Aesthetic emotions are affected by context: a psychometric network analysis.

Aesthetic emotions are defined as emotions arising when a person evaluates a stimulus for its aesthetic appeal. Whether these emotions are unique to aesthetic activities is debated. We address this debate by examining if recollections of different types of engaging activities entail different emotional profiles. A large sample of participants were asked to recall engaging aesthetic (N = 167), non-aesthetic (N = 160), or consumer (N = 172) activities. They rated the extent to which 75 candidate aesthetic emotions were evoked by these activities. We applied a computational psychometric network approach to represent and compare the space of these emotions across the three conditions. At the behavioral level, recalled aesthetic activities were rated as the least vivid but most intense compared to the two other conditions. At the network level, we found several quantitative differences across the three conditions, related to the typology, community (clusters) and core nodes (emotions) of these networks. Our results suggest that aesthetic and non-aesthetic activities evoke emotional spaces differently. Thus, we propose that aesthetic emotions are distributed differently in a multidimensional aesthetic space than for other engaging activities. Our results highlight the context-specificity of aesthetic emotions.

What kind of impacts can artwork have on viewers? Establishing a taxonomy for aesthetic impacts.

What kinds of impacts can visual art have on a viewer? To identify potential art impacts, we recruited five aesthetics experts from different academic disciplines: art history, neuroscience, philosophy, psychology and theology. Together, the group curated a set of terms that corresponded to descriptive features (124 terms) and cognitive-affective impacts (69 terms) of artworks. Using these terms as prompts, participants (n = 899) were given one minute to generate words for each term related to how an artwork looked (descriptive features) or made them think or feel (cognitive-affective impacts). Using network psychometric approaches, we identified terms that were semantically similar based on participants' responses and applied hierarchical exploratory graph analysis to map the relationships between the terms. Our analyses identified 17 descriptive dimensions, which could be further reduced to 5, and 11 impact dimensions, which could be further reduced to 4. The resulting taxonomy demonstrated overlap between the descriptive and impact networks as well as consistency with empirical evidence. This taxonomy could serve as the foundation to empirically evaluate art's impacts on viewers.

Context matters: Novel metaphors in supportive and non-supportive contexts.

Creative language is defined as linguistic output that is both novel and appropriate. Metaphors are one such example of creative language in which one concept is used to express another by highlighting relevant semantic features. While novelty is an inherent property of unfamiliar metaphors, appropriateness depends on the context. The current study tests the hypothesis that the context in which metaphors are encountered affects their processing. We examined the neural effects of comprehending metaphors in context by comparing neural activations in response to novel metaphors and literal sentences that were either embedded in a meaningful narrative or in matched jabberwocky contexts. We found that the neural correlates of processing metaphoric sentences and their literal counterparts are indistinguishable when embedded in a narrative: both conditions activate bilateral areas along the anterior temporal poles, middle temporal gyri, superior temporal sulci, and the angular gyri. Metaphors embedded in a narrative as compared to their identical counterparts embedded in jabberwocky show increased responses in sensorimotor areas that correspond to the modality of the literal meaning of the target word, perhaps reflecting deeper semantic processing. Our results confirm that context affects neural mechanisms for understanding creative ideas.

Selective Metaphor Impairments After Left, Not Right, Hemisphere Injury.

The relative contributions of the left and right hemispheres to the processing of metaphoric language remains unresolved. Neuropsychological studies of brain-injured patients have motivated the hypothesis that the right hemisphere plays a critical role in understanding metaphors. However, the data are inconsistent and the hypothesis is not well-supported by neuroimaging research. To address this ambiguity about the right hemisphere's role, we administered a metaphor sentence comprehension task to 20 left-hemisphere injured patients, 20 right hemisphere injured patients, and 20 healthy controls. Stimuli consisted of metaphors of three different types: predicate metaphors based on action verbs, nominal metaphors based on event nouns, and nominal metaphors based on entity nouns. For each metaphor (n = 60), a closely matched literal sentence with the same source term was also generated. Each sentence was followed by four adjective-noun answer choices (target + three foil types) and participants were instructed to select the phrase that best matched the meaning of the sentence. As a group, both left and right hemisphere patients performed worse on metaphoric than literal sentences, and the degree of this difficulty varied for the different types of metaphor - but there was no difference between the two patient groups. Tests for literal-metaphor dissociations at the level of single cases revealed two types of impairments: general comprehension deficits affecting metaphors and literal sentences equally, and selective metaphor impairments that were specific to different types of metaphor. All cases with selective metaphor deficits had injury to the left hemisphere, and no known comprehension difficulties with literal language. Our results argue against the hypothesis of a specific or necessary contribution of the right hemisphere for understanding metaphoric language. Further, they reveal deficits in metaphoric language comprehension not captured by traditional language assessments, suggesting overlooked communication difficulties in left hemisphere patients.

Stimulus needs are a moving target: 240 additional matched literal and metaphorical sentences for testing neural hypotheses about metaphor.

As the cognitive neuroscience of metaphor has evolved, so too have the theoretical questions of greatest interest. To keep pace with these developments, in the present study we generated a large set of metaphoric and literal sentence pairs ideally suited to addressing the current methodological and conceptual needs of metaphor researchers. In particular, the need has emerged to distinguish metaphors along three dimensions: the grammatical class of their base terms, the sensorimotor features of their base terms, and the syntactic form in which the base terms appear. To meet this need, we generated nominal metaphors (and matched literal sentences) using entity nouns as the base terms, with the intention that they be used in concert with already published sets of predicate metaphors or nominal metaphors using event nouns. Using the results of three norming experiments, we provide 120 pairs of closely matched metaphoric and literal sentences that are characterized along 14 dimensions: 11 at the sentence level (length, frequency, concreteness, familiarity, naturalness, imageability, figurativeness, interpretability, ease of interpretation, valence, and valence judgment reaction time), and three related to the base term (visual, motion, and auditory imagery). These items extend previously published stimuli, filling an extant gap in metaphor research and allowing for tests of new behavioral and neural hypotheses about metaphor.

Metaphor: Bridging embodiment to abstraction.

Embodied cognition accounts posit that concepts are grounded in our sensory and motor systems. An important challenge for these accounts is explaining how abstract concepts, which do not directly call upon sensory or motor information, can be informed by experience. We propose that metaphor is one important vehicle guiding the development and use of abstract concepts. Metaphors allow us to draw on concrete, familiar domains to acquire and reason about abstract concepts. Additionally, repeated metaphoric use drawing on particular aspects of concrete experience can result in the development of new abstract representations. These abstractions, which are derived from embodied experience but lack much of the sensorimotor information associated with it, can then be flexibly applied to understand new situations.

Fronto-temporal regions encode the manner of motion in spatial language.

When describing spatial events, dynamic actions can be decomposed into the path of motion (where the object moves), and the manner of motion (how the object moves). These components may be instantiated in two processing streams in the human brain, wherein dorsal parietal areas process path-related information, while ventral temporal regions process manner information. Previous research showed this pattern during the observation of videos showing animate characters in motion [15]. It is unknown whether reading language describing path and manner information - a level of abstraction beyond the perception of visual motion - relies on similar mechanisms. Here, we use functional neuroimaging to show that the left pMTG processes the manner of motion during reading. We also demonstrate the involvement of other ventral fronto-temporal regions in the understanding of manner of motion in spatial language.

Flying under the radar: figurative language impairments in focal lesion patients.

Despite the prevalent and natural use of metaphor in everyday language, the neural basis of this powerful communication device remains poorly understood. Early studies of brain-injured patients suggested the right hemisphere plays a critical role in metaphor comprehension, but more recent patient and neuroimaging studies do not consistently support this hypothesis. One explanation for this discrepancy is the challenge in designing optimal tasks for brain-injured populations. As traditional aphasia assessments do not assess figurative language comprehension, we designed a new metaphor comprehension task to consider whether impaired metaphor processing is missed by standard clinical assessments. Stimuli consisted of 60 pairs of moderately familiar metaphors and closely matched literal sentences. Sentences were presented visually in a randomized order, followed by four adjective-noun answer choices (target + three foil types). Participants were instructed to select the phrase that best matched the meaning of the sentence. We report the performance of three focal lesion patients and a group of 12 healthy, older controls. Controls performed near ceiling in both conditions, with slightly more accurate performance on literal than metaphoric sentences. While the Western Aphasia Battery (Kertesz, 1982) and the objects and actions naming battery (Druks and Masterson, 2000) indicated minimal to no language difficulty, our metaphor comprehension task indicated three different profiles of metaphor comprehension impairment in the patients' performance. Single case statistics revealed comparable impairment on metaphoric and literal sentences, disproportionately greater impairment on metaphors than literal sentences, and selective impairment on metaphors. We conclude our task reveals that patients can have selective metaphor comprehension deficits. These deficits are not captured by traditional neuropsychological language assessments, suggesting overlooked communication difficulties.

The specificity of action knowledge in sensory and motor systems.

Neuroimaging studies have found that sensorimotor systems are engaged when participants observe actions or comprehend action language. However, most of these studies have asked the binary question of whether action concepts are embodied or not, rather than whether sensory and motor areas of the brain contain graded amounts of information during putative action simulations. To address this question, we used repetition suppression (RS) functional magnetic resonance imaging to determine if functionally-localized motor movement and visual motion regions-of-interest (ROI) and two anatomical ROIs (inferior frontal gyrus, IFG; left posterior middle temporal gyrus, pMTG) were sensitive to changes in the exemplar (e.g., two different people "kicking") or representational format (e.g., photograph or schematic drawing of someone "kicking") within pairs of action images. We also investigated whether concrete versus more symbolic depictions of actions (i.e., photographs or schematic drawings) yielded different patterns of activation throughout the brain. We found that during a conceptual task, sensory and motor systems represent actions at different levels of specificity. While the visual motion ROI did not exhibit RS to different exemplars of the same action or to the same action depicted by different formats, the motor movement ROI did. These effects are consistent with "person-specific" action simulations: if the motor system is recruited for action understanding, it does so by activating one's own motor program for an action. We also observed significant repetition enhancement within the IFG ROI to different exemplars or formats of the same action, a result that may indicate additional cognitive processing on these trials. Finally, we found that the recruitment of posterior brain regions by action concepts depends on the format of the input: left lateral occipital cortex and right supramarginal gyrus responded more strongly to symbolic depictions of actions than concrete ones.

Action concepts in the brain: an activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis.

Many recent neuroimaging studies have investigated the representation of semantic memory for actions in the brain. We used activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analyses to answer two outstanding questions about the neural basis of action concepts. First, on an "embodied" view of semantic memory, evidence to date is unclear regarding whether visual motion or motor systems are more consistently engaged by action concepts. Second, few studies have directly investigated the possibility that action concepts accessed verbally or nonverbally recruit different areas of the brain. Because our meta-analyses did not include studies requiring the perception of dynamic depictions of actions or action execution, we were able to determine whether conceptual processing alone recruits visual motion and motor systems. Significant concordance in brain regions within or adjacent to visual motion areas emerged in all meta-analyses. By contrast, we did not observe significant concordance in motor or premotor cortices in any analysis. Neural differences between action images and action verbs followed a gradient of abstraction among representations derived from visual motion information in the left lateral temporal and occipital cortex. The consistent involvement of visual motion but not motor brain regions in representing action concepts may reflect differences in the variability of experience across individuals with perceiving versus performing actions.

Not all analogies are created equal: Associative and categorical analogy processing following brain damage.

Current research on analogy processing assumes that different conceptual relations are treated similarly. However, just as words and concepts are related in distinct ways, different kinds of analogies may employ distinct types of relationships. An important distinction in how words are related is the difference between associative (dog-bone) and categorical (dog-cat) relations. To test the hypothesis that analogical mapping of different types of relations would have different neural instantiations, we tested patients with left and right hemisphere lesions on their ability to understand two types of analogies, ones expressing an associative relationship and others expressing a categorical relationship. Voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM) and behavioral analyses revealed that associative analogies relied on a large left-lateralized language network while categorical analogies relied on both left and right hemispheres. The verbal nature of the task could account for the left hemisphere findings. We argue that categorical relations additionally rely on the right hemisphere because they are more difficult, abstract, and fragile, and contain more distant relationships.

From novel to familiar: tuning the brain for metaphors.

Metaphors are fundamental to creative thought and expression. Newly coined metaphors regularly infiltrate our collective vocabulary and gradually become familiar, but it is unclear how this shift from novel to conventionalized meaning happens in the brain. We investigated the neural career of metaphors in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study using extensively normed new metaphors and simulated the ordinary, gradual experience of metaphor conventionalization by manipulating participants' exposure to these metaphors. Results showed that the conventionalization of novel metaphors specifically tunes activity within bilateral inferior prefrontal cortex, left posterior middle temporal gyrus, and right postero-lateral occipital cortex. These results support theoretical accounts attributing a role for the right hemisphere in processing novel, low salience figurative meanings, but also show that conventionalization of metaphoric meaning is a bilaterally-mediated process. Metaphor conventionalization entails a decreased neural load within semantic networks rather than a hemispheric or regional shift across brain areas.

Deconstructing events: the neural bases for space, time, and causality.

Space, time, and causality provide a natural structure for organizing our experience. These abstract categories allow us to think relationally in the most basic sense; understanding simple events requires one to represent the spatial relations among objects, the relative durations of actions or movements, and the links between causes and effects. The present fMRI study investigates the extent to which the brain distinguishes between these fundamental conceptual domains. Participants performed a 1-back task with three conditions of interest (space, time, and causality). Each condition required comparing relations between events in a simple verbal narrative. Depending on the condition, participants were instructed to either attend to the spatial, temporal, or causal characteristics of events, but between participants each particular event relation appeared in all three conditions. Contrasts compared neural activity during each condition against the remaining two and revealed how thinking about events is deconstructed neurally. Space trials recruited neural areas traditionally associated with visuospatial processing, primarily bilateral frontal and occipitoparietal networks. Causality trials activated areas previously found to underlie causal thinking and thematic role assignment, such as left medial frontal and left middle temporal gyri, respectively. Causality trials also produced activations in SMA, caudate, and cerebellum; cortical and subcortical regions associated with the perception of time at different timescales. The time contrast, however, produced no significant effects. This pattern, indicating negative results for time trials but positive effects for causality trials in areas important for time perception, motivated additional overlap analyses to further probe relations between domains. The results of these analyses suggest a closer correspondence between time and causality than between time and space.

Stimulus design is an obstacle course: 560 matched literal and metaphorical sentences for testing neural hypotheses about metaphor.

Despite the ubiquity and importance of metaphor in thought and communication, its neural mediation remains elusive. We suggest that this uncertainty reflects, in part, stimuli that have not been designed with recent conceptual frameworks in mind or that have been hampered by inadvertent differences between metaphoric and literal conditions. In this article, we begin addressing these shortcomings by developing a large, flexible, extensively normed, and theoretically motivated set of metaphoric and literal sentences. On the basis of the results of three norming studies, we provide 280 pairs of closely matched metaphoric and literal sentences that are characterized along 10 dimensions: length, frequency, concreteness, familiarity, naturalness, imageability, figurativeness, interpretability, valence, and valence judgment reaction time. In addition to allowing for control of these potentially confounding lexical and sentential factors, these stimuli are designed to address questions about the role of novelty, metaphor type, and sensory-motor grounding in determining the neural basis of metaphor comprehension. Supplemental data for this article may be downloaded from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.

Beyond laterality: a critical assessment of research on the neural basis of metaphor.

Metaphors are a fundamental aspect of human cognition. The major neuropsychological hypothesis that metaphoric processing relies primarily on the right hemisphere is not confirmed consistently. We propose ways to advance our understanding of the neuropsychology of metaphor that go beyond simple laterality. Neuropsychological studies need to more carefully control confounding lexical and sentential factors, and consider the role of different parts of speech as they are extended metaphorically. They need to incorporate recent theoretical frameworks such as the career of metaphor theory, and address factors such as novelty. We also advocate the use of new methods such as voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping, which permits precise and formal tests of hypotheses correlating behavior with lesions sites. Finally, we outline a plausible model for the neural basis of metaphor. (JINS, 2009, 16, 1-5.).

Prescribed spatial prepositions influence how we think about time.

Prepositions combine with nouns flexibly when describing concrete locative relations (e.g. at/on/in the school) but are rigidly prescribed when paired with abstract concepts (e.g. at risk; on Wednesday; in trouble). In the former case they do linguistic work based on their discrete semantic qualities, and in the latter they appear to serve a primarily grammatical function. We used the abstract concept of time as a test case to see if specific grammatically prescribed prepositions retain semantic content. Using ambiguous questions designed to interrogate one's meaningful representation of temporal relations, we found that the semantics of prescribed prepositions modulate how we think about time. Although prescribed preposition use is unlikely to be based on a core representational organization shared between space and time, results demonstrate that the semantics of particular locative prepositions do constrain how we think about paired temporal concepts.

Left inferior prefrontal cortex activity reflects inhibitory rather than facilitatory priming.

Functional neuroimaging has demonstrated reduced activation correlated with behavioral priming effects, a finding generally interpreted in terms of facilitated retrieval of target items in the context of related primes. Without a neutral prime, however, one cannot separate facilitatory effects of related primes from inhibitory effects of unrelated primes. Here we report an auditory semantic priming paradigm with congruent (''The boy bounced the BALL''), neutral (''The next item is BALL''), and incongruent (''Pasta is my favorite kind of BALL'') sentence trials. As previously reported, reduced left inferior prefrontal cortex activation was observed for congruent relative to incongruent trials; however, the neutral condition allowed us to show that the effect arose from increased activation in the incongruent condition rather than reduced activation for congruent trials. Our results suggest that the left inferior prefrontal cortex inhibits interference from prepotent representations in order to select a task-appropriate target, and is consistent with its broader role in behavioral inhibition.