Registered Replication Report: Strack, Martin, & Stepper (1988).

According to the facial feedback hypothesis, people's affective responses can be influenced by their own facial expression (e.g., smiling, pouting), even when their expression did not result from their emotional experiences. For example, Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) instructed participants to rate the funniness of cartoons using a pen that they held in their mouth. In line with the facial feedback hypothesis, when participants held the pen with their teeth (inducing a "smile"), they rated the cartoons as funnier than when they held the pen with their lips (inducing a "pout"). This seminal study of the facial feedback hypothesis has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the results of 17 independent direct replications of Study 1 from Strack et al. (1988), all of which followed the same vetted protocol. A meta-analysis of these studies examined the difference in funniness ratings between the "smile" and "pout" conditions. The original Strack et al. (1988) study reported a rating difference of 0.82 units on a 10-point Likert scale. Our meta-analysis revealed a rating difference of 0.03 units with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.11 to 0.16.

Happiness increases distraction by auditory deviant stimuli.

Rare and unexpected changes (deviants) in an otherwise repeated stream of task-irrelevant auditory distractors (standards) capture attention and impair behavioural performance in an ongoing visual task. Recent evidence indicates that this effect is increased by sadness in a task involving neutral stimuli. We tested the hypothesis that such effect may not be limited to negative emotions but reflect a general depletion of attentional resources by examining whether a positive emotion (happiness) would increase deviance distraction too. Prior to performing an auditory-visual oddball task, happiness or a neutral mood was induced in participants by means of the exposure to music and the recollection of an autobiographical event. Results from the oddball task showed significantly larger deviance distraction following the induction of happiness. Interestingly, the small amount of distraction typically observed on the standard trial following a deviant trial (post-deviance distraction) was not increased by happiness. We speculate that happiness might interfere with the disengagement of attention from the deviant sound back towards the target stimulus (through the depletion of cognitive resources and/or mind wandering) but help subsequent cognitive control to recover from distraction.

Recognizing the bank robber and spotting the difference: emotional state and global vs. local attentional set.

In two experiments (161 participants in total), we investigated how current mood influences processing styles (global vs. local). Participants watched a video of a bank robbery before receiving a positive, negative or neutral induction, and they performed two tasks: a face-recognition task about the bank robber as global processing measure, and a spot-the-difference task using neutral pictures (Experiment-1) or emotional scenes (Experiment-2) as local processing measure. Results showed that positive mood induction favoured a global processing style, enhancing participants' ability to correctly identify a face even when they watched the video before the mood-induction. This shows that, besides influencing encoding processes, mood state can be also related to retrieval processes. On the contrary, negative mood induction enhanced a local processing style, making easier and faster the detection of differences between nearly identical pictures, independently of their valence. This dissociation supports the hypothesis that current mood modulates processing through activation of different cognitive styles.

Response inhibition and attentional control in anxiety.

Traditionally, anxiety has been associated with a selective attentional bias for threat and a decreased capacity in attentional control. In two different experiments, we investigated whether individuals with different levels of self-reported state anxiety (Experiment 1) and induced anxiety (Experiment 2) had impaired response inhibition processes (attentional control deficit) as characterized by a different response style in the presence of negative stimuli under low and high perceptual load conditions. A go/no-go paradigm with emotional distractors (angry, happy, and neutral faces) was used to provide measures of perceptual sensitivity, inhibition, and response style. Our findings showed that perceptual sensitivity, as assessed by the d' parameter of signal detection theory, was reduced in all participants for angry faces under low perceptual load, where enough perceptual resources were available to be attracted by distractors. Importantly, despite similar perceptual sensitivity, the beta parameter indicated that high state anxiety individuals in both experiments were less flexible at adjusting to task demands in the presence of angry face distractors by adopting a stricter criterion. Implications of findings are discussed within current models of attentional control in anxiety.

Alterations of the attentional networks in patients with anxiety disorders.

Cognitive theories of emotion try to explain how anxious people attend to the world. Despite the increase in empirical research in this field, the specific or general attentional impairments of patients with anxiety disorder is not well defined. We decided to investigate the relationship between pathological anxiety and attentional mechanisms from the broader perspective of the attentional networks. In our study, patients with anxiety disorders and control participants carried out a task to assess efficiency of three attentional networks: orienting, alerting, and executive control. The main result was that anxiety disorders are related to both reduced effectiveness of the executive control network and difficulties in disengaging attention from invalid cues, even when using emotionally neutral information. This relationship between these attentional networks and anxiety may in part explain the problems in the day-to-day functioning of these patients.

Attention and anxiety: different attentional functioning under state and trait anxiety.

Anxiety modulates the functioning of attention. Although the existence of this relationship is clear, its nature is still poorly defined. Added are the facts that different types of anxiety--state or trait--may influence attention differently and that attention is not a unitary system. We studied the influence of such types of anxiety by means of a task that, using emotionally neutral information, assesses the efficiency of three attentional networks: orienting, alerting, and executive control. Results showed a double dissociation. Trait anxiety was related to deficiencies in the executive control network, but state anxiety was associated with an overfunctioning of the alerting and orienting networks.