Free will without consciousness?

Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion about how science can inform the free will debate. These discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that decisions might be influenced or biased by various unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do they render subjects' decisions less free or even unfree? Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will in general, they provide important information about limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy are empirically testable and provide insight into their bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for future scientific-philosophical approaches.

You won't believe what this guy is doing with the potato: The ObjAct stimulus-set depicting human actions on congruent and incongruent objects.

Perception famously involves both bottom-up and top-down processes. The latter are influenced by our previous knowledge and expectations about the world. In recent years, many studies have focused on the role of expectations in perception in general, and in object processing in particular. Yet studying this question is not an easy feat, requiring-among other things-the creation and validation of appropriate stimuli. Here, we introduce the ObjAct stimulus-set of free-to-use, highly controlled real-life scenes, on which critical objects are pasted. All scenes depict human agents performing an action with an object that is either congruent or incongruent with the action. The focus on human actions yields highly constraining contexts, strengthening congruency effects. The stimuli were analyzed for low-level properties, using the SHINE toolbox to control for luminance and contrast, and using a deep convolutional neural network to mimic V1 processing and potentially discover other low-level factors that might differ between congruent and incongruent scenes. Two online validation studies (N = 500) were also conducted to assess the congruency manipulation and collect additional ratings of our images (e.g., arousal, likeability, visual complexity). We also provide full descriptions of the online sources from which all images were taken, as well as verbal descriptions of their content. Taken together, this extensive validation and characterization procedure makes the ObjAct stimulus-set highly informative and easy to use for future researchers in multiple fields, from object and scene processing, through top-down contextual effects, to the study of actions.

B or 13? Unconscious Top-Down Contextual Effects at the Categorical but Not the Lexical Level.

Contextual effects require integration of top-down predictions and bottom-up visual information. Given the widely assumed link between integration and consciousness, we asked whether contextual effects require consciousness. In two experiments (total N = 60), an ambiguous stimulus (which could be read as either B or 13) was presented alongside masked numbers (12 and 14) or letters (A and C). Context biased stimulus classification when it was consciously and unconsciously perceived. However, unconsciously perceived contexts evoked smaller effects. This finding was replicated and generalized into another language in a further experiment (N = 46) using a different set of stimuli, strengthening the claim that symbolic contextual effects can occur without awareness. Moreover, four experiments (total N = 160) suggested that these unconscious effects might be limited to the categorical level (numbers context vs. letters context) and do not extend to the lexical level (words context vs. nonwords context). Taken together, our results suggest that although consciousness may not be necessary for effects that require simple integration or none at all, it is nevertheless required for integration over larger semantic windows.