A Primer on Human Birth Theory.

In the 1970s Massimo Fagioli (1931-2017) proposed a new theory of mind that he called the Human Birth Theory, based on a healthy conception of the baby and of the nonconscious mind. Fagioli made significant contributions to the understanding of mental dynamics at birth, the pathophysiology of mental illness, and the nonconscious identity of psychiatrists and psychotherapists. His original contributions to psychodynamic psychotherapy included variations on the setting and understanding of transference and dream interpretations that deviated from classical psychoanalytic techniques. This article introduces the basic tenets of Human Birth Theory, its neuropsychiatric correlates, and clinical applications.

Executive functions and theory of mind associations in middle childhood: Does social interaction act as a mediator?

This study explored the interplay of executive functions (EFs), social interactions, and theory of mind (ToM) in middle childhood. The first aim was to examine how specific EFs-shifting, inhibition, and working memory (WM)-predict social-perceptual and social-cognitive ToM. The second aim was to explore the potential mediating role of social interactions in the EF-ToM relationship. A total of 98 children aged 8 to 11 years completed three computerized EF tasks (task switching, flanker, and running span) and two ToM tasks (Strange Stories and Reading the Mind in the Eyes). The quality and quantity of social interactions were self-reported by using questionnaires. First, multiple regression analyses with age-adjusted scores examined how specific EFs predict ToM scores. The regression model was significant for social-cognitive ToM, but not for social-perceptual ToM. WM accuracy was the only significant, positive predictor for performance on the Strange Stories task. Second, mediation analyses assessed whether social interactions mediate this EF-ToM relationship. There were no significant mediation effects of the quality and quantity of social interactions on the relationship between WM and social-cognitive ToM. In conclusion, EFs play a significant role in explaining social-cognitive ToM variability in middle childhood. WM is relevant for understanding others' mental states, in contrast to shifting and inhibition that lacked predictive value. The results also suggest different cognitive processes associated with social-perceptual versus social-cognitive ToM in this developmental stage.

Tracking politically motivated reasoning in the brain: the role of mentalizing, value-encoding, and error detection networks.

Susceptibility to misinformation and belief polarization often reflects people's tendency to incorporate information in a biased way. Despite the presence of competing theoretical models, the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of motivated reasoning remain elusive as previous empirical work did not properly track the belief formation process. To address this problem, we employed a design that identifies motivated reasoning as directional deviations from a Bayesian benchmark of unbiased belief updating. We asked the members of a proimmigration or an anti-immigration group regarding the extent to which they endorse factual messages on foreign criminality, a polarizing political topic. Both groups exhibited a desirability bias by overendorsing attitude-consistent messages and underendorsing attitude-discrepant messages and an identity bias by overendorsing messages from in-group members and underendorsing messages from out-group members. In both groups, neural responses to the messages predicted subsequent expression of desirability and identity biases, suggesting a common neural basis of motivated reasoning across ideologically opposing groups. Specifically, brain regions implicated in encoding value, error detection, and mentalizing tracked the degree of desirability bias. Less extensive activation in the mentalizing network tracked the degree of identity bias. These findings illustrate the distinct neurocognitive architecture of desirability and identity biases and inform existing cognitive models of politically motivated reasoning.

Synergy of the mirror neuron system and the mentalizing system in a single brain and between brains during joint actions.

Cooperative action involves the simulation of actions and their co-representation by two or more people. This requires the involvement of two complex brain systems: the mirror neuron system (MNS) and the mentalizing system (MENT), both of critical importance for successful social interaction. However, their internal organization and the potential synergy of both systems during joint actions (JA) are yet to be determined. The aim of this study was to examine the role and interaction of these two fundamental systems-MENT and MNS-during continuous interaction. To this hand, we conducted a multiple-brain connectivity analysis in the source domain during a motor cooperation task using high-density EEG dual-recordings providing relevant insights into the roles of MNS and MENT at the intra- and interbrain levels. In particular, the intra-brain analysis demonstrated the essential function of both systems during JA, as well as the crucial role played by single brain regions of both neural mechanisms during cooperative activities. Specifically, our intra-brain analysis revealed that both neural mechanisms are essential during Joint Action (JA), showing a solid connection between MNS and MENT and a central role of the single brain regions of both mechanisms during cooperative actions. Additionally, our inter-brain study revealed increased inter-subject connections involving the motor system, MENT and MNS. Thus, our findings show a mutual influence between two interacting agents, based on synchronization of MNS and MENT systems. Our results actually encourage more research into the still-largely unknown realm of inter-brain dynamics and contribute to expand the body of knowledge in social neuroscience.

[The impact of the impairment of social cognitive functions in acute stage of stroke on its functional outcomes]. / Vliyanie narushenii sotsial'nykh kognitivnykh funktsii v ostrom periode ishemicheskogo insul'ta na ego funktsional'nye iskhody.

OBJECTIVE: To analyze the influence of the impairment of social cognitive functions (SCF) in acute phase of ischemic stroke (IS) on its functional outcomes in 6 months. MATERIAL AND METHODS: One hundred patients with IS were included in the study. The assessment of social-demographic, clinical characteristics and SCF (theory of mind (ToM), affective empathy, social empathy) of the patients on the day 10 after stroke was conducted. Patients underwent standard laboratory tests of blood and urine. Functional outcomes in 6 months were recorded; score ≥3 on the modified Rankin scale (mRs) indicated unfavorable outcome. Multiple linear regression analysis was performed to identify independent predictors of functional outcomes of stroke in 6 months. RESULTS: Patients with unfavorable outcomes in 6 months after stroke in acute phase had more severe neurological deficit, more prominent disability level, lower mobility, severer impairment of SCF and lower level of total protein in biochemical analysis of blood. The independent predictors of functional outcomes of IS in 6 months included severity of the impairment of SCF (namely, ToM) according to the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test and severity of functional impairment on admission assessed by mRs. CONCLUSION: Changes of SCF, particularly of ToM, in the acute phase of IS are associated with its unfavorable functional outcomes in 6 months.

Poorer representation of minds underpins less accurate mental state inference for out-groups.

Societies are becoming more polarised, driven in part by misconceptions about out-groups' beliefs. To understand these effects, one must examine the cognitive processes underlying how people think about others. Here, we investigate whether people are less prone to theorise about the minds of out-groups, or less able to do so. Participants (Study 1: n = 128; Study 2: n = 128) made inferences about social and political beliefs held by real in-group and out-group members, and could choose to receive further information to improve these inferences. Results show: (1) participants sought equivalent or greater information about out-groups relative to in-groups; but despite this, (2) made significantly less accurate inferences for out-groups; and (3) were significantly less aware of their reduced ability. This shows that poorer mental state inference is not underpinned by a reduced propensity to consider out-group minds, but instead by a worse representation of the minds of out-groups.

Large language models have divergent effects on self-perceptions of mind and the attributes considered uniquely human.

The rise of powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) provides a compelling opportunity to investigate the consequences of anthropomorphism, particularly regarding how their exposure may influence the way individuals view themselves (self-perception) and other people (other-perception). Using a mind perception framework, we examined attributions of agency (the ability to do) and experience (the ability to feel). Participants evaluated their agentic and experiential capabilities and the extent to which these features are uniquely human before and after exposure to LLM responses. Post-exposure, participants increased evaluations of their agentic and experiential qualities while decreasing their perception that agency and experience are considered to be uniquely human. These results indicate that anthropomorphizing LLMs impacts attributions of mind for humans in fundamentally divergent ways: enhancing the perception of one's own mind while reducing its uniqueness for others. These results open up a range of future questions regarding how anthropomorphism can affect mind perception toward humans.

Continuity in false belief understanding from 33 to 52 months of age.

Conceptual continuity in children's false belief understanding from toddlerhood to childhood was investigated in a longitudinal study of 75 children. Performance in a low-demands false belief task at 33 months of age was significantly correlated with performance in a content false belief task at 52 months independent of language ability and executive function. In contrast, there was no correlation with performance in a location false belief task, which differed from the "Sally-Anne" format of the low-demands task and was high in executive demands. These findings support the view that explicit false belief understanding may be continuous from toddlerhood to childhood and that developmental change may be characterized in terms of enrichment and increasing stability of core conceptual understanding rather than in terms of fundamental change.

Siblings at home: Moderating influence of sibling presence and composition on the relation between problem behaviors and Theory of Mind in early childhood.

Despite the prevalence of internalizing and externalizing difficulties in children, the impact of these problem behaviors on the development of important social cognitive skills, such as Theory of Mind (ToM), is not well-understood. Indeed, many studies that have explored relations between problem behaviors and ToM report inconsistent findings. A possible reason for these disparities may be a lack of accounting for social protective factors within the home, such as the presence and number of siblings. Here, we explored the moderating influence of sibling presence and number on the relation between problem behaviors (i.e., internalizing and externalizing) and ToM. A total of 184 children (88 boys; Mage = 64.6 months, SD = 10.39) completed six well-validated ToM tasks while mothers reported on their children's externalizing and internalizing behaviors. Children who had siblings living in the same home exhibited higher ToM than children without siblings. In addition, both sibling presence and number of siblings moderated the relation between children's externalizing behaviors and ToM, such that in children without siblings externalizing behaviors were negatively associated with ToM. In contrast, children with siblings had similar ToM regardless of externalizing behaviors. As well, children with relatively fewer siblings and higher externalizing behaviors displayed lower ToM than children with relatively more siblings and higher externalizing behaviors. We did not detect a moderating effect of sibling presence or number on the relation between internalizing behaviors and ToM. These findings provide support for siblings' protective utility within the context of children's social cognition.

Influences of heart rate feedback and autistic traits on affective mindreading.

Although mindreading is an important prerequisite for successful social interactions, the underlying mechanisms are still matter of debate. It is unclear, for example, if inferring others' and own mental states are distinct processes or are based on a common mechanism. Using an affect-induction experimental set-up with an acoustic heart rate feedback that addresses affective mindreading in self and others, we investigated if non-autistic study participants relied on similar information for self- and other-directed mindreading. We assumed that due to altered mindreading capacities in autism, mainly individuals with low autistic traits would focus on additional sensory cues, such as heart rate, to infer their own and their gambling partner's affective states. Our analyses showed that the interpretation of a heart rate signal differed in self- and other-directed mindreading trials. This effect was modulated by autistic traits suggesting that individuals with higher autistic traits might not have interpreted the heart rate feedback for gambling partner ratings and differentiated less between self- and other-directed mindreading trials. We discuss these results in the context of a common mechanism underlying self- and other-directed mindreading and hypothesize that the weighting of internal and external sensory information might contribute to how we make sense of our and others' mental states.

The neural structures of theory of mind are valence-sensitive: evidence from three tDCS studies.

Several cortical structures are involved in theory of mind (ToM), including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and the right temporo- parietal junction (rTPJ). We investigated the role of these regions in mind reading with respect to the valence of mental states. Sixty-five healthy adult participants were recruited and received transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (1.5 mA, 20 min) with one week interval in three separate studies. The stimulation conditions were anodal tDCS over the dlPFC coupled with cathodal tDCS over the vmPFC, reversed stimulation conditions, and sham in the first study, and anodal tDCS over the vmPFC, or dlPFC, and sham stimulation, with an extracranial return electrode in the second and third study. During stimulation, participants underwent the reading mind from eyes/voice tests (RMET or RMVT) in each stimulation condition. Anodal left dlPFC/cathodal right vmPFC stimulation increased the accuracy of negative mental state attributions, anodal rTPJ decreased the accuracy of negative and neutral mental state attributions, and decreased the reaction time of positive mental state attributions. Our results imply that the neural correlates of ToM are valence-sensitive.

Factor analysis of the Chinese version of the Autism Spectrum Quotient 10 and its association with schizotypal traits in adolescents and young adults in Hong Kong.

BACKGROUND: There is evidence suggesting that autistic traits are associated with schizotypal traits. This study examined the factor structure of the Autism Spectrum Quotient 10 (AQ-10) and its associations with schizotypal traits (measured by the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire-Brief [SPQ-B]) in a cohort of Chinese adolescents and young adults. METHODS: Invitation letters, stratified by locations and housing types, were randomly sent to individuals aged 15 to 24 years for participation. Assessments were made using face-to-face or online interviews. Autistic traits were assessed using the Chinese version of the AQ-10. Schizotypal personality traits were assessed using the Chinese version of the 22-item SPQ-B. RESULTS: In total, 395 male and 536 female participants (mean age, 19.93 years) were recruited between July 2020 and May 2021. Exploratory factor analysis of the AQ-10 yielded three factors (theory of mind, task switching, and attention deficits) explaining 55.11% of the total variance. Autistic traits were positively correlated with schizotypal traits of disorganised features (r = 0.21, p < 0.001), interpersonal relationship deficits (r = 0.19, p < 0.001), and cognitive-perceptual deficits (r = 0.11, p = 0.001). CONCLUSION: In Chinese adolescents and young adults, autistic traits, especially task switching and attention deficits (compared with theory of mind) are more closely correlated with schizotypal personality traits. Disentangling the overlapping and diametrical structure of autistic traits and schizotypal traits may help understand their aetiologies, assessment, and interventions.

Neural correlates of static and dynamic social decision-making in real-time sibling interactions.

In traditional game theory tasks, social decision-making is centered on the prediction of the intentions (i.e., mentalizing) of strangers or manipulated responses. In contrast, real-life scenarios often involve familiar individuals in dynamic environments. Further research is needed to explore neural correlates of social decision-making with changes in the available information and environmental settings. This study collected fMRI hyperscanning data (N = 100, 46 same-sex pairs were analyzed) to investigate sibling pairs engaging in an iterated Chicken Game task within a competitive context, including two decision-making phases. In the static phase, participants chose between turning (cooperate) and continuing (defect) in a fixed time window. Participants could estimate the probability of different events based on their priors (previous outcomes and representation of other's intentions) and report their decision plan. The dynamic phase mirrored real-world interactions in which information is continuously changing (replicated within a virtual environment). Individuals had to simultaneously update their beliefs, monitor the actions of the other, and adjust their decisions. Our findings revealed substantial choice consistency between the two phases and evidence for shared neural correlates in mentalizing-related brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus. Specific neural correlates were associated with each phase; increased activation of areas associated with action planning and outcome evaluation were found in the static compared with the dynamic phase. Using the opposite contrast, dynamic decision-making showed higher activation in regions related to predicting and monitoring other's actions, including the anterior cingulate cortex and insula. Cooperation (turning), compared with defection (continuing), showed increased activation in mentalizing-related regions only in the static phase, while defection, relative to cooperation, exhibited higher activation in areas associated with conflict monitoring and risk processing in the dynamic phase. Men were less cooperative and had greater TPJ activation. Sibling competitive relationship did not predict competitive behavior but showed a tendency to predict brain activity during dynamic decision-making. Only individual brain activation results are included here, and no interbrain analyses are reported. These neural correlates emphasize the significance of considering varying levels of information available and environmental settings when delving into the intricacies of mentalizing during social decision-making among familiar individuals.

Attachment and inter-individual differences in empathy, compassion, and theory of mind abilities.

Social processing, namely the ability to understand others' cognitive and affective states, is crucial for successful social interaction. It encompasses socio-affective abilities such as empathy and compassion, as well as socio-cognitive abilities such as theory of mind (ToM). This study examined the link between social processing and attachment. Our study goes beyond previous research in that social processing abilities were assessed in a single, state-of-the-art behavioral paradigm using video narratives, the EmpaToM. Attachment was captured with the Adult Attachment Interview (N = 85; 50.60% women, Mage = 25.87 ± 4.50 years) measuring participants' present-day capacity to think about and communicate attachment-relevant information about the past. Additionally, a self-report attachment questionnaire was employed (N = 158). We found that AAI-based attachment security (vs. insecurity) was associated with higher behavioral ToM abilities. Furthermore, self-reported attachment avoidance was negatively correlated with behavioral compassion abilities. Our findings provide further evidence that interview-based and self-reported attachment measures do not converge, but may rather be understood as capturing different facets of attachment that relate to different components of social processing. We conclude that individuals with secure, non-avoidant attachment show social abilities that allow them to better understand others' thoughts and generate positive, caring emotions in face of others' distress.

Attachment is differentially associated with distinct behavioral social processing abilities, that is, compassion and theory of mind.Higher attachment security in the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) is linked to higher behavioral theory of mind abilities.Increased self-reported attachment avoidance is linked to lower behavioral compassion.

Mentalizing self mind but not others: Self-reported mentalization difficulties in multiple sclerosis.

BACKGROUND: Mentalization can be defined as a mental process by which an individual directly or indirectly perceives and interprets one's own and others' behavior, emotions, beliefs, and needs based on designed mental states. Mentalization problems may be linked to remove associative white matter fiber disconnection. Multiple sclerosis (MS) is one of the diseases with white matter lesions. By comparing MS patients with healthy controls, it was aimed to assess whether MS patients' mentalization skills are affected. METHOD: This study involved 243 participants (170 healthy controls and 73 patients with MS). All the participants completed a sociodemographic questionnaire and the Mentalization Scale (MentS). RESULTS: While it was discovered that MentS scores for the dimension of others-based mentalization (MentS-O) were statistically lower in MS group, there was no statistically significant difference between the groups in terms of the dimensions of motivation to mentalize (MentS-M) and self-based mentalization (MentS-S) scores. CONCLUSION: We may conclude that MS patients have trouble comprehending other people's thoughts. This effect can be one of the causes of MS patients' issues with social cognition.

Preschoolers' in-group bias promotes altruistic sharing and reduces second-party punishment: The role of theory of mind.

This study examines how in-group bias affects altruistic sharing and second-party punishment in preschoolers and the role of theory of mind (ToM) in in-group bias. Preschoolers aged 4 to 7 years (N = 309; 160 girls) were asked to share resources with an in-group member and an out-group member (Dictator Game) and to reject or accept an unequal allocation proposed by an in-group member and an out-group member (Ultimatum Game). The results showed that preschoolers shared more resources with, and tolerated more unfair behaviors from, in-group members. ToM influenced the in-group bias in both altruistic sharing and second-party punishment. Notably, children's degree of in-group favoritism in altruistic sharing was positively related to the second-party punishment children imposed on out-group members. However, this pattern was found only among children who had acquired first-order ToM. This study reveals the developmental patterns of preschoolers' in-group bias in altruistic sharing and second-party punishment and the effects of ToM on in-group bias.

Advanced theory of mind and children's prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood: A training study.

Children's advanced theory of mind (AToM) is concurrently associated with their prosocial lie-telling. However, the causal link between AToM and prosocial lie-telling has not yet been demonstrated. To address this gap, the current study adopted a training paradigm and investigated the role of AToM in children's prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood. A total of 66 9- and 10-year-old children who did not demonstrate any prosocial lie-telling in a disappointment gift paradigm at the baseline were recruited and randomly assigned to either the experimental group (n = 32) or an active control group (n = 34). The experimental group underwent a conversation-based training program of four sessions. The results showed significantly greater gains in AToM at the posttest for the experimental group children compared with the control group children, controlling for family socioeconomic status, children's literacy score, working memory, and inhibition. More important, the experimental group children were more likely to tell prosocial lies than the control group, even after controlling for the pretest AToM and other covariates. However, the training effects faded at the 6-month follow-up test after the training's completion. These findings provide the first evidence for the causal role of AToM in the development of prosocial lie-telling in middle childhood. The fade-out effect is discussed in the context of educational interventions.

Theory of mind in epilepsy.

Epilepsy is characterized by recurrent, chronic, and unprovoked seizures. Epilepsy has a significant negative impact on a patient's quality of life even if seizures are well controlled. In addition to the distress caused by seizures, patients with epilepsy (PwE) may suffer from cognitive impairment with serious social consequences such as poor interpersonal relationships, loss of employment, and reduced social networks. Pathological changes and functional connectivity abnormalities observed in PwE can disrupt the neural network responsible for the theory of mind. Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states to other people (intentions, beliefs, and emotions). It is a complex aspect of social cognition and includes cognitive and affective constructs. In recent years, numerous studies have assessed the relationship between social cognition, including the theory of mind, in PwE, and suggested impairment in this domain. Interventions targeting the theory of mind can be potentially helpful in improving the quality of life of PwE.

Precision mapping of the default network reveals common and distinct (inter) activity for autobiographical memory and theory of mind.

The default network is widely implicated as a common neural substrate for self-generated thought, such as remembering one's past (autobiographical memory) and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others (theory of mind). Findings that the default network comprises subnetworks of regions, some commonly and some distinctly involved across processes, suggest that one's own experiences inform their understanding of others. With the advent of precision functional MRI (fMRI) methods, however, it is unclear if this shared substrate is observed instead due to traditional group analysis methods. We investigated this possibility using a novel combination of methodological strategies. Twenty-three participants underwent multi-echo resting-state and task fMRI. We used their resting-state scans to conduct cortical parcellation sensitive to individual variation while preserving our ability to conduct group analysis. Using multivariate analyses, we assessed the functional activation and connectivity profiles of default network regions while participants engaged in autobiographical memory, theory of mind, or a sensorimotor control condition. Across the default network, we observed stronger activity associated with both autobiographical memory and theory of mind compared to the control condition. Nonetheless, we also observed that some regions showed preferential activity to either experimental condition, in line with past work. The connectivity results similarly indicated shared and distinct functional profiles. Our results support that autobiographical memory and theory of mind, two theoretically important and widely studied domains of social cognition, evoke common and distinct aspects of the default network even when ensuring high fidelity to individual-specific characteristics.NEW & NOTEWORTHY We used cutting-edge precision functional MRI (fMRI) methods such as multi-echo fMRI acquisition and denoising, a robust experimental paradigm, and individualized cortical parcellation across 23 participants to provide evidence that remembering one's past experiences and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others share a common neural substrate. Evidence from activation and connectivity analyses indicate overlapping and distinct functional profiles of these widely studied episodic and social processes.

Effective connectivity analysis of resting-state mentalizing brain networks in spinocerebellar ataxia type 2: A dynamic causal modeling study.

Neuroimaging studies on healthy subjects described the causal effective connectivity of cerebellar-cerebral social mentalizing networks, revealing the presence of closed-loops. These studies estimated effective connectivity by applying Dynamic Causal Modeling on task-related fMRI data of healthy subjects performing mentalizing tasks. Thus far, few studies have applied Dynamic Causal Modeling to resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) data to test the effective connectivity within the cerebellar-cerebral mentalizing network in the absence of experimental manipulations, and no study applied Dynamic Causal Modeling on fMRI data of patients with cerebellar disorders typically showing social cognition deficits. Thus, in this research we applied spectral Dynamic Causal Modeling, to rsfMRI data of 13 patients affected by spinocerebellar ataxia type 2 (SCA2) and of 23 matched healthy subjects. Specifically, effective connectivity was tested between acknowledged mentalizing regions of interest: bilateral cerebellar Crus II, dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporo-parietal junctions and precuneus. SCA2 and healthy subjects shared some similarities in cerebellar-cerebral mentalizing effective connectivity at rest, confirming the presence of closed-loops between cerebellar and cerebral mentalizing regions in both groups. However, relative to healthy subjects, SCA2 patients showed effective connectivity variations mostly in cerebellar-cerebral closed loops, namely weakened inhibitory connectivity from the cerebellum to the cerebral cortex, but stronger inhibitory connectivity from the cerebral cortex to the cerebellum. The present study demonstrated that effective connectivity changes affect a function-specific mentalizing network in SCA2 patients, allowing to deepen the direction and strength of the causal effective connectivity mechanisms driven by the cerebellar damage associated with SCA2.