Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'.

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

The body of law: boundaries, extensions, and the human right to physical integrity in the biotechnical age.

The body is precondition of human existence and reference point of many legal norms. But the law only rarely asks what the body is more precisely. Answers might appear evident, but commonsensical conceptions of the body have been cast into doubt by feminists, artists, and disability theorists. Drawing on polyphonic arguments, they suggest social or post-human reconceptualizations with potential legal implications. Civil rights activists call for better protection of cyborg bodies; some legal scholars suggest redefining or even dismissing the right to bodily integrity because of its uncertain foundations. Of particular importance is the question of the boundaries of the body because the legal treatment of prostheses and assistive devices depends on whether they are part of it. This paper analyzes these boundaries with a focus on the right to bodily integrity, in light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the foundational legal distinction between persons and things. It argues that bodies indeed have multiple boundaries, but none of them qualifies for legal purposes. The law must thus draw normative boundaries. Against the temper of times, it should resort to a naturalistic conception because it accommodates interests of stakeholders in the best way.

Forensic Brain-Reading and Mental Privacy in European Human Rights Law: Foundations and Challenges.

A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes.

Is the European Data Protection Regulation sufficient to deal with emerging data concerns relating to neurotechnology?

Research-driven technology development in the fields of the neurosciences presents interesting and potentially complicated issues around data in general and brain data specifically. The data produced from brain recordings are unlike names and addresses in that it may result from the processing of largely involuntarily brain activity, it can be processed and reprocessed for different aims, and it is highly sensitive. Consenting for brain recordings of a specific type, or for a specific purpose, is complicated by these factors. Brain data collection, retention, processing, storage, and destruction are each of high ethical importance. This leads us to ask: Is the present European Data Protection Regulation sufficient to deal with emerging data concerns relating to neurotechnology? This is pressing especially in a context of rapid advancement in the fields of brain computer interfaces (BCIs), where devices that can function via recorded brain signals are expanding from research labs, through medical treatments, and beyond into consumer markets for recreational uses. One notion we develop herein is that there may be no trivial data collection when it comes to brain recording, especially where algorithmic processing is involved. This article provides analysis and discussion of some specific data protection questions related to neurotechnology, especially BCIs. In particular, whether and how brain data used in BCI-driven applications might count as personal data in a way relevant to data protection regulations. It also investigates how the nature of BCI data, as it appears in various applications, may require different interpretations of data protection concepts. Importantly, we consider brain recordings to raise questions about data sensitivity, regardless of the purpose for which they were recorded. This has data protection implications.

Brain-computer interfaces and personhood: interdisciplinary deliberations on neural technology.

OBJECTIVE: Scientists, engineers, and healthcare professionals are currently developing a variety of new devices under the category of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). Current and future applications are both medical/assistive (e.g. for communication) and non-medical (e.g. for gaming). This array of possibilities has been met with both enthusiasm and ethical concern in various media, with no clear resolution of these conflicting sentiments. APPROACH: To better understand how BCIs may either harm or help the user, and to investigate whether ethical guidance is required, a meeting entitled 'BCIs and Personhood: A Deliberative Workshop' was held in May 2018. MAIN RESULTS: We argue that the hopes and fears associated with BCIs can be productively understood in terms of personhood, specifically the impact of BCIs on what it means to be a person and to be recognized as such by others. SIGNIFICANCE: Our findings suggest that the development of neural technologies raises important questions about the concept of personhood and its role in society. Accordingly, we propose recommendations for BCI development and governance.

Hacking the Brain: Dimensions of Cognitive Enhancement.

In an increasingly complex information society, demands for cognitive functioning are growing steadily. In recent years, numerous strategies to augment brain function have been proposed. Evidence for their efficacy (or lack thereof) and side effects has prompted discussions about ethical, societal, and medical implications. In the public debate, cognitive enhancement is often seen as a monolithic phenomenon. On a closer look, however, cognitive enhancement turns out to be a multifaceted concept: There is not one cognitive enhancer that augments brain function per se, but a great variety of interventions that can be clustered into biochemical, physical, and behavioral enhancement strategies. These cognitive enhancers differ in their mode of action, the cognitive domain they target, the time scale they work on, their availability and side effects, and how they differentially affect different groups of subjects. Here we disentangle the dimensions of cognitive enhancement, review prominent examples of cognitive enhancers that differ across these dimensions, and thereby provide a framework for both theoretical discussions and empirical research.

Non-pharmacological cognitive enhancement.

The term "cognitive enhancement" usually characterizes interventions in humans that aim to improve mental functioning beyond what is necessary to sustain or restore good health. While the current bioethical debate mainly concentrates on pharmaceuticals, according to the given characterization, cognitive enhancement also by non-pharmacological means has to be regarded as enhancement proper. Here we summarize empirical data on approaches using nutrition, physical exercise, sleep, meditation, mnemonic strategies, computer training, and brain stimulation for enhancing cognitive capabilities. Several of these non-pharmacological enhancement strategies seem to be more efficacious compared to currently available pharmaceuticals usually coined as cognitive enhancers. While many ethical arguments of the cognitive enhancement debate apply to both pharmacological and non-pharmacological enhancers, some of them appear in new light when considered on the background of non-pharmacological enhancement. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled 'Cognitive Enhancers'.