Market landscape and insurer-provider integration: the case of ambulatory surgery centers.

Insurer-provider integration is a new form of vertical integration, with increasing prominence in health care markets. While there are potential benefits from tighter alignment between providers and payers, risks of perverse impacts on health care markets loom large. Yet, little is known about this new wave of consolidation, which limits options for policy or regulatory responses. We focus on a dominant insurer's acquisitions of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) to document the growth and geographic spread of these ownership events. We found that a diverse swathe of the United States has experienced an insurer-led ASC takeover. The acquisitions are also more frequently in areas where the insurer holds a higher enrollee market share at baseline, although a linear prediction of the likelihood of ASC acquisition shows a more nuanced picture.

Association between physician age and patterns of end-of-life care among older Americans.

BACKGROUND: End-of-life (EOL) care patterns may differ by physician age given differences in how physicians are trained or changes associated with aging. We sought to compare patterns of EOL care delivered to older Americans according to physician age. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional study of a 20% sample of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries aged ≥66 years who died in 2016-2019 (n = 487,293). We attributed beneficiaries to the physician who had >50% of primary care visits during the last 6 months of life. We compared beneficiary-level outcomes by physician age (<40, 40-49, 50-59, or ≥60) in two areas: (1) advance care planning (ACP) and palliative care; and (2) high-intensity care at the EOL. RESULTS: Beneficiaries attributed to younger physicians had slightly higher proportions of billed ACP (adjusted proportions, 17.1%, 16.1%, 15.5%, and 14.0% for physicians aged <40, 40-49, 50-59, and ≥60, respectively; p-for-trend adjusted for multiple comparisons <0.001) and palliative care counseling or hospice use in the last 180 days of life (64.5%, 63.6%, 61.9%, and 60.8%; p-for-trend <0.001). Similarly, physicians' younger age was associated with slightly lower proportions of emergency department visits (57.4%, 57.0%, 57.4%, and 58.1%; p-for-trend <0.001), hospital admissions (51.2%, 51.1%, 51.4%, and 52.1%; p-for-trend <0.001), intensive care unit admissions (27.8%, 27.9%, 28.2%, and 28.3%; p-for-trend = 0.03), or mechanical ventilation or cardiopulmonary resuscitation (14.2, 14.9%, 15.2%, and 15.3%; p-for-trend <0.001) in the last 30 days of life, and in-hospital death (20.2%, 20.6%, 21.3%, and 21.5%; p-for-trend <0.001). CONCLUSIONS: We found that differences in patterns of EOL care between beneficiaries cared for by younger and older physicians were small, and thus, not clinically meaningful. Future research is warranted to understand the factors that can influence patterns of EOL care provided by physicians, including initial and continuing medical education.

The segregation of physician networks providing care to black and white patients with heart disease: Concepts, measures, and empirical evaluation.

Black-White disparities in cardiac care may be related to physician referral network segregation. We developed and tested new geographic physician network segregation measures. We used Medicare claims to identify Black and White Medicare heart disease patients and map physician networks for 169 hospital referral regions (HRRs) with over 1000 Black patients. We constructed two network segregation indexes ranging from 0 (integration) to 100 (total segregation): Dissimilarity (the unevenness of Black and White patient distribution across physicians [Dn]) and Absolute Clustering (the propensity of Black patients' physicians to have closer ties with each other than with other physicians [ACLn]). We employed conditional logit models to estimate the probability of using the best (lowest mortality) geographically available hospital for Black and White patients undergoing coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) surgery in 126 markets with sufficient sample size at increasing levels of network segregation and for low vs. high HRR Black patient population. Physician network segregation was lower than residential segregation (Dissimilarity 21.9 vs. 48.7, and Absolute Clustering 4.8 vs. 32.4) and positively correlated with residential segregation (p < .001). Network segregation effects differed by race and HRR Black patient population. For White patients, higher network segregation was associated with a higher probability of using the best available hospitals in HRRs with few black patients but unchanged (ACLn) or lower (Dn) probability of best hospital use in HRRs with many Black patients. For Black patients, higher network segregation was not associated with a substantial change in the probability of best hospital use regardless of the HRR Black patient population size. Measuring physician network segregation is feasible and associated with nuanced effects on Black-White differences in high-quality hospital use for heart disease. Further work is needed to understand underlying mechanisms and potential uses in health equity policy.

Understanding the social risk factor adjustment's effect on Star Ratings.

OBJECTIVES: CMS implemented the Categorical Adjustment Index (CAI) to address measurement bias in the Medicare Advantage (MA) Star Ratings, as unadjusted scores may disadvantage MA contracts serving more enrollees at greater social risk. CAI values are added to a contract's Star Ratings to adjust for the mean within-contract performance disparity associated with its percentage of enrollees with low socioeconomic status (ie, receipt of a Part D low-income subsidy or dual eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid [LIS/DE]) and who are disabled. We examined the CAI's effect on Star Ratings and the type of contracts affected. STUDY DESIGN: Observational study of MA contracts with health and prescription drug coverage. METHODS: We compared adjusted and unadjusted 2017-2020 Star Ratings overall and by contracts' proportion of LIS/DE and disabled enrollees. We assessed the CAI's effect on qualifying for quality bonus payments (QBPs), eligibility for rebate payments, and high-performing and low-performing designations. RESULTS: The CAI's impact was modest overall (3.2%-14.9% of contracts experienced one-half Star Rating changes). Upward changes were concentrated among contracts with high percentages of LIS/DE or disabled enrollees (7.7%-32.3% of these contracts saw increased Star Ratings). In 2020, 26.0% of contracts with a high proportion of LIS/DE or disabled enrollees that qualified for a QBP did so because of the CAI. CONCLUSIONS: The CAI primarily affected contracts with high LIS/DE or disabled enrollment, which received higher Star Ratings because of the CAI. The adjustment helps ensure that such contracts' performance is not understated and reduces incentives for MA contracts to avoid patients at greater social risk.