RESUMO
About 40 years have passed since 'theory of mind (ToM)' research started. The false-belief test is used as a litmus test for ToM ability. The implicit false-belief test has renewed views of ToM in several disciplines, including psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience. Many important questions have been considered via the paradigm of implicit false belief. We recently addressed the phylogenetic and physiological aspects of ToM using a version of this paradigm combined with the chemogenetic technique on Old World monkeys. We sought to create animal models for autism that exhibit behavioral phenotypes similar to human symptoms. The simultaneous manipulation of neural circuits and assessments of changes in phenotypes can help identify the causal neural substrate of ToM.
Assuntos
Neurociências , Teoria da Mente , Humanos , FilogeniaRESUMO
The ability to infer others' mental states is essential to social interactions. This ability, critically evaluated by testing whether one attributes false beliefs (FBs) to others, has been considered to be uniquely hominid and to accompany the activation of a distributed brain network. We challenge the taxon specificity of this ability and identify the causal brain locus by introducing an anticipatory-looking FB paradigm combined with chemogenetic neuronal manipulation in macaque monkeys. We find spontaneous gaze bias of macaques implicitly anticipating others' FB-driven actions. Silencing of the medial prefrontal neuronal activity with inhibitory designer receptor exclusively activated by designer drugs (DREADDs) specifically eliminates the implicit gaze bias while leaving the animals' visually guided and memory-guided tracking abilities intact. Thus, neuronal activity in the medial prefrontal cortex could have a causal role in FB-attribution-like behaviors in the primate lineage, emphasizing the importance of probing the neuronal mechanisms underlying theory of mind with relevant macaque animal models.