Heuristics in risky decision-making relate to preferential representation of information.

When making choices, individuals differ from one another, as well as from normativity, in how they weigh different types of information. One explanation for this relates to idiosyncratic preferences in what information individuals represent when evaluating choice options. Here, we test this explanation with a simple risky-decision making task, combined with magnetoencephalography (MEG). We examine the relationship between individual differences in behavioral markers of information weighting and neural representation of stimuli pertinent to incorporating that information. We find that the extent to which individuals (N = 19) behaviorally weight probability versus reward information is related to how preferentially they neurally represent stimuli most informative for making probability and reward comparisons. These results are further validated in an additional behavioral experiment (N = 88) that measures stimulus representation as the latency of perceptual detection following priming. Overall, the results suggest that differences in the information individuals consider during choice relate to their risk-taking tendencies.

Humans perseverate on punishment avoidance goals in multigoal reinforcement learning.

Managing multiple goals is essential to adaptation, yet we are only beginning to understand computations by which we navigate the resource demands entailed in so doing. Here, we sought to elucidate how humans balance reward seeking and punishment avoidance goals, and relate this to variation in its expression within anxious individuals. To do so, we developed a novel multigoal pursuit task that includes trial-specific instructed goals to either pursue reward (without risk of punishment) or avoid punishment (without the opportunity for reward). We constructed a computational model of multigoal pursuit to quantify the degree to which participants could disengage from the pursuit goals when instructed to, as well as devote less model-based resources toward goals that were less abundant. In general, participants (n = 192) were less flexible in avoiding punishment than in pursuing reward. Thus, when instructed to pursue reward, participants often persisted in avoiding features that had previously been associated with punishment, even though at decision time these features were unambiguously benign. In a similar vein, participants showed no significant downregulation of avoidance when punishment avoidance goals were less abundant in the task. Importantly, we show preliminary evidence that individuals with chronic worry may have difficulty disengaging from punishment avoidance when instructed to seek reward. Taken together, the findings demonstrate that people avoid punishment less flexibly than they pursue reward. Future studies should test in larger samples whether a difficulty to disengage from punishment avoidance contributes to chronic worry.

Components of Behavioral Activation Therapy for Depression Engage Specific Reinforcement Learning Mechanisms in a Pilot Study.

Background: Behavioral activation is an evidence-based treatment for depression. Theoretical considerations suggest that treatment response depends on reinforcement learning mechanisms. However, which reinforcement learning mechanisms are engaged by and mediate the therapeutic effect of behavioral activation remains only partially understood, and there are no procedures to measure such mechanisms. Objective: To perform a pilot study to examine whether reinforcement learning processes measured through tasks or self-report are related to treatment response to behavioral activation. Method: The pilot study enrolled 13 outpatients (12 completers) with major depressive disorder, from July of 2018 through February of 2019, into a nine-week trial with BA. Psychiatric evaluations, decision-making tests and self-reported reward experience and anticipations were acquired before, during and after the treatment. Task and self-report data were analysed by using reinforcement-learning models. Inferred parameters were related to measures of depression severity through linear mixed effects models. Results: Treatment effects during different phases of the therapy were captured by specific decision-making processes in the task. During the weeks focusing on the active pursuit of reward, treatment effects were more pronounced amongst those individuals who showed an increase in Pavlovian appetitive influence. During the weeks focusing on the avoidance of punishments, treatment responses were more pronounced in those individuals who showed an increase in Pavlovian avoidance. Self-reported anticipation of reinforcement changed according to formal RL rules. Individual differences in the extent to which learning followed RL rules related to changes in anhedonia. Conclusions: In this pilot study both task- and self-report-derived measures of reinforcement learning captured individual differences in treatment response to behavioral activation. Appetitive and aversive Pavlovian reflexive processes appeared to be modulated by separate psychotherapeutic interventions, and the modulation strength covaried with response to specific interventions. Self-reported changes in reinforcement expectations are also related to treatment response. Trial Registry Name: Set Your Goal: Engaging in GO/No-Go Active Learning, #NCT03538535, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov.

Opportunities for emotion and mental health research in the resource-rationality framework.

We discuss opportunities in applying the resource-rationality framework toward answering questions in emotion and mental health research. These opportunities rely on characterization of individual differences in cognitive strategies; an endeavor that may be at odds with the normative approach outlined in the target article. We consider ways individual differences might enter the framework and the translational opportunities offered by each.

Predictive representations can link model-based reinforcement learning to model-free mechanisms.

Humans and animals are capable of evaluating actions by considering their long-run future rewards through a process described using model-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms. The mechanisms by which neural circuits perform the computations prescribed by model-based RL remain largely unknown; however, multiple lines of evidence suggest that neural circuits supporting model-based behavior are structurally homologous to and overlapping with those thought to carry out model-free temporal difference (TD) learning. Here, we lay out a family of approaches by which model-based computation may be built upon a core of TD learning. The foundation of this framework is the successor representation, a predictive state representation that, when combined with TD learning of value predictions, can produce a subset of the behaviors associated with model-based learning, while requiring less decision-time computation than dynamic programming. Using simulations, we delineate the precise behavioral capabilities enabled by evaluating actions using this approach, and compare them to those demonstrated by biological organisms. We then introduce two new algorithms that build upon the successor representation while progressively mitigating its limitations. Because this framework can account for the full range of observed putatively model-based behaviors while still utilizing a core TD framework, we suggest that it represents a neurally plausible family of mechanisms for model-based evaluation.