Revised nucleic acid test window periods: Applications and limitations in organ donation practice.

BACKGROUND: Nucleic acid test window periods for HIV, HCV, and HBV facilitate estimation of the residual risk of unexpected disease transmission and assist clinicians in determining the timeframe in which a recently acquired infection is at risk of nondetection. OBJECTIVES: Firstly, to provide revised estimates of the NAT window periods based on a currently used triplex NAT assay. Secondly, to examine their validity in organ donation and transplantation practice. METHOD: Estimates were based on the Procleix Ultrio Elite Assay (Grifols Diagnostic Solutions Inc. California, USA). The manufacturer's X50 and X95 limits of detection (LOD) were utilised. Viral doubling times of 0.85, 0.45, and 2.56 days and conversion factors for IU per ml to copies per mL of 0.6, 3.4, and 5 were assumed for HIV, HCV, and HBV respectively. Window periods were derived from the X50 and X95 LODs, based on a range of potential inoculum volumes. RESULTS: Calculated X50 window periods were 5.1 (4.5-5.8), 2.7 (2.4-2.9), and 16.6 (14.2-19.1) days for HIV, HCV, and HBV respectively. Calculated X50 window periods, based on whole body plasma volume, were 11.8 (10.3-13.3), 6.2 (5.6-6.8) and 36.7 (31.3-42.1) days respectively. CONCLUSION: X50 NAT window periods were significantly shorter for HBV and HCV and sit at the lower range of previously published estimates for HIV .  Current modeling assumptions may not account for all unexpected transmission events and may no longer be suitable for application to organ donation and transplantation.

Removal of UK-donor deferral for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: A large donation gain in Australia.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Until 25 July 2022, people who spent more than 6 months in the United Kingdom during the variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) risk period 1980-1996 (UK donors) were deferred from blood donation in Australia. Regulatory approval to remove the deferral was underpinned by published mathematical modelling predicting negligible vCJD transmission risk increase with a gain of 58,000 donations. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The donor questionnaire retained the UK deferral screening question until a version update effective 12 February 2023, which enabled identification of the newly eligible cohort of UK donors. Their donations were tracked for a 6-month period (25 July 2022-24 January 2023) and compared with baseline Lifeblood donation metrics and predicted gains. RESULTS: A total of 38,462 UK donors attended to donate 78,762 times in the 6 months. Of these, 32,358 donors (females = 19,456, males = 12,902) successfully donated 67,914 times representing 8.4% of total collections. CONCLUSION: Cessation of the UK deferral resulted in donation gains exceeding modelled predictions because of a higher than predicted number of donors who donated at a higher rate. Had these newly eligible donors not donated, overall donation numbers would have been 88% of target rather than the 96% achieved.

Recently Acquired Blood-borne Virus Infections in Australian Deceased Organ Donors: Estimation of the Residual Risk of Unexpected Transmission.

Unexpected donor-derived infections of hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and HIV are rare but important potential complications of deceased organ transplantation. The prevalence of recently acquired (yield) infections has not been previously described in a national cohort of Australian deceased organ donors. Donor yield infections are of particularly significance, as they can be used to gain insights in the incidence of disease in the donor pool and in turn, estimate the risk of unexpected disease transmission to recipients. Methods: We conducted a retrospective review of all patients who commenced workup for donation in Australia between 2014 and 2020. Yield cases were defined by having both unreactive serological screening for current or previous infection and reactive nucleic acid testing screening on initial and repeat testing. Incidence was calculated using a yield window estimate and residual risk using the incidence/window period model. Results: The review identified only a single yield infection of HBV in 3724 persons who commenced donation workup. There were no yield cases of HIV or HCV. There were no yield infections in donors with increased viral risk behaviors. The prevalence of HBV, HCV, and HIV was 0.06% (0.01-0.22), 0.00% (0-0.11), and 0.00% (0-0.11), respectively. The residual risk of HBV was estimated to be 0.021% (0.001-0.119). Conclusions: The prevalence of recently acquired HBV, HCV, and HIV in Australians who commence workup for deceased donation is low. This novel application of yield-case-methodology has produced estimates of unexpected disease transmission which are modest, particularly when contrasted with local average waitlist mortality. Supplemental Visual Abstract; http://links.lww.com/TXD/A503.

West Nile virus transfusion-transmission risk in Australia associated with a seasonal outbreak in the United States.

BACKGROUND: West Nile virus (WNV) is a potentially transfusion-transmissible virus endemic in the US. The aim of this study was to estimate the monthly WNV transfusion transmission (TT) risk in Australia associated with donors returning from the US in 2018 and consider the implications for mitigation strategies. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: We used a probabilistic risk model to estimate the monthly WNV TT risks for each outbreak state/district in the US for the 2018 transmission season and the cumulative monthly risk for all US states/districts. RESULTS: The highest monthly cumulative transfusion risk in Australia occurred in August 2018 when 746 West Nile neuroinvasive disease cases were reported in the US and the estimated mean WNV TT risk in Australia was 1 in 1.0 × 108 donations (95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.6 × 108 -7.0 × 107 ). The highest risk during August was associated with California, with a mean risk of 1 in 4.1 × 108 donations (95% CI: 2.9 × 108 -6.6 × 108 ), representing 24% of the total risk in Australia. The cumulative TT risk in Australia for the other 11 months varied from 1 in 1.5 × 108 donations (95% CI: 2.3 × 108 -1.0 × 108 ) in September to 1 in 3.9 × 1010 donations (95% CI: 6.1 × 1010 -2.7 × 1010 ) in February. DISCUSSION: Our modeling indicates that the WNV TT risk in Australia associated with seasonal outbreaks in the US is extremely small and may not warrant donation restrictions for donors returning from the US.

An Outbreak of Japanese Encephalitis Virus in Australia; What Is the Risk to Blood Safety?

A widespread outbreak of Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) was detected in mainland Australia in 2022 in a previous non-endemic area. Given JEV is known to be transfusion-transmissible, a rapid blood-safety risk assessment was performed using a simple deterministic model to estimate the risk to blood safety over a 3-month outbreak period during which 234,212 donors attended. The cumulative estimated incidence in donors was 82 infections with an estimated 4.26 viraemic components issued, 1.58 resulting in transfusion-transmission and an estimated risk of encephalitis of 1 in 4.3 million per component transfused over the risk period. Australia has initiated a robust public health response, including vector control, animal control and movement, and surveillance. Unlike West Nile virus, there is an effective vaccine that is being rolled-out to those at higher risk. Risk evaluation considered options such as restricting those potentially at risk to plasma for fractionation, which incorporates additional pathogen reduction, introducing a screening test, physicochemical pathogen reduction, quarantine, post donation illness policy changes and a new donor deferral. However, except for introducing a new deferral to potentially cover rare flavivirus risks, no option resulted in a clear risk reduction benefit but all posed threats to blood sufficiency or cost. Therefore, the blood safety risk was concluded to be tolerable without specific mitigations.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 and Blood Safety: An Updated Review.

Background: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a novel human coronavirus first identified in late 2019 and subsequently declared a worldwide pandemic in March 2020. In this review, we provide an overview of the implications of SARS-CoV-2 for blood safety and sufficiency. Summary: Approximately one-third of SARS-CoV-2 infections are asymptomatic. The reported mean incubation period typically varies from 2 to 11 days, but longer periods up to 22 days have been reported. The blood phase of SARS-CoV-2 appears to be brief and low level, with RNAaemia detectable in only a small proportion of patients, typically associated with more severe disease and not demonstrated to be infectious virus. A small number of presymptomatic and asymptomatic blood phase cases have been reported. Transfusion-transmission (TT) of SARS-CoV-2 has not been reported. Therefore, the TT risk associated with SARS-CoV-2 is currently theoretical. To mitigate any potential TT risk, but more importantly to prevent respiratory transmission in donor centers, blood services can implement donor deferral policies based on travel, disease status, or potential risk of exposure and encourage staff vaccination. Key Messages: The TT risk of SARS-CoV-2 appears to be low. The biggest risk to blood services in the current COVID-19 pandemic is to maintain the sufficiency of the blood supply while minimizing respiratory transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to donors and staff while donating blood.

Risk of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease transmission by blood transfusion in Australia.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Most of the 233 worldwide cases of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) have been reported in the United Kingdom and 3 have been associated with transfusion-transmission. To mitigate the potential vCJD risk to blood safety, Australian Red Cross Lifeblood imposes restrictions on blood donation from people with prior residency in, or extended travel to, the United Kingdom during the risk period 1980-1996. We have modified a previously published methodology to estimate the transfusion-transmission risk of vCJD associated with fresh component transfusion in Australia if the UK residence deferral was removed. MATERIALS AND METHODS: The prevalence of current pre-symptomatic vCJD infection in the United Kingdom by age at infection and genotype was estimated based on risk of exposure to the bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent for the period 1980-1996. These results were used to estimate the age-specific prevalence of undiagnosed, pre-symptomatic vCJD in the Australian population in the current year due to prior UK residency or travel. The primary model outputs were the 2020 vCJD risks/unit of vCJD contamination, transfusion-transmission (infections) and clinical cases. RESULTS: The overall (prior UK residency in and travel to United Kingdom, 1980-1996) mean risk of contamination per unit was 1 in 29,900,000. The risks of resulting vCJD transmission (infection) and clinical case were 1 in 389,000,000 and 1 in 1,450,000,000, respectively. CONCLUSION: Our modelling suggests that removing the Lifeblood donation deferral for travel to, or UK residence, would result in virtually no increased risk of vCJD transfusion-transmission and would be a safe and effective strategy for increasing the donor base.

Does a failed DRIL mean the end for a fistula? A case report in the use of an Amplatzer plug post DRIL procedure for ongoing steal syndrome.

Dialysis access steal syndrome is a well-recognised complication, affecting 1%-8% of all patients who undergo arteriovenous fistula formation particularly those that are brachial based. We present a case of ongoing steal syndrome following a DRIL procedure via retrograde flow in the ulnar artery. This was managed via a hybrid procedure and the use of an Amplatzer plug. This case demonstrates a novel use for the Amplatzer occlusion device, it is also a reminder that failure to occlude the vessel close to the fistula anastomosis can result in continued steal despite a functioning DRIL bypass.

Endoscopies, blood-borne viruses and blood donors: time to move on from precaution.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Based on the Council of Europe directive which dictates regulatory requirements in Australia, blood donors are currently deferred from donating for 4 months after an endoscopic procedure if either polyps were removed or a biopsy sample was taken. We aimed to assess the incidence of blood-borne viruses (BBVs) (HIV, hepatitis B and C) in blood donors who donated after an endoscopic procedure and evaluate the risk to blood safety through risk modelling. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Donors from 1/1/2013 to 31/12/2017 with an endoscopy deferral on their blood donor file with pre- and post-BBV testing were analysed to determine an incidence of BBVs using standard methods. The standard blood donor cohort was used as a comparator group. Using the incidence of endoscopies and BBV risk, the total residual risk estimate of allowing donors to return postendoscopy without restriction was calculated. RESULTS: The incidence of a BBV postendoscopy in this large cohort of 16,283 where testing has been confirmed postendoscopy was zero (95% CI 0-0·000105). The upper confidence interval of the zero events is 10·5 per 100 000 donations. Total positive donations from 2017 repeat donors were 1·87 per 100 000 (95% CI 0·0000117-0·0000277). Sensitivity analysis demonstrated that the residual risk remained negligible under realistic worst-case scenarios. CONCLUSION: A BBV endoscopy deferral is not required for blood safety in Australia. The presented data has enabled us to submit a request for an exemption to our regulator, which has been approved and the policy change subsequently implemented by Lifeblood on 4/4/2020.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2: implications for blood safety and sufficiency.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a novel coronavirus, first identified in China at the end of 2019 and has now caused a worldwide pandemic. In this review, we provide an overview of the implications of SARS-CoV-2 for blood safety and sufficiency. MATERIAL AND METHOD: We searched the PubMed database, the preprint sites bioRxiv and medRxiv, the websites of the World Health Organization, European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, the US Communicable Diseases Center and monitored ProMed updates. RESULTS: An estimated 15%-46% of SARS-CoV-2 infections are asymptomatic. The reported mean incubation period is 3 to 7 days with a range of 1-14 days. The blood phase of SARS-CoV-2 appears to be brief and low level, with RNAaemia detectable in only a small proportion of patients, typically associated with more severe disease and not demonstrated to be infectious virus. An asymptomatic blood phase has not been demonstrated. Given these characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 infection and the absence of reported transfusion transmission (TT), the TT risk is currently theoretical. To mitigate any potential TT risk, but more importantly to prevent respiratory transmission in donor centres, blood centres can implement donor deferral policies based on travel, disease status or potential risk of exposure. CONCLUSION: The TT risk of SARS-CoV-2 appears to be low. The biggest risk to blood services in the current COVID-19 pandemic is to maintain the sufficiency of the blood supply while minimizing respiratory transmission of SARS-CoV-19 to donors and staff while donating blood.

Modeling the West Nile virus transfusion transmission risk in a nonoutbreak country associated with traveling donors.

BACKGROUND: West Nile virus (WNV) is a mosquito-borne virus and transfusion transmission (TT) has been demonstrated. The European Union and neighboring countries experience an annual transmission season. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: We developed a novel probabilistic model to estimate the WNV TT risk in Australia attributable to returned donors who had travelled to the European Union and neighboring countries during the 2018. We estimated weekly WNV TT risks in Australia for each outbreak country and the cumulative risk for all countries. RESULTS: Highest mean weekly TT risk in Australia attributable to donors returning from a specific outbreak country was 1 in 23.3 million (plausible range, 16.8-41.9 million) donations during Week 39 in Croatia. Highest mean weekly cumulative TT risk was 1 in 8.5 million donations (plausible range, 5.1-17.8 million) during Week 35. CONCLUSIONS: The estimated TT risk in Australia attributable to returning donors from the European Union and neighboring countries in 2018 was very small, and additional risk mitigation strategies were not indicated. In the context of such low TT risks, a simpler but effective approach would be to monitor the number of weekly reported West Nile fever cases and implement risk modeling only when the reported cases reached a predefined number or trigger point.

Complete resection of a massive mesenteric lymphangioma in an adult.

Mesenteric lymphangioma is a benign cystic tumour of the lymphatic vessels that occurs rarely in adults. Due to the infrequency of cases and the insidious presentation, these tumours can be diagnosed late and become massive. Resection of mesenteric lymphangioma in its entirety is the recommended management in order to prevent recurrence. This case report describes the finding of a massive mesenteric lymphangioma (dimensions 420×470×100 mm) in a young man, the investigations leading to diagnosis, and the subsequent surgical management. The substantial size of this tumour produced considerable challenges for the surgical team, including involvement of adjacent small bowel and mesenteric vasculature. Preoperative diagnosis and assessment of the anatomy was pivotal in achieving a complete resection and a good patient outcome.

Understanding occult hepatitis C infection.

BACKGROUND: Occult hepatitis C infection (OCI) is a type of hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection, defined as the presence of HCV RNA in hepatocytes or peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) and the absence of HCV RNA in serum. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: A literature review was conducted to identify articles that characterized OCI as a disease, including its epidemiology, mode of transmission, pattern of infection, progression, and treatment. RESULTS: OCI patients experience a milder degree of inflammatory and cirrhotic changes than patients with chronic hepatitis C. OCI is transmissible parenterally both in vivo and in vitro, however the duration and outcome of OCI remains unclear. OCI is most consistently found in patients with previous hepatitis C disease and hemodialysis patients. Beyond the at-risk populations, OCI has also been demonstrated among healthy individuals and blood donors. CONCLUSIONS: This review summarises our current understanding of OCI and suggests areas for further research to improve our understanding of this phenomenon, including a better understanding of its epidemiology and full clinical course. The current understanding of OCI and its clinical implications remain limited. Further standardized detection methods, ongoing surveillance, and investigation of its potential transmissions are required.

Blood safety assessment of hepatitis A outbreak linked to frozen pomegranate arils: are foodborne outbreaks an emerging blood safety risk?

BACKGROUND: Foodborne hepatitis A virus (HAV) outbreaks are becoming more common in high-income countries with low HAV incidence, and the associated blood safety risk may not be adequately mitigated by routine HAV risk mitigation strategies. This study describes the rapid risk modeling undertaken in response to a 2018 HAV outbreak in Australia associated with imported frozen pomegranate arils. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: The input parameters used in the modeling were the outbreak-associated HAV incidence, duration of viremia, population seroprevalence, and rate of symptomatic infection in adults. The number and risk of viremic components issued, cases of transfusion transmission, and symptomatic infections among recipients were estimated. RESULTS: The incidence of pomegranate-associated HAV infection among donors was very low, with fewer than 0.1 viremic fresh components estimated to have been released during the risk period. The risk of this event was less than one in 500,000, and the risks of transfusion transmission and symptomatic illness in recipients were less than one in one million. When considering only donors who had consumed the pomegranate product, the risk was much higher, with approximately one in 1000 components estimated to be viremic. CONCLUSION: Rapid risk assessment indicated that the overall risk to blood safety associated with a small foodborne outbreak of HAV was negligible. Because fresh components collected from donors known to have consumed the affected product were at high risk, these donors were identified via signage in donor centers and deferred. The contribution of factors other than outbreak size to risk management decisions is discussed.