Pirfenidone affects human cardiac fibroblast proliferation and cell cycle activity in 2D cultures and engineered connective tissues.

The anti-fibrotic drug pirfenidone (PFD) is currently in clinical testing for the treatment of heart failure with preserved ejection fraction; however, its effects on human cardiac cells have not been fully investigated. Therefore, we aimed to characterize the impact of PFD on human cardiac fibroblasts (CF) in 2D culture as well as in 3D-engineered connective tissues (ECT). We analyzed proliferation by automated cell counting and changes in signaling by immunoblotting. We generated ECT with different geometries to modify the cellular phenotype and investigated the effects of PFD on cell number and viability as well as on cell cycle activity. We further studied its effect on ECT compaction, contraction, stiffening, and strain resistance by ECT imaging, pole deflection analysis, and ultimate tensile testing. Our data demonstrate that PFD inhibits human CF proliferation in a concentration-dependent manner with an IC50 of 0.43 mg/ml and its anti-mitogenic effect was further corroborated by an inhibition of MEK1/2, ERK1/2, and riboprotein S6 (rpS6) phosphorylation. In ECT, a lower cell cycle activity was found in PFD-treated ECT and fewer cells resided in these ECT after 5 days of culture compared to the control. Moreover, ECT compaction as well as ECT contraction was impaired. Consequently, biomechanical analyses demonstrated that PFD reduced the stiffness of ECT. Taken together, our data demonstrate that the anti-fibrotic action of PFD on human CF is based on its anti-mitogenic effect in 2D cultures and ECT.

The neural circuitry of affect-induced distortions of trust.

Aversive affect is likely a key source of irrational human decision-making, but still, little is known about the neural circuitry underlying emotion-cognition interactions during social behavior. We induced incidental aversive affect via prolonged periods of threat of shock, while 41 healthy participants made investment decisions concerning another person or a lottery. Negative affect reduced trust, suppressed trust-specific activity in the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and reduced functional connectivity between the TPJ and emotion-related regions such as the amygdala. The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) seems to play a key role in mediating the impact of affect on behavior: Functional connectivity of this brain area with left TPJ was associated with trust in the absence of negative affect, but aversive affect disrupted this association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and behavioral trust. Our findings may be useful for a better understanding of the neural circuitry of affective distortions in healthy and pathological populations.

Anticipatory anxiety disrupts neural valuation during risky choice.

Incidental negative emotions unrelated to the current task, such as background anxiety, can strongly influence decisions. This is most evident in psychiatric disorders associated with generalized emotional disturbances. However, the neural mechanisms by which incidental emotions may affect choices remain poorly understood. Here we study the effects of incidental anxiety on human risky decision making, focusing on both behavioral preferences and their underlying neural processes. Although observable choices remained stable across affective contexts with high and low incidental anxiety, we found a clear change in neural valuation signals: during high incidental anxiety, activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum showed a marked reduction in (1) neural coding of the expected subjective value (ESV) of risky options, (2) prediction of observed choices, (3) functional coupling with other areas of the valuation system, and (4) baseline activity. At the same time, activity in the anterior insula showed an increase in coding the negative ESV of risky lotteries, and this neural activity predicted whether the risky lotteries would be rejected. This pattern of results suggests that incidental anxiety can shift the focus of neural valuation from possible positive consequences to anticipated negative consequences of choice options. Moreover, our findings show that these changes in neural value coding can occur in the absence of changes in overt behavior. This suggest a possible pathway by which background anxiety may lead to the development of chronic reward desensitization and a maladaptive focus on negative cognitions, as prevalent in affective and anxiety disorders.

The misdiagnosis of bipolar disorder as a psychotic disorder: some of its causes and their influence on therapy.

OBJECTIVES: Looking at chart records bipolar disorder is often misdiagnosed as a psychotic disorder but no study has ever systematically looked into the reasons. One reason for misdiagnoses could be that clinicians use heuristics like the prototype approach in routine practice instead of strictly adhering to the diagnostic criteria. Using an experimental approach we investigated if the use of heuristics can explain when a diagnosis of psychotic disorder is given instead of bipolar disorder. We systematically varied information about the presence or absence of specific symptoms, i.e. hallucinations and decreased need for sleep during a manic episode. METHODS: Experimentally varied case vignettes were randomly sent to psychiatrists in Southern Germany. The four versions of the case vignette all described the same person in a manic state and differed only in two aspects: the presence or absence of auditory hallucinations and of decreased need for sleep. The psychiatrists were asked to make a diagnosis, to rate their confidence in their diagnosis, and to recommend treatments. RESULTS: Almost half of the 142 psychiatrists (45%) did not diagnose bipolar disorder. Mentioning hallucinations decreased the likelihood of diagnosing bipolar disorder. The information about decreased need for sleep only affected the diagnosis significantly, if schizoaffective disorder was considered a bipolar disorder. CONCLUSIONS: Our results suggest that clinicians indeed use heuristics when making diagnostic decisions instead of strictly adhering to diagnostic criteria. More research is needed to better understand diagnostic decision making, especially under real life settings, and this might also be of interest when revising diagnostic manuals such as DSM.