[The impact of the impairment of social cognitive functions in acute stage of stroke on its functional outcomes]. / Vliyanie narushenii sotsial'nykh kognitivnykh funktsii v ostrom periode ishemicheskogo insul'ta na ego funktsional'nye iskhody.

OBJECTIVE: To analyze the influence of the impairment of social cognitive functions (SCF) in acute phase of ischemic stroke (IS) on its functional outcomes in 6 months. MATERIAL AND METHODS: One hundred patients with IS were included in the study. The assessment of social-demographic, clinical characteristics and SCF (theory of mind (ToM), affective empathy, social empathy) of the patients on the day 10 after stroke was conducted. Patients underwent standard laboratory tests of blood and urine. Functional outcomes in 6 months were recorded; score ≥3 on the modified Rankin scale (mRs) indicated unfavorable outcome. Multiple linear regression analysis was performed to identify independent predictors of functional outcomes of stroke in 6 months. RESULTS: Patients with unfavorable outcomes in 6 months after stroke in acute phase had more severe neurological deficit, more prominent disability level, lower mobility, severer impairment of SCF and lower level of total protein in biochemical analysis of blood. The independent predictors of functional outcomes of IS in 6 months included severity of the impairment of SCF (namely, ToM) according to the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test and severity of functional impairment on admission assessed by mRs. CONCLUSION: Changes of SCF, particularly of ToM, in the acute phase of IS are associated with its unfavorable functional outcomes in 6 months.

Influences of heart rate feedback and autistic traits on affective mindreading.

Although mindreading is an important prerequisite for successful social interactions, the underlying mechanisms are still matter of debate. It is unclear, for example, if inferring others' and own mental states are distinct processes or are based on a common mechanism. Using an affect-induction experimental set-up with an acoustic heart rate feedback that addresses affective mindreading in self and others, we investigated if non-autistic study participants relied on similar information for self- and other-directed mindreading. We assumed that due to altered mindreading capacities in autism, mainly individuals with low autistic traits would focus on additional sensory cues, such as heart rate, to infer their own and their gambling partner's affective states. Our analyses showed that the interpretation of a heart rate signal differed in self- and other-directed mindreading trials. This effect was modulated by autistic traits suggesting that individuals with higher autistic traits might not have interpreted the heart rate feedback for gambling partner ratings and differentiated less between self- and other-directed mindreading trials. We discuss these results in the context of a common mechanism underlying self- and other-directed mindreading and hypothesize that the weighting of internal and external sensory information might contribute to how we make sense of our and others' mental states.

Poorer representation of minds underpins less accurate mental state inference for out-groups.

Societies are becoming more polarised, driven in part by misconceptions about out-groups' beliefs. To understand these effects, one must examine the cognitive processes underlying how people think about others. Here, we investigate whether people are less prone to theorise about the minds of out-groups, or less able to do so. Participants (Study 1: n = 128; Study 2: n = 128) made inferences about social and political beliefs held by real in-group and out-group members, and could choose to receive further information to improve these inferences. Results show: (1) participants sought equivalent or greater information about out-groups relative to in-groups; but despite this, (2) made significantly less accurate inferences for out-groups; and (3) were significantly less aware of their reduced ability. This shows that poorer mental state inference is not underpinned by a reduced propensity to consider out-group minds, but instead by a worse representation of the minds of out-groups.

Factor analysis of the Chinese version of the Autism Spectrum Quotient 10 and its association with schizotypal traits in adolescents and young adults in Hong Kong.

BACKGROUND: There is evidence suggesting that autistic traits are associated with schizotypal traits. This study examined the factor structure of the Autism Spectrum Quotient 10 (AQ-10) and its associations with schizotypal traits (measured by the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire-Brief [SPQ-B]) in a cohort of Chinese adolescents and young adults. METHODS: Invitation letters, stratified by locations and housing types, were randomly sent to individuals aged 15 to 24 years for participation. Assessments were made using face-to-face or online interviews. Autistic traits were assessed using the Chinese version of the AQ-10. Schizotypal personality traits were assessed using the Chinese version of the 22-item SPQ-B. RESULTS: In total, 395 male and 536 female participants (mean age, 19.93 years) were recruited between July 2020 and May 2021. Exploratory factor analysis of the AQ-10 yielded three factors (theory of mind, task switching, and attention deficits) explaining 55.11% of the total variance. Autistic traits were positively correlated with schizotypal traits of disorganised features (r = 0.21, p < 0.001), interpersonal relationship deficits (r = 0.19, p < 0.001), and cognitive-perceptual deficits (r = 0.11, p = 0.001). CONCLUSION: In Chinese adolescents and young adults, autistic traits, especially task switching and attention deficits (compared with theory of mind) are more closely correlated with schizotypal personality traits. Disentangling the overlapping and diametrical structure of autistic traits and schizotypal traits may help understand their aetiologies, assessment, and interventions.

Neural correlates of static and dynamic social decision-making in real-time sibling interactions.

In traditional game theory tasks, social decision-making is centered on the prediction of the intentions (i.e., mentalizing) of strangers or manipulated responses. In contrast, real-life scenarios often involve familiar individuals in dynamic environments. Further research is needed to explore neural correlates of social decision-making with changes in the available information and environmental settings. This study collected fMRI hyperscanning data (N = 100, 46 same-sex pairs were analyzed) to investigate sibling pairs engaging in an iterated Chicken Game task within a competitive context, including two decision-making phases. In the static phase, participants chose between turning (cooperate) and continuing (defect) in a fixed time window. Participants could estimate the probability of different events based on their priors (previous outcomes and representation of other's intentions) and report their decision plan. The dynamic phase mirrored real-world interactions in which information is continuously changing (replicated within a virtual environment). Individuals had to simultaneously update their beliefs, monitor the actions of the other, and adjust their decisions. Our findings revealed substantial choice consistency between the two phases and evidence for shared neural correlates in mentalizing-related brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus. Specific neural correlates were associated with each phase; increased activation of areas associated with action planning and outcome evaluation were found in the static compared with the dynamic phase. Using the opposite contrast, dynamic decision-making showed higher activation in regions related to predicting and monitoring other's actions, including the anterior cingulate cortex and insula. Cooperation (turning), compared with defection (continuing), showed increased activation in mentalizing-related regions only in the static phase, while defection, relative to cooperation, exhibited higher activation in areas associated with conflict monitoring and risk processing in the dynamic phase. Men were less cooperative and had greater TPJ activation. Sibling competitive relationship did not predict competitive behavior but showed a tendency to predict brain activity during dynamic decision-making. Only individual brain activation results are included here, and no interbrain analyses are reported. These neural correlates emphasize the significance of considering varying levels of information available and environmental settings when delving into the intricacies of mentalizing during social decision-making among familiar individuals.

Preschoolers' in-group bias promotes altruistic sharing and reduces second-party punishment: The role of theory of mind.

This study examines how in-group bias affects altruistic sharing and second-party punishment in preschoolers and the role of theory of mind (ToM) in in-group bias. Preschoolers aged 4 to 7 years (N = 309; 160 girls) were asked to share resources with an in-group member and an out-group member (Dictator Game) and to reject or accept an unequal allocation proposed by an in-group member and an out-group member (Ultimatum Game). The results showed that preschoolers shared more resources with, and tolerated more unfair behaviors from, in-group members. ToM influenced the in-group bias in both altruistic sharing and second-party punishment. Notably, children's degree of in-group favoritism in altruistic sharing was positively related to the second-party punishment children imposed on out-group members. However, this pattern was found only among children who had acquired first-order ToM. This study reveals the developmental patterns of preschoolers' in-group bias in altruistic sharing and second-party punishment and the effects of ToM on in-group bias.

Advanced theory of mind and children's prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood: A training study.

Children's advanced theory of mind (AToM) is concurrently associated with their prosocial lie-telling. However, the causal link between AToM and prosocial lie-telling has not yet been demonstrated. To address this gap, the current study adopted a training paradigm and investigated the role of AToM in children's prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood. A total of 66 9- and 10-year-old children who did not demonstrate any prosocial lie-telling in a disappointment gift paradigm at the baseline were recruited and randomly assigned to either the experimental group (n = 32) or an active control group (n = 34). The experimental group underwent a conversation-based training program of four sessions. The results showed significantly greater gains in AToM at the posttest for the experimental group children compared with the control group children, controlling for family socioeconomic status, children's literacy score, working memory, and inhibition. More important, the experimental group children were more likely to tell prosocial lies than the control group, even after controlling for the pretest AToM and other covariates. However, the training effects faded at the 6-month follow-up test after the training's completion. These findings provide the first evidence for the causal role of AToM in the development of prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood. The fade-out effect is discussed in the context of educational interventions.

Theory of mind in epilepsy.

Epilepsy is characterized by recurrent, chronic, and unprovoked seizures. Epilepsy has a significant negative impact on a patient's quality of life even if seizures are well controlled. In addition to the distress caused by seizures, patients with epilepsy (PwE) may suffer from cognitive impairment with serious social consequences such as poor interpersonal relationships, loss of employment, and reduced social networks. Pathological changes and functional connectivity abnormalities observed in PwE can disrupt the neural network responsible for the theory of mind. Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states to other people (intentions, beliefs, and emotions). It is a complex aspect of social cognition and includes cognitive and affective constructs. In recent years, numerous studies have assessed the relationship between social cognition, including the theory of mind, in PwE, and suggested impairment in this domain. Interventions targeting the theory of mind can be potentially helpful in improving the quality of life of PwE.

Precision mapping of the default network reveals common and distinct (inter) activity for autobiographical memory and theory of mind.

The default network is widely implicated as a common neural substrate for self-generated thought, such as remembering one's past (autobiographical memory) and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others (theory of mind). Findings that the default network comprises subnetworks of regions, some commonly and some distinctly involved across processes, suggest that one's own experiences inform their understanding of others. With the advent of precision functional MRI (fMRI) methods, however, it is unclear if this shared substrate is observed instead due to traditional group analysis methods. We investigated this possibility using a novel combination of methodological strategies. Twenty-three participants underwent multi-echo resting-state and task fMRI. We used their resting-state scans to conduct cortical parcellation sensitive to individual variation while preserving our ability to conduct group analysis. Using multivariate analyses, we assessed the functional activation and connectivity profiles of default network regions while participants engaged in autobiographical memory, theory of mind, or a sensorimotor control condition. Across the default network, we observed stronger activity associated with both autobiographical memory and theory of mind compared to the control condition. Nonetheless, we also observed that some regions showed preferential activity to either experimental condition, in line with past work. The connectivity results similarly indicated shared and distinct functional profiles. Our results support that autobiographical memory and theory of mind, two theoretically important and widely studied domains of social cognition, evoke common and distinct aspects of the default network even when ensuring high fidelity to individual-specific characteristics.NEW & NOTEWORTHY We used cutting-edge precision functional MRI (fMRI) methods such as multi-echo fMRI acquisition and denoising, a robust experimental paradigm, and individualized cortical parcellation across 23 participants to provide evidence that remembering one's past experiences and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others share a common neural substrate. Evidence from activation and connectivity analyses indicate overlapping and distinct functional profiles of these widely studied episodic and social processes.

Attachment and inter-individual differences in empathy, compassion, and theory of mind abilities.

Social processing, namely the ability to understand others' cognitive and affective states, is crucial for successful social interaction. It encompasses socio-affective abilities such as empathy and compassion, as well as socio-cognitive abilities such as theory of mind (ToM). This study examined the link between social processing and attachment. Our study goes beyond previous research in that social processing abilities were assessed in a single, state-of-the-art behavioral paradigm using video narratives, the EmpaToM. Attachment was captured with the Adult Attachment Interview (N = 85; 50.60% women, Mage = 25.87 ± 4.50 years) measuring participants' present-day capacity to think about and communicate attachment-relevant information about the past. Additionally, a self-report attachment questionnaire was employed (N = 158). We found that AAI-based attachment security (vs. insecurity) was associated with higher behavioral ToM abilities. Furthermore, self-reported attachment avoidance was negatively correlated with behavioral compassion abilities. Our findings provide further evidence that interview-based and self-reported attachment measures do not converge, but may rather be understood as capturing different facets of attachment that relate to different components of social processing. We conclude that individuals with secure, non-avoidant attachment show social abilities that allow them to better understand others' thoughts and generate positive, caring emotions in face of others' distress.

Attachment is differentially associated with distinct behavioral social processing abilities, that is, compassion and theory of mind.Higher attachment security in the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) is linked to higher behavioral theory of mind abilities.Increased self-reported attachment avoidance is linked to lower behavioral compassion.

The neural structures of theory of mind are valence-sensitive: evidence from three tDCS studies.

Several cortical structures are involved in theory of mind (ToM), including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and the right temporo- parietal junction (rTPJ). We investigated the role of these regions in mind reading with respect to the valence of mental states. Sixty-five healthy adult participants were recruited and received transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (1.5 mA, 20 min) with one week interval in three separate studies. The stimulation conditions were anodal tDCS over the dlPFC coupled with cathodal tDCS over the vmPFC, reversed stimulation conditions, and sham in the first study, and anodal tDCS over the vmPFC, or dlPFC, and sham stimulation, with an extracranial return electrode in the second and third study. During stimulation, participants underwent the reading mind from eyes/voice tests (RMET or RMVT) in each stimulation condition. Anodal left dlPFC/cathodal right vmPFC stimulation increased the accuracy of negative mental state attributions, anodal rTPJ decreased the accuracy of negative and neutral mental state attributions, and decreased the reaction time of positive mental state attributions. Our results imply that the neural correlates of ToM are valence-sensitive.

Mentalizing self mind but not others: Self-reported mentalization difficulties in multiple sclerosis.

BACKGROUND: Mentalization can be defined as a mental process by which an individual directly or indirectly perceives and interprets one's own and others' behavior, emotions, beliefs, and needs based on designed mental states. Mentalization problems may be linked to remove associative white matter fiber disconnection. Multiple sclerosis (MS) is one of the diseases with white matter lesions. By comparing MS patients with healthy controls, it was aimed to assess whether MS patients' mentalization skills are affected. METHOD: This study involved 243 participants (170 healthy controls and 73 patients with MS). All the participants completed a sociodemographic questionnaire and the Mentalization Scale (MentS). RESULTS: While it was discovered that MentS scores for the dimension of others-based mentalization (MentS-O) were statistically lower in MS group, there was no statistically significant difference between the groups in terms of the dimensions of motivation to mentalize (MentS-M) and self-based mentalization (MentS-S) scores. CONCLUSION: We may conclude that MS patients have trouble comprehending other people's thoughts. This effect can be one of the causes of MS patients' issues with social cognition.

Mindreading quality versus quantity: A theoretically and empirically motivated two-factor structure for individual differences in adults' mindreading.

Existing methods for studying individual differences in adults' mindreading often lack good psychometric characteristics. Moreover, it remains unclear, even in theory, how mindreading varies in adults who already possess an understanding of mental states. In this pre-registered study, it was hypothesised that adults vary in their motivation for mindreading and in the degree to which their answers on mindreading tasks are appropriate (context-sensitive). These factors are confounded in existing measures as they do not differentiate between the frequency of mental state terms (MST), indicative of motivation, and the quality of an explanation. Using an innovative scoring system, the current study examined whether individual differences in adult undergraduate psychology students' (N = 128) answer quality and / or quantity of explicit references to others' mental states on two open-ended response mindreading tasks were separable constructs, accounted for by mindreading motivation, and related differentially to measures previously linked with mindreading (e.g., religiosity, loneliness, social network size). A two-factor and one-factor model both provided acceptable fit. Neither model showed significant associations with mindreading motivation. However, a two-factor model (with MST and response appropriateness loading onto separate factors) provided greater explanatory power. Specifically, MST was positively associated with religiosity and response appropriateness was negatively associated with religiosity, whilst the one-factor solution did not predict any socially relevant outcomes. This provides some indication that mindreading quantity and mindreading quality may be distinguishable constructs in the structure of individual differences in mindreading.

Does a high threshold of sensory responsiveness affect the development of pretend play in children on the autism spectrum?

BACKGROUND: Among the current avenues of research into the origins and development of the autism spectrum, those concerning atypical levels of sensory responsiveness are gaining increasing relevance. Researchers note the relationship of sensory responsiveness in children on the autism spectrum to their motor, cognitive and social development. Current research reports combines the responsiveness to sensory stimuli also with the development of pretend play. Aim of this study was to verify the relationship between the level of development of pretend play and the level of sensory responsiveness in children on the autism spectrum. METHODS: A study was conducted in a group of 63 children with a diagnosis of autism spectrum aged from 3 years and 7 months to 9 years and 3 months using: Pretend Play subscale from the Theory of Mind Mechanism Scale and Sensory Experiences Questionnaire version 2.1. RESULTS: The results revealed that elevated sensory hyporesponsiveness predicted low pretend play skills in the group of participating children. CONCLUSION: The study verified the contribution of the level of sensory hyporesponsiveness to explaining the atypical development of pretend play in children on the autism spectrum.

Disentangling the relationship between social cognition, executive functions and behaviour changes in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.

BACKGROUND: Social cognition (SC) deficits are included in the amyotrophic lateral sclerosis-frontotemporal spectrum disorder (ALS-FTDS) revised diagnostic criteria. However, the impact of SC assessment on cognitive classification and the cognitive-behavioural correlates of SC remain unclear. This cross-sectional study aimed to assess the impact of SC assessment on ALS-FTDS categorisation and explore the relationship of SC with executive functions (EF) and behaviour changes in a cohort of ALS patients. METHODS: 121 patients and 56 healthy controls from the Turin ALS Centre underwent cognitive/behavioural testing, including the SC subdomains of facial emotion recognition, and cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM). RESULTS: Patients performed significantly worse than controls in all SC explored domains, and 45% of patients exhibited a deficit in at least one SC test, dissociated from the presence of EF deficits. In 13% of cases, the SC deficit was isolated and subclinical. SC assessment contributed to the attribution of cognitive impairment in 10% of patients. Through a statistical clustering approach, we found that ToM only partially overlaps with EF while behaviour changes are associated with emotional disorders (anxiety and depression). CONCLUSIONS: SC is overall independent of EF in ALS, with ToM only partially associated with specific EF measures, and behaviour changes associated with emotional disorders. The influence of SC on cognitive categorisation and the frequent identification of a subclinical SC impairment have implications in a clinical setting, considering the substantial impact of cognitive impairment on disease burden and therapeutic choices.

Disruption of dopamine D2/D3 system function impairs the human ability to understand the mental states of other people.

Difficulties in reasoning about others' mental states (i.e., mentalising/Theory of Mind) are highly prevalent among disorders featuring dopamine dysfunctions (e.g., Parkinson's disease) and significantly affect individuals' quality of life. However, due to multiple confounding factors inherent to existing patient studies, currently little is known about whether these sociocognitive symptoms originate from aberrant dopamine signalling or from psychosocial changes unrelated to dopamine. The present study, therefore, investigated the role of dopamine in modulating mentalising in a sample of healthy volunteers. We used a double-blind, placebo-controlled procedure to test the effect of the D2/D3 antagonist haloperidol on mental state attribution, using an adaptation of the Heider and Simmel (1944) animations task. On 2 separate days, once after receiving 2.5 mg haloperidol and once after receiving placebo, 33 healthy adult participants viewed and labelled short videos of 2 triangles depicting mental state (involving mentalistic interaction wherein 1 triangle intends to cause or act upon a particular mental state in the other, e.g., surprising) and non-mental state (involving reciprocal interaction without the intention to cause/act upon the other triangle's mental state, e.g., following) interactions. Using Bayesian mixed effects models, we observed that haloperidol decreased accuracy in labelling both mental and non-mental state animations. Our secondary analyses suggest that dopamine modulates inference from mental and non-mental state animations via independent mechanisms, pointing towards 2 putative pathways underlying the dopaminergic modulation of mental state attribution: action representation and a shared mechanism supporting mentalising and emotion recognition. We conclude that dopaminergic pathways impact Theory of Mind, at least indirectly. Our results have implications for the neurochemical basis of sociocognitive difficulties in patients with dopamine dysfunctions and generate new hypotheses about the specific dopamine-mediated mechanisms underlying social cognition.

Intersubject correlations in reward and mentalizing brain circuits separately predict persuasiveness of two types of ISIS video propaganda.

The Islamist group ISIS has been particularly successful at recruiting Westerners as terrorists. A hypothesized explanation is their simultaneous use of two types of propaganda: Heroic narratives, emphasizing individual glory, alongside Social narratives, which emphasize oppression against Islamic communities. In the current study, functional MRI was used to measure brain responses to short ISIS propaganda videos distributed online. Participants were shown 4 Heroic and 4 Social videos categorized as such by another independent group of subjects. Persuasiveness was measured using post-scan predictions of recruitment effectiveness. Inter-subject correlation (ISC) was used to measure commonality of brain activity time courses across individuals. ISCs in ventral striatum predicted rated persuasiveness for Heroic videos, while ISCs in mentalizing and default networks, especially in dmPFC, predicted rated persuasiveness for Social videos. This work builds on past findings that engagement of the reward circuit and of mentalizing brain regions predicts preferences and persuasion. The observed dissociation as a function of stimulus type is novel, as is the finding that intersubject synchrony in ventral striatum predicts rated persuasiveness. These exploratory results identify possible neural mechanisms by which political extremists successfully recruit prospective members and specifically support the hypothesized distinction between Heroic and Social narratives for ISIS propaganda.

Examining interpersonal metacognitive monitoring in artificial grammar learning.

This study investigates the observers' ability to monitor the ongoing cognitive processes of a partner who is implicitly learning an artificial grammar. Our hypothesis posits that learners experience metacognitive feelings as they attempt to apply their implicit knowledge, and that observers are capable of detecting and interpreting these feelings as cues of the learner's cognitive state. For instance, learners might encounter affective signals linked to cognitive conflicts and errors at different processing stages, which observers can construe as manifestations of the learner's cognitive dissonance. The research involved 126 participants organized into dyads, with one participant acting as a learner, and the other as an observer. The observer's task was to judge whether the learner agrees with the information presented (consonance judgment) and was limited to reading the learner's nonverbal signals to avoid explicit mindreading. The findings suggest that observers possess mindreading abilities, enabling them to detect both learners' confidence and accuracy in stimuli classification. This extends our understanding of non-verbal mindreading capabilities and indicates that observers can effectively interpret early implicit metacognitive information, even in the absence of explicit self-evaluation from the learners. This research offers significant insights into how individuals interpret others' mental states during implicit learning tasks, particularly in the context of utilizing early affective cues within the Artificial Grammar Learning paradigm.

Theory of Mind: A Brief Review of Candidate Genes.

Deficits in theory of mind (ToM), known as the ability to understand the other's mind, have been associated with several psychopathological outcomes. The present systematic review aims to summarize the results of genetic studies that investigated gene polymorphisms associated with mentalization performance tasks in children and adults. The systematic review was carried out following PRISMA guidelines, and the literature search was conducted in PubMed and EBSCOhost using the following keywords: 'theory of mind, mentalizing, mindreading' and 'gene, genetic basis'. Nineteen studies met the eligibility criteria for inclusion. Most of the literature focused on the role of DRD4, DAT1, OXTR, OXT, COMT, ZNF804A, AVP, AVPR, SCL6A4, EFHC2, MAO-A, and the family of GTF2I genes in influencing ToM. However, controversial results emerged in sustaining the link between specific genetic polymorphisms and mentalization abilities in children and adults. Available data show heterogeneous outcomes, with studies reporting an association between the same family genes in subjects of the same age and other studies reporting no correlation. This does not allow us to draw any solid conclusions but paves the way for exploring genes involved in ToM tasks.

Network and state specificity in connectivity-based predictions of individual behavior.

Predicting individual behavior from brain functional connectivity (FC) patterns can contribute to our understanding of human brain functioning. This may apply in particular if predictions are based on features derived from circumscribed, a priori defined functional networks, which improves interpretability. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that task-based FC data may yield more successful predictions of behavior than resting-state FC data. Here, we comprehensively examined to what extent the correspondence of functional network priors and task states with behavioral target domains influences the predictability of individual performance in cognitive, social, and affective tasks. To this end, we used data from the Human Connectome Project for large-scale out-of-sample predictions of individual abilities in working memory (WM), theory-of-mind cognition (SOCIAL), and emotion processing (EMO) from FC of corresponding and non-corresponding states (WM/SOCIAL/EMO/resting-state) and networks (WM/SOCIAL/EMO/whole-brain connectome). Using root mean squared error and coefficient of determination to evaluate model fit revealed that predictive performance was rather poor overall. Predictions from whole-brain FC were slightly better than those from FC in task-specific networks, and a slight benefit of predictions based on FC from task versus resting state was observed for performance in the WM domain. Beyond that, we did not find any significant effects of a correspondence of network, task state, and performance domains. Together, these results suggest that multivariate FC patterns during both task and resting states contain rather little information on individual performance levels, calling for a reconsideration of how the brain mediates individual differences in mental abilities.