Children's anthropomorphism of inanimate agents.

This review article examines the extant literature on animism and anthropomorphism in infants and young children. A substantial body of work indicates that both infants and young children have a broad concept of what constitutes a sentient agent and react to inanimate objects as they do to people in the same context. The literature has also revealed a developmental pattern in which anthropomorphism decreases with age, but social robots appear to be an exception to this pattern. Additionally, the review shows that children attribute psychological properties to social robots less so than people but still anthropomorphize them. Importantly, some research suggests that anthropomorphism of social robots is dependent upon their morphology and human-like behaviors. The extent to which children anthropomorphize robots is dependent on their exposure to them and the presence of human-like features. Based on the existing literature, we conclude that in infancy, a large range of inanimate objects (e.g., boxes, geometric figures) that display animate motion patterns trigger the same behaviors observed in child-adult interactions, suggesting some implicit form of anthropomorphism. The review concludes that additional research is needed to understand what infants and children judge as social agents and how the perception of inanimate agents changes over the lifespan. As exposure to robots and virtual assistants increases, future research must focus on better understanding the full impact that regular interactions with such partners will have on children's anthropomorphizing. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Learning Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development Computer Science and Robotics > Robotics.

Do preschoolers trust a competent robot pointer?

How young children learn from different informants has been widely studied. However, most studies investigate how children learn verbally conveyed information. Furthermore, most studies investigate how children learn from humans. This study sought to investigate how 3-year-old children learn from, and come to trust, a competent robot versus an incompetent human when competency is established using a pointing paradigm. During an induction phase, a robot informant pointed at a toy inside a transparent box, whereas a human pointed at an empty box. During the test phase, both agents pointed at opaque boxes. We found that young children asked the robot for help to locate a hidden toy more than the human (ask questions) and correctly identified the robot to be accurate (judgment questions). However, children equally endorsed the locations pointed at by both the robot and the human (endorse questions). This suggests that 3-year-olds are sensitive to the epistemic characteristics of the informant even when its displayed social properties are minimal.

Of children and social robots.

In the target article, Clark and Fischer argue that little is known about children's perceptions of social robots. By reviewing the existing literature we demonstrate that infants and young children interact with robots in the same ways they do with other social agents. Importantly, we conclude children's understanding that robots are artifacts (e.g., not alive) develops gradually during the preschool years.

Preschoolers' anthropomorphizing of robots: Do human-like properties matter?

Prior work has yielded contradicting evidence regarding the age at which children consistently and correctly categorize things as living or non-living. The present study tested children's animacy judgments about robots with a Naïve Biology task. In the Naïve Biology task, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked if robots, animals, or artifacts possessed mechanical or biological internal parts. To gauge how much children anthropomorphize robots in comparison to animals and artifacts, children also responded to a set of interview questions. To examine the role of morphology, two robots were used: a humanoid robot (Nao) and a non-humanoid robot (Dash). To investigate the role of dynamic characteristics, children saw one robot behave in a goal-directed manner (i.e., moving towards a ball) and one robot exhibit non-goal-directed behavior (i.e., moving away from a ball). Children of both age groups correctly attributed biological insides to the animal and mechanical insides to the artifact. However, 3-year-olds seemed confused about what belonged inside both robots and assigned biological and mechanical insides equally. In contrast, 5-year-olds correctly assigned mechanical insides to both robots, regardless of the robot's morphology or goal-directedness. Regarding the Animacy Interview, 3-year-olds performed at chance level when asked about the animacy of robots, animals, and artifacts. In contrast, 5-year-olds correctly attributed animacy to animals and accurately refrained from anthropomorphizing artifacts and the non-humanoid robot Dash. However, 5-year-olds performed at chance for Nao, suggesting they may be confused about the psychological properties of a human-looking robot. Taken together, these findings reveal a developmental transition during the preschool years in the attribution of biological and psychological properties to social robot.

Specificity of representations in infants' visual statistical learning.

Past work has demonstrated infants' robust statistical learning across visual and auditory modalities. However, the specificity of representations produced via visual statistical learning has not been fully explored. The current study addressed this by investigating infants' abilities to identify previously learned object sequences when some object features (e.g., shape, face) aligned with prior learning and other features did not. Experiment 1 replicated past work demonstrating that infants can learn statistical regularities across sequentially presented objects and extended this finding to 16-month-olds. In Experiment 2, infants viewed test sequences in which one object feature (e.g., face) had been removed but the other feature (e.g., shape) was maintained, resulting in failure to identify familiar sequences. We further probed learning specificity by assessing infants' recognition of sequences when one feature was altered rather than removed (Experiment 3) and when one feature was uncorrelated with the original sequence structure (Experiment 4). In both cases, infants failed to identify sequences in which object features were not identical between learning and test. These findings suggest that infants are limited in their ability to generalize the statistical structure of an object sequence when the objects' features do not align between learning and test.

Comparison facilitates the use of height information by 5-month-olds in containment events.

Past research has shown a discrepancy in young infants' use of height information in occlusion and containment events-a pattern typically accounted for by event categorization and rule learning. Broadening these theories, the present experiment examined the role of comparison in young infants' reasoning about physical events. We rotated a typical setup of a top-open container 90 degrees such that the opening now faced the side. An object was held vertically aligned with the side opening, enhancing the direct comparison of height. After the object was glided behind or inside the container and became hidden, 5-month-olds detected a height change in both containment and occlusion events. Thus, enhanced support for comparison facilitated young infants' use of key information in physical events (i.e., height in containment events). The finding underscores the importance of considering the role of comparison in the research of intuitive physics in infancy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).