The effects of paranoia and dopamine on perception of cohesion and conspiracy: a pre-registered, double-blind, placebo-controlled experiment.

Paranoia is a common symptom of psychotic disorders but is also present on a spectrum of severity in the general population. Although paranoia is associated with an increased tendency to perceive cohesion and conspiracy within groups, the mechanistic basis of this variation remains unclear. One potential avenue involves the brain's dopaminergic system, which is known to be altered in psychosis. In this study, we used large-N online samples to establish the association between trait paranoia and perceptions of cohesion and conspiracy. We further evaluated the role of dopamine on perceptions of cohesion and conspiracy using a double-blind, placebo-controlled laboratory experiment where participants received levodopa or a placebo control. Our results were mixed: group perceptions and perceptions of cohesion were higher among more paranoid individuals but were not altered under dopamine administration. We outline the potential reasons for these discrepancies and the broader implications for understanding paranoia in terms of dopamine dysregulation.

Conflict and cooperation in paranoia: a large-scale behavioural experiment.

BACKGROUND: Paranoia involves thoughts and beliefs about the harmful intent of others but the social consequences have been much less studied. We investigated whether paranoia predicts maladaptive social behaviour in terms of cooperative and punitive behaviour using experimental game theory paradigms, and examined whether reduced cooperation is best explained in terms of distrust as previous studies have claimed. METHODS: We recruited a large population sample (N = 2132) online. All participants completed the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale and (i) a Dictator Game and (ii) an Ultimatum Game, the former with an option for costly punishment. Following distrust-based accounts, we predicted highly paranoid people would make higher offers when the outcome depended on receiving a positive response from their partner (Ultimatum Game) but no difference when the partner's response was irrelevant (Dictator Game). We also predicted paranoia would increase punitive responses. Predictions were pre-registered in advance of data collection. Data and materials are open access. RESULTS: Highly paranoid participants actually made lower offers than non-paranoid participants both in the Dictator Game and in the Ultimatum Game. Paranoia positively predicted punitive responses. CONCLUSIONS: These findings suggest that distrust is not the best explanation for reduced cooperation in paranoia and alternative explanations, such as increased self-interest, may apply. However, the tendency to attribute harmful intent to partners was important in motivating punitive responses. These results highlight differing motivations underlying adverse social behaviour in paranoia and suggest that accounts based solely on the presenting features of paranoia may need to be rethought.

Hidden altruism in a real-world setting.

Concerns for reputation can promote cooperative behaviour. Individuals that behave cooperatively stand to benefit if they gain in influence, status or are more likely to be chosen as interaction partners by others. Most theoretical and empirical models of cooperation predict that image score will increase with cooperative contributions. Individuals are therefore expected to make higher contributions when observed by others and should opt to make contributions publicly rather than privately, particularly when contributions are higher than average. Here, however, I find the opposite effect. Using data from an online fundraising website, I show that donors are more likely to opt for anonymity when making extremely low and extremely high donations. Mid-range donations, on the other hand, are typically publicized. Recent work has shown that extremely generous individuals may be ostracized or punished by group members. The data presented here suggest that individuals may hide high donations to avoid these repercussions.

The influence of fledgling location on adult provisioning: a test of the blackmail hypothesis.

One theory to explain the existence of conspicuous solicitation is that it is a way for young to 'blackmail' carers into provisioning them, by threatening their own destruction. Fledgling birds offer a unique opportunity to investigate the 'blackmail theory', as their mobility enables them to influence the predation risk they face. We investigated a novel solicitation behaviour in fledgling pied babblers (Turdoides bicolor), where fledglings use their location to influence provisioning rates. We show that fledglings face a trade-off: the ground is a much more profitable location in terms of provisioning rate from adult carers, but they are at greater risk from predators owing to their limited flying ability and slow response to alarm calls. Young babbler fledglings move to the ground when hungry, signalling their state, and this stimulates adults to increase their provisioning rates. Once satiated, fledglings return to the safety of cover. By experimentally increasing terrestrial predation risk, we found that adults increased their provisioning rate to terrestrial but not arboreal fledglings. Thus, by moving to a riskier location, fledglings revealed their need and were able to manipulate adults to achieve higher provisioning rates. These results provide support for the 'blackmail theory'.

Human punishment is motivated by inequity aversion, not a desire for reciprocity.

Humans involved in cooperative interactions willingly pay a cost to punish cheats. However, the proximate motives underpinning punitive behaviour are currently debated. Individuals who interact with cheats experience losses, but they also experience lower payoffs than the cheating partner. Thus, the negative emotions that trigger punishment may stem from a desire to reciprocate losses or from inequity aversion. Previous studies have not disentangled these possibilities. Here, we use an experimental approach to ask whether punishment is motivated by inequity aversion or by a desire for reciprocity. We show that humans punish cheats only when cheating produces disadvantageous inequity, while there is no evidence for reciprocity. This finding challenges the notion that punishment is motivated by a simple desire to reciprocally harm cheats and shows that victims compare their own payoffs with those of partners when making punishment decisions.

Female cleaner fish cooperate more with unfamiliar males.

Joint group membership is of major importance for cooperation in humans, and close ties or familiarity with a partner are also thought to promote cooperation in other animals. Here, we present the opposite pattern: female cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, behave more cooperatively (by feeding more against their preference) when paired with an unfamiliar male rather than with their social partner. We propose that cooperation based on asymmetric punishment causes this reversed pattern. Males are larger than and dominant to female partners and are more aggressive to unfamiliar than to familiar female partners. In response, females behave more cooperatively with unfamiliar male partners. Our data suggest that in asymmetric interactions, weaker players might behave more cooperatively with out-group members than with in-group members to avoid harsher punishment.

Resolving the iterated prisoner's dilemma: theory and reality.

Pairs of unrelated individuals face a prisoner's dilemma if cooperation is the best mutual outcome, but each player does best to defect regardless of his partner's behaviour. Although mutual defection is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in one-shot games, cooperative solutions based on reciprocity can emerge in iterated games. Among the most prominent theoretical solutions are the so-called bookkeeping strategies, such as tit-for-tat, where individuals copy their partner's behaviour in the previous round. However, the lack of empirical data conforming to predicted strategies has prompted the suggestion that the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) is neither a useful nor realistic basis for investigating cooperation. Here, we discuss several recent studies where authors have used the IPD framework to interpret their data. We evaluate the validity of their approach and highlight the diversity of proposed solutions. Strategies based on precise accounting are relatively uncommon, perhaps because the full set of assumptions of the IPD model are rarely satisfied. Instead, animals use a diverse array of strategies that apparently promote cooperation, despite the temptation to cheat. These include both positive and negative reciprocity, as well as long-term mutual investments based on 'friendships'. Although there are various gaps in these studies that remain to be filled, we argue that in most cases, individuals could theoretically benefit from cheating and that cooperation cannot therefore be explained with the concept of positive pseudo-reciprocity. We suggest that by incorporating empirical data into the theoretical framework, we may gain fundamental new insights into the evolution of mutual reciprocal investment in nature.

Experimental evidence that sentinel behaviour is affected by risk.

Sentinels are a conspicuous feature of some cooperative societies and are often assumed to provide benefits in terms of increased predator detection. Similar to other cooperative behaviours, variation in investment in sentinel behaviour should reflect variation in the benefits of such behaviour. However, evidence for this is inconclusive: to date experiments have manipulated the cost of sentinel behaviour, and considerations of changes in the benefits of sentinel activity on investment patterns are lacking. Here, we experimentally manipulated the benefits of sentinel behaviour in the cooperatively breeding pied babbler (Turdoides bicolor) to assess whether this had any impact on sentinel activity. We simulated the presence of an unseen predator using playbacks of heterospecific alarm calls, and the presence of an actual predator using a model snake. In both cases, the increase in perceived predation risk caused an increase in sentinel activity, demonstrating that investment in sentinel activity increases when the benefits are greater.

Variable fledging age according to group size: trade-offs in a cooperatively breeding bird.

Group living can provide individuals with several benefits, including cooperative vigilance and lower predation rates. Individuals in larger groups may be less vulnerable to predation due to dilution effects, efficient detection or greater ability to repel predators. Individuals in smaller groups may consequently employ alternative behavioural tactics to compensate for their greater vulnerability to predators. Here, we describe how pied babbler (Turdoides bicolor) fledging age varies with group size and the associated risk of nestling predation. Nestling predation is highest in smaller groups, but there is no effect of group size on fledgling predation. Consequently, small groups fledge young earlier, thereby reducing the risk of predation. However, there is a cost to this behaviour as younger fledglings are less mobile than older fledglings: they move shorter distances and are less likely to successfully reach the communal roost tree. The optimal age to fledge young appears to depend on the trade-off between reduced nestling predation and increased fledgling mobility. We suggest that such trade-offs may be common in species where group size critically affects individual survival and reproductive success.