Volition and control in law and in brain science: neurolegal translation of a foundational concept.

The law assumes that healthy adults are generally responsible for their actions and have the ability to control their behavior based on rational and moral principles. This contrasts with some recent neuroscientific accounts of action control. Nevertheless, both law and neuroscience acknowledge that strong emotions including fear and anger may "trigger" loss of normal voluntary control over action. Thus, "Loss of Control" is a partial defense for murder under English law, paralleling similar defenses in other legal systems. Here we consider the neuroscientific evidence for such legal classifications of responsibility, particularly focussing on how emotional states modulate voluntary motor control and sense of agency. First, we investigate whether neuroscience could contribute an evidence-base for law in this area. Second, we consider the societal impact of some areas where legal thinking regarding responsibility for action diverges from neuroscientific evidence: should we be guided by normative legal traditions, or by modern understanding of brain functions? In addressing these objectives, we propose a translation exercise between neuroscientific and legal terms, which may assist future interdisciplinary research.

Why neuroscience changes some things but not everything for the law.

Neuroenthusiasts and neuroskeptics both exaggerate the strength of their positions. Neuroscience is already having a significant impact in the courts in many jurisdictions and as knowledge from the cognitive sciences expands, that knowledge, wherever relevant, should continue to inform legal systems. However, neuroscience will only ever be one influence among many. In certain areas, for example, our understanding of fear responses or the reliability of memory evidence, the cognitive sciences may help challenge errors of folk psychology and assist the law to adopt better approaches. In other areas such as juvenile responsibility, developmental neuroscience may prove decisive in reinforcing messages from educational psychology and the behavioral sciences both in persuading legislators and judges but also importantly in altering public attitudes. Drawing on examples from a range of countries including Argentina, Australia, Canada, England, the Netherlands, Scotland, Slovenia, and the United States, we argue that legal systems must be open to and learn from science and must not be afraid to engage with science even where there is no clear scientific consensus.

Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of 'Neurorights'.

The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty - often framed as "neurorights" in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are taking an active interest in developing international policy and governance guidelines on this issue. However, in many discussions of neurorights the philosophical assumptions, ethical frames of reference and legal interpretation are either not made explicit or conflict with each other. The aim of this multidisciplinary work is to provide conceptual, ethical, and legal foundations that allow for facilitating a common minimalist conceptual understanding of mental privacy, mental integrity, and cognitive liberty to facilitate scholarly, legal, and policy discussions.

Reforming automatism and insanity: Neuroscience and claims of lack of capacity for control.

This paper examines some of the issues raised by the current criminal law defence of automatism and the related defence of insane automatism, and considers what neuroscience may contribute to the reform discussion. It also considers some of the claims made in relation to the impact of neuroimaging in the courtroom. It examines an American medical case report in which an individual's criminal behaviour is linked to a brain tumour, and considers how the reformed law as presented in the Law Commission for England and Wales' Discussion Paper might treat such claims. It concludes by examining what assistance the law may gain from a deeper understanding of how a sense of agency emerges from brain states, and the implications of this scientific knowledge for the reform of the law.

The use of neuroscientific evidence in the courtroom by those accused of criminal offenses in England and Wales.

This examination of the extent of the use of neuroscientific evidence in England and Wales identifies 204 reported cases in which such evidence has been used by those accused of criminal offenses during the eight-year period from 2005-12. Based on the number of reported cases found, the use of such evidence appears well established with those accused of criminal offenses utilizing such evidence in approximately 1 per cent of cases in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Neuroscientific evidence is used to quash convictions, to lead to convictions for lesser offenses and to lead to reduced sentences. In addition, cases are identified where neuroscientific evidence is used to avoid extradition, to challenge bail conditions and to resist prosecution appeals against unduly lenient sentences. The range of uses identified is wide: including challenging prosecution evidence as to the cause of death or injury, challenging the credibility of witnesses and arguing that those convicted were unfit to plead, lacked mens rea or were entitled to mental condition defenses. The acceptance of such evidence reflects the willingness of the courts in England and Wales to hear novel scientific argument, where it is valid and directly relevant to the issue(s) to be decided. Indeed, in some of the cases the courts expressed an expectation that structural brain scan evidence should have been presented to support the argument being made.

Are there lessons to be learned from a more scientific approach to mental condition defences?

The timing of the English Law Commission's consideration of reform to the law of insanity coincides with increasing scientific and in particular neuroscientific understanding of the brain. The work of researchers is leading to a greater comprehension of what had been termed irresistible impulses to commit crime and of the impact of brain damage, particularly evidence of brain lesions and frontal lobe damage on behaviour. There remain problems in establishing causal relationships which might diminish or eliminate criminal responsibility for crimes committed by those suffering from pre existing mental conditions at the time they commit a criminal offence. This is especially the case where those mental conditions are of short duration. However, the law should not ignore the best available scientific knowledge. Neuroscientific advances are already informing court deliberations in England and Wales: assisting in considerations of guilt, fitness to plead and in sentencing. In terms of the insanity defence the questions that the law seeks to address are not necessarily the most medically or scientifically pertinent questions. They remain grounded in 19th century scientific understanding. It is argued that the more nuanced Dutch approach to mental condition defences warrants very serious consideration by those charged with making proposals to reform the English law.