Ancient Greek laws of nature.

The prevailing narrative in the history of science maintains that the ancient Greeks did not have a concept of a 'law of nature'. This paper overturns that narrative and shows that some ancient Greek philosophers did have an idea of laws of nature and, moreover, they referred to them as 'laws of nature'. This paper analyzes specific examples of laws of nature in texts by Plato, Aristotle, Philo of Alexandria, Nicomachus of Gerasa, and Galen. These examples emerged out of the closely intertwined Platonic and Pythagorean traditions, and these philosophers' texts make reference to laws of nature when describing arithmetical methods, arithmological doctrines, or medical theories. Nicomachus' laws of nature are especially noteworthy, because they have features that historians look for in the search for the origin of the modern concept of laws of nature. Nicomachus' laws of nature are mathematical, universal, and necessary. This paper raises the possibility that the ancient Platonic and Pythagorean traditions influenced the subsequent development of the idea of laws of nature in medieval and early modern Europe, including the conception of laws of nature deployed by Johannes Kepler and Isaac Newton.

Theoretical concepts as goal-derived concepts.

In this paper, I will focus on the nature of theoretical concepts, i.e., the psychological entities related to theoretical terms in science. I will first argue that the standard picture of theoretical concepts in twentieth-century philosophy of science understood them as representation-oriented common taxonomic concepts. However, I will show how, in light of recent pragmatist approaches to scientific laws and theories, several important theoretical concepts in science do not seem to fit such picture. I will then argue that these theoretical concepts should be understood instead as goal-derived concepts, since their construction and use exhibit the typical characteristics that cognitive scientists assign to goal-derived concepts. I will furthermore argue that the existence of theoretical concepts that are goal-derived concepts represents yet another example of the central role that human goals play in science.

Lessons for the Future of NAMs from History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science.

This paper explores what we can learn from the humanities and social sciences about how standards operate in and around science, in order to understand more about how 'the gold standard' can be shifted away from the use of animals in research and testing, and toward New Approach Methodologies (NAMs). These fields allow us to consider potential futures of NAMs as alternatives, replacements, or complements to animal use in testing and research. As we demonstrate, the questions that we pose and how they are framed are as important as the answers that result. Rather than asking how to 'redefine the gold standard', norms and expectations for NAMs must be actively debated and transparently defined. These considerations would be based, in part, on what has been learned in the past from non-human animal models and systems, but also use the norms within the fields from which the NAMs derive in light of the rich broader contexts within which they are being developed. As we argue, notions such as 'a gold standard' are limited and must be replaced by contextualised standards that depend on the scientific, sociocultural and other factors that contribute to our understanding of a particular method (new or otherwise) as 'good' for a particular purpose.

Positivist or post-positivist philosophy of science? The left Vienna Circle and Thomas Kuhn.

The debate between the revisionist and received views of the relationship between Thomas Kuhn and logical empiricism has until now focused on the relationship between Kuhn and Rudolf Carnap. Here, I consider the relationship between Kuhn and two other members of the Vienna Circle's left-wing; Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank. It is argued that the attribution of the historical turn in philosophy of science to Kuhn obscures the historical awareness displayed in important works by members of the Vienna Circle, and thereby distorts its legacy. Both Frank and Neurath recognised the role for history in theorizing about science, and drawing upon these insights lead them to considerations of scientific theory-choice, rational disagreement, and the role of extra-scientific values in science, that anticipate those later made famous by Kuhn. It is also argued that the Left-Vienna Circle's programme for Unified Science, the replacement of traditional philosophy with a bipartite metatheory of science, provides a clearer and potentially more radical role for the history of science within the philosophy of science than Kuhn's. To reach this conclusion, it is demonstrated that some members of the Vienna Circle maintained a far less robust distinction between contexts of discovery and justification than has typically been attributed to them.

Beyond Anthropocentrism: The Moral and Strategic Philosophy behind Russell and Burch's 3Rs in Animal Experimentation.

The 3Rs framework in animal experimentation- "replace, reduce, refine" - has been alleged to be expressive of anthropocentrism, the view that only humans are directly morally relevant. After all, the 3Rs safeguard animal welfare only as far as given human research objectives permit, effectively prioritizing human use interests over animal interests. This article acknowledges this prioritization, but argues that the characterization as anthropocentric is inaccurate. In fact, the 3Rs prioritize research purposes even more strongly than an ethical anthropocentrist would. Drawing on the writings of Universities Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW) founder Charles W. Hume, who employed Russell and Burch, it is argued that the 3Rs originally arose from an animal-centered ethic which was however restricted by an organizational strategy aiming at the voluntary cooperation of animal researchers. Research purposes thus had to be accepted as given. While this explains why the 3Rs focus narrowly on humane method selection, not on encouraging animal-free question selection in the first place, it suggests that governments should (also) focus on the latter if they recognize animals as deserving protection for their own sake.

The Classical Stance: Dennett's Criterion in Wallacian quantum mechanics.

David Wallace's 'Dennett's Criterion' plays a key part in establishing realist claims about the existence of a multiverse emerging from the mathematical formalism of quantum physics, even after decoherence is fully appreciated. Although the philosophical preconditions of this criterion are not neutral, they are rarely explicitly addressed conceptually. I tease apart three: (I) a rejection of conceptual bridge laws even in cases of inhomogeneous reduction; (II) a reliance on the pragmatic notion of usefulness to highlight quasi-classical patterns, as seen in a decoherence basis, over others; and (III) a structural realist or 'functional realist' point of view that leads to individuating those patterns as real macroscopic objects at the coarse-grained level, as they are seen from the Classical Stance (analogous to Dennett's Intentional Stance). I conclude that the justification of Dennett's Criterion will be intimately tied up with the fate of strong forms of naturalism, and in particular that Wallacian quantum mechanics is a key case study for concretely evaluating his 'math-first' structural realism (Wallace 2022).

A reinterpretation of Heisenberg's Umdeutung in prescriptive-dynamical terms.

There has been a lot of discussion about Heisenberg's Umdeutung paper of 1925, which is universally credited as the first formulation of modern quantum mechanics. Much of this discussion has been characterized by puzzlement over the manner in which Heisenberg arrived at his formulation, supposedly through Bohr's atomic theory in conjunction with two philosophical principles, namely the Correspondence Principle and the Observability Principle. I provide textual, contextual, and philosophical evidence that the "prescriptive-dynamical framework" - recently advocated in the literature on independent grounds - is the perfect perspective from which to understand Heisenberg's work and the significance of the two principles he utilized to arrive at it.

Mary Hesse on the role of the human imagination in the philosophy and practice of science.

Although Mary Hesse remains an influential figure within the history of the philosophy of science her reflections on the role of the human imagination in science have, to date, been mostly neglected. In her first, and often overlooked monograph-Science and the Human Imagination-Hesse described the imagination as composed of four dimensions. Defined as the historical, the critical, the fertile and the creative imagination, these dimensions played, for Hesse, various roles in both the philosophy and practice of science. Suffice to say, Hesse's discussion of the role of the imagination in science challenges the idea that philosophy and science are logically determined forms of practice through an appeal, as will be argued, to Immanuel Kant's seminal reflections on the 'indispensable function' of the imagination. Accordingly, a detailed elucidation of Science and the Human Imagination not only situates Hesse's reflections within the long history of the philosophy of the imagination; it revitalises anew contemporary debates on the role of the imagination in the philosophy and practice of science.

Responsibility Gap(s) Due to the Introduction of AI in Healthcare: An Ubuntu-Inspired Approach.

Due to its enormous potential, artificial intelligence (AI) can transform healthcare on a seemingly infinite scale. However, as we continue to explore the immense potential of AI, it is vital to consider the ethical concerns associated with its development and deployment. One specific concern that has been flagged in the literature is the responsibility gap (RG) due to the introduction of AI in healthcare. When the use of an AI algorithm or system results in a negative outcome for a patient(s), to whom can or should responsibility for that outcome be assigned? Although the concept of the RG was introduced in Anglo-American and European philosophy, this paper aims to broaden the debate by providing an Ubuntu-inspired perspective on the RG. Ubuntu, deeply rooted in African philosophy, calls for collective responsibility, and offers a uniquely forward-looking approach to address the alleged RG caused by AI in healthcare. An Ubuntu-inspired perspective can serve as a valuable guide and tool when addressing the alleged RG. Incorporating Ubuntu into the AI ethics discourse can contribute to a more ethical and responsible integration of AI in healthcare.

A philosophy of science approach to the amyloid hypothesis of Alzheimer's disease.

Disputes about the scientific validity of the amyloid-ß hypothesis of Alzheimer's disease have been held since the early 1990s, with little constructive progress made between opposing sides despite recent therapeutic progress. Here, I argue that philosophy of science can improve the chance of constructive debate by giving researchers technical language to describe and assess scientific progress. To do so, I interpret the amyloid hypothesis using a modified version of the research programme concept from philosopher of science Imre Lakatos. I first outline the amyloid-ß hypothesis and study critiques of its central place in Alzheimer's research. Then, I draw on the complexity of amyloid-ß and Alzheimer's research to discuss the limits of using concepts from popular philosophers of science Karl Popper or Thomas Kuhn, before finally arguing that an adaptation of the research programme concept can foster constructive debates about the science of Alzheimer's and within it. I will argue that the amyloid-ß hypothesis has contributed to significant progress in the Alzheimer's field based on what Lakatos called the "positive heuristic" (motivating the programme to test its predictions) and the "negative heuristic" (protecting the programme from refutation). I consider the amyloid research agenda to be progressive despite the fact that its claims about disease aetiology could be wrong.

The life sciences and the history of analytic philosophy.

Comparative to the commonplace focus onto developments in mathematics and physics, the life sciences appear to have received relatively sparse attention within the early history of analytic philosophy. This paper addresses two related aspects of this phenomenon. On the one hand, it asks: to the extent that the significance of the life sciences was indeed downplayed by early analytic philosophers, why was this the case? An answer to this question may be found in Bertrand Russell's 1914 discussions of the relation between biology and philosophy. Contrary to received views of the history of analytic philosophy, Russell presented his own 'logical atomism' in opposition not only to British Idealism, but also to 'evolutionism'. On the other hand, I will question whether this purported neglect of the life sciences does indeed accurately characterise the history of analytic philosophy. In answering this, I turn first to Susan Stebbing's criticisms of Russell's overlooking of biology, her influence on J.H. Woodger, and her critical discussion of T.H. Huxley's and C.H. Waddington's application of evolutionary views to philosophical questions. I then discuss the case of Moritz Schlick, whose evolutionist philosophy has been overlooked within recent debates concerning Logical Empiricism's relation to the philosophy of biology.

[Human reason versus arrogance technoscience and the replacement shadow. -Ethical evaluation and social control to regain power on the means and ends from the work of José Sanmartín]. / La razón humana frente a la arrogancia tecnocientífica y la sombra de reemplazo. -Evaluación ética y control social para recuperar el poder sobre los medios y los fines desde la obra de José Sanmartín.

This essay analyzes from a personalistic bioethics the model of technological progress supported by an autonomy without controls and an imperative that is governed by the maxim: if it can be done, let's do it!, as a necessary and sufficient condition of progress. This puts us on the slippery slope between the technically feasible and the morally lawful. The pioneering work of the philosopher, José Sanmartin Esplugues 2 , urges reflection in the face of a technological profusion that sees the human being as a useful embodied object and offers powers of intervention on human life that were previously unimaginable. The reduction of the person to mere biological-material data opens the door to increasing deshumanization by subordination to the calculations of an instrumental rationalism. Underlying the desire to see ourselves at the top of the world and genetic techniques are the ultimate expression of a longing for human emancipation that aspires to take the reins of evolution through an abstract postbiological imaginary. Sanmartin proposes a model of ethical evaluation and social insertion of technoscientific activity that goes beyond the conventional categories of impact, use and effectiveness to distinguish social, cultural, economic, political and values correlates, in order to embroider a pattern that decides on the means and ends of human life through technologies that are neither innocuous nor neutral. A society without antidotes to manipulation that also teaches us to cultivate utopian dreams about human nature is easily malleable by elites who promise happy worlds and redeem us from our vulnerability.

Historiography: Why Should Historians Pay More Attention to Philosophy of Technology?

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology marks the maturity of the philosophy of technology, which has lagged behind the history of technology as a distinct field. The book's thirty-two chapters span almost seven hundred pages, written by thirty-four authors from twelve countries. Shannon Vallor, professor of philosophy at University of Edinburgh, edited the volume and wrote its excellent introduction, which provides a historical framing that is largely absent from the rest of the volume. Although many of the remaining chapters are quite strong, the volume as a whole suffers from an unevenness that reflects the conceptual disunity of the field. Nevertheless, the volume shows the value of this field for historians of technology, especially as an alternative to the stale STS theories that many historians of technology draw on.

"Facts" and "Ideas": Richard Jones, William Whewell, and the Entangled Histories of Science and Political Economy in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain.

This essay explores hitherto unnoticed conceptual transactions between reflections on scientific method and a rethinking of political-economic categories in early-nineteenth century Britain through the writings of William Whewell and Richard Jones. Closely examining personal correspondences between Whewell and Jones, their works, contemporary debates on political economy and the problem of scientific method, Jones's pedagogic practices, Karl Marx's engagements with Jones, and his receptions as a teacher of political economy in colonial governance and imperial education, I argue that Jones drew upon Whewell's philosophical considerations on the relation between "fact" and "idea," to reconstitute the epistemological orientation of political economy.

Philosophy leading the way: An interdisciplinary approach to study communication of severe diagnoses.

This paper explores a brand-new interdisciplinary approach applied to an enduring problem: the communication of severe diagnoses. The moment when physicians explain the diagnosis to patients and their relatives is sensitive, particularly for a disease that is rarely diagnosed early. The first part of the article is dedicated to the context of this delicate doctor-patient interaction. With this framework in mind, the paper delves into the innovative interdisciplinary methodology developed in the pilot study Communi.CARE, conducted in a hospital in Northern Italy, which focuses on the diagnosis of pancreatic ductal adenocarcinoma (PDAC). SARS-CoV-2 impact on the study development is highlighted. The study aims to explore the topic by combining different areas of expertise, including medicine, philosophy, sociology, and psychology. The contribution of philosophy is here presented as essential: it has a leading role in the conception of the study, its development, and the elaboration of results. It is shown throughout the study, from methodology to the analysis of results. Strengths and weaknesses of the methodology are discussed. In conclusion, further philosophical considerations on effective and ethical communication in this delicate context are recommended.

What Western Philosophers of Technology Might Learn from Li Bocong's Philosophy of Engineering.

This essay aims to rectify a failure on the part of Western philosophers of technology to attend to the creative philosophical work of Li Bocong at the University of Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. After a brief account of Li Bocong's personal contacts with the West and some remarks on his relationship to Marxism, we take up three aspects of his philosophy that can contribute to enlarging Western philosophical thinking about engineering and technology: (1) Li's analysis of engineering as more than design, (2) his argument for the relevance of the sociology of engineering, and (3) his conceptualization of engineering ethics as more than professional ethics.