Subjective logic as a complementary tool to meta-analysis to explicitly address second-order uncertainty in research findings: A case from infant studies.

Any experiment brings about results and conclusions that necessarily have a component of uncertainty. Many factors influence the degree of this uncertainty, yet they can be overlooked when drawing conclusions from a body of research. Here, we showcase how subjective logic could be employed as a complementary tool to meta-analysis to incorporate the chosen sources of uncertainty into the answer that researchers seek to provide to their research question. We illustrate this approach by focusing on a body of research already meta-analyzed, whose overall aim was to assess if human infants prefer prosocial agents over antisocial agents. We show how each finding can be encoded as a subjective opinion, and how findings can be aggregated to produce an answer that explicitly incorporates uncertainty. We argue that a core feature and strength of this approach is its transparency in the process of factoring in uncertainty and reasoning about research findings. Subjective logic promises to be a powerful complementary tool to incorporate uncertainty explicitly and transparently in the evaluation of research.

How infants predict respect-based power.

Research has shown that infants represent legitimate leadership and predict continued obedience to authority, but which cues they use to do so remains unknown. Across eight pre-registered experiments varying the cue provided, we tested if Norwegian 21-month-olds (N=128) expected three protagonists to obey a character even in her absence. We assessed whether bowing for the character, receiving a tribute from or conferring a benefit to the protagonists, imposing a cost on them (forcefully taking a resource or hitting them), or relative physical size were used as cues to generate the expectation of continued obedience that marks legitimate leadership. Whereas bowing sufficed in generating such an expectation, we found positive Bayesian evidence that all the other cues did not. Norwegian infants unlikely have witnessed bowing in their everyday life. Hence, bowing/prostration as cue for continued obedience may form part of an early-developing capacity to represent leadership built by evolution.

The violation-of-expectation paradigm: A conceptual overview.

For over 35 years, the violation-of-expectation paradigm has been used to study the development of expectations in the first 3 years of life. A wide range of expectations has been examined, including physical, psychological, sociomoral, biological, numerical, statistical, probabilistic, and linguistic expectations. Surprisingly, despite the paradigm's widespread use and the many seminal findings it has contributed to psychological science, so far no one has tried to provide a detailed and in-depth conceptual overview of the paradigm. Here, we attempted to do just that. We first focus on the rationale of the paradigm and discuss how it has evolved over time. We then show how improved descriptions of infants' looking behavior, together with the addition of a rich panoply of brain and behavioral measures, have helped deepen our understanding of infants' responses to violations. Next, we review the paradigm's strengths and limitations. Finally, we end with a discussion of challenges that have been leveled against the paradigm over the years. Through it all, our goal was twofold. First, we sought to provide psychologists and other scientists interested in the paradigm with an informed and constructive analysis of its theoretical origins and development. Second, we wanted to take stock of what the paradigm has revealed to date about how infants reason about events, and about how surprise at unexpected events, in or out of the laboratory, can lead to learning, by prompting infants to revise their working model of the world. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

No single notion of cooperation explains when we respect ownership.

Cooperation is fundamentally moderated by the form of relationship between the actors involved, as is normative resource distribution. We argue that possessions are likely treated differently across different types of cooperative relationships. Whereas Boyer's computational model might in principle account for this, the theory would benefit from a specification of how different cooperative contexts can shape the representation of ownership.

Age-Related Differences in Moral Judgment: The Role of Probability Judgments.

Research suggests that moral evaluations change during adulthood. Older adults (75+) tend to judge accidentally harmful acts more severely than younger adults do, and this age-related difference is in part due to the greater negligence older adults attribute to the accidental harmdoers. Across two studies (N = 254), we find support for this claim and report the novel discovery that older adults' increased attribution of negligence, in turn, is associated with a higher perceived likelihood that the accident would occur. We propose that, because older adults perceive accidents as more likely than younger adults do, they condemn the agents and their actions more and even infer that the agents' omission to exercise due care is intentional. These findings refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underpinning moral judgment in older adulthood and highlight the role of subjective probability judgments in negligence attribution.

Age-dependent changes in intuitive and deliberative cooperation.

Cooperation is one of the most advantageous strategies to have evolved in small- and large-scale human societies, often considered essential to their success or survival. We investigated how cooperation and the mechanisms influencing it change across the lifespan, by assessing cooperative choices from adolescence to old age (12-79 years, N = 382) forcing participants to decide either intuitively or deliberatively through the use of randomised time constraints. As determinants of these choices, we considered participants' level of altruism, their reciprocity expectations, their optimism, their desire to be socially accepted, and their attitude toward risk. We found that intuitive decision-making favours cooperation, but only from age 20 when a shift occurs: whereas in young adults, intuition favours cooperation, in adolescents it is reflection that favours cooperation. Participants' decisions were shown to be rooted in their expectations about other people's cooperative behaviour and influenced by individuals' level of optimism about their own future, revealing that the journey to the cooperative humans we become is shaped by reciprocity expectations and individual predispositions.

Jurors use mental state information to assess breach in negligence cases.

To prove guilt, jurors in many countries must find that the criminal defendant acted with a particular mental state. However, this amateur form of mindreading is not supposed to occur in civil negligence trials. Instead, jurors should decide whether the defendant was negligent by looking only at his actions, and whether they were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Even so, across four pre-registered studies (N = 782), we showed that mock jurors do not focus on actions alone. US mock jurors spontaneously rely on mental state information when evaluating negligence cases. In Study 1, jurors were given three negligence cases to judge, and were asked to evaluate whether a reasonably careful person would have foreseen the risk (foreseeability) and whether the defendant acted unreasonably (negligence). Across conditions, we also varied the extent and content of additional information about defendant's subjective mental state: jurors were provided with evidence that the defendant either thought the risk of a harm was high or was low, or were not provided with such information. Foreseeability and negligence scores increased when mock jurors were told the defendant thought there was a high risk, and negligence scores decreased when the defendant thought there was a low risk, compared to when no background mental state information was provided. In Study 2, we replicated these findings by using mild (as opposed to severe) harm cases. In Study 3, we tested an intervention aimed at reducing jurors' reliance on mental states, which consisted in raising jurors' awareness of potential hindsight bias in their evaluations. The intervention reduced mock juror reliance on mental states when assessing foreseeability when the defendant was described as knowing of a high risk, an effect replicated in Study 4. This research demonstrates that jurors rely on mental states to assess breach, regardless of what the legal doctrine says.

Meta-analytic evidence against sex differences in infants' and toddlers' preference for prosocial agents.

Can well-documented gender differences in evaluations of prosocial versus antisocial actions found in childhood and adulthood be traced to sex differences in basic sociomoral preferences in infancy? We provide an answer to this question by meta-analyzing sex differences in preference for prosocial over antisocial agents in a set of 53 samples of American and European infants and toddlers aged between 4 and 32 months (N = 1,094). Although the original studies were agnostic to sex differences, we were able to retrieve the original data sets and estimate the effect of infants' and toddlers' sex on sociomoral preferences. Employing both a standard frequentist and a Bayesian approach to meta-analysis, we found strong evidence supporting the absence of sex differences in sociomoral preferences among infants and toddlers. We discuss the relevance of this finding for theories and descriptions of the emergence and developmental trajectory of gender differences in morality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Intent-Based Moral Judgment in Old Age.

OBJECTIVES: Recent studies support the idea of an intent-to-outcome shift in moral judgments with age. We further assessed whether a reduced reliance on intentions is associated with aging in a preregistered study with 73 younger (20-41 years) and 79 older (70-84 years) adults, group-matched on education level. METHOD: Participants were presented with a set of moral cases to evaluate, created by varying orthogonally the valence (neutral, negative) of the information regarding the agent's intentions and the action's outcomes. RESULTS: The two age groups did not differ in the extent they relied on intentions in moral judgment. DISCUSSION: These results suggest that an intent-to-outcome shift might not be found in all aging populations, challenging prevailing theories suggesting that aging is necessarily associated with a reduced reliance on intentions.

Do children selectively trust leaders and prosocial agents in an economic exchange?

Most cooperative interactions involve interpersonal trust and the expectation of mutual reciprocation. Thus, understanding when and how humans acquire interpersonal trust can help unveil the origins and development of children's cooperative behavior. Here, we investigated whether prior sociomoral information about trading partners modulates the choice of preschool (4-5 years) and school-age children (7-8 years) to share their own goods in a child-friendly version of the trust game. In this game, the trustee partner can repay the child's initial investment or keep everything and betray the trustor. In two studies, we addressed whether trust is modulated by trustees exhibiting prosocial versus antisocial behaviors (Study 1, "helper and hinderer"), or respect-based versus fear-based power (Study 2, "leader and bully"). Preschoolers trusted the leader reliably more than the bully, and the hinderer reliably less than a neutral agent. The tendency to trust the helper more than the hinderer increased with age as a result of the increased propensity to trust the prosocial agent. Overall, these findings indicate that, by age 5, children understand complex cooperative exchanges and start relying on sociomoral information when deciding whom to trust. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

fMRI evidence reveals emotional biases in bilingual decision making.

Research indicates that the foreign language effect on decision making can be partially explained by a reduction in emotional response in the second language. In this fMRI study, we aimed at elucidating the neural mechanisms underpinning the interaction between language and emotion in decision making. Across multiple trials, Chinese-English bilinguals were asked to decide whether to gamble in a Gambling task, and received feedbacks either in L1 (Chinese) or in L2 (English). If they gambled, feedbacks were either positively or negatively valenced words; if they did not gamble, feedback was the word 'safe'. We assessed how emotionally valenced words were processed in the two languages, and how this processing influenced subsequent decision making. Overall, we found evidence that in L2 context, but not in L1 context, loss aversion was mediated by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) which also showed strong functional connectivity with the visual cortex, suggesting an avoidance mechanism for negative stimuli in L2. However, we also found an enhanced response to positive feedbacks in L2 compared to L1, as evidenced by greater activation of the hippocampus for win feedbacks compared to safe feedbacks in L2, eventually resulting in a greater tendency to gamble. Thus, foreign language influenced decision making by both regulating emotional response to negative stimuli and enhancing emotional response to positive stimuli. This study helps unveiling the neural bases of the interaction between language and emotion in the foreign language context.

Neural substrates of the interplay between cognitive load and emotional involvement in bilingual decision making.

Prior work has reported that foreign language influences decision making by either reducing access to emotion or imposing additional cognitive demands. In this fMRI study, we employed a cross-task design to assess at the neural level whether and how the interaction between cognitive load and emotional involvement is affected by language (native L1 vs. foreign L2). Participants completed a Lexico-semantic task where in each trial they were presented with a neutrally or a negatively valenced word either in L1 or L2, either under cognitive load or not. We manipulated cognitive load by varying the difficulty of the task: to increase cognitive demands, we used traditional characters instead of simplified ones in L1 (Chinese), and words with capital letters instead of lowercase letters in L2 (English). After each trial, participants decided whether to take a risky decision in a gambling game. During the Gamling task, left amygdala and right insula were more activated after having processed a negative word under cognitive load in the Lexico-semantic task. However, this was true for L1 but not for L2. In particular, in L1, cognitive load facilitated rather than hindered access to emotion. Further suggesting that cognitive load can enhance emotional sensitivity in L1 but not in L2, we found that functional connectivity between reward-related striatum and right insula increased under cognitive load only in L1. Overall, results suggest that cognitive load in L1 can favor access to emotion and lead to impulsive decision making, whereas cognitive load in L2 can attenuate access to emotion and lead to more rational decisions.

Changing the logic of replication: A case from infant studies.

Among infant researchers there is growing concern regarding the widespread practice of undertaking studies that have small sample sizes and employ tests with low statistical power (to detect a wide range of possible effects). For many researchers, issues of confidence may be partially resolved by relying on replications. Here, we bring further evidence that the classical logic of confirmation, according to which the result of a replication study confirms the original finding when it reaches statistical significance, could be usefully abandoned. With real examples taken from the infant literature and Monte Carlo simulations, we show that a very wide range of possible replication results would in a formal statistical sense constitute confirmation as they can be explained simply due to sampling error. Thus, often no useful conclusion can be derived from a single or small number of replication studies. We suggest that, in order to accumulate and generate new knowledge, the dichotomous view of replication as confirmatory/disconfirmatory can be replaced by an approach that emphasizes the estimation of effect sizes via meta-analysis. Moreover, we discuss possible solutions for reducing problems affecting the validity of conclusions drawn from meta-analyses in infant research.

Conceptual continuity in the development of intent-based moral judgment.

When asked to say whether an agent is morally good or bad, younger preschoolers tend to rely more on the outcomes of agents' actions than on agents' intentions, whereas older children show the opposite bias. Children aged 3 to 5 years were examined with a novel task that facilitated the selection and expression of response by means of response generation training. In two experiments, we found that 3-year-olds succeeded in generating intent-based judgments when the task was simplified, whereas older preschoolers succeeded also without the help of response generation training. Results are inconsistent with views positing a conceptual change occurring in the moral domain at about 4 years of age and provide support for alternative accounts positing conceptual continuity.

First steps toward an understanding of procedural fairness.

In four experiments, we tested whether 20-month-old infants are sensitive to violations of procedural impartiality. Participants were shown videos in which help was provided in two different ways. A main character provided help to two other agents either impartially, by helping them at the same time, or in a biased way, by helping one agent almost immediately while the other after a longer delay. Infants looked reliably longer at the biased than at the unbiased help scenarios despite the fact that in both scenarios help was provided to each beneficiary. This suggests that human infants can attend to departures from impartiality and, in their second year, they already show an initial understanding of procedural fairness.

Brief Report: Young Children with Autism Can Generate Intent-Based Moral Judgments.

Past research suggested that, due to difficulties in mentalistic reasoning, individuals with autism tend to base their moral judgments on the outcome of agents' actions rather than on agents' intentions. In a novel task, aimed at reducing the processing demands required to represent intentions and generate a judgment, autistic children were presented with agents that accidentally harmed or attempted but failed to harm others and were asked to judge those agents. Most of the times, children blamed the character who attempted to harm and exculpated the accidental wrongdoer, suggesting that they generated intent-based moral judgments. These findings suggest that processing limitations rather than lack of conceptual competence explain the poor performance reported in previous research on moral judgment in autism.

Infants distinguish between leaders and bullies.

We examined whether 21-month-old infants could distinguish between two broad types of social power: respect-based power exerted by a leader (who might be an authority figure with legitimate power, a prestigious individual with merited power, or some combination thereof) and fear-based power exerted by a bully. Infants first saw three protagonists interact with a character who was either a leader (leader condition) or a bully (bully condition). Next, the character gave an order to the protagonists, who initially obeyed; the character then left the scene, and the protagonists either continued to obey (obey event) or no longer did so (disobey event). Infants in the leader condition looked significantly longer at the disobey than at the obey event, suggesting that they expected the protagonists to continue to obey the leader in her absence. In contrast, infants in the bully condition looked equally at the two events, suggesting that they viewed both outcomes as plausible: The protagonists might continue to obey the absent bully to prevent further harm, or they might disobey her because her power over them weakened in her absence. Additional results supported these interpretations: Infants expected obedience when the bully remained in the scene and could harm the protagonists if defied, but they expected disobedience when the order was given by a character with little or no power over the protagonists. Together, these results indicate that by 21 months of age, infants already hold different expectations for subordinates' responses to individuals with respect-based as opposed to fear-based power.

Infants' evaluation of prosocial and antisocial agents: A meta-analysis.

Over the past decade, numerous studies have reported that infants prefer prosocial agents (those who provide help, comfort, or fairness in distributive actions) to antisocial agents (those who harm others or distribute goods unfairly). We meta-analyzed the results of published and unpublished studies on infants aged 4-32 months and estimated that approximately two infants out of three, when given a choice between a prosocial and an antisocial agent, choose the former. This preference was not significantly affected by age or other factors, such as the type of dependent variable (selective reaching or helping) or the modality of stimulus presentation (cartoons or real events). Effect size was affected by the type of familiarization events: giving/taking actions increased its magnitude compared with helping/hindering actions. There was evidence of a publication bias, suggesting that the effect size in published studies is likely to be inflated. Also, the distribution of children who chose the prosocial agent in experiments with N = 16 suggested a file-drawer problem. (PsycINFO Database Record

Moral Judgment in Old Age.

Younger (21-39 years) and older (63-90 years) adults were presented with scenarios illustrating either harmful or helpful actions. Each scenario provided information about the agent's intention, either neutral or valenced (harmful/helpful), and the outcome of his or her action, either neutral or valenced. Participants were asked to rate how morally good or bad the agent's action was. In judging harmful actions, older participants relied less on intentions and more on outcomes compared to younger participants. This age-related difference was associated with a decline in older adults' theory of mind abilities. However, we did not find evidence of any significant age-related difference in the evaluations of helpful actions. We argue that the selective association of aging with changes in the evaluation of harmful but not helpful actions may be due also to motivational factors and highlight some implications of the present findings for judicial systems.