Mammalian adaptation risk in HPAI H5N8: a comprehensive model bridging experimental data with mathematical insights.

Understanding the mammalian pathogenesis and interspecies transmission of HPAI H5N8 virus hinges on mapping its adaptive markers. We used deep sequencing to track these markers over five passages in murine lung tissue. Subsequently, we evaluated the growth, selection, and RNA load of eight recombinant viruses with mammalian adaptive markers. By leveraging an integrated non-linear regression model, we quantitatively determined the influence of these markers on growth, adaptation, and RNA expression in mammalian hosts. Furthermore, our findings revealed that the interplay of these markers can lead to synergistic, additive, or antagonistic effects when combined. The elucidation distance method then transformed these results into distinct values, facilitating the derivation of a risk score for each marker. In vivo tests affirmed the accuracy of scores. As more mutations were incorporated, the overall risk score of virus heightened, and the optimal interplay between markers became essential for risk augmentation. Our study provides a robust model to assess risk from adaptive markers of HPAI H5N8, guiding strategies against future influenza threats.

Field and laboratory investigation of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 and H5N8 in Quang Ninh province, Vietnam, 2020 to 2021.

BACKGROUND: Avian influenza (AI) is a contagious disease that causes illness and death in poultry and humans. High pathogenicity AI (HPAI) H5N6 outbreaks commonly occur in Quang Ninh province bordering China. In June 2021, the first HPAI H5N8 outbreak occurred at a Quang Ninh chicken farm. OBJECTIVES: This study examined the risk factors associated with HPAI H5N6 and H5N8 outbreaks in Quang Ninh. METHODS: A retrospective case-control study was conducted in Quang Ninh from Nov 2021 to Jan 2022. The cases were households with susceptible poultry with two or more clinical signs and tested positive by real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction. The controls were households in the same village as the cases but did not show clinical symptoms of the disease. Logistic regression models were constructed to assess the risk factors associated with HPAI outbreaks at the household level. RESULTS: There were 38 cases with H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4h viruses (n = 35) and H5N8 clade 2.3.4.4b viruses (n = 3). Compared to the 112 controls, raising poultry in uncovered or partially covered ponds (odds ratio [OR], 7.52; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.44-39.27), poultry traders visiting the farm (OR, 8.66; 95% CI, 2.7-27.69), farms with 50-2,000 birds (OR, 3.00; 95% CI, 1.06-8-51), and farms with ≥ 2,000 birds (OR, 11.35; 95% CI, 3.07-41.94) were significantly associated with HPAI outbreaks. CONCLUSIONS: Combining biosecurity measures, such as restricting visitor entry and vaccination in farms with more than 50 birds, can enhance the control and prevention of HPAI in Quang Ninh and its spread across borders.

Caught Right on the Spot: Isolation and Characterization of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus from a Common Pochard (Aythya ferina) Being Attacked by a Peregrine Falcon (Falco peregrinus).

We isolated a high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) virus from a common pochard (Aythya ferina) that was being attacked by a bird of prey in South Korea in December 2020. Genetic analyses indicated that the isolate was closely related to the clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 HPAI viruses found in South Korea and Japan during the winter season of 2020-2021. The histopathological examination revealed multifocal necrotizing inflammation in the liver, kidney, and spleen. Viral antigens were detected in the liver, kidney, spleen, trachea, intestine, and pancreas, indicating the HPAI virus caused a systemic infection. The presence of immunoreactivity for the viral antigen was observed in the cells involved in multifocal necrotic inflammation. Notably, epitheliotropic-positive patterns were identified in the epithelial cells of the trachea, mucosal epithelium of the intestine, and ductular epithelium of the pancreas. These findings provide direct evidence supporting the possibility of HPAI transmission from infected waterfowl to predators.

Detectado en el acto: Aislamiento y caracterización de un virus de la influenza aviar de alta patogenicidad del clado 2.3.4.4b H5N8 de un porrón común (Aythya ferina) atacado por un halcón peregrino (Falco peregrinus). Se aisló un virus de la influenza aviar (HPAI) de alta patogenicidad de un porrón común (Aythya ferina) que estaba siendo atacado por un ave rapaz en Corea del Sur en diciembre de 2020. Los análisis genéticos indicaron que el aislado estaba estrechamente relacionado con virus de influenza aviar de alta patogenicidad H5N8, clado 2.3.4.4 b encontrados en Corea del Sur y Japón durante la temporada de invierno de 2020­2021. El examen histopatológico reveló inflamación necrotizante multifocal en hígado, riñón y bazo. Se detectaron antígenos virales en el hígado, el riñón, el bazo, la tráquea, el intestino y el páncreas, lo que indica que este virus de alta patogenicidad causó una infección sistémica. Se observó la presencia de inmunorreactividad para el antígeno viral en las células involucradas en la inflamación necrótica multifocal. En particular, se identificaron patrones epiteliotrópicos positivos en las células epiteliales de la tráquea, el epitelio mucoso del intestino y el epitelio ductular del páncreas. Estos hallazgos proporcionan evidencia directa que respalda la posibilidad de transmisión de HPAI de aves acuáticas infectadas a especies depredadoras.

Genetics of H5N1 and H5N8 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated in Japan in Winter 2021-2022.

In winter 2021-2022, H5N1 and H5N8 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses (HPAIVs) caused serious outbreaks in Japan: 25 outbreaks of HPAI at poultry farms and 107 cases in wild birds or in the environment. Phylogenetic analyses divided H5 HPAIVs isolated in Japan in the winter of 2021-2022 into three groups-G2a, G2b, and G2d-which were disseminated at different locations and times. Full-genome sequencing analyses of these HPAIVs revealed a strong relationship of multiple genes between Japan and Siberia, suggesting that they arose from reassortment events with avian influenza viruses (AIVs) in Siberia. The results emphasize the complex of dissemination and reassortment events with the movement of migratory birds, and the importance of continual monitoring of AIVs in Japan and Siberia for early alerts to the intrusion of HPAIVs.

Analysis of H5N8 influenza virus infection in chicken with mApple reporter genes in vivo and in vitro.

H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) has caused huge losses to the global poultry industry and critically threatens public health. Chickens are the important host for the transmission. However, the distribution of H5N8 avian influenza virus (AIV) in chicken and the infected cell types are limitedly studied. Therefore, in this study, we detected viral replication and infection by generating recombinant H5N8 AIV expressing an easily tracked mApple fluorescent reporter. The results showed that recombinant viruses passaged four times in chicken embryos successfully expressed mApple proteins detected by fluorescence microscopy and WB, which verified that the constructed recombinant viruses were stable. Compared to parental virus, although recombinant virus attenuated for replication in MDCK cells, it can still replicate effectively, and form visible plaques. Importantly, the experiments on infection of chicken PBMCs in vitro showed a strong correlation between mApple positivity rate and NP positivity rate (r = 0.7594, P =0.0176), demonstrating that mApple reporter could be used as an indicator to accurately reflect AIV infection. Then we infected monocytes/macrophages in PBMCs in vitro and detected the mApple positive percentage was 55.1%-80.4%, which confirmed the chicken primary monocytic/macrophages are important target cells for avian influenza virus infection. In chicken, compared with parental virus, the recombinant virus-infected chickens had lower viral titers in oropharyngeal cloacal and organs, but it can cause significant pathogenicity in chicken and the mortality rate was approximately 66%. In addition, the results of bioluminescent imaging showed that the fluorescence in the lungs was strongest at 5 days post-infection (DPI). Finally, we discovered the mApple positive expression in chicken lung immune cells (CD45+ cells), especially some T cells (CD4 and CD8 T cells) also carrying mApple, which indicates that the H5N8 AIV showed a tropism for immune cells including chicken T cells causing potentially aggressive against cellular immunity. We have provided a simple visualization for further exploration of H5N8 AIV infected chicken immune cells, which contributes to further understanding pathogenic mechanism of H5N8 AIV infection in chicken.

Spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 avian influenza viruses contributed to H5N1 emergence in 2021/2022 panzootic.

Since 2020, clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 and H5N1 viruses have swept through continents, posing serious threats to the world. Through comprehensive analyses of epidemiological, genetic, and bird migration data, we found that the dominant genotype replacement of the H5N8 viruses in 2020 contributed to the H5N1 outbreak in the 2021/2022 wave. The 2020 outbreak of the H5N8 G1 genotype instead of the G0 genotype produced reassortment opportunities and led to the emergence of a new H5N1 virus with G1's HA and MP genes. Despite extensive reassortments in the 2021/2022 wave, the H5N1 virus retained the HA and MP genes, causing a significant outbreak in Europe and North America. Furtherly, through the wild bird migration flyways investigation, we found that the temporal-spatial coincidence between the outbreak of the H5N8 G1 virus and the bird autumn migration may have expanded the H5 viral spread, which may be one of the main drivers of the emergence of the 2020-2022 H5 panzootic.IMPORTANCESince 2020, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 subtype variants of clade 2.3.4.4b have spread across continents, posing unprecedented threats globally. However, the factors promoting the genesis and spread of H5 HPAI viruses remain unclear. Here, we found that the spatiotemporal genotype replacement of H5N8 HPAI viruses contributed to the emergence of the H5N1 variant that caused the 2021/2022 panzootic, and the viral evolution in poultry of Egypt and surrounding area and autumn bird migration from the Russia-Kazakhstan region to Europe are important drivers of the emergence of the 2020-2022 H5 panzootic. These findings provide important targets for early warning and could help control the current and future HPAI epidemics.

Pathological investigation of high pathogenicity avian influenza H5N8 in captive houbara bustards (Chlamydotis undulata), the United Arab Emirates 2020.

At the end of 2020, an outbreak of HPAI H5N8 was registered in captive African houbara bustards (Chlamydotis undulata) in the United Arab Emirates. In order to better understand the pathobiology of this viral infection in bustards, a comprehensive pathological characterization was performed. A total of six birds were selected for necropsy, histopathology, immunohistochemistry, RNAscope in situ hybridization and RT-qPCR and nanopore sequencing on formalin-fixed and paraffin-embedded (FFPE) tissue blocks. Gross lesions included mottled and/or hemorrhagic pancreas, spleen and liver and fibrinous deposits on air sacs and intestine. Necrotizing pancreatitis, splenitis and concurrent vasculitis, hepatitis and fibrino-heterophilic peritonitis were identified, microscopically. Viral antigens (nucleoprotein) and RNAs (matrix gene) were both detected within necro-inflammatory foci, parenchymal cells, stromal cells and endothelial cells of affected organs, including the myenteric plexus. Molecular analysis of FFPE blocks successfully detected HPAI H5N8, further confirming its involvement in the lesions observed. In conclusion, HPAI H5N8 in African houbara bustards results in hyperacute/acute forms exhibiting marked pantropism, endotheliotropism and neurotropism. In addition, our findings support the use of FFPE tissues for molecular studies of poorly characterized pathogens in exotic and endangered species, when availability of samples is limited.

Transmission dynamics and pathogenesis differ between pheasants and partridges infected with clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 and H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses.

During the UK 2020-2021 epizootic of H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b high-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs), high mortality occurred during incursions in commercially farmed common pheasants (Phasianus colchicus). Two pheasant farms, affected separately by H5N8 and H5N1 subtypes, included adjacently housed red-legged partridges (Alectoris rufa), which appeared to be unaffected. Despite extensive ongoing epizootics, H5Nx HPAIV partridge outbreaks were not reported during 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 in the UK, so it is postulated that partridges are more resistant to HPAIV infection than other gamebirds. To assess this, pathogenesis and both intra- and inter-species transmission of UK pheasant-origin H5N8-2021 and H5N1-2021 HPAIVs were investigated. Onward transmission to chickens was also assessed to better understand the risk of spread from gamebirds to other commercial poultry sectors. A lower infectious dose was required to infect pheasants with H5N8-2021 compared to H5N1-2021. However, HPAIV systemic dissemination to multiple organs within pheasants was more rapid following infection with H5N1-2021 than H5N8-2021, with the former attaining generally higher viral RNA levels in tissues. Intraspecies transmission to contact pheasants was successful for both viruses and associated with viral environmental contamination, while interspecies transmission to a first chicken-contact group was also efficient. However, further onward transmission to additional chicken contacts was only achieved with H5N1-2021. Intra-partridge transmission was only successful when high-dose H5N1-2021 was administered, while partridges inoculated with H5N8-2021 failed to shed and transmit, although extensive tissue tropism was observed for both viruses. Mortalities among infected partridges featured a longer incubation period compared to that in pheasants, for both viruses. Therefore, the susceptibility of different gamebird species and pathogenicity outcomes to the ongoing H5Nx clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIVs varies, but pheasants represent a greater likelihood of H5Nx HPAIV introduction into galliforme poultry settings. Consequently, viral maintenance within gamebird populations and risks to poultry species warrant enhanced investigation.

A case-control study of the infection risk of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza in Japan during the winter of 2020-2021.

In Japan, outbreaks of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) were reported between November 2020 and March 2021 in 52 poultry farms. Understanding HPAI epidemiology would help poultry industries improve their awareness of the disease and enhance the immediate implementation of biosecurity measures. This study was a simulation-based matched case-control study to elucidate the risk factors associated with HPAI outbreaks in chicken farms in Japan. Data were collected from 42 HPAI-affected farms and 463 control farms that were within a 5-km radius of each case farm but remained uninfected. When infected farms were detected as clusters, one farm was randomly selected from each cluster, considering the possibility that the cluster was formed by farm-to-farm transmission within an epidemic area. For each case farm, up to three control farms were selected within a 5-km radius. Overall, 26 case farms (16 layer and 10 broiler farms) and 75 control farms (45 layer and 30 broiler farms) were resampled 1000 times for the conditional logistic regression model with explanatory variables comprising geographical factors and farm flock size. A larger flock size and shorter distance to water bodies from the farm were found to increase infection risk in layer farms. Similarly, in broiler farms, a shorter distance to water bodies increased infection risk. On larger farms, frequent access of farm staff and instrument carriages to premises could lead to increased infection risk. Waterfowl visiting water bodies around farms may also be associated with infection risk.

Vaccination of African penguins (Spheniscus demersus) against high-pathogenicity avian influenza.

BACKGROUND: High-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) has become a conservation threat to wild birds. Therefore, suitable vaccine technology and practical application methods require investigation. METHODS: Twenty-four African penguins (Spheniscus demersus) were vaccinated with either a conventional inactivated clade 2.3.4.4b H5N8 HPAI whole virus or a tobacco leaf-produced H5 haemagglutinin-based virus-like particle (VLP). Six birds received a second dose of the inactivated vaccine. Antibody responses were assessed and compared by employing haemagglutination inhibition tests. RESULTS: A second dose of inactivated vaccine was required to induce antibody titres above the level required to suppress virus shedding, while a single dose of VLP vaccine produced these levels by day 14, and one bird still had antibodies on day 430. LIMITATIONS: Bacterial contamination of the VLP vaccine limited the monitoring period and sample size in that treatment group, and it was not possible to perform a challenge study with field virus. CONCLUSION: VLP vaccines offer a more practical option than inactivated whole viruses, especially in logistically challenging situations involving wild birds.

Experimental Infection of Chickens with H5N8 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated in Japan in the Winter of 2020-2021.

During the winter of 2020-2021, numerous outbreaks of high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) were caused by viruses of the subtype H5N8 in poultry over a wide region in Japan. The virus can be divided into five genotypes-E1, E2, E3, E5, and E7. The major genotype responsible for the outbreaks was E3, followed by E2. To investigate the cause of these outbreaks, we experimentally infected chickens with five representative strains of each genotype. We found that the 50% chicken infectious dose differed by up to 75 times among the five strains, and the titer of the E3 strains (102.75 50% egg infectious dose (EID50)) was the lowest, followed by that of the E2 strains (103.50 EID50). In viral transmission experiments, in addition to the E3 and E2 strains, the E5 strain was transmitted to naïve chickens with high efficiency (>80%), whereas the other strains had low efficiencies (<20%). We observed a clear difference in the virological characteristics among the five strains isolated in the same season. The higher infectivity of the E3 and E2 viruses in chickens may have caused the large number of HPAI outbreaks in Japan during this season.

Avian influenza A(H5) virus circulation in live bird markets in Vietnam, 2017-2022.

BACKGROUND: Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) human infections are a global concern, with many A(H5) human cases detected in Vietnam, including a case in October 2022. Using avian influenza virus surveillance from March 2017-September 2022, we described the percent of pooled samples that were positive for avian influenza A, A(H5), A(H5N1), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) viruses in live bird markets (LBMs) in Vietnam. METHODS: Monthly at each LBM, 30 poultry oropharyngeal swab specimens and five environmental samples were collected. Samples were pooled in groups of five and tested for influenza A, A(H5), A(H5N1), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) viruses by real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction. Trends in the percent of pooled samples that were positive for avian influenza were summarized by LBM characteristics and time and compared with the number of passively detected avian influenza outbreaks using Spearman's rank correlation. RESULTS: A total of 25,774 pooled samples were collected through active surveillance at 167 LBMs in 24 provinces; 36.9% of pooled samples were positive for influenza A, 3.6% A(H5), 1.9% A(H5N1), 1.1% A(H5N6), and 0.2% A(H5N8). Influenza A(H5) viruses were identified January-December and at least once in 91.7% of sampled provinces. In 246 A(H5) outbreaks in poultry; 20.3% were influenza A(H5N1), 60.2% A(H5N6), and 19.5% A(H5N8); outbreaks did not correlate with active surveillance. CONCLUSIONS: In Vietnam, influenza A(H5) viruses were detected by active surveillance in LBMs year-round and in most provinces sampled. In addition to outbreak reporting, active surveillance for A(H5) viruses in settings with high potential for animal-to-human spillover can provide situational awareness.

Pathogenicity in Chickens and Turkeys of a 2021 United States H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Clade 2.3.4.4b Wild Bird Virus Compared to Two Previous H5N8 Clade 2.3.4.4 Viruses.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of subtype H5 of the Gs/GD/96 lineage remain a major threat to poultry due to endemicity in wild birds. H5N1 HPAIVs from this lineage were detected in 2021 in the United States (U.S.) and since then have infected many wild and domestic birds. We evaluated the pathobiology of an early U.S. H5N1 HPAIV (clade 2.3.4.4b, 2021) and two H5N8 HPAIVs from previous outbreaks in the U.S. (clade 2.3.4.4c, 2014) and Europe (clade 2.3.4.4b, 2016) in chickens and turkeys. Differences in clinical signs, mean death times (MDTs), and virus transmissibility were found between chickens and turkeys. The mean bird infective dose (BID50) of the 2021 H5N1 virus was approximately 2.6 log10 50% embryo infective dose (EID50) in chickens and 2.2 log10 EID50 in turkeys, and the virus transmitted to contact-exposed turkeys but not chickens. The BID50 for the 2016 H5N8 virus was also slightly different in chickens and turkeys (4.2 and 4.7 log10 EID50, respectively); however, the BID50 for the 2014 H5N8 virus was higher for chickens than turkeys (3.9 and ~0.9 log10 EID50, respectively). With all viruses, turkeys took longer to die (MDTs of 2.6-8.2 days for turkeys and 1-4 days for chickens), which increased the virus shedding period and facilitated transmission to contacts.

The episodic resurgence of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5 virus.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 activity has intensified globally since 2021, increasingly causing mass mortality in wild birds and poultry and incidental infections in mammals1-3. However, the ecological and virological properties that underscore future mitigation strategies still remain unclear. Using epidemiological, spatial and genomic approaches, we demonstrate changes in the origins of resurgent HPAI H5 and reveal significant shifts in virus ecology and evolution. Outbreak data show key resurgent events in 2016-2017 and 2020-2021, contributing to the emergence and panzootic spread of H5N1 in 2021-2022. Genomic analysis reveals that the 2016-2017 epizootics originated in Asia, where HPAI H5 reservoirs are endemic. In 2020-2021, 2.3.4.4b H5N8 viruses emerged in African poultry, featuring mutations altering HA structure and receptor binding. In 2021-2022, a new H5N1 virus evolved through reassortment in wild birds in Europe, undergoing further reassortment with low-pathogenic avian influenza in wild and domestic birds during global dissemination. These results highlight a shift in the HPAI H5 epicentre beyond Asia and indicate that increasing persistence of HPAI H5 in wild birds is facilitating geographic and host range expansion, accelerating dispersion velocity and increasing reassortment potential. As earlier outbreaks of H5N1 and H5N8 were caused by more stable genomic constellations, these recent changes reflect adaptation across the domestic-bird-wild-bird interface. Elimination strategies in domestic birds therefore remain a high priority to limit future epizootics.

Different Outcomes of Chicken Infection with UK-Origin H5N1-2020 and H5N8-2020 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses (Clade 2.3.4.4b).

Clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) of the "goose/Guangdong" lineage have caused a series of European epizootics since 2014. During autumn/winter 2020-2021, several H5Nx subtypes were detected in the UK, with H5N8 being the dominant subtype in wild birds and poultry. Despite the greater subtype diversity (due to viral neuraminidase gene reassortment) reported in wild birds, only H5N8 and H5N1 subtypes caused clade 2.3.4.4 UK HPAIV poultry outbreaks during this period. The direct inoculation of layer chickens showed that H5N8-2020 was more infectious than H5N1-2020, which supported the European H5N8 dominance during that season. However, the mean death time was longer for H5N8-2020 (3.42 days) than for H5N1-2020 (2.17 days). Transmission from directly infected to naive in-contact chickens was inefficient for both subtypes. Histological lesions, the tissue dissemination of viral antigen, and nucleic acid were more extensive and abundant and accumulated more rapidly for H5N1-2020 compared with H5N8-2020. Although inefficient, H5N1-2020 transmission was faster, with its greater virulence indicating that this subtype posed a major concern, as subsequently shown during H5N1 dominance of the clade 2.3.4.4 epizootic since autumn 2021. An evaluation of these in vivo viral characteristics is key to understanding the continuing poultry threats posed by clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx HPAIVs.

Genetic and antigenic analyses of H5N8 and H5N1 subtypes high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses isolated from wild birds and poultry farms in Japan in the winter of 2021-2022.

In the winter of 2021-2022, multiple subtypes (H5N8 and H5N1) of high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) were confirmed to be circulating simultaneously in Japan. Here, we phylogenetically and antigenically analyzed HPAIVs that were isolated from infected wild birds, an epidemiological investigation of affected poultry farms, and our own active surveillance study. H5 subtype hemagglutinin (HA) genes of 32 representative HPAIV isolates were classified into clade 2.3.4.4b lineage and subsequently divided into three groups (G2a, G2b, and G2d). All H5N8 HPAIVs were isolated in early winter and had HA genes belonging to the G2a group. H5N1 HPAIVs belong to the G2b and G2d groups. Although G2b viruses were widespread throughout the season, G2d viruses endemically circulated in Northeast Japan after January 2022. Deep sequence analysis showed that the four HPAIVs isolated at the beginning of winter had both N8 and N1 subtypes of neuraminidase genes. Environmental water-derived G2a HPAIV, A/water/Tottori/NK1201-2/2021 (H5N8), has unique polymerase basic protein 1 and nucleoprotein genes, similar to those of low pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs). These results indicate that multiple H5 HPAIVs and LPAIVs disseminated to Japan via transboundary winter migration of wild birds, and HPAIVs with novel gene constellations could emerge in these populations. Cross-neutralization test revealed that G2a H5N8 HPAIVs were antigenically distinct from a G2b H5N1 HPAIV, suggesting that antibody pressure in wild birds was involved in the transition of the HPAIV groups during the season.

Spatio-temporal distribution & seasonality of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 & H5N8 outbreaks in India, 2006-2021.

Background & objectives: The highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 and H5N8 viruses have been one of the leading causes of avian diseases worldwide, resulting in severe economic losses and posing potential zoonotic risk. There are no reports on the correlation of the seasonality of H5N1 and H5N8 viruses with the migratory bird season in India, along with the species affected. The present report describes the distribution and seasonality of HPAI outbreaks in India from 2006 to 2021. Methods: The data on the occurrence and locations of outbreaks in India and affected bird species were collated from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations database and grouped by month and year. The distribution and seasonality of HPAI H5N1 and H5N8 viruses were analyzed. Results: A total of 284 H5N1 outbreaks were reported since 2006, with a surge in 2021. The initial outbreaks of H5N1 were predominantly in poultry. Since 2016, 57 outbreaks of H5N8 were also reported, predominantly in wild birds. Most of the outbreaks of HPAI were reported from post monsoon onwards till pre-summer season (i.e. between October and March) with their peak in winter, in January. Apart from poultry, the bird species such as owl, Indian peafowl, lesser adjutant, crows and wild migratory birds such as demoiselle crane, northern pintail and bar-headed goose were positive for HPAI. Interpretation & conclusions: Such studies on the seasonality of HPAI outbreaks would help in the development of prevention and control strategies. The recent human infections of H5N1 and H9N2 viruses highlight the need to strengthen surveillance in wild, resident, migratory birds and in poultry along with One Health studies in India.

Pathogenicity of H5N8 avian influenza virus in chickens and in duck breeds and the role of MX1 and IFN-α in infection outcome and transmission to contact birds.

This study examined the pathogenicity, immunogenicity, and transmission potential of the H5N8 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b virus in three breeds of ducks and in broiler chickens. Chickens, Muscovy, Pekin, and Mallard ducks (n = 10) received a dose of 6 log10 EID50 of HPAIV H5N8 directly. Nine contact chickens were introduced to each group on the day of infection. All infected chickens died, with MDT of 7.6 days. Muscovy and Pekin ducks died by 11.1% and 10%, respectively, with MDTs of 7 and 6 days. No Mallards died but showed more severe clinical disease than Pekin ducks. Mallards had the highest MX1 gene expression in the lung and spleen and IFN-α in the spleen. MX1 expression levels were lower in the spleen and lung of Pekin ducks, in the spleen of chickens and in the lung of Muscovy ducks than in noninfected controls. However, viral shedding was higher in ducks than in chickens and was highest in Mallards. 66.7% of chickens placed in contact with infected chickens died and 77.8% of in-contact chickens to infected three duck breeds died. In conclusion, there was a diversity in sensitivity and immunogenicity for HPAIV H5N8 among duck breeds, resulting in diverse infection outcomes and transmissibility to contacts. This study provides duck/chicken interface models for HPAIV transmission to poultry.

Evaluation of inactivated avian influenza virus and Newcastle disease virus bivalent vaccination program against newly circulated H5N8 and NDV strains.

Avian influenza virus (AIV) and Newcastle disease virus (NDV) are respiratory illness syndromes that have recently been detected in vaccinated flocks and are causing major financial losses in the chicken farming industry. The objective was to evaluate the efficacy of Valley Vac H5Plus NDVg7 vaccine in protecting chickens against the H5N8 and NDV strains that have recently been circulating in comparison with the efficacy of the commercially available bivalent H5+ND7 vaccine. In contrast to the H5+ND7 vaccine, which was made of genetically distinct H5N8/2018 clade 2.3.4.4b genotype group (G5), H9N2/2016, H5N1/2017, and genetically comparable NDV genotype VII 1.1/2019 of the recently circulating challenge viruses, the Valley Vac H5Plus NDVg7 vaccine consisted of the recently isolated (RG HPAI H5N1 AIV/2015 Clade 2.2.1.2, RG HPAIV H5N8/2020 Clade 2.3.4.4b genotype group 6 (G6), and NDV genotype VII 1.1/2012) which were genetically similar to challenged strains. To determine the effectiveness of the Valley Vac H5Plus NDVg7 vaccine, a total of 70-day-old commercial chicks were divided into 7 groups of 10 birds each. Groups (G1 and G4) received Valley Vac H5Plus NDVg7 vaccine. Groups (G2 and G5) groups received commercial H5+ND7 vaccine. While groups (G3 and G6) were kept nonvaccinated, and group (G7) was kept as a nonchallenged and nonvaccinated. After 3-wk post vaccination (WPV), groups G1, G2, and G3 were challenged with A/Duck/ Egypt/SMG4/2019(H5N8) genotype G6. On the other hand, groups G4, G5, G6 were challenged with NDV/EGYPT/18629F/2018 genotype VII 1.1 with an intranasal injection of 0.1 mL. Antibody titer was calculated at the first 3 wk after vaccination, and the viral shedding titer was calculated at 3-, 5-, and 7-days post challenge. Mortality and morbidity rates were monitored daily during the experiment, and for the first 10 d after the challenge, to provide an estimate of the protection rate. The results showed that a single dosage of 0.5 mL per bird of Valley Vac H5Plus NDVg7 vaccine provides 80% protection against both H5N8 and NDV, compared to the bivalent H5+ND7 vaccine, which provided 20 and 80% protection against H5N8 and NDV, respectively. In addition, 0.5 mL per bird of Valley Vac H5Plus NDVg7 vaccine produced a greater immune response against both viruses than commercial vaccination at 1 to 3 WPV with a significant difference at 1 WPV for H5N8 and a comparatively higher immune response for NDV. Furthermore, it reduced virus shedding of H5N8 on the third, fifth, seventh, and tenth days lower than H5+ND7 vaccine with a significant difference on the third day for H5N8 and relatively lower than bivalent H5+ND7 vaccine for NDV with a significant difference on the fifth day. The Valley vaccinated group demonstrated more tissue intactness compared to the commercially vaccinated group against the H5N8 challenge, however the bivalent commercially vaccinated group showed the similar level of tissue integrity against NDV. In conclusion, Valley Vac H5Plus NDVg7  that contains the  genetically similar strain to recently circulating challenged virus (H5N8 genotype G6) provided better protection with greater immune response and decreased the amount of virus shed against H5N8 genotype G6 and showed less histopathological alteration than the commercial bivalent H5+ND7 vaccine that contain genetically distinct (H5N8 genotype G5). However the Valley Vac H5Plus NDVg7 provided the same protection with relatively high immune response and  relatively decreased the amount of virus shed and showed equal tissue integrity than the commercial bivalent H5+ND7 vaccine against NDV genotype VII 1.1 that contain the same genotype of NDV genotype VII 1.1.

Impact of palmiped farm density on the resilience of the poultry sector to highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 in France.

We analysed the interplay between palmiped farm density and the vulnerability of the poultry production system to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N8. To do so, we used a spatially-explicit transmission model, which was calibrated to reproduce the observed spatio-temporal distribution of outbreaks in France during the 2016-2017 epidemic of HPAI. Six scenarios were investigated, in which the density of palmiped farms was decreased in the municipalities with the highest palmiped farm density. For each of the six scenarios, we first calculated the spatial distribution of the basic reproduction number (R0), i.e. the expected number of farms a particular farm would be likely to infect, should all other farms be susceptible. We also ran in silico simulations of the adjusted model for each scenario to estimate epidemic sizes and time-varying effective reproduction numbers. We showed that reducing palmiped farm density in the densest municipalities decreased substantially the size of the areas with high R0 values (> 1.5). In silico simulations suggested that reducing palmiped farm density, even slightly, in the densest municipalities was expected to decrease substantially the number of affected poultry farms and therefore provide benefits to the poultry sector as a whole. However, they also suggest that it would not have been sufficient, even in combination with the intervention measures implemented during the 2016-2017 epidemic, to completely prevent the virus from spreading. Therefore, the effectiveness of alternative structural preventive approaches now needs to be assessed, including flock size reduction and targeted vaccination.