Minors Lack the Autonomy to Consent to Gender-Affirming Care: Best Interests Must Be Primary.

What ethically justifies the provision of invasive and irreversible treatments to minors? In this commentary, I examine this question in response to Moti Gorin's article "What Is the Aim of Pediatric 'Gender-Affirming' Care?," which critiques autonomy-based arguments for justification of gender-affirming care in minors. Minors generally lack sufficient autonomy to make significant medical decisions or major life decisions. For this reason, parents are generally their decision-makers, working with medical professionals to choose treatments that serve the best interests of the minor. Medical care in minors is justified by beneficence, not autonomy, and this should be no different for gender-affirming care. This severely undermines autonomy-based arguments for provision of gender-affirming care to minors. Given the lack of conclusive evidence for benefit, the nature of the treatment, and the fact that gender dysphoria in minors resolves spontaneously in most cases, there is presently insufficient justification for provision of such care to minors.

Childhood Interests: what they are and why it matters.

This paper examines the concept and moral significance of "childhood interests." This concept is important in medical decision-making for children and more broadly in the field of pediatric ethics. The authors argue that childhood interests are identifiable components of childhood well-being that carry moral weight. Parents have a special role in protecting and promoting these interests and special obligations to do so. These parental obligations are grounded by the independent interests of the child, as well as the good of society more generally. Because parents have these child-rearing obligations, they must also have the authority and wide discretion necessary to fulfill them. However, while parental discretion is wide, it is not unlimited, for it must be used to safeguard and advance childhood interests.

Assessing Acceptability of COVID-19 Vaccine Booster Dose among Adult Americans: A Cross-Sectional Study.

Given the emergence of breakthrough infections, new variants, and concerns of waning immunity from the primary COVID-19 vaccines, booster shots emerged as a viable option to shore-up protection against COVID-19. Following the recent authorization of vaccine boosters among vulnerable Americans, this study aims to assess COVID-19 vaccine booster hesitancy and its associated factors in a nationally representative sample. A web-based 48-item psychometric valid survey was used to measure vaccine literacy, vaccine confidence, trust, and general attitudes towards vaccines. Data were analyzed through Chi-square (with a post hoc contingency table analysis) and independent-sample t-/Welch tests. Among 2138 participants, nearly 62% intended to take booster doses and the remaining were COVID-19 vaccine booster hesitant. The vaccine-booster-hesitant group was more likely to be unvaccinated (62.6% vs. 12.9%) and did not intend to have their children vaccinated (86.1% vs. 27.5%) compared to their non-hesitant counterparts. A significantly higher proportion of booster dose hesitant individuals had very little to no trust in the COVID-19 vaccine information given by public health/government agencies (55% vs. 12%) compared to non-hesitant ones. The mean scores of vaccine confidence index and vaccine literacy were lower among the hesitant group compared to the non-hesitant group. Compared to the non-hesitant group, vaccine hesitant participants were single or never married (41.8% vs. 28.7%), less educated, and living in a southern region of the nation (40.9% vs. 33.3%). These findings underscore the need of developing effective communication strategies emphasizing vaccine science in ways that are accessible to individuals with lower levels of education and vaccine literacy to increase vaccination uptake.

Justice, Well-Being, and Civic Duty in the Age of a Pandemic: Why we all Need to Do our bit.

This article presents an argument related to justice obligations during a pandemic and explores implications of the argument. A just society responds to a serious threat to the well-being of its people such as a viral pandemic to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the well-being of its members. This creates identifiable societal obligations which are discharged by the institutions and individuals within society that are situated to do so. There are therefore identifiable obligations resting on various societal institutions, such as government, churches, schools, and corporate institutions, as well as obligations resting on individuals. Should an institution or individual fail to act in ways consistent with these social obligations, they perpetrate an injustice on society and its members.

The Best Interest Standard Is the Best We Have: Why the Harm Principle and Constrained Parental Autonomy Cannot Replace the Best Interest Standard in Pediatric Ethics.

While the best interest standard (BIS) enjoys wide endorsement as ethical and decision-making standard in pediatrics, it has been criticized as vague and indeterminate. Alternate decision-making standards have been proposed to replace or augment the BIS, notably the harm principle (HP) and constrained parental autonomy (CPA) model. In this edition of The Journal of Clinical Ethics, Lainie Friedman Ross argues that CPA is a better standard than the BIS or the HP as both guide and limiter in pediatrics. In response, I review the important work done by the BIS in pediatrics, and argue that neither the HP nor the CPA can take over these functions or replace the BIS. Among other things I argue: (1) The BIS provides more robust protections for the moral claims of children. (2) The CPA model and the HP do not resolve the indeterminacy and vagueness present in complex medical situations, and the BIS is better suited to deal with this vagueness and indeterminacy. (3) The BIS is a general principle of medical ethics with special application in pediatrics; it fits seamlessly into the system of medical ethics and fulfills many functions within pediatrics. The HP and the CPA model do not fit in so readily within medical ethics, and are not equipped to take over the functions of the BIS.

Pediatric Ethics Consultation: Practical Considerations for the Clinical Ethics Consultant.

Clinical ethics consultants face a wide range of ethical dilemmas that require broad knowledge and skills. Although there is considerable overlap with the approach to adult consultation, ethics consultants must be aware of differences when they work with infant, pediatric, and adolescent cases. This article addresses unique considerations in the pediatric setting, reviews foundational theories on parental authority, suggests practical approaches to pediatric consultation, and outlines current available resources for clinical ethics consultants who wish to deepen their skills in this area.

When a Child Needs a Transplant but Lacks Familial Social Support.

We present the case of a 19-month-old boy with complex congenital heart disease. His single father is skeptical of traditional medicine and does not offer the social support needed to make heart transplantation successful for his son. After the father demonstrates commitment to transplant success and provides enhanced social support, doctors place the child on a Berlin Heart (a biventricular assist device) as a bridge to transplantation and list him for transplant. When the child is matched to a donor heart, the father refuses transplantation, despite that it is the child's only chance for survival. His doctors report the case to child protective services, but they decline to take protective custody. The father then changes his mind and asks that the child be put back on the waiting list for transplant. By this time, the social supports the father implemented are no longer in place. This case raises a number of issues. First, should courts order heart transplantation when doctors believe that it is in the child's best interest and parents do not consent? Second, once parents refuse a transplant, can they change their minds? Third, if there are uncertainties regarding whether the child has the social support to make transplantation successful, should the child be relisted? Finally, should a child who is not currently a transplant candidate but who may become one in the future be supported with ventricular assist devices?

Not a matter of parental choice but of social justice obligation: Children are owed measles vaccination.

This article presents arguments that reframe the discussion on vaccination ethics. The correct starting point for discussions on vaccination ethics is not what society owes parents, but rather what society owes children. Drawing on the justice theory of Powers and Faden, two conclusions are defended by presenting and defending a set of arguments. First, a just society is obligated to protect its children against serious vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles through adequate levels of vaccination. Second, this obligation of the just society rests on identifiable individuals and institutions: parents, healthcare professionals, government, and vaccine producers have important obligations in this regard. This removes vaccination out of the realm of individual or parental discretion, and situates it in the realm of societal obligation. Children are owed vaccination, society is obligated to provide it. If parents cannot or will not provide it, society ought to respond.