ABSTRACT
Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) aim to find compatible kidneys for recipients with incompatible donors. Patients without a living donor depend upon deceased donor (DD) donations to get a kidney transplant. In India, a ©DD donates kidneys directly to a©DD wait-list. The idea of initiating an exchange chain starting from a ©DD kidney is proposed in a few articles (and executed in Italy in 2018), but no mathematical formulation has been given for this merger. We have introduced an integer programming formulation that creates ©DD-initiated chains, considering both paired exchange registry and ©DD allocations simultaneously and addressing the overlap issue between the exchange registry and ©DD wait-list as recipients can register for both registries independently. A long-term simulation study is done to ©analyse the gain of these DD-initiated chains over time. It suggests that even with small numbers of ©DDs, these chains can significantly increase potential transplants.
ABSTRACT
Introduction: Rather than generating 1 transplant by directly donating to a candidate on the waitlist, deceased donors (DDs) could achieve additional transplants by donating to a candidate in a kidney paired donation (KPD) pool, thereby, initiating a chain that ends with a living donor (LD) donating to a candidate on the waitlist. We model outcomes arising from various strategies that allow DDs to initiate KPD chains. Methods: We base simulations on actual 2016 to 2017 US DD and waitlist data and use simulated KPD pools to model DD-initiated KPD chains. We also consider methods to assess and overcome the primary criticism of this approach, namely the potential to disadvantage blood type O-waitlisted candidates. Results: Compared with shorter DD-initiated KPD chains, longer chains increase the number of KPD transplants by up to 5% and reduce the number of DDs allocated to the KPD pool by 25%. These strategies increase the overall number of blood type O transplants and make LDs available to candidates on the waitlist. Restricting allocation of blood type O DDs to require ending KPD chains with LD blood type O donations to the waitlist markedly reduces the number of KPD transplants achieved. Conclusion: Allocating fewer than 3% of DD to initiate KPD chains could increase the number of kidney transplants by up to 290 annually. Such use of DDs allows additional transplantation of highly sensitized and blood type O KPD candidates. Collectively, patients of each blood type, including blood type O, would benefit from the proposed strategies.
ABSTRACT
Background: Kidney Exchange Programs can play an important role to increase access to the life saving and most cost-effective treatment for End Stage Renal Disease. The rise of national KEPs in Europe brings a need for standardized performance reporting to facilitate the development of an international evidence base on program practices. Methods: We systematically searched and reviewed the literature to extract kidney exchange program performance measures. Reported measures were initially categorized as structure, process, and outcome measures. Expert feedback was used to redefine categories and extend the set of measures to be considered. Using the Delphi method and a panel of 10 experts, the resulting measures were subsequently classified as mandatory (Base set), optional (Extended set), or deleted. Results: Out of the initial 1,668 articles identified by systematic literature search, 21 European publications on kidney exchange programs were included to collect performance measures, accompanied by three national program reports. The final measurement categories were Context, Population, Enrollment, Matching, Transplantation, and Outcomes. The set of performance measures resulting from the literature review was modified and classified as mandatory or optional. The resulting Base set and Extended set form the kidney exchange program reporting standard. Conclusions: The evidence-based and consensus-based kidney exchange program reporting standard can harmonize practical and scientific reporting on kidney exchange programs, thus facilitating the advancement of national programs. In addition, the kidney exchange program reporting standard can promote and align cross-national programs.
Subject(s)
Kidney Failure, Chronic , Consensus , Europe , Humans , Kidney , Outcome Assessment, Health CareABSTRACT
Kidney exchange programs, which allow a potential living donor whose kidney is incompatible with his or her intended recipient to donate a kidney to another patient in return for a kidney that is compatible for their intended recipient, usually aims to maximize the number of possible kidney exchanges or the total utility of the program. However, the fairness of these exchanges is an issue that has often been ignored. In this paper, as a way to overcome the problems arising in previous studies, we take fairness to be the degree to which individual patient-donor pairs feel satisfied, rather than the extent to which the exchange increases social benefits. A kidney exchange has to occur on the basis of the value of the kidneys themselves because the process is similar to bartering. If the matched kidneys are not of the level expected by the patient-donor pairs involved, the match may break and the kidney exchange transplantation may fail. This study attempts to classify possible scenarios for such failures and incorporate these into a stochastic programming framework. We apply a two-stage stochastic programming method using total utility in the first stage and the sum of the penalties for failure in the second stage when an exceptional event occurs. Computational results are provided to demonstrate the improvement of the proposed model compared to that of previous deterministic models.
Subject(s)
Kidney Transplantation , Living Donors/supply & distribution , Models, Statistical , Tissue and Organ Procurement/methods , Blood Group Incompatibility , Health Care Rationing , Humans , Living Donors/psychology , Stochastic Processes , Tissue and Organ Procurement/statistics & numerical dataABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Highly immunized patients are a challenge for organ transplantation programs. One way of increasing the likelihood of transplantation in this group of patients is to expand the possible donations by defining acceptable HLA mismatches. In the Scandiatransplant Acceptable Mismatch Program (STAMP), a de-centralized approach has been implemented in 2009. AIMS: The program has been improved during the years from utilizing HLA-A, -B, -DR matching only to include typing of all deceased donors for HLA-A, -B, -C, -DRB1 and -DQB1. The calculation of a transplantability score (TS) has been introduced in order to take both HLA and AB0 into consideration resulting in a more realistic picture of the transplantability chance. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Patients were selected for eligibility and results of immunisation status were prepared in each of the 9 tissue typing laboratories, while access to the program is finally governed by a common steering group of immunologists and clinicians. RESULTS: In the period from March 2009 until February 2015, 96 patients were transplanted within this program. The mean recipient age was 49 years and 57% were females, 30% of the patients were first transplants and of these 93% were females. The majority of the patients had 2-5 HLA-A, -B. -DR mismatches. The allograft survival at 60 months was 79.1%. Applying the TS to the cohort confirmed that patients with a low TS score had longer waiting times. CONCLUSION: The program has matured during the years and now proves to be a valid approach for transplanting highly immunized patients.