Whole-exome sequencing in pediatrics: parents' considerations toward return of unsolicited findings for their child.

Parents' preferences for unsolicited findings (UFs) from diagnostic whole-exome sequencing (WES) for their children remain largely unexplored. Our aim was to gain insight into parental considerations favoring acceptance/decline of UFs pertaining to their child. We conducted 20 qualitative, semistructured interviews with parents (n=34) of children with a developmental delay, aged <1 to 17 years, after consenting to WES, but before feedback of results. Key findings from our study were that all parents favored acceptance of UFs for medically actionable conditions in childhood, but that preferences and considerations diverged for UFs with no medical actionability, or only in adulthood, and regarding carrier-status. Sometimes non-medical utility considerations (considerations of usefulness of knowing UFs, not rooted in (preventive) medical treatment or controls) were given in favor of disclosure of UFs. Sometimes the child's future autonomy formed a reason to withhold UFs at present, despite an unfavorable prognosis concerning the child's cognitive capabilities. Some parents only preferred receiving UFs if these findings were directly related to their reasons for seeking a diagnosis. These findings are essential for developing morally responsible policy and for counseling. Further research should focus on whether considerations of non-medical utility alone can justify disclosure of UFs and whether reasons for seeking a diagnosis place further constraints on what UFs may be returned/withheld. How parents can be aided in contemplating different scenarios regarding their child's future development also deserves further inquiry.

Dotting the I's and crossing the T's: autonomy and/or beneficence? The 'fetus as a patient' in maternal-fetal surgery.

Chervenak and McCullough, authors of the most acknowledged ethical framework for maternal-fetal surgery, rely on the 'ethical-obstetrical' concept of the fetus as a patient in order to determine what is morally owed to fetuses by both physicians and the women who gestate them in the context of prenatal surgery. In this article, we reconstruct the argumentative structure of their framework and present an internal criticism. First, we analyse the justificatory arguments put forward by the authors regarding the moral status of the fetus qua patient. Second, we discuss the internal coherence and consistency of the moral obligations those authors derive from that concept. We claim that some of the dilemmas their approach is purported to avoid, such as the debate about the independent moral status of the fetus, and the foundation of the moral obligations of pregnant women (towards the fetuses they gestate) are not, all things considered, avoided. Chervenak and McCullough construct the obligations of physicians as obligations towards entities with equal moral status. But, at the same time, they assume that the woman has an independent moral status while the moral status of the fetus is dependent on the decision of the woman to present it to a physician for care. According to the logic of their own argumentation, Chervenak and McCullough implicitly admit a different moral status of the woman and the fetus, which will lead to different ascription of duties of the physician than those they ascribed.