Chronic disease, prevention policy, and the future of public health and primary care.

Globally, chronic disease and conditions such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease, depression and cancer are the leading causes of morbidity and mortality. Why, then, are public health efforts and programs aimed at preventing chronic disease so difficult to implement and maintain? Also, why is primary care--the key medical specialty for helping persons with chronic disease manage their illnesses--in decline? Public health suffers from its often being socially controversial, personally intrusive, irritating to many powerful corporate interests, and structurally designed to be largely invisible and, as a result, taken for granted. Primary care struggles from low reimbursements, relative to specialists, excessive paperwork and time demands that are unattractive to medical students. Our paper concludes with a discussion of why the need for more aggressive public health and redesigned primary care is great, will grow substantially in the near future, and yet will continue to struggle with funding and public popularity.

Beyond capitation: how new payment experiments seek to find the 'sweet spot' in amount of risk providers and payers bear.

A key issue in the decades-long struggle over US health care spending is how to distribute liability for expenses across all market participants, from insurers to providers. The rise and abandonment in the 1990s of capitation payments-lump-sum, per person payments to health care providers to provide all care for a specified individual or group-offers a stark example of how difficult it is for providers to assume meaningful financial responsibility for patient care. This article chronicles the expansion and decline of the capitation model in the 1990s. We offer lessons learned and assess the extent to which these lessons have been applied in the development of contemporary forms of provider cost sharing, particularly accountable care organizations, which in effect constitute a search for the "sweet spot," or appropriate place on a spectrum, between providers and payers with respect to the degree of risk they absorb.

Chronic disease and the shifting focus of public health: is prevention still a political lightweight?

Why is it so politically difficult to obtain government investment in public health initiatives that are aimed at addressing chronic disease? This article examines the structural disadvantage faced by those who advocate for public health policies and practices to reduce chronic disease related to people's unhealthy lifestyles and physical environments. It identifies common features that make it difficult to establish and maintain initiatives to prevent or reduce costly illness and physical suffering: (1) public health benefits are generally dispersed and delayed; (2) benefactors of public health are generally unknown and taken for granted; (3) the costs of many public health initiatives are concentrated and generate opposition from those who would pay them; and (4) public health often clashes with moral values or social norms. The article concludes by discussing the importance of a new paradigm, "health in all policies," that targets the enormous health and economic burdens associated with chronic conditions and asserts a need for new policies, practices, and participation beyond the confines of traditional public health agencies and services.

Moving (realistically) from volume-based to value-based health care payment in the USA: starting with medicare payment policy.

Employers and policy-makers in the USA are desperate to slow the rate at which health expenditures grow. Changing how most health care providers are reimbursed will be necessary to achieve this. Although both politically and practically daunting, massive restructuring or replacement of fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement is what is most required. As the dominant reimbursement model in the USA, FFS payment to individual providers strongly encourages and financially rewards the quantity of care provided, regardless of its quality or necessity. Providing high quality, lower cost care with fewer complications and hospital re-admissions can even financial penalize providers. Unfortunately, physicians and other health providers respond rationally to existing financial incentives (translation: they do what they get paid to do and generally try to, or have to, minimize those activities and services for which they are not paid). Altering this reality and fostering the expansion of exemplary delivery models-such as the Mayo Clinic or Geisinger Health System-requires change in how providers behave. And changing behavior often starts with adjusting how providers are paid. Medicare is the programme and payer most capable of using payment reform to catalyze delivery system reform.

Public health and primary care: struggling to "win friends and influence people".

Why are the goals of public health and primary care less politically popular and financially supported than those of curative medicine? A major part of the answer to this question lies in the fact that humans often worry wrongly by assessing risk poorly. This reality is a significant obstacle to the adequate promotion of and investment in public health, primary care, and prevention. Also, public health's tendency to infringe on personal privacy-as well as to call for difficult behavioral change-often sparks intense controversy and interest group opposition that discourage broader political support. Finally, in contrast to curative medicine, both the cost-benefit structure of public health (costs now, benefits later) and the way in which the profession operates make it largely invisible to and, thus, underappreciated by the general public. When curative medicine works well, most everybody notices. When public health and primary care work well, virtually nobody notices.

ADHD and the rise in stimulant use among children.

Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) holds the distinction of being the most extensively studied pediatric mental disorder and one of the most controversial, in part because it is also the most commonly diagnosed mental disorder among minors. Currently, almost 8% of youth aged 4 to 17 years have a diagnosis of ADHD, and approximately 4.5% both have the diagnosis and are using a stimulant (methylphenidate or amphetamine) as treatment for the disorder. Yet a diagnosis of ADHD is not simply a private medical finding; it carries with it a host of policy ramifications. The enduring controversy over ADHD in the public arena therefore reflects the discomfort over what happens when science is translated into policies and rules that govern how children will be treated medically, educationally, and legally. This article (1) summarizes the existing knowledge of ADHD, (2) provides the relevant history and trends, (3) explains the controversy, (4) discusses what is and is not unique about ADHD and stimulant pharmacotherapy, (5) outlines future directions of research, and (6) concludes with a brief analysis of how two North Carolina counties have established community protocols that have improved the screening, treatment, and societal consensus over ADHD and stimulants.

The origins, development, and passage of Medicare's revolutionary prospective payment system.

This article explains the origins, development, and passage of the single most influential postwar innovation in medical financing: Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS). Inexorably rising medical inflation and deep economic deterioration forced policymakers in the late 1970s to pursue radical reform of Medicare to keep the program from insolvency. Congress and the Reagan administration eventually turned to the one alternative reimbursement system that analysts and academics had studied more than any other and had even tested with apparent success in New Jersey: prospective payment with diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Rather than simply reimbursing hospitals whatever costs they charged to treat Medicare patients, the new model paid hospitals a predetermined, set rate based on the patient's diagnosis. The most significant change in health policy since Medicare and Medicaid's passage in 1965 went virtually unnoticed by the general public. Nevertheless, the change was nothing short of revolutionary. For the first time, the federal government gained the upper hand in its financial relationship with the hospital industry. Medicare's new prospective payment system with DRGs triggered a shift in the balance of political and economic power between the providers of medical care (hospitals and physicians) and those who paid for it--power that providers had successfully accumulated for more than half a century.

Suffer the restless children: the evolution of ADHD and paediatric stimulant use, 1900-80.

This article traces the historical evolution of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and the controversial use of stimulants as a treatment for children diagnosed with the disorder in North America. While the children in question have exhibited similar behaviour over the last century, the diagnostic labels used to identify them have changed due largely to cultural, medical and scientific changes and discoveries. For decades, children's treatment with psychotropic drugs was sufficiently controversial that pharmaceutical companies would not finance research in the area. The only substantial source of research funding for paediatric psychopharmacology in the USA from the 1950s to the 1970s was the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). In 1970, the first in a long-running series of controversies erupted over children's treatment with stimulants.

Pursuing cost containment in a pluralistic payer environment: from the aftermath of Clinton's failure at health care reform to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.

Following a decade in which Medicare operated as the leading 'change agent' within the US health care system, the private sector rose to the fore in the mid 1990s. The failure of President Clinton's attempt at comprehensive, public sector-led reform left managed care as the solution for cost control. And for a period it worked, largely because managed care organizations were able to both squeeze payments to selective networks of medical providers and significantly reduce inpatient hospital stays. There was a lot of 'fat' in the nation's convoluted health care system that could be (and was) eliminated through competitive negotiations between medical providers and insurers, employers, or managed care organizations. One of our primary arguments in this article is that managed care operated partly as a systematic suppression of price discrimination or differential pricing (often referred to as 'cost shifting'), as managed care organizations qua purchasing agents prevented hospitals and physicians from summarily raising prices to private payers to meet their financial requirements. Over time, however, managed care fell victim to inflated expectations, its own initial success, and larger fiscal forces. During this same period, Republicans and Democrats struggled to reach a consensus over the future direction of Medicare. Their disagreements contributed to the impasse over budget policy in 1995 and the infamous partial federal government shutdown. After President Clinton's reelection in 1996, partisan disagreements over Medicare dissipated. And, in 1997, Congress and the president passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which emerged as a massive piece of patchwork legislation that sought to balance the federal budget, rein in Medicare spending, and increase the number of the programme's beneficiaries in private health plans.

DSM-III and the revolution in the classification of mental illness.

A revolution occurred within the psychiatric profession in the early 1980s that rapidly transformed the theory and practice of mental health in the United States. In a very short period of time, mental illnesses were transformed from broad, etiologically defined entities that were continuous with normality to symptom-based, categorical diseases. The third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) was responsible for this change. The paradigm shift in mental health diagnosis in the DSM-III was neither a product of growing scientific knowledge nor of increasing medicalization. Instead, its symptom-based diagnoses reflect a growing standardization of psychiatric diagnoses. This standardization was the product of many factors, including: (1) professional politics within the mental health community, (2) increased government involvement in mental health research and policymaking, (3) mounting pressure on psychiatrists from health insurers to demonstrate the effectiveness of their practices, and (4) the necessity of pharmaceutical companies to market their products to treat specific diseases. This article endeavors to explain the origins of DSM-III, the political struggles that generated it, and its long-term consequences for clinical diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders in the United States.

Medicare and America's healthcare system in transition: from the death of managed care to the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and beyond.

This Article traces the transition--in Medicare, specifically, and in the American healthcare system, generally--from the aftermath of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. During this time, restrictive managed care died under an onslaught of resurgent cost pressures, legislative and legal attacks, and a vehement physician and consumer backlash. The subsequent reversion to more generous (and more expensive) health plans coincided with a recession in 2001 to trigger a return to rapidly escalating healthcare spending and yet another in the Nation's series of healthcare crises. Current trends suggest that future policymakers will have no choice but to confront the consequences of rapidly rising rates of healthcare spending.

An analysis of the significant variation in psychostimulant use across the U.S.

OBJECTIVE: To provide a national profile of the area variation in per-capita psychostimulant consumption in the U.S. METHODS: We separated 3030 U.S. counties into two categories of 'low' and 'high' per-capita use of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) drugs (based on data from the Drug Enforcement Administration), and then analyzed them on the basis of their socio-demographic, economic, educational and medical characteristics. RESULTS: We found significant differences and similarities in the profile of counties in the U.S. that are above and below the national median rate of per-capita psychostimulant use (defined as g/per 100K population). Compared to counties below the median level, counties above the median level have: significantly greater population, higher per-capita income, lower unemployment rates, greater HMO penetration, more physicians per capita, a higher ratio of young-to-old physicians and a slightly higher students-to-teacher ratio. CONCLUSIONS: Our analysis of the DEA's ARCOS data shows that most of the significant variables correlated with 'higher' per-capita use of ADHD drugs serve as a proxy for county affluence. To provide a more complex, multivariate analysis of the area variation in psychostimulant use across the U.S.-which is the logical next step-requires obtaining price data to match the DEA's quantity data.

Medicare payment policy and the controversy over hospital cost shifting.

This article examines (i) the background and debate over cost shifting; (ii) hospitals as business institutions that often shift the financial responsibility for their costs in the form of differential pricing; and (iii) how the cost-shifting debate affects and is affected by Medicare. The aim is to gain a better understanding of how changes in reimbursement by large government health insurance programmes affect hospital behaviour. The article argues that the controversy over cost shifting is becoming an increasingly important issue for hospitals in the US and their ability (or willingness) to provide uncompensated charity care. The issue has also become very important for workers and their dependants. This is because workers have shouldered the largest portion of the dramatic growth in healthcare costs that have occurred in the US in recent years, due in large part to increased cost shifting (or 'sharing of financial responsibility') from their employers.

Medicare payment policy: does cost shifting matter?

We examine cost shifting within the context of Medicare payment policy. We briefly review economic theory and available data and discuss the importance of cost shifting for policy. Then we present four central findings on cost shifting based on the views of former high-level policymakers. First, Medicare's early (pre-prospective) payment policy was a boon to hospitals. Second, Medicare payment policy is a "top-down" affair, driven by budgetary and special-interest politics. Third, federal policymakers may not consciously consider cost shifting, but state policymakers do. Fourth, Medicare payment policy requires constant adjustment, but we are "getting it right" most of the time.