Decomposing modal thought.

Cognitive scientists have become increasingly interested in understanding how natural minds represent and reason about possible ways the world could be. However, there is currently little agreement on how to understand this remarkable capacity for modal thought. We argue that the capacity for modal thought is built from a set of relatively simple component parts, centrally involving an ability to consider possible extensions of a part of the actual world. Natural minds can productively combine this ability with a range of other capacities, eventually allowing for the observed suite of increasingly more sophisticated ways of modal reasoning. We demonstrate how our (de)compositional account is supported by both the trajectory of children's developing capacity for reasoning about possible ways the world could be and by what we know about how such modal thought is expressed within and across natural languages. Our approach makes new predictions about which kinds of capacities are required by which kinds of experimental tasks and, as a result, contributes to settling currently open theoretical questions about the development of modal thought and the acquisition of modal vocabulary in children. Our work also provides a more systematic way of understanding possible variation in modal thought and talk, and, more generally, paves the way toward a unified theory that will ultimately allow researchers across disciplines to relate their findings to each other within a framework of shared assumptions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Places for reasoning.

In this article, we explore behaviour settings that enable reasoning and the diversity of constraints that not only limit but also make these behaviour settings possible. We focus specifically on reasoning and surveying how behaviour settings allow for the generation of norms of action that are nevertheless differentiated by geographies and sociocultural systems. These geographies and sociocultural systems involve diverse trajectories for reasoning even within similar behaviour settings. We will touch on places for reasoning like Twitter, social movements, traditional knowledge and laboratories set up for experimentation on our reasoning abilities. We will show how these places and the behaviour settings that emerge in them can be studied in terms of the complexity of the interactions between their participants and in terms of enabling constraints. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things, and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century'.

Evidence-based scientific thinking and decision-making in everyday life.

In today's knowledge economy, it is critical to make decisions based on high-quality evidence. Science-related decision-making is thought to rely on a complex interplay of reasoning skills, cognitive styles, attitudes, and motivations toward information. By investigating the relationship between individual differences and behaviors related to evidence-based decision-making, our aim was to better understand how adults engage with scientific information in everyday life. First, we used a data-driven exploratory approach to identify four latent factors in a large set of measures related to cognitive skills and epistemic attitudes. The resulting structure suggests that key factors include curiosity and positive attitudes toward science, prosociality, cognitive skills, and openmindedness to new information. Second, we investigated whether these factors predicted behavior in a naturalistic decision-making task. In the task, participants were introduced to a real science-related petition and were asked to read six online articles related to the petition, which varied in scientific quality, while deciding how to vote. We demonstrate that curiosity and positive science attitudes, cognitive flexibility, prosociality and emotional states, were related to engaging with information and discernment of evidence reliability. We further found that that social authority is a powerful cue for source credibility, even above the actual quality and relevance of the sources. Our results highlight that individual motivating factors toward information engagement, like curiosity, and social factors such as social authority are important drivers of how adults judge the credibility of everyday sources of scientific information.

Conscious but not thinking-Mind-blanks during visuomotor tracking: An fMRI study of endogenous attention lapses.

Attention lapses (ALs) are complete lapses of responsiveness in which performance is briefly but completely disrupted and during which, as opposed to microsleeps, the eyes remain open. Although the phenomenon of ALs has been investigated by behavioural and physiological means, the underlying cause of an AL has largely remained elusive. This study aimed to investigate the underlying physiological substrates of behaviourally identified endogenous ALs during a continuous visuomotor task, primarily to answer the question: Were the ALs during this task due to extreme mind-wandering or mind-blanks? The data from two studies were combined, resulting in data from 40 healthy non-sleep-deprived subjects (20M/20F; mean age 27.1 years, 20-45). Only 17 of the 40 subjects were used in the analysis due to a need for a minimum of two ALs per subject. Subjects performed a random 2-D continuous visuomotor tracking task for 50 and 20 min in Studies 1 and 2, respectively. Tracking performance, eye-video, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) were recorded simultaneously. A human expert visually inspected the tracking performance and eye-video recordings to identify and categorise lapses of responsiveness as microsleeps or ALs. Changes in neural activity during 85 ALs (17 subjects) relative to responsive tracking were estimated by whole-brain voxel-wise fMRI and by haemodynamic response (HR) analysis in regions of interest (ROIs) from seven key networks to reveal the neural signature of ALs. Changes in functional connectivity (FC) within and between the key ROIs were also estimated. Networks explored were the default mode network, dorsal attention network, frontoparietal network, sensorimotor network, salience network, visual network, and working memory network. Voxel-wise analysis revealed a significant increase in blood-oxygen-level-dependent activity in the overlapping dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and supplementary motor area region but no significant decreases in activity; the increased activity is considered to represent a recovery-of-responsiveness process following an AL. This increased activity was also seen in the HR of the corresponding ROI. Importantly, HR analysis revealed no trend of increased activity in the posterior cingulate of the default mode network, which has been repeatedly demonstrated to be a strong biomarker of mind-wandering. FC analysis showed decoupling of external attention, which supports the involuntary nature of ALs, in addition to the neural recovery processes. Other findings were a decrease in HR in the frontoparietal network before the onset of ALs, and a decrease in FC between default mode network and working memory network. These findings converge to our conclusion that the ALs observed during our task were involuntary mind-blanks. This is further supported behaviourally by the short duration of the ALs (mean 1.7 s), which is considered too brief to be instances of extreme mind-wandering. This is the first study to demonstrate that at least the majority of complete losses of responsiveness on a continuous visuomotor task are, if not due to microsleeps, due to involuntary mind-blanks.

Cross-sectional and longitudinal changes in mind-wandering in older adulthood.

Age-related declines in the frequency of mind-wandering are well established. Theories of mind-wandering have attempted to explain why this decline occurs, but no one theory firmly predicts such changes. One problem with these theoretical views, and the studies that have grown out of them, is their reliance on cross-sectional methods, which do not account for within-person changes over time in mind-wandering, and it is well-documented that cross-sectional and longitudinal changes in some cognitive domains do not align. We present a novel analysis of longitudinal change in subjective and objective indicators of mind-wandering during a sustained attention task. Cognitively normal adults (N = 277, age range 42-94) completed a sustained attention task with thought probes to measure mind-wandering repeatedly over several years. Linear mixed effect models revealed baseline differences in subjective mind-wandering reports among middle-aged and older adults. However, longitudinally, middle-aged participants showed a significant increase in subjective mind-wandering, whereas older participants showed no change. Changes in mind-wandering could not be explained by attentional control ability or contemporaneous estimates of interest and perceived difficulty, but they were explained by baseline levels of conscientiousness. Objective measures of mind-wandering did not show these same patterns and were largely only associated with participants perceived difficulty. Our results build on previous cross-sectional research and suggest that incorporating longitudinal analyses into theories of ageing and mind-wandering and mind-wandering more broadly is important for refining these theories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Reciprocal developmental pathways between future-related thinking and symptoms of adolescent depression and anxiety: A systematic review and meta-analysis of longitudinal studies.

Adolescence is a time when important decisions about the future are made and vulnerability to mental health problems increases. We reviewed longitudinal studies examining the reciprocal pathways between future-related thinking (hopelessness, hope, optimism/positive future expectations) and adolescent depression and anxiety symptoms. Evidence from 22 studies (N = 10,682) found that negative future-related thinking predicted subsequent depression (r = 0.27, p < .001), an effect still significant after controlling for baseline depression (r = 0.23, p < .001). Higher hopelessness (r = 0.34, p < .001), lower hope (r = 0.16, p < .001), and reduced optimism/positive future expectations (r = 0.18, p < .001) were associated with subsequently increased depressive symptoms. Negative future-related thinking also predicted later increased anxiety symptoms (r = 0.15, p = .021). Concerning the reciprocal pathway, depressive symptoms were associated with later negative future-related thinking (r = 0.32, p < .001), which remained after baseline levels of future-related thinking were controlled (r = 0.07, p = .02). There were insufficient studies to infer reciprocal links between anxiety and future-related thinking. Our analyses provided evidence of a reciprocal developmental relationship between depressive symptoms and future-related thinking, implying a negative cycle. Identifying precursors of this cycle could provide the basis for depression prevention in adolescents and promote better decision-making about the future.

Model-agnostic counterfactual reasoning for identifying and mitigating answer bias in knowledge tracing.

Knowledge tracing (KT) aims to monitor students' evolving knowledge states through their learning interactions with concept-related questions, and can be indirectly evaluated by predicting how students will perform on future questions. In this paper, we observe that there is a common phenomenon of answer bias, i.e., a highly unbalanced distribution of correct and incorrect answers for each question. Existing models tend to memorize the answer bias as a shortcut for achieving high prediction performance in KT, thereby failing to fully understand students' knowledge states. To address this issue, we approach the KT task from a causality perspective. A causal graph of KT is first established, from which we identify that the impact of answer bias lies in the direct causal effect of questions on students' responses. A novel COunterfactual REasoning (CORE) framework for KT is further proposed, which separately captures the total causal effect and direct causal effect during training, and mitigates answer bias by subtracting the latter from the former in testing. The CORE framework is applicable to various existing KT models, and we implement it based on the prevailing DKT, DKVMN, and AKT models, respectively. Extensive experiments on three benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of CORE in making the debiased inference for KT. We have released our code at https://github.com/lucky7-code/CORE.

Improving dependability in science: A critique on the psychometric qualities of the HiTOP psychosis superspectrum.

We reevaluated HiTOP's existing factor analytic evidence-base for a Psychosis (P) superspectrum as encompassing two psychosis-relevant subfactors ("spectra")-Thought Disorder (TD) and Detachment (D). We found that their data did not support P as a superspectrum with TD and D subfactors. Instead, TD contained both positive and negative symptoms of psychosis and emerged at the subfactor level. D did not target negative symptoms but, largely, disorders unrelated to psychosis and should not be placed under P. Determining if P is truly a superspectrum with psychosis TD and D subfactors will require factor analyses whose items are symptom-based and span the full range of psychopathology. Secondly, HiTOP authors state that TD and D provide a "nearly 2-fold" improvement in reliability over schizophrenia diagnoses but, after aligning the comparative study methodologies, this 2-fold improvement disappears. Finally, HiTOP's use of the term thought disorder is inconsistent with the ICD-11 and psychosis literature, in which it refers to formal thought disorder. We recommend that HiTOP (a) refer to P as a subfactor with positive and negative symptoms of psychosis until research indicates otherwise, (b) regularly rely on formal systematic reviews, (c) use appropriate reliability comparisons, (d) deconflate D with negative symptoms, and (e) rename TD.

Exploring the conceptualisation, measurement, clinical utility and treatment of formal thought disorder in psychosis: A Delphi study.

BACKGROUND: Formal Thought Disorder (FTD) is a recognised psychiatric symptom, yet its characterisation remains debated. This is problematic because it contributes to poor efficiency and heterogeneity in psychiatric research, with salient clinical impact. OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to investigate expert opinion on the concept, measurement and clinical utility of FTD using the Delphi technique. METHOD: Across three rounds, experts were queried on their definitions of FTD, methods for the assessment and measurement of FTD, associated clinical outcomes and treatment options. RESULTS: Responses were obtained from 56 experts, demonstrating varying levels of consensus across different aspects of FTD. While consensus (>80 %) was reached for some aspects on the concept of FTD, including its definition and associated symptomology and mechanisms, others remained less clear. Overall, the universal importance attributed to the clinical understanding, measurement and treatment of FTD was clear, although consensus was infrequent as to the reasons behind and methods for doing so. CONCLUSIONS: Our results contribute to the still elusive formal definition of FTD. The multitude of interpretations regarding these topics highlights the need for further clarity with this phenomenon. Our findings emphasised that the measurement and clinical utility of FTD are closely tied to the concept; hence, until there is agreement on the concept of FTD, difficulties with measuring and understanding its clinical usefulness to inform treatment interventions will persist. Future FTD research should focus on clarifying the factor structure and dimensionality to determine the latent structure and elucidate the core clinical phenotype.

Children use disagreement to infer what happened.

In a rapidly changing and diverse world, the ability to reason about conflicting perspectives is critical for effective communication, collaboration, and critical thinking. The current pre-registered experiments with children ages 7 to 11 years investigated the developmental foundations of this ability through a novel social reasoning paradigm and a computational approach. In the inference task, children were asked to figure out what happened based on whether two speakers agreed or disagreed in their interpretation. In the prediction task, children were provided information about what happened and asked to predict whether two speakers will agree or disagree. Together, these experiments assessed children's understanding that disagreement often results from ambiguity about what happened, and that ambiguity about what happened is often predictive of disagreement. Experiment 1 (N = 52) showed that children are more likely to infer that an ambiguous utterance occurred after learning that people disagreed (versus agreed) about what happened and found that these inferences become stronger with age. Experiment 2 (N = 110) similarly found age-related change in children's inferences and also showed that children could reason in the forward direction, predicting that an ambiguous utterance would lead to disagreement. A computational model indicated that although children's ability to predict when disagreements might arise may be critical for making the reverse inferences, it did not fully account for age-related change.

Fast & slow decisions under risk: Intuition rather than deliberation drives advantageous choices.

Would you take a gamble with a 10% chance to gain $100 and a 90% chance to lose $10? Even though this gamble has a positive expected value, most people would avoid taking it given the high chance of losing money. Popular "fast-and-slow" dual process theories of risky decision making assume that to take expected value into account and avoid a loss aversion bias, people need to deliberate. In this paper we directly test whether reasoners can also consider expected value benefit intuitively, in the absence of deliberation. To do so, we presented participants with bets and lotteries in which they could choose between a risky expected-value-based choice and a safe loss averse option. We used a two-response paradigm where participants made two choices in every trial: an initial intuitive choice under time-pressure and cognitive load and a final choice without constraints where they could freely deliberate. Results showed that in most trials participants were loss averse, both in the intuitive and deliberate stages. However, when people opted for the expected-value-based choice after deliberating, they had predominantly already arrived at this choice intuitively. Additionally, loss averse participants often showed an intuitive sensitivity to expected value (as reflected in decreased confidence). Overall, these results suggest that deliberation is not the primary route for expected-value-based responding in risky decision making. Risky decisions may be better conceptualized as an interplay between different types of "fast" intuitions rather than between two different types of "fast" and "slow" thinking per se.

Further unpacking individual differences in mind wandering: The role of emotional valence and awareness.

Previous work has established a link between executive attention ability and mind wandering propensity, these studies typically collapse thought reports into a single category of task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). We have shown that these TUTs can be differentiated by the emotional valence of their content. Awareness of TUTs might also be an important to consider, yet little work has been done on this front. The current study conceptually replicated and extended previous work by investigating the relationship between individual differences in executive attention, emotional valence and awareness of TUTs. Latent variable models indicated that Executive Attention was differentially correlated with emotional valence TUTs. However, only Attention Control was related to frequency of mind wandering with awareness. Intra-individual analyses indicated that negatively valenced TUTs and TUTs that occurred without awareness were associated with worse performance. Considering different dimensions of TUTs can provide a more complete picture of individual differences in mind wandering.

Positively framing mind wandering does not increase mind wandering in older adults.

Age-related differences in mind wandering are robust, with older adults reporting less mind wandering compared to younger adults. While several theories have been put forth to explain this difference, one view has received less attention than others. Specifically, age-related differences in mind wandering might occur because older adults are reluctant to report on their mind wandering. The aim of the current study was to explicitly test this hypothesis. Older and younger adults completed a go/no-go task with intermittent thought probes to assess mind wandering. In one condition, participants were provided with standard instructions about how to respond to questions about their thoughts. In a second condition, participants were provided with a positive framing of mind wandering. Mind wandering was assessed both subjectively (i.e., via thought probes) and objectively (i.e., using different behavioral measures from the go/no-go task). The results of the study suggest that positively framing mind wandering did not impact rates of mind wandering or objective indicators of mind wandering for older or younger adults. Older adults reported less mind wandering, regardless of condition, compared to younger adults. Older adults also had generally better performance on the go/no-go task compared to younger adults. Bayesian analyses suggested that the main effect of framing condition, although not significant in Frequentist terms, did provide moderate evidence of an overall effect on mind wandering rates. We interpret the results as evidence against the reluctance hypothesis, consistent with previous work.

Contractualist tendencies and reasoning in moral judgment and decision making.

The social-contract tradition of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls has been widely influential in moral philosophy but has until recently received relatively little attention in moral psychology. For contractualist moral theories, ethics is a matter of forming, adhering to, and enforcing (hypothetical) agreements, and morality is fundamentally about acting according to what would be agreed by rational agents. A recent psychological theory, virtual bargaining, models social interactions in contractualist terms, suggesting that we often act as we would agree to do if we were to negotiate explicitly. However, whether such contractualist tendencies (a propensity to make typically contractualist choices) and forms of reasoning (agreement-based cognitive processes) play a role in moral cognition is still unclear. Drawing upon virtual bargaining, we develop two novel experimental paradigms designed to elicit incentivized decisions and moral judgments. We then test the descriptive relevance of contractualism in moral judgment and decision making in five preregistered online experiments (n = 4103; English-speaking Prolific participants). In the first task, we find evidence that many participants show contractualist tendencies: their choices are "characteristically" contractualist. In the second task, we find evidence consistent with contractualist reasoning influencing some participants' judgments and incentivized decisions. Our findings suggest that a propensity to act as prescribed by tacit agreements may be particularly important in understanding the moral psychology of fleeting social interactions and coordination problems. By complementing the rich literature on deontology and consequentialism in moral psychology, empirical approaches inspired by contractualism may prove fruitful to better understand moral cognition.

Integrity of autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in older adults varies with cognitive functioning.

Research has documented changes in autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD). However, cognitive decline occurs gradually and recent findings suggest that subtle alterations in autobiographical cognition may be evident earlier in the trajectory towards dementia, before AD-related symptoms emerge or a clinical diagnosis has been given. The current study used the Autobiographical Interview to examine the episodic and semantic content of autobiographical past and future events generated by older adults (N = 38) of varying cognitive functioning who were grouped into High (N = 20) and Low Cognition (N = 18) groups based on their Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) scores. Participants described 12 past and 12 future autobiographical events, and transcripts were scored to quantify the numbers of internal (episodic) or external (non-episodic, including semantic) details. Although the Low Cognition group exhibited a differential reduction for internal details comprising both past and future events, they did not show the expected overproduction of external details relative to the High Cognition group. Multilevel modelling demonstrated that on trials lower in episodic content, semantic content was significantly increased in both groups. Although suggestive of a compensatory mechanism, the magnitude of this inverse relationship did not differ across groups or interact with MoCA scores. This finding indicates that external detail production may be underpinned by mechanisms not affected by cognitive decline, such as narrative style and the ability to contextualize one's past and future events in relation to broader autobiographical knowledge.

Standing out: an atypical salience account of creativity.

Creativity often entails gaining a novel perspective, yet it remains uncertain how this is accomplished. Atypical salience processing may foster creative thinking by prioritizing putatively irrelevant information, thereby broadening the material accessible for idea generation and inhibiting attentional fixedness; in essence, motivating creative individuals to incorporate information that others overlook.

Response to commentaries on What Babies Know.

Twenty-five commentaries raise questions concerning the origins of knowledge, the interplay of iconic and propositional representations in mental life, the architecture of numerical and social cognition, the sources of uniquely human cognitive capacities, and the borders among core knowledge, perception, and thought. They also propose new methods, drawn from the vibrant, interdisciplinary cognitive sciences, for addressing these questions and deepening understanding of infant minds.

A recurrent network model of planning explains hippocampal replay and human behavior.

When faced with a novel situation, people often spend substantial periods of time contemplating possible futures. For such planning to be rational, the benefits to behavior must compensate for the time spent thinking. Here, we capture these features of behavior by developing a neural network model where planning itself is controlled by the prefrontal cortex. This model consists of a meta-reinforcement learning agent augmented with the ability to plan by sampling imagined action sequences from its own policy, which we call 'rollouts'. In a spatial navigation task, the agent learns to plan when it is beneficial, which provides a normative explanation for empirical variability in human thinking times. Additionally, the patterns of policy rollouts used by the artificial agent closely resemble patterns of rodent hippocampal replays. Our work provides a theory of how the brain could implement planning through prefrontal-hippocampal interactions, where hippocampal replays are triggered by-and adaptively affect-prefrontal dynamics.