Nature and determinants of social actions during a mass shooting.

Reactions to danger have been depicted as antisocial but research has shown that supportive behaviors (e.g., helping injured others, giving information or reassuring others) prevail in life-threatening circumstances. Why is it so? Previous accounts have put the emphasis on the role of psychosocial factors, such as the maintenance of social norms or the degree of identification between hostages. Other determinants, such as the possibility to escape and distance to danger may also greatly contribute to shaping people's reactions to deadly danger. To examine the role of those specific physical constraints, we interviewed 32 survivors of the attacks at 'Le Bataclan' (on the evening of 13-11-2015 in Paris, France). Consistent with previous findings, supportive behaviors were frequently reported. We also found that impossibility to egress, minimal protection from danger and interpersonal closeness with other crowd members were associated with higher report of supportive behaviors. As we delved into the motives behind reported supportive behaviors, we found that they were mostly described as manifesting cooperative (benefits for both interactants) or altruistic (benefits for other(s) at cost for oneself) tendencies, rather than individualistic (benefits for oneself at cost for other(s)) ones. Our results show that supportive behaviors occur during mass shootings, particularly if people cannot escape, are under minimal protection from the danger, and feel interpersonal closeness with others. Crucially, supportive behaviors underpin a diversity of motives. This last finding calls for a clear-cut distinction between the social strategies people use when exposed to deadly danger, and the psychological motivations underlying them.

Unconscious categorization of sub-millisecond complex images.

Can people categorize complex visual scenes unconsciously? The possibility of unconscious perception remains controversial. Here, we addressed this question using psychophysical methods applied to unmasked visual stimuli presented for extremely short durations (in the µsec range) by means of a custom-built modern tachistoscope. Our experiment was composed of two phases. In the first phase, natural or urban scenes were either absent or present (for varying durations) on the tachistoscope screen, and participants were simply asked to evaluate their subjective perception using a 3-points scale (absence of stimulus, stimulus detection or stimulus identification). Participants' responses were tracked by means of two staircases. The first psychometric function aimed at defining participants' proportion of subjective detection responses (i.e., not having seen anything vs. having seen something without being able to identify it), while the second staircase tracked the proportion of subjective identification rates (i.e., being unaware of the stimulus' category vs. being aware of it). In the second phase, the same participants performed an objective categorization task in which they had to decide, on each trial, whether the image was a natural vs. an urban scene. A third staircase was used in this phase so as to build a psychometric curve reflecting the objective categorization performance of each participant. In this second phase, participants also rated their subjective perception of each stimulus on every trial, exactly as in the first phase of the experiment. Our main result is that objective categorization performance, here assumed to reflect the contribution of both conscious and unconscious trials, cannot be explained based exclusively on conscious trials. This clearly suggests that the categorization of complex visual scenes is possible even when participants report being unable to consciously perceive the contents of the stimulus.

Nonlinear neural network dynamics accounts for human confidence in a sequence of perceptual decisions.

Electrophysiological recordings during perceptual decision tasks in monkeys suggest that the degree of confidence in a decision is based on a simple neural signal produced by the neural decision process. Attractor neural networks provide an appropriate biophysical modeling framework, and account for the experimental results very well. However, it remains unclear whether attractor neural networks can account for confidence reports in humans. We present the results from an experiment in which participants are asked to perform an orientation discrimination task, followed by a confidence judgment. Here we show that an attractor neural network model quantitatively reproduces, for each participant, the relations between accuracy, response times and confidence. We show that the attractor neural network also accounts for confidence-specific sequential effects observed in the experiment (participants are faster on trials following high confidence trials). Remarkably, this is obtained as an inevitable outcome of the network dynamics, without any feedback specific to the previous decision (that would result in, e.g., a change in the model parameters before the onset of the next trial). Our results thus suggest that a metacognitive process such as confidence in one's decision is linked to the intrinsically nonlinear dynamics of the decision-making neural network.

Comparing self- and hetero-metacognition in the absence of verbal communication.

The ability to infer how confident other people are in their decisions is crucial for regulating social interactions. In many cooperative situations, verbal communication enables one to communicate one's confidence and to appraise that of others. However, in many circumstances, people either cannot explicitly communicate their confidence level (e.g., in an emergency situation) or may be intentionally deceitful (e.g., when playing poker). It is currently unclear whether one can read others' confidence in the absence of verbal communication, and whether one can infer it as accurately as for one's own confidence. To explore these questions, we used an auditory task in which participants either had to guess the confidence of someone else performing the task or to judge their own confidence, in different conditions (i.e., while performing the task themselves or while watching themselves perform the task on a pre-recorded video). Results demonstrate that people can read the confidence someone else has in their decision as accurately as they evaluate their own uncertainty in their decision. Crucially, we show that hetero-metacognition is a flexible mechanism that relies on different cues according to the context. Our results support the idea that metacognition leverages the same inference mechanisms as those involved in theory of mind.

Learning to Be Conscious.

Consciousness remains a formidable challenge. Different theories of consciousness have proposed vastly different mechanisms to account for phenomenal experience. Here, appealing to aspects of global workspace theory, higher-order theories, social theories, and predictive processing, we introduce a novel framework: the self-organizing metarerpresentational account (SOMA), in which consciousness is viewed as something that the brain learns to do. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of metarepresentations that qualify target first-order representations. Thus, experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. In this sense, consciousness is the brain's (unconscious, embodied, enactive, nonconceptual) theory about itself.

Alterations of agency in hypnosis: A new predictive coding model.

Hypnotic suggestions can lead to altered experiences of agency, reality, and memory. The present work is primarily concerned with alterations of the sense of agency (SoA) following motor suggestions. When people respond to the suggestion that their arm is rising up all by itself, they usually have a feeling of passivity for their action. The mechanisms leading to such alterations of the SoA are still controversial. We propose a theoretical model based on the framework of predictive coding: The view that the brain constantly generates hypotheses that predict sensory input at varying levels of abstraction and minimizes prediction errors either by updating its prior hypotheses-perceptual inference-or by modifying sensory input through action-active inference. We argue that suggested motor behavior and the experience of passivity accompanying it can be accounted for in terms of active inference. We propose that motor suggestions optimize both proprioceptive predictions and actual proprioceptive evidence through attentional modulation. The comparison between predicted and actual sensory evidence leads to highly precise prediction errors that call for an explanation. The motor suggestion readily supplies such an explanation by providing a prior of nonagency to the subject. We present this model in detail and discuss how it relates to, and differs from, other recent models of hypnosis. We compare its predictions with the predictions derivable from these other models. We also discuss the potential application of our predictive account to reality and memory alterations in hypnosis and offer an explanation of interindividual differences in hypnotic suggestibility. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Attention or instruction: Do sustained attentional abilities really differ between high and low hypnotisable persons?

Previous research has suggested that highly hypnotisable participants ('highs') are more sensitive to the bistability of ambiguous figures-as evidenced by reporting more perspective changes of a Necker cube-than low hypnotisable participants ('lows'). This finding has been interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that highs have more efficient sustained attentional abilities than lows. However, the higher report of perspective changes in highs in comparison to lows may reflect the implementation of different expectation-based strategies as a result of differently constructed demand characteristics according to one's level of hypnotisability. Highs, but not lows, might interpret an instruction to report perspective changes as an instruction to report many changes. Using a Necker cube as our bistable stimulus, we manipulated demand characteristics by giving specific information to participants of different hypnotisability levels. Participants were told that previous research has shown that people with similar hypnotisability as theirs were either very good at switching or maintaining perspective versus no information. Our results show that highs, but neither lows nor mediums, were strongly influenced by the given information. However, highs were not better at maintaining the same perspective than participants with lower hypnotisability. Taken together, these findings favour the view that the higher sensitivity of highs in comparison to lows to the bistability of ambiguous figures reflect the implementation of different strategies.

Perceiving Time Differences When You Should Not: Applying the El Greco Fallacy to Hypnotic Time Distortions.

The way we experience and estimate time - subjective time - does not systematically correspond to objective time (the physical duration of an event). Many factors can influence subjective time and lead to mental dilation or compression of objective time. The emotional valence of stimuli or the levels of attention or expectancy are known to modulate subjective time even though objective time is constant. Hypnosis too is known to alter people's perception of time. However, it is not known whether hypnotic time distortions are intrinsic perceptual effects, based for example on the changing rate of an internal clock, or rather the result of a response to demand characteristics. Here we distinguished the theories using the logic of the El Greco fallacy. When participants initially had to compare the duration of two successive events -with the same duration - while in "trance," they responded that the second event was on average longer than the first event. As both events were estimated in "trance," if hypnosis had impacted on an internal clock, they should have been affected to the same extent. Conversely, when only the first event was in "trance," there was no difference in perceived duration. The findings conform to an El Greco fallacy effect and challenge theories of hypnotic time distortion arguing that "trance" itself changes subjective time.

Hysteresis in audiovisual synchrony perception.

The effect of stimulation history on the perception of a current event can yield two opposite effects, namely: adaptation or hysteresis. The perception of the current event thus goes in the opposite or in the same direction as prior stimulation, respectively. In audiovisual (AV) synchrony perception, adaptation effects have primarily been reported. Here, we tested if perceptual hysteresis could also be observed over adaptation in AV timing perception by varying different experimental conditions. Participants were asked to judge the synchrony of the last (test) stimulus of an AV sequence with either constant or gradually changing AV intervals (constant and dynamic condition, respectively). The onset timing of the test stimulus could be cued or not (prospective vs. retrospective condition, respectively). We observed hysteretic effects for AV synchrony judgments in the retrospective condition that were independent of the constant or dynamic nature of the adapted stimuli; these effects disappeared in the prospective condition. The present findings suggest that knowing when to estimate a stimulus property has a crucial impact on perceptual simultaneity judgments. Our results extend beyond AV timing perception, and have strong implications regarding the comparative study of hysteresis and adaptation phenomena.

Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophrenia.

People with schizophrenia are known to exhibit difficulties in the updating of their current belief states even in the light of disconfirmatory evidence. In the present study we tested the hypothesis that people with schizophrenia could also manifest perceptual inflexibility, or difficulties in the updating of their current sensory states. The presence of perceptual inflexibility might contribute both to the patients' altered perception of reality and the formation of some delusions as well as to their social cognition deficits. Here, we addressed this issue with a protocol of auditory hysteresis, a direct measure of sensory persistence, on a population of stabilized antipsychotic-treated schizophrenia patients and a sample of control subjects. Trials consisted of emotional signals (i.e., screams) and neutral signals (i.e., spectrally-rotated versions of the emotional stimuli) progressively emerging from white noise - Ascending Sequences - or progressively fading away in white noise - Descending Sequences. Results showed that patients presented significantly stronger hysteresis effects than control subjects, as evidenced by a higher rate of perceptual reports in Descending Sequences. The present study thus provides direct evidence of perceptual inflexibility in schizophrenia.

Experiences of activity and causality in schizophrenia: when predictive deficits lead to a retrospective over-binding.

In this paper I discuss an intriguing and relatively little studied symptomatic expression of schizophrenia known as experiences of activity in which patients form the delusion that they can control some external events by the sole means of their mind. I argue that experiences of activity result from patients being prone to aberrantly infer causal relations between unrelated events in a retrospective way owing to widespread predictive deficits. Moreover, I suggest that such deficits may, in addition, lead to an aberrant intentional binding effect i.e., the subjective compression of the temporal interval between an intentional action and its external effects (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). In particular, it might be that patient's thoughts are bound to the external events they aimed to control producing, arguably, a temporal contiguity between these two components. Such temporal contiguity would reinforce or sustain the (causal) feeling that the patient mind is directly causally efficient.

Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership and context-integration.

We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a failure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in particular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity of consciousness, manifested by incoherent subjective experiences is a general phenomenal characteristic of schizophrenia. This loss of coherence has been hypothesized to reflect a generalized deficit of contextual information integration not conveyed by, but related to, a target event. This deficit is manifested across many cognitive domains. We argue that it is also manifested in the process of thinking itself, resulting in causally decontextualized thoughts that are experienced as inserted thoughts.