicted. In exploratory analysis, the strongest predictors of transition were measures of verbal memory and subjective emotional disturbance.