The Concept of Thinking: A Reappraisal of Ryle's Work.

ABSTRACT

In The Concept of Mind, Ryle's official position seems to be that mental acts cannot be intrinsically private. In The Concept of Mind as well as his later work on thinking, Ryle views thinking as an activity that terminates in a thought, which is a state of being prepared for a performance. Thinking is characterised by what Ryle calls intention-parasitism; for it is, insofar as its underlying motive is concerned, parasitic on the final performance which will take place later. Ryle shows that acts of thinking, owing to their intention-parasitism, can be described in a tactical idiom, with reference to the final performance for which it was intended. However, this framework of intention-parasitism is not adequate to describe all instances of thinking in all their aspects, which therefore remain inextricably private. The task of this paper is to accommodate such privacy within the theoretical framework suggested in The Concept of Mind.