Perception of mind and dehumanization: Human, animal, or machine?

Dehumanization is reached through several approaches, including the attribute-based model of mind perception and the metaphor-based model of dehumanization. We performed two studies to find different (de)humanized images for three targets: Professional people, Evil people, and Lowest of the low. In Study 1, we examined dimensions of mind, expecting the last two categories to be dehumanized through denial of agency (Lowest of the low) or experience (Evil people), compared with humanized targets (Professional people). Study 2 aimed to distinguish these targets using metaphors. We predicted that Evil and Lowest of the low targets would suffer mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization, respectively; our predictions were confirmed, but the metaphor-based model nuanced these results: animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization were shown as overlapping rather than independent. Evil persons were perceived as "killing machines" and "predators." Finally, Lowest of the low were not animalized but considered human beings. We discuss possible interpretations.

Nations' income inequality predicts ambivalence in stereotype content: how societies mind the gap.

Income inequality undermines societies: The more inequality, the more health problems, social tensions, and the lower social mobility, trust, life expectancy. Given people's tendency to legitimate existing social arrangements, the stereotype content model (SCM) argues that ambivalence-perceiving many groups as either warm or competent, but not both-may help maintain socio-economic disparities. The association between stereotype ambivalence and income inequality in 37 cross-national samples from Europe, the Americas, Oceania, Asia, and Africa investigates how groups' overall warmth-competence, status-competence, and competition-warmth correlations vary across societies, and whether these variations associate with income inequality (Gini index). More unequal societies report more ambivalent stereotypes, whereas more equal ones dislike competitive groups and do not necessarily respect them as competent. Unequal societies may need ambivalence for system stability: Income inequality compensates groups with partially positive social images.

Intergroup time bias and racialized social relations.

Within the framework of intergroup relations, the authors analyzed the time people spent evaluating ingroup and outgroup members. They hypothesized that White participants take longer to evaluate White targets than Black targets. In four experiments, White participants were slower to form impressions of White than of Black people; that is, they showed an intergroup time bias (ITB). In Study 1 (N = 60), the ITB correlated with implicit prejudice and homogeneity. Study 2 (N = 60) showed that the ITB was independent of the type of trait in question (nonstereotypical vs. stereotypical). Study 3 (N = 100) demonstrated that ITB correlates with racism measured 3 months beforehand, is independent of motivation to control prejudice, and is not an epiphenomenon of homogeneity. In Study 4 (N = 40) participants not only showed the ITB in a racialized social context but also displayed it following a minimal group manipulation.

What do people mean when speaking of evilness?

The term evilness started to become popular in social psychology after the publication in 1999 of the special issue edited by Arthur G. Miller, "Perspectives on evil and violence". It is usually used to define behaviors that are extremely and strongly harmful. However, the concept is still imprecise and needs to be empirically delineated. This article attempts to answer the following questions. What is evilness? What is the difference between aggression and evilness? We conducted several studies with three goals: to analyze how laypersons and experts define evilness, to verify whether laypeople distinguish between different intensities of evilness, and to determine the dimensions that predict aggression and evilness. The results offer preliminary answers to the three questions.

Does contact reduce prejudice or does prejudice reduce contact? A longitudinal test of the contact hypothesis among majority and minority groups in three European countries.

A widely researched panacea for reducing intergroup prejudice is the contact hypothesis. However, few longitudinal studies can shed light on the direction of causal processes: from contact to prejudice reduction (contact effects) or from prejudice to contact reduction (prejudice effects). The authors conducted a longitudinal field survey in Germany, Belgium, and England with school students. The sample comprised members of both ethnic minorities (n = 512) and ethnic majorities (n = 1,143). Path analyses yielded both lagged contact effects and prejudice effects: Contact reduced prejudice, but prejudice also reduced contact. Furthermore, contact effects were negligible for minority members. These effects were obtained for 2 indicators of prejudice: negative intergroup emotions and desire for social distance. For both majority and minority members, contact effects on negative emotions were stronger when outgroup contacts were perceived as being typical of their group. Contact effects were also mediated by intergroup anxiety. This mediating mechanism was impaired for minority members because of a weakened effect of anxiety on desire for social distance. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Stereotype content model across cultures: towards universal similarities and some differences.

The stereotype content model (SCM) proposes potentially universal principles of societal stereotypes and their relation to social structure. Here, the SCM reveals theoretically grounded, cross-cultural, cross-groups similarities and one difference across 10 non-US nations. Seven European (individualist) and three East Asian (collectivist) nations (N=1,028) support three hypothesized cross-cultural similarities: (a) perceived warmth and competence reliably differentiate societal group stereotypes; (b) many out-groups receive ambivalent stereotypes (high on one dimension; low on the other); and (c) high status groups stereotypically are competent, whereas competitive groups stereotypically lack warmth. Data uncover one consequential cross-cultural difference: (d) the more collectivist cultures do not locate reference groups (in-groups and societal prototype groups) in the most positive cluster (high-competence/high-warmth), unlike individualist cultures. This demonstrates out-group derogation without obvious reference-group favouritism. The SCM can serve as a pancultural tool for predicting group stereotypes from structural relations with other groups in society, and comparing across societies.

The role of in-group identification in infra-humanization.

People tend to infra-humanize by attributing more human essence to their in-group than to out-groups. In the present article, we focus on the attribution of primary and secondary emotions to operationalize the human essence. We propose that, in order to infra-humanize, people need to be categorized in meaningful groups. In addition, we argue that what differentiates meaningful from nonmeaningful groups is that the people essentialize, perceiving members of the group as sharing an underlying, common essence. Also, we hypothesize that participants will identify more with their in-group in the case of meaningful groups. Three types of groups were created to manipulate the meaningfulness of the categorization. Participants were either randomly assigned to a group or they chose their group as a function of their preferences for a colour or the type of career they wished to pursue. As expected, infra-humanization occurred only where the categorization's criterion was meaningful. In addition, in-group identification, but not essentialism, mediated the impact of the categorization criteria on the tendency to infra-humanize. Data also showed that infra-humanization is different from classic in-group favouritism. This is because in-group favouritism, but not infra-humanization, was observed in the situation where group membership was based on random assignment. In other words, for infra-humanization to occur mere categorization is not enough; meaningfulness is also needed. For in-group favouritism to arise, the knowledge of being part of a group is a sufficient prerequisite. The discussion focuses on conditions for reducing infra-humanization and on the relationship between in-group favouritism and out-group derogation.

The attribution of primary and secondary emotions to the in-group and to the out-group: the case of equal status countries.

We examined the attribution of primary and secondary emotions in the context of equal status groups with a non-conflictual relationship, that is, Germans and French. In Study 1 (N = 169), we found that in such an intergroup context, there was no differential attribution of secondary emotions but an over-attribution of primary emotions to the out-group. Only high identifiers tended to attribute more secondary emotions to the in-group than to the out-group. In Study 2 (N = 423), the role of the identification with the in-group and a superordinate group (Europe) in the process of infrahumanization was examined. Participants' national versus European identification was primed. The results did not differ between these two conditions. As in Study 1, an over-attribution of primary emotions to the out-group was observed. Concerning the secondary emotions, the classical infrahumanization effect occurred, that is, an over-attribution of secondary emotions to the in-group.

Intergroup relations in soccer finals: people's forecasts of the duration of emotional reactions of in-group and out-group soccer fans.

The authors examined the hypothesis that people forecast a longer duration of uniquely human secondary emotions for their in-group than for an out-group. The authors conducted a field experiment in the setting of the European soccer championship. They asked Belgian participants to forecast the intensity with which their in-group Belgian fans or the out-group Turkish fans would experience various primary and secondary emotions in response to their team's victory or loss immediately after the Turkey-Belgium match and three days later. The results support the hypothesis. Moreover, and as the authors expected, they found no differences in the participants' forecasts of primary emotions. The authors discussed the implications of these findings for intergroup relations in general and for soccer fans' behavior in particular.

Infrahumanization or familiarity? Attribution of uniquely human emotions to the self, the ingroup, and the outgroup.

People attribute more secondary emotions to their ingroup than to outgroups. This effect is interpreted in terms of infrahumanization theory. Familiarity also could explain this differential attribution because secondary emotions are thought to be less visible and intense than primary ones. This alternative explanation to infrahumanization was tested in three studies. In Study 1, participants attributed, in a between-participants design, primary and secondary emotions to themselves, to their ingroup, or to an outgroup. In Study 2, participants answered for themselves and their ingroup or for themselves and an outgroup. In Study 3, participants made attributions to the ingroup or a series of outgroups varying in terms of familiarity. The data do not support an explanation in terms of familiarity. The discussion centers on conditions not conducting to infrahumanization.

Stereotype threat undermines intellectual performance by triggering a disruptive mental load.

Research on stereotype threat has repeatedly demonstrated that the intellectual performance of social groups is particularly sensitive to the situational context in which tests are usually administered. In the present experiment, an adaptation of the Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices Test was introduced as a measure of cognitive ability. Results showed that individuals targeted by a reputation of intellectual inferiority scored lower on the test than did other people. However, when the identical test was not presented as a measure of cognitive ability, the achievement gap between the target and the control group disappeared. Using heart rate variability indices to assess mental workload, our findings showed that the situational salience of a reputation of lower ability undermined intellectual performance by triggering a disruptive mental load. Our results indicate that group differences in cognitive ability scores can reflect different situational burdens and not necessarily actual differences in cognitive ability.

On the behavioral consequences of infrahumanization: the implicit role of uniquely human emotions in intergroup relations.

Four experiments confirmed the hypothesis that people discriminate the out-group on the basis of the expression of uniquely human emotions. In Study 1, using a lost e-mail paradigm, the expression of a uniquely human emotion resulted in "nicer" replies when the sender was an in-group compared with an out-group member. The same pattern of results was obtained in Studies 2 and 3 using a conformity paradigm. In addition, perceived similarity was measured and proposed as a potential underlying mechanism (Study 3). Finally, using an approach-avoidance procedure, Study 4 showed that people not only deprive the out-group of positive consequences as in the former studies but that people also act against the out-group. The role of infrahumanization underlying prejudice and discrimination is discussed.

The lost e-mail: prosocial reactions induced by uniquely human emotions.

Leyens et al. (2000) have developed a theory on the role of secondary emotions as a uniquely human characteristic. An implication of this theory is that the use of secondary emotions, compared to primary emotions, will increase prosocial intentions and behaviours. Given the uniquely human character of secondary emotions, people who express themselves in terms of these emotions are tacitly seen as more human. As a consequence, these individuals share the human nature that we usually reserve for our own group or ourselves and will therefore evoke prosocial attitudes and behaviours. In two studies, French-speaking participants were confronted with an e-mail that started with either a primary or a secondary emotion. As expected, secondary emotion messages, compared to primary emotion messages, provoked stronger intentions to help the sender (Expt 1) and elicited 'nicer' responses (Expt 2). Implications for intergroup relations are discussed.