How to build a better 4E cognition.

Mougenot and Matheson outline a theoretical approach to cognitive neuroscience that combines the commitments of embodied cognition with a mechanistic approach to scientific explanation. They argue that this theoretical approach provides several general benefits, including enabling researchers to develop more robust theories and ontologies that do not require either neuroscientific reductionism or the complete autonomy of psychology from neuroscience. In this commentary, I argue that the sort of embodied cognitive neuroscience that they envision has a more specific benefit: it has the potential to help resolve internal tensions within 4E cognition.

Brain mechanisms discriminating enactive mental simulations of running and plogging.

Enactive cognition emphasizes co-constructive roles of humans and their environment in shaping cognitive processes. It is specifically engaged in the mental simulation of behaviors, enhancing the connection between perception and action. Here we investigated the core network of brain regions involved in enactive cognition as applied to mental simulations of physical exercise. We used a neuroimaging paradigm in which participants (N = 103) were required to project themselves running or plogging (running while picking-up litter) along an image-guided naturalistic trail. Using both univariate and multivariate brain imaging analyses, we find that a broad spectrum of brain activation discriminates between the mental simulation of plogging versus running. Critically, we show that self-reported ratings of daily life running engagement and the quality of mental simulation (how well participants were able to imagine themselves running) modulate the brain reactivity to plogging versus running. Finally, we undertook functional connectivity analyses centered on the insular cortex, which is a key region in the dynamic interplay between neurocognitive processes. This analysis revealed increased positive and negative patterns of insular-centered functional connectivity in the plogging condition (as compared to the running condition), thereby confirming the key role of the insular cortex in action simulation involving complex sets of mental mechanisms. Taken together, the present findings provide new insights into the brain networks involved in the enactive mental simulation of physical exercise.

An Ecological Approach to Conceptual Thinking in Material Engagement.

Although post-cognitivist approaches have shaken the status quo by emphasising the dynamic interactions among the brain, the body, and the environment in cognition, mainstream psychological theories continue to view concepts as primarily representational or skull-bound mental phenomena. As a result, the dynamics of action and the possible impact of material culture on conceptual thinking are poorly understood. In this paper, we explore the process and meaning of conceptual thinking from a material engagement perspective. We argue that conceptual thinking is not a matter of forming representations in the head but something we do-a way of engaging with materiality. Conceptual thinking is conceptual thinging, namely a kind of unmediated practical knowledge that individuals put into play when they engage, in a general way, with and through the world. In this sense, we propose that conceptual thinking is instantiated in the dynamic coordination of bodily practices and artefacts in sociomaterial activities. To elucidate this perspective, we introduce seven principles defining conceptual thinking within an ecological-enactive framework of cognition.

Longevity as a Responsibility: Constructing Healthy Aging by Enacting within Contexts over the Entire Lifespan.

Studying aging now requires going beyond the bio-psycho-social model and incorporating a broader multidisciplinary view capable of capturing the ultimate complexity of being human that is expressed as individuals age. Current demographic trends and the lengthening of life expectancies allow the observation of long-lived individuals in full health. These super-agers are no longer an exception. Indeed, individuals can have a good quality of life even over age 70 and living with chronic or neurodegenerative diseases. This change is driven in part by the cohort effect observed in people who are about to age today (e.g., better schooling, more advanced health conditions, and technologization) but more so by the gradual overcoming of ageist views. An aged person is no longer seen as a quitter but rather as one empowered to direct their own trajectory of potentially healthy longevity. According to this vision, this article proposes a situated lifespan perspective for the study of aging that integrates pedagogical models of developmental ecology with psychological theories of optimal experience to understand the individual motivational perspective on aging. At the same time, it does not disregard analyzing the daily and cultural contexts in which everyone situates and that guide aging trajectories. Nor does it forget that aging people are body-mind (embodied) organisms that, with contexts and through motivations, seize opportunities for action (affordances) to evolve in an optimal way during their lifespan. This theoretical reflection sheds new light on the aging process and on future trends in healthy longevity research.

Interoceptive experiences and ecological care: an embodied approach within therapeutical realms.

The conventional dichotomy between human health and disease has historically been approached through reductionist models that emphasize the exclusive causal relevance of physiological and pathological processes. Consequently, self-awareness and affective dimensions, integral to a phenomenological perspective, are often relegated to secondary traits, affording little consideration for the causal role of embodied living organization. Our interest lies in exploring the potential relevance of the phenomenology of embodied self-awareness in relation to interoceptive processes within therapeutic settings. As we illustrate, when the unfolding processes of interoceptive awareness and its affective capacity take precedence, the agent assumes an active, rather than passive, role in their own experience of health or illness. Departing from an enactive, phenomenological, and ecological standpoint, we propose a distinctive perspective on interoceptive processes, relying on an affective conceptualization of a spectrum of experiences of bodily being-in-the-world. Our primary argument posits that considering interoceptive processes from an embodied and ecological viewpoint of the self, interacting with the material and social environment, enables an approach to the gradient of affective experiences of embodied self-awareness-where pleasure or suffering is perceived and felt-in a naturalized, non-reductive, and relational manner. We discern two ways in which interoceptive processes interrelate with the experience of embodied self-awareness: sensitivity (self-affective) and affective-laden perception. Drawing on this distinction, we provide a nuanced description of these experiences within communities of cis-women, exemplified through the contexts of menstruation and endometriosis. This exploration seeks to enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of embodied, ecological, and affective self-experience from within diverse and situated bodies. The goal is to contribute to their autonomy and ability to adapt and self-regulate within therapeutic contexts.

Intertwining the social and the cognitive loops: socially enactive cognition for human-compatible interactive systems.

It is increasingly important for technical systems to be able to interact flexibly, robustly and fluently with humans in real-world scenarios. However, while current AI systems excel at narrow task competencies, they lack crucial interaction abilities for the adaptive and co-constructed social interactions that humans engage in. We argue that a possible avenue to tackle the corresponding computational modelling challenges is to embrace interactive theories of social understanding in humans. We propose the notion of socially enactive cognitive systems that do not rely solely on abstract and (quasi-)complete internal models for separate social perception, reasoning and action. By contrast, socially enactive cognitive agents are supposed to enable a close interlinking of the enactive socio-cognitive processing loops within each agent, and the social-communicative loop between them. We discuss theoretical foundations of this view, identify principles and requirements for according computational approaches, and highlight three examples of our own research that showcase the interaction abilities achievable in this way. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'Face2face: advancing the science of social interaction'.

Enactive and simondonian reflections on mental disorders.

As an alternative to linear and unidimensional perspectives focused mainly on either organic or psychological processes, the enactive approach to life and mind-a branch of 4-E (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended) cognitive theories-offers an integrative framework to study mental disorders that encompasses and articulates organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective dimensions of embodiment. These three domains are deeply entangled in a non-trivial manner. A question remains on how this systemic and multi-dimensional approach may be applied to our understanding of mental disorders and symptomatic behavior. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon's philosophy of individuation (focusing particularly on the concepts of tension, metastability, and preindividual), we provide some enactive conceptual tools to better understand the dynamic, interactive, and multi-dimensional nature of human bodies in mental disorders and psychopathological symptoms. One of such tools cursiva is sense-making, a key notion that captures the relational process of generating meaning by interacting with the sociomaterial environment. The article analyzes five aspects related to sense-making: temporality, adaptivity, the multiplicity of normativities it involves, the fundamental role of tension, and its participatory character. On this basis, we draw certain implications for our understanding of mental disorders and diverse symptoms, and suggest their interpretation in terms of difficulties to transform tensions and perform individuation processes, which result in a reduction of the field of potentialities for self-individuation and sense-making.

Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism.

We present a multiscale integrationist interpretation of the boundaries of cognitive systems, using the Markov blanket formalism of the variational free energy principle. This interpretation is intended as a corrective for the philosophical debate over internalist and externalist interpretations of cognitive boundaries; we stake out a compromise position. We first survey key principles of new radical (extended, enactive, embodied) views of cognition. We then describe an internalist interpretation premised on the Markov blanket formalism. Having reviewed these accounts, we develop our positive multiscale account. We argue that the statistical seclusion of internal from external states of the system-entailed by the existence of a Markov boundary-can coexist happily with the multiscale integration of the system through its dynamics. Our approach does not privilege any given boundary (whether it be that of the brain, body, or world), nor does it argue that all boundaries are equally prescient. We argue that the relevant boundaries of cognition depend on the level being characterised and the explanatory interests that guide investigation. We approach the issue of how and where to draw the boundaries of cognitive systems through a multiscale ontology of cognitive systems, which offers a multidisciplinary research heuristic for cognitive science.

Dimensions of Musical Creativity.

Current literature on creative cognition has developed rich conceptual landscapes dedicated to the analysis of both individual and collective forms of creativity. This work has favored the emergence of unifying theories on domain-general creative abilities in which the main experiential, behavioral, computational, and neural aspects involved in everyday creativity are examined and discussed. But while such accounts have gained important analytical leverage for describing the overall conditions and mechanisms through which creativity emerges and operates, they necessarily leave contextual forms of creativity less explored. Among the latter, musical practices have recently drawn the attention of scholars interested in its creative properties as well as in the creative potential of those who engage with them. In the present article, we compare previously posed theories of creativity in musical and non-musical domains to lay the basis of a conceptual framework that mitigates the tension between (i) individual and collective and (ii) domain-general and domain-specific perspectives on creativity. In doing so, we draw from a range of scholarship in music and enactive cognitive science, and propose that creative cognition may be best understood as a process of skillful organism-environment adaptation that one cultivates endlessly. With its focus on embodiment, plurality, and adaptiveness, our account points to a structured unity between living systems and their world, disclosing a variety of novel analytical resources for research and theory across different dimensions of (musical) creativity.

Proprioception in Action: A Matter of Ecological and Social Interaction.

The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical and formal framework to understand how the proprioceptive and kinesthetic system learns about body position and possibilities for movement in ongoing action and interaction. Whereas most weak embodiment accounts of proprioception focus on positionalist descriptions or on its role as a source of parameters for internal motor control, we argue that these aspects are insufficient to understand how proprioception is integrated into an active organized system in continuous and dynamic interaction with the environment. Our strong embodiment thesis is that one of the main theoretical principles to understand proprioception, as a perceptual experience within concrete situations, is the coupling with kinesthesia and its relational constitution-self, ecological, and social. In our view, these aspects are underdeveloped in current accounts, and an enactive sensorimotor theory enriched with phenomenological descriptions may provide an alternative path toward explaining this skilled experience. Following O'Regan and Noë (2001) sensorimotor contingencies conceptualization, we introduce three distinct notions of proprioceptive kinesthetic-sensorimotor contingencies (PK-SMCs), which we describe conceptually and formally considering three varieties of perceptual experience in action: PK-SMCs-self, PK-SMCs-self-environment, and PK-SMC-self-other. As a proof of concept of our proposal, we developed a minimal PK model to discuss these elements in detail and show their explanatory value as important guides to understand the proprioceptive/kinesthetic system. Finally, we also highlight that there is an opportunity to develop enactive sensorimotor theory in new directions, creating a bridge between the varieties of experiences of oneself and learning skills.

How Radical Is Embodied Creativity? Implications of 4E Approaches for Creativity Research and Teaching.

Modern ideas of embodiment have been influential in cognitive science for the past several decades, yet there is minimal evidence of embodied cognition approaches in creativity research or pedagogical practices for teaching creativity skills. With creativity research in crisis due to conceptual, methodological, and theoretical issues, radical embodied cognitive science (RECS) may offer a framework to move the field forward. This conceptual analysis examines the current state of creativity research from the 4E (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) cognition and RECS perspectives. Two streams are critiqued for their potential to further knowledge about the development of creative expertise and inform educational practices. Promising directions for future research is discussed, including ways dynamical systems approaches, such as those used in improvisational and musical creativity, might yield new insights about how people develop creative expertise and help address the "higher order thinking" criticisms of RECS.

Enacting Space in Virtual Reality: A Comparison Between Money's Road Map Test and Its Virtual Version.

In the field of spatial cognition research the mutual relationship between perception and action that brings out spatial orientation was lately investigated. Besides, the sameness between creating a cognitive map from the exploration of a not simulated environment, from the use of an allocentric (survey-like) sketched map, and from the interaction with egocentric (route-like) 3D virtual environments, is generally contrived. To understand if different embodied affordances could provide different knowledge organization during wayfinding through the use of distinct spatial simulations, the same group of 61 healthy subjects experienced both the classical version of the Money's Road Map test (M-RMT) and a virtual reality version of the Road Map test (VR-RMT). The M-RMT requires a allocentric to egocentric right/left reasoning to explore a stylized city provided in a survey perspective. The VR-RMT is a 3D version of the same environment through which participants can actively navigate by choosing egocentric-based right/left directions in a route perspective. The results showed that the different embodiments afforded by the two environments and the increasing complexity in turn types provides different spatial outcomes. Results were discussed according to the sensorimotor coupling theory provided from the enactive cognition approach and significances for spatial cognition research were provided.

The Evolution of Soundscape Appraisal Through Enactive Cognition.

We propose a framework based on evolutionary principles and the theory of enactive cognition ("being by doing"), that addresses the foundation of key results and central questions of soundscape research. We hypothesize that the two main descriptors (measures of how people perceive the acoustic environment) of soundscape appraisal ('pleasantness' and 'eventfulness'), reflect evolutionarily old motivational and affective systems that promote survival through preferences for certain environments and avoidance of others. Survival is aimed at ending or avoiding existential threats and protecting viability in a deficient environment. On the other hand, flourishing occurs whenever survival is not an immediate concern and aims to improve the agent's viability and by co-creating ever better conditions for existence. As such, survival is experienced as unpleasant, and deals with immediate problems to be ended or avoided, while flourishing is enjoyable, and therefore to be aimed for and maintained. Therefore, the simplest, safety-relevant meaning attributable to soundscapes (audible safety) should be key to understanding soundscape appraisal. To strengthen this, we show that the auditory nervous system is intimately connected to the parts of our brains associated with arousal and emotions. Furthermore, our theory demonstrates that 'complexity' and 'affordance content' of the perceived environment are important underlying soundscape indicators (measures used to predict the value of a soundscape descriptor). Consideration of these indicators allows the same soundscape to be viewed from a second perspective; one driven more by meaning attribution characteristics than merely emotional appraisal. The synthesis of both perspectives of the same person-environment interaction thus consolidates the affective, informational, and even the activity related perspectives on soundscape appraisal. Furthermore, we hypothesize that our current habitats are not well matched to our, evolutionarily old, auditory warning systems, and that we consequently have difficulty establishing audible safety. This leads to more negative and aroused moods and emotions, with stress-related symptoms as a result.

Recombinant Enaction: Manipulatives Generate New Procedures in the Imagination, by Extending and Recombining Action Spaces.

Manipulation of physical models such as tangrams and tiles is a popular approach to teaching early mathematics concepts. This pedagogical approach is extended by new computational media, where mathematical entities such as equations and vectors can be virtually manipulated. The cognitive and neural mechanisms supporting such manipulation-based learning-particularly how actions generate new internal structures that support problem-solving-are not understood. We develop a model of the way manipulations generate internal traces embedding actions, and how these action-traces recombine during problem-solving. This model is based on a study of two groups of sixth-grade students solving area problems. Before problem-solving, one group manipulated a tangram, the other group answered a descriptive test. Eye-movement trajectories during problem-solving were different between the groups. A second study showed that this difference required the tangram's geometrical structure, just manipulation was not enough. We propose a theoretical model accounting for these results, and discuss its implications.

Evolutionary Musicology Meets Embodied Cognition: Biocultural Coevolution and the Enactive Origins of Human Musicality.

Despite evolutionary musicology's interdisciplinary nature, and the diverse methods it employs, the field has nevertheless tended to divide into two main positions. Some argue that music should be understood as a naturally selected adaptation, while others claim that music is a product of culture with little or no relevance for the survival of the species. We review these arguments, suggesting that while interesting and well-reasoned positions have been offered on both sides of the debate, the nature-or-culture (or adaptation vs. non-adaptation) assumptions that have traditionally driven the discussion have resulted in a problematic either/or dichotomy. We then consider an alternative "biocultural" proposal that appears to offer a way forward. As we discuss, this approach draws on a range of research in theoretical biology, archeology, neuroscience, embodied and ecological cognition, and dynamical systems theory (DST), positing a more integrated model that sees biological and cultural dimensions as aspects of the same evolving system. Following this, we outline the enactive approach to cognition, discussing the ways it aligns with the biocultural perspective. Put simply, the enactive approach posits a deep continuity between mind and life, where cognitive processes are explored in terms of how self-organizing living systems enact relationships with the environment that are relevant to their survival and well-being. It highlights the embodied and ecologically situated nature of living agents, as well as the active role they play in their own developmental processes. Importantly, the enactive approach sees cognitive and evolutionary processes as driven by a range of interacting factors, including the socio-cultural forms of activity that characterize the lives of more complex creatures such as ourselves. We offer some suggestions for how this approach might enhance and extend the biocultural model. To conclude we briefly consider the implications of this approach for practical areas such as music education.

Aproximación Neurodinámica a la Cognición Social / Neurodimanic Approach to Social Cognition

En las últimas décadas ha crecido el estudio los mecanismos involucrados en el comportamiento social, gran parte de estas indagaciones se han realizado desde una aproximación de la neurociencia social cognitiva, la cual se basa en un modelo representacional del procesamiento de información. No obstante, esta aproximación ha sido ampliamente criticada por desconocer la participación del cuerpo, la dinámica afectiva, el contexto social, el cambio durante el desarrollo y suponer un procesamiento modular endógeno. En este sentido, este artículo presenta un modelo neurodinámico de la cognición social (CS), comprendiéndola desde una aproximación enactiva, situada, relacional y sistémica. Desde este modelo se describen los principales cambios en esperados la actividad cerebral durante las interacciones sociales en tiempo real y durante la ontogenia. Se concluye resaltando los desafíos y oportunidades que este tipo de aproximaciones puede proporcionar a la neurociencia y psicología social del futuro.

In recent decades it has seen a growing interest to study the mechanisms involved in social behavior, much of these inquiries fall within social cognitive neuroscience approach, which is based on a representational model of information processing. However, this approach has been widely criticized for ignoring the body participation, emotional dynamics, social context, developmental changes and assuming an endogenous modular processing. In this regard, this article presents a neurodynamic model of social cognition, which understand social process from an enactive, embodied, situated, relational and systemic perspective. This model let us described the main expected changes in brain activity during ongoing social interactions and ontogeny. The conclusion highlights the challenges and opportunities that this kind of approach can provide for a coming neuroscience and social psychology.

A touch with words: Dynamic synergies between manual actions and language.

Manual actions are a hallmark of humanness. Their underlying neural circuitry gives rise to species-specific skills and interacts with language processes. In particular, multiple studies show that hand-related expressions - verbal units evoking manual activity - variously affect concurrent manual actions, yielding apparently controversial results (interference, facilitation, or null effects) in varied time windows. Through a systematic review of 108 experiments, we show that such effects are driven by several factors, such as the level of verbal processing, action complexity, and the time-lag between linguistic and motor processes. We reconcile key empirical patterns by introducing the Hand-Action-Network Dynamic Language Embodiment (HANDLE) model, an integrative framework based on neural coupling dynamics and predictive-coding principles. To conclude, we assess HANDLE against the backdrop of other action-cognition theories, illustrate its potential applications to understand high-level deficits in motor disorders, and discuss key challenges for further development. In sum, our work aligns with the 'pragmatic turn', moving away from passive and static representationalist perspectives to a more dynamic, enactive, and embodied conceptualization of cognitive processes.

Creative Practices Embodied, Embedded, and Enacted in Architectural Settings: Toward an Ecological Model of Creativity.

Memoires by eminently creative people often describe architectural spaces and qualities they believe instrumental for their creativity. However, places designed to encourage creativity have had mixed results, with some found to decrease creative productivity for users. This may be due, in part, to lack of suitable empirical theory or model to guide design strategies. Relationships between creative cognition and features of the physical environment remain largely uninvestigated in the scientific literature, despite general agreement among researchers that human cognition is physically and socially situated. This paper investigates what role architectural settings may play in creative processes by examining documented first person and biographical accounts of creativity with respect to three central theories of situated cognition. First, the embodied thesis argues that cognition encompasses both the mind and the body. Second, the embedded thesis maintains that people exploit features of the physical and social environment to increase their cognitive capabilities. Third, the enaction thesis describes cognition as dependent upon a person's interactions with the world. Common themes inform three propositions, illustrated in a new theoretical framework describing relationships between people and their architectural settings with respect to different cognitive processes of creativity. The framework is intended as a starting point toward an ecological model of creativity, which may be used to guide future creative process research and architectural design strategies to support user creative productivity.