The pre-Darwinian history of the comparative method, 1555-1855.

The comparative method, closely identified with Darwinian evolutionary biology, also has a long pre-Darwinian history. The method derives its scientific power from its ability to interpret comparative observations with reference to a theory of relatedness among the entities being compared (the comparates). Such scientifically powerful strong comparison is distinguished from weak comparison, which lacks such theoretical grounding. This paper examines the history of the strong comparison permitted by the comparative method from the early modern period to the threshold of the Darwinian revolution in the mid nineteenth century. It interprets the work of early pioneers such as Belon, Willis, Perrault, and Tyson from this methodological perspective, rather than focusing on their particular anatomical findings. Although these early writers made formative scientific contributions through their comparative investigations, the more theoretically grounded application of the comparative method by Geoffroy, Cuvier, and Owen was instrumental in laying the foundation for its later incorporation into Darwinian evolutionary theory.

Synthesis and separation in the history of "nature" and "nurture".

For much of the 20th century scientific psychology treated the relative contributions of nature and nurture to the development of phenotypes as the result of two quite separate sources of influence. One, nature, was linked to biological perspectives, often manifest as "instinct", while the other, nurture, was taken to reflect psychological influences. We argue that this separation was contingent on historical circumstance. Prior to about 1920, several perspectives in biology and psychology promoted the synthesis of nature and nurture. But between 1930 and 1980 that synthetic consensus was lost in America as numerous influences converged to promote a view that identified psychological and biological aspects of mind and behavior as inherently separate. Around 1960, during the hegemony of behaviorism, Daniel Lehrman, Gilbert Gottlieb, and other pioneers of developmental psychobiology developed probabilistic epigenesis to reject predeterminist notions of instinct and restore a synthesis. We describe the earlier and later periods of synthesis and discuss several influences that led to the separation of nature and nurture in the middle of the 20th century.

Three pioneers of comparative psychology in America, 1843-1890: Lewis H. Morgan, John Bascom, and Joseph LeConte.

Scientific comparative psychology in America dates from the mid-1890s, but there is a body of earlier literature on the topic, written during a period of theistic debates over Darwinian evolution. The anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan rejected instinct as an explanation of animal behavior in 1843 and defended the mental similarities between animals and humans, although he was not an evolutionist. John Bascom's textbook Comparative Psychology (1878) is the earliest American work to use that title, and its theistic approach anticipates some arguments found in much later evolutionary works. Beginning in 1860, the geologist Joseph LeConte, who is well known for defending the compatibility of evolution and religion, wrote several articles in which he outlined a comparative evolutionary approach to psychological problems. However, these writers did not establish a coherent research tradition and were ignored by the "New Psychologists" of the 1880s.

An early manuscript in the history of American comparative psychology: Lewis Henry Morgan's "Animal Psychology" (1857).

Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) is best known as the 1st ethnographer of Native American culture, but he also wrote on animal psychology, beginning in 1843, some 50 years before the founding of comparative psychology as a scientific discipline. Although not an evolutionist, Morgan argued that animals possess many human mental abilities, such as reason and moral judgment, and he rejected the scientific utility of the concept of instinct, a view that did not gain much currency in psychology until the rise of behaviorism in the 1920s. This 1857 manuscript, which is in the Lewis Henry Morgan Papers at the University of Rochester in Rochester, New York, formed the basis for the last chapter of his 1868 monograph on the American beaver but gives additional information on his sources and an expanded criticism of the concept of instinct.

Genes, interactions, and the development of behavior.

Explaining how genes influence behavior is important to many branches of psychology, including development, behavior genetics, and evolutionary psychology. Presented here is a developmental model linking the immediate consequence of gene activity (transcription of messenger RNA molecules from DNA sequences) to behavior through multiple molecular, cellular, and physiological levels. The model provides a level of detail appropriate to theories of behavioral development that recognizes the molecular level of gene action, dispensing with the metaphorical use of such terms as blueprints, plans, or constraints that has obscured much previous discussion. Special attention is paid to the possible role of immediate-early genes in initiating developmental responses to experience, adding specificity to the claim that neither genes nor experience act alone to shape development.