Comparative severity of COVID-19 cases caused by Alpha, Delta or Omicron SARS-CoV-2 variants and its association with vaccination.

BACKGROUND: This study compares the severity of SARS-CoV-2 infections caused by Alpha, Delta or Omicron variants in periods of co-circulation in Spain, and estimates the variant-specific association of vaccination with severe disease. METHODS: SARS-CoV-2 infections notified to the national epidemiological surveillance network with information on genetic variant and vaccination status were considered cases if they required hospitalisation or controls otherwise. Alpha and Delta were compared during June-July 2021; and Delta and Omicron during December 2021-January 2022. Adjusted odds ratios (aOR) were estimated using logistic regression, comparing variant and vaccination status between cases and controls. RESULTS: We included 5,345 Alpha and 11,974 Delta infections in June-July and 5,272 Delta and 10,578 Omicron in December-January. Unvaccinated cases of Alpha (aOR: 0.57; 95% CI: 0.46-0.69) or Omicron (0.28; 0.21-0.36) had lower probability of hospitalisation vs. Delta. Complete vaccination reduced hospitalisation, similarly for Alpha (0.16; 0.13-0.21) and Delta (June-July: 0.16; 0.14-0.19; December-January: 0.36; 0.30-0.44) but lower from Omicron (0.63; 0.53-0.75) and individuals aged 65+ years. CONCLUSION: Results indicate higher intrinsic severity of the Delta variant, compared with Alpha or Omicron, with smaller differences among vaccinated individuals. Nevertheless, vaccination was associated to reduced hospitalisation in all groups.

Lifting COVID-19 mitigation measures in Spain (May-June 2020).

Introduction: The state of alarm was declared in Spain due to the COVID-19 epidemic on March 14, 2020, and established population confinement measures. The objective is to describe the process of lifting these mitigation measures. Methods: The Plan for the Transition to a New Normality, approved on April 28, contained four sequential phases with progressive increase in socio-economic activities and population mobility. In parallel, a new strategy for early diagnosis, surveillance and control was implemented. A bilateral decision mechanism was established between the Spanish Government and the autonomous communities (AC), guided by a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators capturing the epidemiological situation and core capacities. The territorial units were established ad-hoc and could be from Basic Health Zones to entire AC. Results: The process run from May 4 to June 21, 2020. AC implemented plans for reinforcement of core capacities. Incidence decreased from a median (50% of territories) of 7.4 per 100,000 in 7 days at the beginning to 2.5 at the end. Median PCR testing increased from 53% to 89% of suspected cases and PCR total capacity from 4.5 to 9.8 per 1000 inhabitants weekly; positivity rate decreased from 3.5% to 1.8%. Median proportion of cases with traced contacts increased from 82% to 100%. Conclusion: Systematic data collection, analysis, and interterritorial dialogue allowed adequate process control. The epidemiological situation improved but, mostly, the process entailed a great reinforcement of core response capacities nation-wide, under common criteria. Maintaining and further reinforcing capacities remained crucial for responding to future waves.

Introducción: El 14 de marzo de 2020 España declaró el estado de alarma por la pandemia por COVID-19 incluyendo medidas de confinamiento. El objetivo es describir el proceso de desescalada de estas medidas. Métodos: Un plan de transición hacia una nueva normalidad, del 28 de abril, incluía 4 fases secuenciales incrementando progresivamente las actividades socioeconómicas y la movilidad. Concomitantemente, se implementó una nueva estrategia de diagnóstico precoz, vigilancia y control. Se estableció un mecanismo de decisión bilateral entre Gobierno central y comunidades autónomas (CCAA), guiado por un panel de indicadores cualitativos y cuantitativos de la situación epidemiológica y las capacidades básicas. Las unidades territoriales evaluadas comprendían desde zonas básicas de salud hasta CCAA. Resultados: El proceso se extendió del 4 de mayo al 21 de junio y se asoció a planes de refuerzo de las capacidades en las CCAA. La incidencia disminuyó de una mediana inicial de 7,4 por 100.000 en 7 días a 2,5 al final del proceso. La mediana de pruebas PCR aumentó del 53% al 89% de los casos sospechosos, y la capacidad total de 4,5 a 9,8 pruebas semanales por 1.000 habitantes; la positividad disminuyó del 3,5% al 1,8%. La mediana de casos con contactos trazados aumentó del 82% al 100%. Conclusión: La recogida y análisis sistemático de información y el diálogo interterritorial logaron un adecuado control del proceso. La situación epidemiológica mejoró, pero sobre todo, se aumentaron las capacidades, en todo el país y con criterios comunes, cuyo mantenimiento y refuerzo fue clave en olas sucesivas.

Lifting COVID-19 mitigation measures in Spain (May-June 2020).

INTRODUCTION: The state of alarm was declared in Spain due to the COVID-19 epidemic on March 14, 2020, and established population confinement measures. The objective is to describe the process of lifting these mitigation measures. METHODS: The Plan for the Transition to a New Normality, approved on April 28, contained four sequential phases with progressive increase in socio-economic activities and population mobility. In parallel, a new strategy for early diagnosis, surveillance and control was implemented. A bilateral decision mechanism was established between the Spanish Government and the autonomous communities (AC), guided by a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators capturing the epidemiological situation and core capacities. The territorial units were established ad-hoc and could be from Basic Health Zones to entire AC. RESULTS: The process run from May 4 to June 21, 2020. AC implemented plans for reinforcement of core capacities. Incidence decreased from a median (50% of territories) of 7.4 per 100,000 in 7 days at the beginning to 2.5 at the end. Median PCR testing increased from 53% to 89% of suspected cases and PCR total capacity from 4.5 to 9.8 per 1000 inhabitants weekly; positivity rate decreased from 3.5% to 1.8%. Median proportion of cases with traced contacts increased from 82% to 100%. CONCLUSION: Systematic data collection, analysis, and interterritorial dialogue allowed adequate process control. The epidemiological situation improved but, mostly, the process entailed a great reinforcement of core response capacities nation-wide, under common criteria. Maintaining and further reinforcing capacities remained crucial for responding to future waves.

[Lessons learnt from COVID-19 surveillance. Urgent need for a new public health surveillance. SESPAS Report 2022]. / Lecciones de la vigilancia de la COVID-19. Necesidad urgente de una nueva vigilancia en salud pública. Informe SESPAS 2022.

In this article we provide the most important epidemiological aspects in the first phases of the pandemic and some preliminary reflections from the Coordinating Centre for Health Alerts and Emergencies, the unit that has coordinated surveillance at the national level. COVID-19 has brought to light the weaknesses in the surveillance system and how difficult it is to manage a health crisis in the absence of a robust public health structure. The commitment of public health professionals during this epidemic has made up for the lack of resources in many occasions, and has evidenced the need to incorporate new professional profiles to surveillance teams. The need to rapidly adapt has achieved an improvement in existing systems and the development of new tools and new systems. These need to turn into structural changes that improve the quality of surveillance, decreasing territorial gaps and ensuring a better and coordinated response to future health crises. It is urgent to incorporate tools for process automation and to grant timely availability of data. To that end, public health and epidemiological surveillance must participate in the process of digital development within the National Health System. Profound changes are needed in public health surveillance, which has to be integrated in all healthcare levels. It is also important to strengthen the capacity for analysis by promoting alliances and joint actions. During this alert, the importance of coordination in public health in a decentralized country has been evident. At international level, it is necessary to review the tools to share data to coordinate an alert from the early stages.

[Risk Factors for Potentially Unsuccessful Results and Mortality during Tuberculosis Treatment in Spain]. / Factores de riesgo asociados a los resultados potencialmente insatisfactorios y a la mortalidad durante el tratamiento antituberculoso en España.

BACKGROUND: Successful result of treatment in 85% of cases is the target of a Tuberculosis (TB) Control Programme. The aim of this study is to determine the risk factors for unsuccessful completion of treatment and deaths of TB cases in Spain. METHODS: Data from the National Surveillance Epidemiological Network. Retrospective study including 5,880 TB cases reported in 2012. Outcomes were classified as: successful (S: cured and treatment completed), potentially unsuccessful (PU: failed, transferred, defaulted, still on treatment and unknown) and deaths. Logistic regression analysis was used to explore the association between epidemiological and clinical factors with PU and deaths as outcome variables. Two different models for nationals and foreigners were adjusted. RESULTS: Successful outcome was 81% in nationals and 79% in foreigners. Spanish TB cases had higher mortality rates than foreigners (8% vs. 2%), and lower percentage of transfers (2% vs. 6%). At multivariate level the risk factors for PU in nationals were: HIV coinfection (OR 1.6 CI95% 1.09-2.29) and previous treatment (OR 2.4 CI95% 1.67-3.53); and HIV coinfection (OR 1.7 CI95% 1.15-2.60), male sex (OR 1.4 CI95% 1.11-1.83) and pulmonary TB (OR 1.6 CI95% 1.22-2.09) in foreigners. Risk factors for death in nationals were: HIV coinfection (OR 2.7 CI95% 1.63-4.54), male sex (OR 1.4 CI95% 1.09-1.89), pulmonary TB (OR 1.5 CI95% 1.13-1.95) and an increasing risk with age (OR 8.9 CI95% 5.16-15.67 in over 45 years group.).; and HIV coinfection (OR 3.2 CI95% 1.53-6.76), male sex (OR 2.2 CI95% 1.01-4.60) and older age (OR 3.4 CI95% 1.81-6.48 in over 45 years group.) in foreigners. CONCLUSION: The rate of successful treatment in Spain does not meet the international target, especially in foreigners. To reduce unsuccessful treatment and deaths it is necessary to improve management in TB-HIV co-infected cases, and those with previous treatment story, pulmonary TB, males and older age.

[Enhanced surveillance of initial cases of pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 infection in Spain, April-June 2009]. / Vigilancia individualizada de los casos iniciales de infección por gripe pandémica (H1N1) 2009 en España, Abril-Junio 2009.

BACKGROUND: In April 2009, a new surveillance strategy for the detection of cases of pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 infection and for the implementation of appropriate control measures to contain its transmission was initiated in Spain. We describe the clinical and epidemiological characteristics of confirmed cases in Spain notified by the National Epidemiological Surveillance Network from April 24 to June 30, 2009. METHODS: As part of the initial surveillance response to the pandemic, case-based clinical and epidemiological information was collected nationwide on cases under investigation for pandemic virus (H1N1) 2009 infection and their contacts. RESULTS: Of 717 confirmed cases, 91% were notified by 5 Autonomous Communities. As of June 15,49.1% of cases belonged to school outbreaks. No nosocomial outbreaks were detected. The median incubation period was 3 days. Eighty-eight percent of cases were under the age of 30 years, and 24.9% were imported. The most frequent symptoms were cough (92%) and fever (81.8%). The median duration of symptoms was 5 days. Thirteen cases required hospitalization and one died. CONCLUSIONS: During the first months of the pandemic, pandemic influenza cases experienced a mild illness similar to seasonal influenza, predominantly affecting children and young adults. By the end of June 2009, the detection of outbreaks in different settings indicated the diffusion of the pandemic virus into the community and the start of its circulation.

[Occupational exposures to blood and biological material in healthcare workers. EPINETAC Project 1996-2000]. / Exposición ocupacional a sangre y material biológico en personal sanitario. Proyecto EPINETAC 1996-2000.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: The bloodborne injury is the most frequent risk in healthcare workers. Among them, the hollow-bore needlesticks are the most associated with the risk of acquire a bloodborne infection. In this study, occupational percutaneous injuries and risk factors associated to hollow-bore needlesticks registered in a national multicenter surveillance system are described. PATIENTS AND METHOD: Prospective and analytical study of percutaneous injuries registered in the surveillance system EPINETAC (Exposure Prevention Information Network) in Spain between 1996-200. A descriptive analysis of the variables related to the exposed healthcare worker, the exposure and their mechanism and the source patient is performed. The incidence rates were calculated by 100 occupied beds and by job category. A multivariable analysis is performed in order to know the risk factors most associated to hollow-bore needle. RESULTS: 16,374 percutaneous injuries has been registered, which 87% are hollow-bore needlesticks. The incidence rate has been 11.8 expositions per 100 occupied beds. Midwives are the most risky workers (9 injuries per 100 occupied beds). The risk factors most associated to hollow-bore needlesticks are the following: job category of midwife (OR = 7.5 95% CI, 4.1-13.7) and student nurse (OR = 2.1; 95% CI, 1.2-3.7), recapping (OR = 28.8; 95% CI, 16.5-50.6), working in venipuncture room (OR = 3.3; 95% CI, 1.2-9.5) or in the dialysis unit (OR = 2.5; 95% CI, 1.4-4.3). CONCLUSIONS: The incidence of occupational percutaneous injuries in Spain is similar to those described in other countries using comparable surveillance systems. The risk of hollow-bore needlestick is directly related to job category, work experience, work area and the activities that the healthcare worker does.

[Occupational exposure to multiresistant Mycobacterium bovis in a hospital in Saragossa, Spain]. / Exposición laboral a Mycobacterium bovis multirresistente en un hospital de Zaragoza.

BACKGROUND: Those working in a hospital environment are exposed to different occupational risks, although more specifically biological ones. One of the major risks is that of exposure by airborne transmission, more specifically, tuberculosis. This study is aimed at providing a description and analysis of the results of the implementation of an evaluation and surveillance protocol following occupational exposure to Multiresistant mycobacterium bovis (MRMb). METHOD: A male patient was diagnosed with MRMb infection at the Miguel Servet Hospital in Zaragoza in 1999 following ten days without respiratory isolation. During this period, he came into contact with 167 employees from different hospital departments. A surveillance and contact control protocol was prepared based on: completing a survey and undergoing an initial Mantoux (if the employee had previously tested negative for tuberculin), followed three months later by a chest X-ray and then a two-year clinical follow-up (check-ups every three months) for those having tested positive for tuberculin and no administering of chemoprophylaxis even though signs of infection were to have been found. RESULTS: Information was gathered on 160 employees (96%). A total of 94 employees (59%) had previously undergone a Mantoux, seven (7) having had tuberculosis. It was necessary for a follow-up to be conducted on sixty-one (61) employees who tested positive (29 previously positive and 32 detected in the initial Mantoux). No employee who had tested negative on an initial Mantoux tested positive on repeated testing three months later nor showed any symptoms indicative of transmission during the follow-up period. Some variables, such as age or working in the Infectious Disease Unit were related, on a statistically significant basis, to follow-up being required. CONCLUSIONS: The risk of occupational transmission following contact with MRMb might be similar to M. Tuberculosis, although further experience would be required in order to confirm this fact. Early diagnosis and availing of a protocol for implementing measures aimed at preventing and controlling this type of occupational exposure are of importance.